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The purpose of this study is to determine why the enhanced prison industries 
(PIE) model has prospered for more than 10 years in South Carolina, when in other 
states it has struggled to survive—or even been abolished.  A history of prison 
industries in the United States will provide context for a review of legal, economic, 
and political issues affecting the PIE program in South Carolina and elsewhere.  The 
leadership style of the state’s director of prison industries (under whose tenure the 
PIE model has developed and flourished) will be described.  Additionally, a cross-
jurisdictional comparison of the PIE programs in five other states will be presented, to 
facilitate future research initiatives, and to provide policymakers and correctional 
administrators with preliminary guidance for development or improvement of PIE 
initiatives.  In this regard, a conceptual model of enhanced prison industries will be 
developed and described.  Finally, policy and program recommendations will be 
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 Originally, my dissertation was to be a search for the “ideal” American prison.  
It was my intention to research and describe key components essential to establishing 
and identifying a prison “ideal.”  While I was not convinced that such a prison 
currently existed, I believed that a number of prisons might be identified where 
research-based programming revealed success measured in terms of reduced 
recidivism and perhaps even cost effectiveness. 
 Some elements I identified to make up an ideal prison were prison industries, 
drug treatment, vocational training and education.  My dissertation committee, 
however, asked me to narrow my focus to one element, or component, of a successful 
prison. 
 At least two members of my committee knew that my focus for many years 
had been on identifying effective prison-based drug treatment programs for offenders 
with a history of substance abuse.  Indeed, the choice of narrowing my focus to 
prison-based drug treatment seemed compelling, certainly the most expedient path 
toward completing my dissertation. 
 However, in my reviews of successful prison-based drug treatment programs, 
I had noticed that a common Achilles heel for inmates who graduated such programs 
was difficulty in finding gainful employment.  Recent research (Knight et al., 1999; 
Martin, et al., 1999; Wexler, et al., 1999) revealed, however, that inmate drug 
treatment graduates who received assistance in finding post-prison employment were 
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more likely to remain both drug- and crime-free than inmates who did not receive 
such assistance. 
 For a long time, I had observed that inmate employment, like substance abuse 
treatment, appeared to be associated with reduced recidivism.  It seemed unlikely to 
me, however, that an offender—even a gainfully employed offender with a high-
paying job—could sustain a crime-free lifestyle in the post-prison world, if he or she 
had an untreated history of substance abuse.  Just as treatment alone was not 
sufficient for treatment graduates who needed jobs, employment alone might not be 
sufficient for an inmate who needed treatment for substance abuse. 
   Substance abuse has been called a primary (as opposed to secondary) 
problem.  In other words, until and unless the problem of substance abuse is 
successfully addressed, other rehabilitative measures are likely to be ineffective.  In 
short, an ex-offender with a history of drug abuse is likely to relapse to drug use—no 
matter how splendid his or her education, training or job.  Indeed, a higher salary 
might facilitate the purchase of more or “better” drugs.  The research of the past few 
decades, however, while not complete, has made important inroads into the issues 
related to treatment of substance-abusing inmates.  I did not feel that I had much to 
contribute in my dissertation, other than adding to the already considerable extant 
research findings in the area. 
Prison industries, on the other hand, seemed ripe for examination.  The 
research on prison industries was not as developed, and could hardly be described as 
“considerable.”  Besides, from a personal perspective, it seemed to me that I had 
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more room to grow in pursuing what for me was “the unknown”—in short, I wanted 
to attempt to develop a modest expertise in another area. 
 For these reasons, I chose to narrow the focus of my dissertation to prison 
industries.  I wanted to learn more about a crucial ingredient for post-prison success.  
Employment is fundamental to the post-prison lives of most offenders, just as a 
crime-free environment is fundamental to the lives of citizens.  Could there be a link 
between the two? 
 The search for the answer has been long and tedious.  Many times I felt 
discouraged by the enormity of the goal I had set for myself.  How much easier (and 
faster!) it might have been, had I stayed with the issues associated with drug 
treatment— issues that I knew well.  But my topic, enhanced prison industries (better 
known by its acronym PIE), did not disappoint.  At the end of my journey, I remained 
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Introduction and Statement of the Problem 
 
 
For decades, criminal justice researchers have examined the issue of why 
some offenders succeed following release from prison, and others don’t.  
Research demonstrates that jobs are important.  It follows that prison industries 
and training can facilitate the likelihood of post-prison employment for inmates.  
The enhanced prison industries (PIE) program is a contemporary model shown to 
be associated with reducing recidivism and increasing post-release employment.  
But not all PIE programs are thriving.  Indeed, at least one such initiative has 
been terminated.  The question of why one such program has prospered during 
the past decade, while others have struggled to survive is the topic of this study.  
For those committed to reducing recidivism, the answer is crucial. 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine why the enhanced prison industries 
(PIE) model has prospered for more than 10 years in South Carolina, when in other states 
it has struggled to survive—or even been abolished.  A history of prison industries in the 
United States will provide context for a review of legal, economic, and political issues 
affecting the PIE program in South Carolina and elsewhere. 
As a long-time student of “what works” in prison treatment programs, my 
objective is to discern “what works” in developing a robust prison industries program.  In 
correctional literature, the issues of “what works” have been associated with reductions in 
recidivism.  In drug treatment literature, “what works” has been associated with 
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reductions in recidivism and drug use.  It seems logical, therefore, to explore the question 
of what works in prison industries, and whether the evidence demonstrates persuasively 
that prison industries are indeed associated with reductions in recidivism and increases in 
the post-release employment of prison industries participants.  In fact, there is a growing 
and persuasive body of such evidence, although until recently (2006) there has been little 
focus on following up Prison Industries Enhancement Certification Project (PIECP) 
participants.  Those who are interested in “what works” may want to know more—
whether, for example, the PIE model compares favorably to traditional and “service” 
prison industries. 
Although the primary purpose of this study is to discover how and why the PIE 
model prospered in South Carolina, collateral and relevant issues are numerous in any 
discussion of the problems associated with prison industries. What are the goals of 
imprisonment?  What are the goals of prison industries?  Are prison industries cost 
effective, and if so, how?  A consideration of recent U.S. corrections will provide context 
for framing the issues of offender employment and recidivism, and a brief review of the 
characteristics of effective treatment for offenders will be provided.  Also, the costs and 
benefits of prison industries programming will be briefly considered. 
What Are the Goals of Imprisonment? 
 In order to consider the goals of prison industries, the observer may benefit by 
considering the goals of imprisonment.  It is unlikely that prison industries can prosper in 
an environment with conflicting goals.  As a component of corrections, industries must 
be considered, implemented and developed in that context; hence, a brief review of the 
goals of imprisonment may sharpen our focus on the goals of prison industries. 
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For decades, controversy and debate have been generated by a lack of consensus 
about the appropriate goals of imprisonment.  Disagreement among scholars and those 
who manage prisoners—as well as those who devise criminal policy—continues to this 
day.  Is the purpose of imprisonment meant to be punishment?  Rehabilitation?  
Incapacitation?  Deterrence?  Or retribution?   Researchers (Sherman et al., 1997) at the 
University of Maryland maintain that the appropriate goals of imprisonment should be 
crime prevention.  In a report to Congress, these researchers rendered a rationale that 
outlined research findings related to leading philosophical and theoretical models of 
punishment, incapacitation, rehabilitation, deterrence, etc.  As a long-time proponent of 
correctional treatment, I was impressed with their findings.  Effective rehabilitation and 
treatment, it seemed to me, should lead to reductions in criminal behavior, and hence, to 
crime prevention. 
 In the mid-70s, two decades earlier, when the “Nothing works (in correctional 
treatment)” philosophy reached its peak, I observed that the report by Lipton, Martinson 
and Wilks (Lipton et al., 1975)—although calling attention to the shortcomings and 
effectiveness of many then-current correctional treatment programs—still found a few 
that appeared to be effective.  Why not focus on those few that did work?  What about 
improving and replicating them?  The treatment research of the next 20 years did exactly 
that. 
 Few would disagree that reducing crime is one appropriate goal of corrections, 
and by implication, correctional treatment programs.  If retribution renders increasingly 
hardened offenders, have we not lost sight of our objective?  A novice psychologist will 
predict negative outcomes for most human subjects locked in a small space under harsh 
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conditions for prolonged periods of time.  Social learning theory predicts that frequent or 
long-term association with criminal peers will result in an increase in criminal behavior.  
Similarly, frequent or long-term association with positive peers is likely to result in a 
decrease in criminal behavior.  Is it not true that to an extent, prisons that offer 
rehabilitation programs (e.g., drug treatment, prison industries) to offenders are still 
somewhat responsive to incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution principles?  After all, 
the simple taking of freedom is retributive and incapacitative as well.  Deterrence 
principles, also, may be realized. 
What Are the Goals of Prison Industries? 
 Given the historical and controversial backdrop of prison and its purpose, it may 
not seem surprising that controversy also has long surrounded the topic of inmate labor 
and/or prison industries.  And—just as there are many different prison models—there are 
more than a few contrasting models of prison industries.  For this study, I will focus on 
three contemporary models: traditional, service, and private sector prison industries. 
 Although many experts would say—and researchers have demonstrated—that 
there are profound links between unemployment, poverty and crime, the prison system in 
this country struggles to justify the merits of  employing inmates and paying them 
minimum wage for their work.  The reasons for this are numerous and complex, and are 
part of this study.  Why—when once U.S. prison leaders sought to make prisons pay for 
themselves through prison programming—did this country’s prison system move from 
self-supporting to taxpayer-supported?  Although prison labor was originally seen as a 
means of rehabilitating criminals, that view for awhile was supplanted by a parallel view: 
inmates should pay for their own maintenance.  The prison literature reveals that inmate 
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labor was fraught with controversy from the beginning. This study will review the history 
and the controversy surrounding prison labor and industries. 
Recent U.S. Correctional Industries Background 
 The “get tough on crime” trend of the 1980s resulted in the incarceration of ever-
escalating numbers of offenders (a European phenomenon as well).  A concomitant 
escalation in prison building resulted in record-breaking expenditures to maintain these 
prisons and their residents.  In many instances, taxes that once flowed to education and 
school-building were re-directed to fund prisons.  Justice professionals argued the merits 
of supplying rehabilitation and even educational services to inmates.  Critics maintained 
that prison treatment was too costly, often ineffective, and should be curtailed.  Emphasis 
should be placed on security, not programming, they said.  Those who sought to provide 
services or treatment to offenders were called “soft on crime.”  Elections were won or 
lost, depending on political platforms that often highlighted crime and justice issues (e.g., 
the Bush/Dukakis presidential race of 1988).  Among the programs criticized were 
correctional industries, especially those that paid inmates for work that was seen as taking 
jobs from law-abiding citizens.  The entrepreneurial principles upon which this country 
rests were seen as not applying to offenders.  Certainly, competition—hailed by many as 
part of the American “spirit”—was seen as threatening if correctional industries appeared 
to complete with local industry. 
Offender Employment and Recidivism 
 Critics of the criminal justice system demand to know the causes of recidivism.  
Why, they ask, does an inmate who has been locked up for many years often revert to 
criminal behavior following release from prison?  Why hasn’t s/he “learned a lesson?”  
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Proponents of capital punishment sometimes justify their views with another question: 
why, for example, should taxes support convicted murderers and felons?  The resentment 
towards offenders in this regard might seem ironic, since the prison system was designed 
by “experts,” not prisoners.  Prisons are the product of political and economic influences, 
scholarly research and debate.  Occasionally, though not always, researchers may arrive 
at a kind of consensus.  However, for the most part, consensus is rarely achieved, as we 
shall see. 
 The links between prisoner post-release employment and recidivism have been 
studied (Maguire et al., 1988; Flanagan, et al., 1989; Saylor and Gaes, 1992, 1996; 
MacKenzie and Hickman, 1998; Smith et al., 2006) with mixed findings.  Recent 
evidence, however, suggests that inmates who participate in prison industries are more 
likely to find jobs and to remain crime-free following release from prison.  Saylor and 
Gaes (1992, 1996) reported that inmates who participated in prison industries had lower 
rates of recidivism.  The differences were small but significant.  Other studies have 
reported larger effects (Smith, et al., 2006).  If these studies are correct, one might ask 
how these effects might be improved.  Even more relevant, one might ask how effective 
prison industries are implemented in the first place, and why prison industries with 
proven track records aren’t replicated more frequently. 
Central Assumption 
 My central assumption is that an ideal prison industries program will be cost-
effective and reduce recidivism for its participants.  All prison industries programs are 
not created equal; I will attempt to identify and describe prison industries programs in 
more than one category. 
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In framing this study, three things seem  essential: first, the study should focus on 
current prison industries models, with historical background information to facilitate 
understanding of economic, legal and political issues that influence their development; 
second, the study should include at least one traditional prison industries, a service prison 
industries model, and a private sector/prison industries enhancement (PIE) project model; 
and third, the study should be comparative and exploratory.  The advantages and 
disadvantages of each model will be compared, along with the political and economic 
milieu that spawned their development. 
Study Issues 
 In 1979, when Congress passed enabling legislation for state departments of 
corrections to partner with the private sector in what became known as the Prison 
Industries Enhancement Certification Project, observers of prison industries in the U.S. 
might have anticipated a seismic shift in possibilities for correctional industry 
participants and their advocates.  Similarly, some might have expected substantial interest 
in developing PIE programs in state prison systems, flowing from correctional directors 
and prison administrators.  Optimists might have thought labor and business had signaled 
their willingness to cooperate in the development of PIE programs—or, at a minimum, to 
withhold objection to PIE development.  How else had the legislation passed?  The 
purpose of the legislation (USC 1761) was to enable state prison industries to partner 
with the private sector.  Inmate employees would be paid wages in line with comparable 
industries in the area.  But as 2005 drew to its close, only 4,354 inmate participants were 
working in PIE programs across the country (National Correctional Industries 
Association [NCIA] Directory, 2005).  The total correctional population was 1,604,737, 
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of which 686,235 inmates were eligible for employment.  This meant that less than 1% 
(or .6 percent) of inmates eligible to work were employed in a PIE program. 
 Why hasn’t the PIE model prospered nationally?  Why didn’t prison industries 
stakeholders in the United States exhibit enthusiastic endorsement of PIE?  Who could 
resist the concept of inmates being paid wages comparable to those paid in individual 
localities, when such wages were to be used to pay room and board during incarceration, 
to compensate victims, to pay taxes, to pay child support, and to save for release from 
prison?  To some it appeared that the PIE model held enormous promise, including the 
ability to become the gold standard of prison industries. 
 The PIE program has the extraordinary potential to pay for itself—not only in 
terms of post-release reductions in recidivism and unemployment, and the concomitant 
costs of both—but in terms of pre-release cost reductions made possible by a program 
that virtually pays for itself. 
Restating the Problem 
 The problem of contemporary prison industries can be framed as a question: Why, 
in consideration of the promise that the PIE model appears to hold—to reduce recidivism 
and increase post-release employment—has it struggled to survive in a correctional 
environment plagued by escalating costs and the search to reduce recidivism? 
 When the PIE certification program was established in 1979, the Congressional 
intent was to facilitate collaboration between corrections and the private sector, and to 
explore the possibility that private sector prison industries might facilitate development 
of a self-supporting segment of corrections. 
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 Recent barriers to correctional funding may eventually prove to hold a key to 
loosening the resistance the PIE program has encountered through the years, much of 
which will be reviewed in this study.  Budgetary shortfalls and unanticipated national 
crises (e.g., 9-11 and hurricane Katrina) have necessitated increased Congressional 
funding, and corrections expenditures have moved down the ladder of priorities in the 
view of both the public and policymakers.  These kinds of challenges have led to a 
renewed search for other means of funding for existing correctional programs.  The result 
has been a new interest in self-sustaining programs.  Observers—and attendees at recent 
National Correctional Industries Association conferences—may note a gradually 
increasing interest in the PIE program among the states.  However, well before the recent 
growth of national interest in PIE, South Carolina was in the vanguard of those states 
implementing the PIE program with more than modest success. 
Exploratory Case Study 
 This is an exploratory case study of the implementation and development of 
prison industries in one state, South Carolina, with an emphasis on the PIE model of 
prison industries.  John DiIulio has written: 
Exploratory studies do not provide settled answers.  They are a beginning where 
none has been made.  Exploratory research is appropriate at the earliest stages of 
our knowledge, when we do  not know what variables are important, how they 
relate one to the other, or how (if at all) they can be measured.  The explorer has 
to get out into the field, talk to people, and observe things first-hand. 
Where DiIulio’s goal in his book Governing Prisons: A Comparative Study of 
Correctional Management, was to open up the study of prison management, the goal of 
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this study is to frame and open up the study of prison industries, particularly enhanced 
prison industries (the PIE model). 
 A case study is most likely to be responsive to questions of “how” or “why.”  
Whereas many case studies require the researcher to develop at least one proposition, the 
exploratory case study is often appropriately explained by its purpose (Yin, 1994).  This 
study will seek to identify legal, political and economic factors that may have contributed 
to the successful implementation and development of South Carolina’s PIE program. 
Why South Carolina? 
 I chose the state of South Carolina because of the vigor of its PIE program, as 
well as its other prison industries.  Additionally, there was a general consensus among 
prison industries professionals that the state presented a broad array of industries and 
prison industry types. 
 To strengthen my rationale for selecting South Carolina prison industries as my 
“laboratory,” I have developed a graph that shows the progress (in terms of program size) 
of the ten largest PIE programs during the relevant decade.  The graph will show that 
while some state’s PIE programs grew slowly and gradually, and others shrank or 
disappeared, South Carolina’s PIE program maintained a steady growth.  Separate graphs 
will also demonstrate that South Carolina’s PIE program has ranked first among the 
southern states in terms of growth and size.  The graphs and charts will be a springboard 
for identifying some of the catalysts and impediments to implementation of the PIE 
model.  They will also provide a guide for discussion—not only of what the problems 
associated with enhanced prison industries have been and continue to be—but for how 
South Carolina has dealt with similar problems.  After identifying key factors affecting 
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the implementation and development of prison industries in the state, I will explore the 
leadership style, skills and philosophy of the state’s prison industries director, under 
whose tenure the program has developed and flourished. 
 I have gathered reports, documents, and data from the South Carolina Department 
of Corrections (SCDC) and from its Division of Prison Industries; in addition, I have 
obtained relevant data from five other states.  My study includes interviews with state and 
national prison industries stakeholders, site visits, and personal observation (List of 
Interviewees in Appendix A). 
This study will seek to show how and why the state of South Carolina became 
home to the largest PIE program in the country during the decade 1996 – 2005.  
Specifically, I will explore the prosperity of the PIE model in the state, its early history, 
its implementation and development, and (comparatively speaking) rapid growth.  I will 
also describe the state’s traditional and service prison industries.  Additionally, a cross-
jurisdictional comparison of PIE programs in five other states will be presented to 
facilitate future research initiatives, and to provide policy makers and correctional 
administrators with preliminary guidance for development or improvement of PIE 
initiatives.  A conceptual model of enhanced prison industries will be developed and 
described. 
 One research question for this study will be: How did South Carolina’s prison 
industries become a leader in development of enhanced prison industries in the U.S.?  
How were challenges met and overcome? 
 A review of relevant South Carolina statutes will be conducted, as well as 
interviews with key administrators and knowledgeable others.  The economic context in 
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which the state’s PIE development occurred will be described, along with the state’s 
political environmental fluctuations over a period of 27 years.  When other factors or 
influences are noted, these may be explored as well.   
Other Study Issues 
 At the beginning of the new millennium, virtually all U.S. state correctional 
systems had established traditional prison industries models.  As a result of the multitude 
of problems, criticisms and challenges associated with such programs, other models have 
evolved.  In particular, service prison industries and enhanced prison industries appear to 
be the “wave of the future.”  The common ground shared by the two models is their 
ability to overcome legal obstacles to profit-making, and to circumvent or replace laws 
that were designed to obstruct prison industries’ competition with the private sector.  The 
two models are different, however, in two important ways.  In the first instance, Congress 
intended to facilitate collaboration between correctional industries and the private sector 
with the passage of USC 1761, which enabled the PIE initiative.  On the other hand, so-
called “service industries” appear to have evolved from the ground up, more profitable 
than traditional industries for both inmates and the state, though less profitable than PIE. 
 This study will seek to identify distinguishing characteristics of prison industries 
models, and I will report research findings.  Few prison programs can be easily matched 
or compared.  Recidivism measures, for example, cannot be readily interpreted and 
compared when regional program and individual inmate characteristics can’t be matched.  
Even two apparently identical programs—in terms of size, services, security levels, etc. 
can be very different in terms of regional differences, or legal criteria that lead to 
incarceration.  The definition of felon—or the length of prison sentences for specific 
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crimes—can very substantially between states.  Such differences ultimately contribute to 
the difficulty in comparing prison programs that may appear, on the surface, to be almost 
identical. 
 For this study, I attempted to locate virtually all relevant correctional industries 
literature and research.  The work of one of my dissertation committee members, Doris 
MacKenzie, was particularly helpful.  Dr. MacKenzie was a major researcher/contributor 
to two important reports:  Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s 
Promising (1997) and An Examination of the Effectiveness of the Type of Rehabilitation 
Programs Offered by Washington State Department of Corrections (1998).  Both reports 
are relevant to this study.  Additionally, I found the work of at least one other scholar to 
be helpful: Elaine Cummins’ Private Prisons in Texas: 1987-2000: The Legal, Economic, 
and Political Influences on Policy Implementation (2000). 
Cross-Jurisdictional Comparisons 
 My cross-jurisdictional comparison of PIE programs will review the states of 
Florida, Iowa, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and South Carolina.  While primary focus 
will be on South Carolina, the other states will provide contrasts and similarities, as well 
as an array of factors that plausibly function as antecedents to the success of a PIE 
program.  This will include: 
 Individual state economies at the beginning of the relevant decade (1996-
2005) 
 Individual state total tax burdens for the initial year of the study period 




 Liberal vs. Conservative (Democratic vs. Republican) leanings of individual 
states 
 PIE program organizational structures (Intra-DOC PIE or Extra-DOC PIE) 
 PIE model types (Customer, Manpower, or Employer models) 
 Political Factors (Executive branch, Legislative and union support) 
 Program Outputs and Outcomes, including costs covered by inmate wages 
(room and board, taxes, restitution to victim(s), and family or child support; 
inmate post-release performance (employment and recidivism); and PIE 
sales/revenues. 
Ultimately, the writer will attempt to develop a conceptual model of PIE, linking 
specific antecedents and consequences in hypothesized relationships.  The model will be 
provided, not as a fixed blueprint, but as a kind of preliminary loose framework for those 
interested in pursuing the PIE model further. 
Parallel Objectives 
 I have two parallel objectives: one is to identify key differences and similarities in 
the PIE program in South Carolina compared to other states, and thus frame the issues.  
The second is to frame and encourage the study of prison industries policy.  I have 
participated in criminal justice programs at three top-tier graduate schools: University of 
Maryland, SUNY-Albany, and Harvard’s Kennedy School.  Strikingly, I encountered 
little emphasis on prison industries.  Ironically, too, although I had been working in the 
field of criminal justice for more than 25 years, I had not even heard of the PIE program 






REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
This chapter, divided into two parts, is meant to present not only a review 
of prison industries literature and research, but to introduce the seminal passage 
of the congressional legislation which established the Prison Industries 
Enhancement (PIE) Certification Program.  Part I will focus on the prison 
industries literature in general, while Part II will focus on PIE literature in 
particular.  Both sections will review relevant research and findings. 
 
Part I.  History of Prison Industries in the United States 
 
U.S. Prison Industries:  The Past 
Early History  
 The notion that inmates should work is a natural outgrowth of a society that 
values the work ethic.  If those of us who are law-abiding citizens must work, surely the 
criminal should work.  This philosophy has contributed to the development of prison 
industries in this country (and others).  But as Miller and Greiser (1986) have pointed out, 
concepts of inmate labor and prison industries are not synonymous.  Both have a rich 
history, however, in U.S. corrections. 
Cesare Beccaria, viewed by many as one of the fathers of criminal justice as we 
know it today, became prominent throughout Europe in the mid-1700s.  His view of 
imprisonment was that it could and should deter criminal behavior by making the “pain” 
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of punishment out-weigh the “pleasure” of criminal behavior.  Reformation, he believed, 
would occur if prisoners were required to work.  His 1764 essay “On Crimes and 
Punishments” called for penal slavery for robbers, and “perpetual” slavery in lieu of 
capital punishment.  His ideas had an immediate and enduring impact on European 
(particularly English) and U.S. criminal justice policies and practices. 
 The establishment in 1775 of a prison in Ghent, Belgium marked one of the 
earliest recorded linkages between imprisonment and labor.  The prison instituted a labor 
program that emphasized work as a means of rehabilitating criminals.  A major 
consideration, even then, was that inmate labor should not be competitive with free labor 
(Miller and Grieser, 1986). 
 The earliest concepts of putting inmates to work were rooted in the idea that 
prisoners should pay for their maintenance.  The costs of confinement were viewed as 
burdensome, something that could and should be obviated by the work of prison 
residents. 
 In the early days of U.S. criminal imprisonment, jails were seen as places wherein 
inmates could work for their keep, while prisons focused more often on inmate 
rehabilitation (Miller and Grieser, 1986).  In 1786, the “public work system” of inmate 
labor was used by the city of Philadelphia.  Inmates in iron shackles worked in road 
gangs, repairing city streets. 
The establishment of the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia in 1790 was part of a 
movement toward a new kind of prisoner labor (Miller and Grieser, 1986; Christianson, 
1998).  Modeled after a jail located in Norfolk, England, the objective of the Walnut 
Street Jail was to reform inmates by means of “contemplation,” solitary confinement, and 
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hard work. The creator of the English model, Thomas Beever, had boasted that prisoners 
there earned more than twice the costs of their own custody.  The Pennsylvania model 
required that inmates “study the Bible, meditate about their misdeeds, and do penance for 
their crimes” (Schwalb, 1996).  Additionally, they worked in their cells at solitary 
pursuits like shoemaking, tailoring, and weaving. 
In the late 1790s, a prison was built on the Hudson River in New York City.  The 
intent of the state legislature was for the prison to pay for itself through inmate labor.  
Thomas Eddy, a Quaker from Pennsylvania, came to be known as the “Father” of the 
New York Prison (Christianson, 1998).  Eddy was influenced by the Pennsylvania prison 
model that combined convict “penance” and work; however, he instigated congregate 
housing in favor of solitary cells (though he later regretted it). 
Eddy placed a high premium on inmate cleanliness.  In his book With Liberty for 
Some: 500 Years of Imprisonment in America (1998), Scott Christianson described the 
procedures at the prison: 
Accordingly, as soon as a new inmate was admitted, he or she was bathed, 
provisioned, interrogated, and told the rules.  Prison regulations strictly 
prohibited uncleanliness, swearing, indecent language or vulgar stories, and 
quarrelling, and called for any infraction to receive immediate punishment by 
confinement in a solitary cell on bread and water. . . . On the second day, the 
convict was assigned to the prison workshop (pp. 97-8). 
 
Prisoners at the facility worked both separately and together, depending on their 
jobs, but were not allowed to talk to each other.  When possible, inmates who had 
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shoemaking, weaving or other skills, were allowed to practice those skills.  With a focus 
on developing prison industries, Eddy promoted the idea of allowing shoemakers to train 
other inmates in the trade, weavers to train weavers, and so forth.  Inmates paid for their 
own clothing, maintenance (15 cents per day), and even educational classes.  An inmate 
who completed imprisonment with an exemplary record might expect to receive a 
percentage of his overall earnings when leaving prison. 
Eventually, Eddy’s critics expressed the belief that congregate housing for 
prisoners had been a mistake, contributed to the spread of contagious diseases, and 
increased the likelihood of riots.  Eddy himself later said that he wished he had used John 
Howard’s “separate cells” for inmate, instead of congregate housing (Christianson, 
1998). 
Other prisons, opened in Massachusetts and New York in the last decades of the 
18th century, also emphasized inmate labor—again, however, primarily as a tool for 
economic maintenance.  The Newgate Prison in New York City was particularly 
successful.  After paying nearly all of its operating expenses for several years, it reported 
a small surplus in 1803 (Reynolds, 1996).1   
The New York general assembly passed legislation stipulating that prison 
authorities use prisoner labor to fund all prison expenses to the extent possible.  The 
success of the Newgate Prison had demonstrated that full economic maintenance by 
inmate labor was possible. 
In 1823, a prison “fortress” opened in Auburn, New York.  The Auburn model 
featured military discipline, inmate “penitence” and individual cells for sleep, allowing 
                                                 
1 The early 1800s also saw the introduction of the concept of convict labor as a means of making restitution 
to victims of crime (Florida Senate Committee on Corrections, Probation, and Parole, 1991). 
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inmates to work in communal areas during the day.   The model forbade inmates to 
talk—or even to exchange glances—while working, the better to enforce “penitence.”  
Such constraints were believed necessary in order to avoid inmate-to-inmate “negative” 
influences (Mauer, 1999).  The prison was set up like an industrial center.  According to 
Christianson, “(a) whole routine was developed to impose the regularity, discipline, and 
frugality of factory work.  Although it was already commonplace in some British mills to 
lock the factory gates and impose absolute discipline over everybody inside, the fortress 
factory of Auburn prison would take such features to radical new extremes.  ‘Industry, 
obedience, silence’ were the guiding principles of the system.” 
 Thomas Eddy’s “cleanliness” rites of passage were carried to new heights: 
Each arriving convict was admitted according to a carefully developed 
ritual.  First his irons were taken off and he was stripped naked by other convicts 
(usually Negro men) under the watchful eyes of a keeper.  Then he was subjected 
to a thorough cleansing process known as the ‘ceremony of ablution.’  Dunked 
into a high wooden tub of hot soapy water, he was scrubbed and scoured of the 
filth and vermin he had brought from the county jail.  His face was shaved and his 
hair was cropped.  After being clad in a coarse, clean prison uniform, he was 
brought to the clerk’s office, where a detailed description of him was taken and 
entered in the prison register.  Each admission was assigned a number, his new 
identity. . . .Then (he) was brought to the agent’s ornate office for a face-to-face 
meeting with his new master. . . . the agent made sharp remarks that were 
calculated to impress upon the new arrival his guilt and degraded status, the 
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justness of his punishment, and the importance of his using his seclusion as a 
means of improving himself and showing deep repentance. . .  
An assistant keeper then assigned the convict to a trade and a cell 
(Christianson, 1998, pp. 114-15). 
 
Auburn authorities went to elaborate means to monitor prison factory laborers.  A 
series of secret passages were built behind factory walls, with small openings arranged 
here and there to facilitate covert observation of inmates at their tasks (Christianson, 
1998).  Violators of factory rules were subjected to severe penalties, sometimes without 
knowing how they were caught. 
Visitors to the Auburn facility came from near and far, reporting their amazement 
at what they saw.  Some expressed admiration at the degree of silence of inmates, 
whether on the job or at mealtime.  One Boston clergyman described “(t)he unremitted 
industry, the entire subordination and subdued feelings of the convicts.”  His associates 
concurred, adding their belief that the model was “worthy of the world’s emulation” 
(Boston Prison Discipline Society, 5th Report, 1830; Christianson, 1998). 
Tocqueville and Beaumont (1831) wrote that once inmates were returned to their 
cells, the silence was “that of death” and “a desert solitude (Morris and Rothman, 1995, 
1998).”  Nothing could be heard during the day, they reported, “but the steps of those 
who march or sounds proceeding from the workshops.”  The march they referred to was 
the result of a strict military regimen that was imposed, requiring inmates to march, 
lockstep, in single file, each inmate with his head turned slightly to the right, his eyes 
fixed over the shoulder of the inmate in front of him (Morris and Rothman, 1995, 1998). 
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The daily routine also followed a military model.  At the sound of a horn 
or bell, the guards opened the cells, and the prisoners stepped onto the deck and 
then in lockstep went into the yard.  In formation they emptied their night pails, 
which they then washed; they took a few more steps and placed the pails on a 
rack to dry.  They then moved in lockstep to the shops and worked at their tasks 
while sitting in rows on long benches. . . . [T]hey ate their meals . . .  by 
regulation, sitting erect with their backs straight.  At the bell they stood, reentered 
formation, and in lockstep returned to their shops or cells.  (Morris and Rothman, 
p. 110, 1995/1998) 
 
Prison factories facilitated other kinds of inmate labor, including production of 
goods that were not possible in solitary confinement.  Such goods included carpets, 
engines, harnesses, furniture and clothing.  Products were sold on the open market, again 
with the goal of supporting prison operations.  The Auburn model was soon implemented 
in another New York prison, Sing Sing (Rothman, 1995, 1998; Christianson, 1998).  Both 
prisons were widely recognized as being economic successes.  Inmates working together 
were more productive, and the economic benefits of prisoner labor were welcomed by 
New York authorities.  Prison industries were the order of the day. 
Sing Sing, the largest prison in the United States at the time, was well known for 
its strict regimen.  Inmates were forced to be stonecutters, owing to the facility’s location 
at a site where marble was plentiful. 
(C)onvicts lugging heavy sledgehammers pounded . . .  the rocks, leaving 
large marble chunks to be transported from the quarries to the prison yards.  To 
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accomplish this, four to six convicts were yoked to a cart, and a heavy block of 
stone was fastened to it; they were forced to haul the load away by brute strength 
. . . (Christianson, p. 122, 1998). 
 
A different version of the Auburn model was instigated at Pennsylvania’s Eastern 
Penitentiary, where newly arrived inmates were hooded on arrival, led down a winding 
corridor to the cells where they would reside until release (Christianson, 1998).  Inmates 
were thus psychologically reduced to virtual nonhuman status, given numbers, and 
forbidden contact with the outside world, or even other inmates.  At Eastern, work was 
seen not as a punishment, but as a reward.  Inmates worked in solitary confinement, if 
they were lucky.  Otherwise, as Christianson puts it, they did not get to work at all. 
 By 1850, the Annual Prison Report for New York revealed that the Sing Sing 
Prison (for men) reported a “surplus per prisoner” of $51.11 for the most recent 12-month 
period.   Massachusetts Prison reported $46.71.  Sales per Prisoner for each prison were 
reported to be $100.69 for Sing Sing’s male facility, $107.38 for the Massachusetts 
Prison, and $106.93 for the Auburn, N. Y. Prison.  That same year, prisons in Ohio, 
Connecticut and New Jersey also reported substantial surpluses per prisoner (Figure 1, 
“Selected Annual Prison Industry Earnings, 1848-1849”, Reynolds, 1996). 
 

















Auburn, NY $106.93 - $51.75 = $55.18 $45.30 
Connecticut Prison $90.00 - $63.00 = $27.00 $39.00 
Maine Prison $83.00 - $70.82 = $12.18 $12.18 
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Massachusetts Prison $107.38 - $51.00 = $56.38 $46.71 
New Hampshire Prison $30.91 - $65.16 = ($34.25) ($11.34) 
New Jersey Prison $92.19 - $63.00 = $29.19 $28.78 
New Penitentiary, 
Philadelphia, PA 
$43.00 - $43.00 = $0 ($17.00) 
Ohio State Prison $93.54 - $43.00 = $50.54 $30.90 
Rhode Island Prison $49.00 - NA = NA NA 
Sing Sing, NY, Male 
Prison 
$100.69 - $48.49 = $52.20 $51.11 
Sing Sing, NY, Female 
Prison 
$29.65 - $91.38 = ($61.73) ($62.75) 
Vermont Prison $70.72 - $60.87 = $9.85 $8.30 
*Excludes salaries of Prison officials. The discrepancy between the calculated and reported 
surplus or loss may be due to sales or costs not reported in the original table. 
Source: Annual Prison Report for New York, 1850, reprinted in American Correctional 
Association, The American Prison: From the Beginning…A Pictorial History, p. 55.  
 
 Proponents of the Auburn model of prison industries were convinced that the 
marriage between prisoner “reform” and labor had produced compelling results.  Other 
states were quick to follow suit.  By the early 1860s, at least 24 states had established 
prisons based on Auburn concepts (Miller and Grieser, 1986). 
   The emergence of prison industries, however, was not without problems.  While 
many legislators and prison officials extolled the economic benefits of inmate labor, 
others deplored the loss of the rehabilitation ideal.  Forcing inmates to pay for their own 
upkeep, while appealing to economic concerns, was viewed by some as unfair and 
producing diminishing returns.  Proponents of rehabilitation believed its role should be 
central, not incidental (Miller and Grieser, 1986).  If work was primary, then 
rehabilitation appeared to be relegated to secondary status.  Economic concerns were 
unavoidable, in the view of some, but had prison administrators and legislators lost sight 
of the importance of rehabilitation? 
Additionally, as already mentioned, the concept of prisoner labor and productivity 




Prison Contracting and Manufacturing 
 The open market sales of prisoner products brought about several systems for 
inmate employment.  In the mid-1820s, the “contract” system was instigated (Parker, 
1976; Christianson, 1998).  This system, in place from 1825 to 1840 (Parker, 1976), 
enabled manufacturers to contract with prisons for inmate labor, while supplying needed 
materials and equipment.  Security was overseen by the contractor, while the state was 
reimbursed for inmate services on a per capita basis.  The contract system evolved in two 
distinctive directions: the “piece-price” system, where payment was based on the quantity 
(and quality) of finished products, and supervision of inmates overseen by the state.  The 
“public-account” system was created, where the state was itself the contractor of services.  
In the latter, the state was ultimately responsible for both the manufacture and sale on the 
open market of inmate products.  The state was also responsible for acquiring materials 
needed for production (Parker, 1976).  A system based on leasing of inmate labor was 
also established (described below).  The common denominator to all these models was 
that goods and services were sold on the open market. 
 One of the best known contract arrangements in place in the early 1830s was in 
place at New York’s Sing Sing prison: 
. . . (T)he state owned only the bare walls of the prison workshop, with the 
prison contractors functioning as ‘the owners of the slaves and stock’ and 
‘owners of the prisoners.’  The contractors purchased from the state the labor of 
a certain number of prisoners per month, pledging their property in the shops as 
security in the event that they defaulted on their monthly payments.  Besides 
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operating a marble shop, contractors employed convicts at shoemaking, 
hatmaking, and carpentry, and they maintained a blacksmith shop, a brass 
foundry or saddler’s stirrup shop, and other industries, depending upon what 
businessmen contracted with the state.  (Christianson, p. 126, 1998) 
  
 Within a few years, the state’s stonecutters objected to the use of inmate labor in 
building a local university.  Throughout the northeast, labor leaders were beginning to 
protest the use of inmate workers in trades that they claimed took jobs from law-abiding 
citizenry (Parker, 1976; Christianson, 1998). 
 Another way of viewing these models of prison labor was to identify the recipient 
of profits.  It was the private sector that profited from the contract, piece-price, and 
leasing system, while in the public account models the state reaped the profits (Table 1, 
“Industry Systems”, reprinted from Miller and Grieser, 1986).  The public account 
system eventually split into two types: state use, first adopted in Nevada in 1887, and 
public works (Miller and Grieser, 1986).  
 
Industry Systems 
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sold to:  market market market market only only 
Source: A Study of Prison Industry: History, Components, and Goals (1986), Chapter 1, 
page 5.  N. Miller and R. Grieser, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of 
Corrections, Washington, DC. 
 
 By the end of the 1800s, the contract system was in use in 28 states; the lease 
system in 25; the piece-price system in six.  The public-account system was in place in 47 
states and territories, and the state-use system in 24 (Miller and Grieser, 1986). 
 
Inmate Leasing 
 An inmate leasing system was first used by the state of Kentucky in 1825, 
although it did not become widespread until after the Reconstruction era (Reynolds, 
1996).  The “lease system” enabled inmates to be released to private individuals who paid 
the state a specified amount for the inmates.  Lessors provided food and shelter to the 
inmates, and maintained their security. 
 In Tennessee, a 200-cell prison was established in 1831 where inmates worked at 
labor ranging from rock quarrying to blacksmithing (Reynolds, 1996).  The state’s capitol 
was constructed of stone cut and quarried by inmates.  Although the state legislature was 
pleased with the profitability of the new prison and its labor practices, local tradesmen 
complained that leased inmate labor and products infringed on their livelihoods, and also 
degraded their trade. 
 
Post-Civil  War Inmate Labor 
 Abuses of inmate labor were perhaps inevitable in a post-Civil War environment 
in the United States.  In his book, Accomplices to the Crime: The Arkansas Prison 
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Scandal (1969), former prison superintendent Tom Murton described what his research 
revealed: 
This whole system of exploitation began in the days after the Civil War, 
when the farmers and plantation owners who were forced to free their slaves 
looked for a new source of cheap labor and found it in the prisons.  The same 
thing happened intermittently in other states, but it became a way of life in 
Arkansas. 
State records show that on May 5, 1875, “the entire penitentiary, its 
buildings, equipment and the labor of all convicts confined then or after,” were 
leased to a Mr. Jno. Peck for ten years.  State supervision of such an arrangement 
was minimal, and anyone who submitted critical reports would be dismissed by 
the Penitentiary Commission. . . . 
In 1892, the penitentiary lease earned the state a profit of $32,128.42.  
The next year, the highest bid for a ten-year lease was $31,500 a year.  As a 
result, the state decided to eliminate the middle man and lease individual 
prisoners and groups of prisoners.  In a one-year period from 1898 to 1899, over 
two hundred inmates died in mines, quarries, and turpentine camps. 
A public scandal ensued . . .  (Murton, pp. 101-2, 1969) 
 
 Murton, whose efforts at reform rocked the Arkansas corrections system in the 
1960s, claimed that much of what he found in place more than six decades later was 
effectively equivalent to inmate slavery.  He described parole in the state as “tantamount 
to indentured servitude and an extension of penal slavery.” 
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 In Mississippi, prison administrators initially paid private contractors for taking 
over the custody of inmates.  Eventually, Mississippi saw the potential for profit, 
whereupon contractors were required to pay for the use of prisoner labor (Mauer, 1999). 
 In his book Worse Than Slavery (1996), Oshinsky described the economic 
benefits to employers: 
Under the sublease, an employer was not stuck with a set number of 
prisoners over a long period of time.  He did not have to feed, clothe, and guard 
them when there was little work to be done.  He could now lease convicts 
according to his specific, or seasonal, needs. (p. 32) 
 
 Prisoner laborers suffered extreme abuse, however, as revealed by the state’s 
inmate mortality rates in the 1880s, which ranged from 9 to 16 percent.  Blacks in 
particular suffered; in 1882 Oshinsky reports that 126 black inmates (out of 735) died, 
while two of only 83 Whites died. 
 Other southern states followed suit.  After the Civil War, Texas also made liberal 
use of leasing prisoners to private individuals and businesses (Reynolds, 1996).  
Although the state attempted to maintain profitable prison industries inside the institution, 
they were rarely successful.  In contrast, the leasing of prisoners to individuals and 
commercial concerns was typically profitable, effectively allowing the prison system to 
pay for itself.  Black inmates were used in sugarcane fields at rock-bottom prices.  Black 
inmates in top physical condition “cost” $31 per month, while comparable white inmates 
cost $29 (Reynolds, 1996).  In the four decades stretching from the 1870s to 1912, the 
state of Texas recorded net revenues of $3.4 million. 
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 Many black inmates found themselves building railroads in Southern states, 
including (but not limited to) North Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia, Virginia and 
Texas.  Nathan Bedford Forrest, the first head of the Ku Klux Klan and a prominent 
Mississippi Confederate war hero, leased inmates to build his Selma, Marion and 
Memphis Railroad (Christianson, 1998). 
 By 1866, the governor of Virginia boasted that the state’s prison system was 
paying for itself by means of convict labor, and that the work of black convicts working 
on excavation projects (e.g., railroads) was beneficial not only to the state and the 
contractors, but to prisoners as well, who enjoyed “the benefit of open air” (Keve, 1986; 
Christianson, 1998). 
 By the end of Reconstruction, convict-leasing was prevalent throughout the 
South: North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Kentucky (McKelvey, 1936).  In one 
Virginia case, Ruffin v. Commonwealth (1871), the appeals court ruled that “during his 
term of service in the penitentiary, [the prisoner] is in a state of penal servitude to the 
State. . . . He is for the timebeing the slave of the State.  He is civiliter mortuus; and his 
estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a dead man.”  (Christianson, 1998)  
 
Growth of Resistance to Prison Industries and Convict Labor 
 Resistance to prison labor took two forms: resistance by organized labor and 




Resistance to inmate labor by private tradesmen and even unskilled workers 
evolved early, and the states responded.  In New York, the 1842 Legislature prohibited 
the training of inmates in “any other mechanical trade” than those practiced (by 
prisoners) prior to imprisonment (Lewis, 1965; Reynolds, 1996).  Within a short time, 
both the Auburn and Sing Sing facilities recorded budgetary shortfalls; no longer were 
they able to be self-sustaining. 
The last few decades of the 19th century saw the triumph of resistance to prison 
industries in the northeast.  In 1883, legislation was enacted in Pennsylvania that paved 
the way for the eventual termination of prison industries in the state altogether (Reynolds, 
1996).  Similarly, New York legislators enacted the “Yates Law” a few years later, 
proscribing use of “motive-power machinery” by inmates (Reynolds, 1996).  Constraints 
on inmate labor in the state ultimately resulted in the termination of sales of prison goods 
to all public entities except state agencies.  Other states (Illinois, New Jersey and Ohio) 
also abolished prison labor contracts (Reynolds, 1996), limiting inmate labor to 
handicrafts and intrastate sales only. 
 In one southern state, Tennessee, outraged union miners, objecting to the use of 
inmates for mining, broke into local prisons, overwhelmed prison guards, and released 
miner-inmates (Wilson, 1933; Reynolds, 1996).  Ultimately, mining officials gave in to 
the demands of the union’s miners, and stopped using inmate labor. 
The opposition of unions to convict labor—evident in the 1800s—remained a 
constant obstacle to the development of prison industries for more than a century.  The 
impact of the opposition of organized labor did not abate in Tennessee.  Even in the late 
1990s, inmates were still barred from working for the private sector, and limited to 
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producing goods and services for government agencies only (Reynolds, 1996).2  An 
influential essay by George Washington Cable of Louisiana in 1883 called for an end to 
the convict-leasing.  The high rate of mysterious deaths in Southern prisons was viewed 
with suspicion by many, along with unusually high “escape” rates.  At least three 
Southern states, Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi, were suspected of deliberately 
failing to maintain statistical prison records in order to hide widespread prisoner 
maltreatment and exploitation (Cable, 1885; Christianson, 1996). 
 
Correctional Industries in the 20th Century 
As the 1800s came to an end, so did support for prison industries.  The view of 
inmate labor as a threat to free industry was almost universal, and advocates of free trade 
joined forces to urge the passage of legislation to halt prisoner production of goods to be 
sold on the open market. 
In Florida, the governor reported to the state’s legislature in 1909 that state 
prisoners were leased to the Florida Pine Company at a rate of $281.60 “apiece”.  
However, he assured them “the employment of convicts in our turpentine farms, and in 
phosphate mines, does not conflict with free labor” ([Florida] Senate Journal, 1909; 
[Florida] Senate Committee on Corrections, Probation and Parole, 1991).  By the 
governor’s accounting, 1,681 of leased convicts in 1908 were Black, and 75 White.  
Conditions under which the inmates labored were so severe that many died.  However, in 
the governor’s view the death rate of 12.25 per 1,000 “was a remarkably low death rate” 
when one considered the fact that “many of the convicts were diseased before entering 
                                                 
2 In 1996, an exception was made for 50 Tennessee prisoners who were allowed to work for Goodwill 




the camps” ([Florida] Senate Journal, 1909; [Florida] Senate Committee on Corrections, 
Probation and Parole, 1991). 
Nevertheless, the turn of the century brought with it a gradual end to the 
flourishing of inmate labor for profit.  Proponents of rehabilitation were beginning to 
raise their voices, adding to the pressures to end support for prison labor.  At the arrival 
of the twentieth century, the vast majority of prison inmates (more than 80 percent) were 
involved in prison industries.  But resistance and controversy—and the publicized abuses 
of prison laborers in some quarters (particularly the South)—combined to usher in a new 
emphasis on rehabilitation and reform (Miller and Grieser, 1986; Reynolds, 1996). 
In 1912, a representative of the National Committee on Prison Labor referred to 
the use of convict labor as “the last surviving vestige of the slave system” (Whitin, 1912).  
Gradually, publicized abuses resulted in an end to the lease systems of states like Georgia 
and Florida.  Mississippi’s lease system had been terminated in 1890, but it was 1923 
before Florida abolished convict-leasing, and 1928 before Alabama followed suit 
(Christianson, 1998). 
 
Establishment of Federal Prison System 
 The development of the federal prison system was the direct result of 
Congressional objections to the leasing of inmates.  Historically, the federal government 
had paid the states to maintain custody of federal prisoners (Roberts, 1996).  However, 
the evolution of inmate labor into inmate leasing spawned resistance by Congress, and in 
1887 a law was passed which made leasing of federal prisoners illegal.  Since many states 
depended on the profits facilitated by inmate leasing, federal prisoners were turned away 
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in many quarters following the passage of the new Congressional legislation.  In 1891 
Congress responded by calling for the establishment of federal prisons (Miller and 
Grieser, 1986; Reynolds, 1996).   
 Initially, work opportunities for federal prisoners were limited to construction of 
two of the new federal penitentiaries in Atlanta and Leavenworth (Roberts, 1996).  
Following that, federal prisoner labor consisted of work related to maintaining the three 
federal facilities (Atlanta, Leavenworth, and McNeil Island).  Such work included 
farming, maintenance and repair, janitorial work, and clerical jobs for prison officials.  
Also, inmates made, mended and laundered their own clothing (Roberts, 1996). 
 In 1919, the USP Atlanta opened a textile mill; five years later, USP Leavenworth 
opened a shoe factory.  From the start, federal prison authorities were careful to avoid the 
ire of unions.  Products from the textile mill and the shoe factory could be sold only to 
federal agencies.  Keenly aware of the need to keep inmates busy, federal officials sought 
to involve as many prisoners as possible in prison work.  Nevertheless, work 
opportunities were inadequate to the population (Roberts, 1996). 
 Conditions in the new prisons were unsanitary and crowded.  A 1928 U.S. Bureau 
of Efficiency report, followed by a report issued by the U.S. House of Representatives, 
was critical, and called for reform.  Rehabilitation programs were all but non-existent, 
and work opportunities were the exception rather than the rule.  Records show that at the 
Atlanta facility, for example, out of more than 3,000 inmate residents, only 850 could 
work in the textile mill.  While a few hundred more were able to work at farming or 




State Prison Industries After the Depression 
 Federal restrictions on state inmate labor and the shipment of inmate-produced 
goods arrived with the Depression (Parker, 1976; Reynolds, 1996).  The prevailing 
imagery of convicts taking profits from law-abiding citizens was exacerbated by the loss 
of jobs and incomes that accompanied the Depression.  In 1929, the Hawes-Cooper Act 
was passed to require that states sending prisoner-made products abide by the laws of the 
receiving state.  This allowed states to bar the sale of inmate-produced goods.  The new 
law took effect in 1934 (Miller and Grieser, 1986; Reynolds, 1996; Roberts, 1996). 
 The following year, 1935, brought with it the Ashurst-Sumners Act which banned 
transport of inmate products into states where their receipt was prohibited.  The Act also 
mandated labeling of all prisoner-made goods.  Union leaders did not believe the 1935 
Act was strong enough in that its enforcement depended on the diligence of receiving 
states.  As a result, five years later, the Ashurst-Sumners Act of 1940 was passed to 
reinforce the earlier Act (Miller and Grieser, 1986; Reynolds, 1996; Roberts, 1996).  The 
effect of the 1940 Act was to outlaw interstate shipment of inmate products except for 
agricultural products and goods produced expressly for state government use. 
 In 1936, the Walsh-Healy Act (Reynolds, 1996) barred the use of inmate labor 
attached to federal procurement, specifically with regard to the manufacture, production 
or supplying of materials or equipment to be used in government contracts exceeding 
$10,000. 
 The deconstruction of prison industries was virtually complete.  One observer, a 
southwestern state attorney general, commented with more than a trace of irony that 
prison labor had become, literally, “a federal offense” (Frum, 1995; Reynolds, 1996). 
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 By 1933, more than 20 states had enacted legislation restricting the marketing of 
prison goods.  By 1940, the percent of prisoners productively employed in contract, 
piece-price, and leasing systems had declined to zero.  The open-market systems declined 
from 74 percent in 1905 to 12 percent in 1940 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).  The 
Bureau also revealed that only 44 percent of state prisoners were productively employed.  
The concepts of custody and retribution reigned supreme once more in U.S. state prisons. 
 
Concomitant Establishment of Federal Prison Industries 
 In 1934, Federal Prison Industries, Incorporated (FPI) was born.  A corporation 
belonging to the U.S. Government, FPI was established in part to end the abusive 
practices of state prison labor, and to provide work opportunities to federal inmates that 
might contribute to inmate progress both in and outside of prison.  Another important 
factor central to the thinking of the creators of FPI was the need to avoid competition 
with organized labor and small business owners alike (Roberts, 1996). 
 The inadequate federal prison work programs, unsanitary conditions and prison 
crowding described earlier resulted in recommendations by the U.S. House of 
Representatives Special Committee on Federal Penal and Reformatory Institutions, which 
urged the creation of additional shops and factories in federal prison facilities.  The 
Special Committee believed that prison work programs could be self-supporting, and that 
expansion of prison industries could be achieved without special Congressional 
appropriations (Roberts, 1996).  In 1930, federal prisons, which previously functioned 




 The first director of the newly established centralized agency was Sanford Bates, 
who sought at the outset to be responsive to Congressional recommendations to improve 
the abysmal conditions of federal facilities.  Bates and his assistant, James V. Bennett, 
introduced classification of inmates and worked to expand federal prison space (Roberts, 
1996).  Their focus was on establishing uniform policies throughout the BOP, with an 
emphasis on chain-of-command administrative structure.  Training of prison staff was 
implemented, and special attention was paid to organization of prison industries.  The 
goal was to ensure that federal prisoners were productively employed, and to end inmate 
idleness. 
 Recent laws forbidding shipment and sale of inmate goods (Miller and Grieser, 
1986; Reynolds, 1996; Roberts, 1996) complicated the determination of the new director 
and his assistant to employ federal prisoners at meaningful work.  However, four sub-
categories of work assignments were devised:  farming; institutional support activities 
(including food preparation, janitorial work, and clerical work); prison factories; and 
public service (forestry, highway construction, and service provision to other federal 
agencies).  In spite of the opposition to prison industries, special attention was given to 
development of prison industrial work that could be rehabilitative for inmates and 
financially beneficial to the prison.  Another objective was to pay inmates a modest wage 
for the work they did.  Core concepts included devising a prison work structure that 
would not threaten free industry, and would require the least possible support from 




Prison Industries Development 
Miller and Grieser (1986) have divided prison industries history into five periods:  
the Development period, prior to the Civil War; the Wide-Scale Adoption period, which 
followed the Civil War and ended at the turn of the century (1900); the Decline of 
Industry period, the result of antipathy that led to strict legislation to curtail prison 
industry; and the Industry Stagnation period, which prevailed, they write, until 
approximately 1967.  The fifth (and current) period, which they call the Contemporary 
Era, is distinguished by a renewed interest in prison industry as well as evolution in 
correctional philosophy. 
We have already reviewed the Development and Wide-Scale Adoption periods, 
along with the Decline of Industry which followed passage of the Hawes-Cooper, 
Ashurst-Sumners and Walsh-Healy Acts.  The prevailing negative attitude toward prison 
industries had set the “mood,” and prison industry stagnation was perhaps inevitable 
thereafter. 
The growth of the “medical model” approach to inmate rehabilitation led to a de-
emphasis on work as a means of reform (Miller and Grieser, 1986).  Instead, an emphasis 
on inmate psychology, therapy, counseling (Lipton, et al., 1975) and education were 
viewed by many as more important than inmate work (Curran, 1957; President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967).  A brief 
exception to the new thinking was brought about by the war with Germany and Japan 
(Lewisohn, 1943; Miller and Grieser, 1986; Reynolds, 1996); inmate labor was often at 
full-throttle during that period, as all Americans, incarcerated or not, joined in the effort 
to respond to the needs of American soldiers and allies.  But following the war, interest in 
38 
 
prison industries gradually diminished, while interest in treatment and rehabilitation 
began to flourish. 
Prison riots during the early 50s served to remind corrections officials of the 
importance of an inmate work ethic.  Many believed that inmate idleness was a critical 
factor that led to the riots (Olgardt, 1961; Miller and Grieser, 1986), and this belief fueled 
a new interest in inmate work.  This was further fueled by the work of Daniel Glaser in 
the early 60s.  Glaser (1963) demonstrated the links between pre-release preparation, 
post-release employment, and recidivism.  His study was followed by inmate training in 
the “real world”—the U.S. Department of Labor introduced programming for prisoners 
made possible by the Manpower Development and Training Act (Miller and Grieser, 
1986). 
 
President’s Commission Task Force Report  
In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration 
of Justice Task Force Report on Corrections called for a work-oriented philosophy to 
facilitate prisoners’ return to society.  The Report reviewed prison industries in the U.S., 
and identified problems that had beset correctional industries of the past:  the resistance 
of labor and private industry to prison industries; curtailment of appropriate markets for 
inmate goods, a result of legislative restrictions; inferior quality of inmate-produced 
goods; poor delivery of goods.  Pricing of goods was criticized as being unrealistic, along 
with inadequate pay scales. 
The authors of the President’s Commission Report saw the need for more 
emphasis on prisoner reintegration.  This could not be achieved without use of the same 
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goals used by labor outside prisons:  prisoners should be trained in the way that ordinary 
citizens were trained.  Inmates needed the same skills and training if they were to be 
prepared for entering private industry after release.  As Guynes and Grieser (1986) have 
pointed out, this preparation was also viewed as rehabilitative for the inmate. 
The self-defeating abandonment of an emphasis on inmate work was noted.  
Prisons must emphasize the same work ethic utilized by private industry.  A reduction in 
inmate idleness must be replaced by a strong work ethic.  The Report called on public 
officials and politicians alike to recognize the inefficiencies and dangers of idleness in 
prisons. 
Key ingredients necessary to improving prison industries were also noted.  These 
included a scale of operation that could be competitive; a sales force; and an inmate 
incentive structure to include adequate wages.  This might be achieved only with the 
involvement of private industry and labor.  The Task Force called for economic return to 
the state, something that could be achieved only by means of an effectively functioning 
prison industries program. 
The Report specified three subject areas for consideration: (1) external milieu or 
negative and positive influences on prison industries—standards, court rulings and 
legislation, marketing regulations, and private sector involvement; (2) internal 
management (management, inmate wages and incentives, types of industry and 
production concerns); and (3) prison industry goals. 
In spite of the Task Force Report, however, a study conducted by Econ, Inc. less 
than a decade later described an extant virtual dichotomy between prison industries and 
rehabilitation.  The author (Parker, 1976) found that “the increased popularity of 
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individualized rehabilitation-oriented treatment programs [have] progressively supplanted 
the work ethic in American prisons.” 
 
Nothing Works: The Move from Rehabilitation to Punitiveness 
 In the mid-1970s, two opposing movements crossed paths, both affecting 
correctional industries.  The first came to be called the “nothing works” philosophy of 
rehabilitation (Martinson, 1974; Lipton et al., 1975).  Prisoner rehabilitation was dubbed 
a failure, and was soon supplanted by a subsequent movement toward a more punitive 
approach toward offenders.  The way was paved by David Fogel (1976) and others (e.g., 
van den Haag, 1975; von Hirsch, 1976).  These researchers urged that sentencing be 
“appropriate” to the seriousness of the offense, the amount of harm inflicted on society, 
and the extent of the offender’s responsibility for the crime.  Fogel embraced a “just 
deserts” philosophy, while van den Haag supported retribution as a viable concept.  Von 
Hirsch, also a proponent of just deserts and retribution, felt that the penalty was a means 
of crime prevention, and that it was an essential response to the offender’s wrongdoing.  
The punitive approach, perhaps not surprisingly, led to longer sentences, resulting in 
increasingly crowded prisons, and, collaterally, a more difficult-to-manage prison 
population. 
 A simultaneous increase in costs of incarceration—combined with concerns that 
inmates not be “idle”—eventually led to more emphasis on inmate work programs.  A 
parallel move towards standards (National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals, 1973) combined with court rulings affecting prison crowding and 
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inmate rights to facilitate the trend, and also contributed to significant change and 
improvement in prison industries as well (Guynes and Grieser, 1986). 
 Private sector involvement in prison industries also led to the growth of 
correctional industries (Guynes and Grieser, 1986; Miller and Grieser, 1986).  This 
involvement reflected a growing awareness that prison industries, if they were to flourish, 
must follow virtually all the same rules and philosophies that contributed to the growth of 
private industries.  (This included standards.)  As a result, many states began to pass 
legislation to allow for the sale of prison industries products to the private sector. 
 The renewed interest in correctional industries was, in the view of some, a natural 
outgrowth of the prison riots of the 1950s and 1960s, and the eventual denunciation of 
rehabilitation.  “Idle hands” were thought to have contributed to the deterioration of 
prisoner morale, and the pronounced inadequacies of rehabilitative programming 
exacerbated the problem. But some (including the writer) believed that the condemnation 
of treatment was premature, and that practitioners “threw out the baby with the 
bathwater” when they abandoned treatment.  Nevertheless, the renewal of interest in 
prison industries brought with it many benefits, as we shall see. 
 
Prison Industries in the Last 30 Years of the 20th Century 
 In the mid-70s, findings from three studies conducted by the Institute of Criminal 
Law and Procedure at Georgetown University Law Center, the Batelle Institute, and the 
John Wald Company were reported (Parker, 1976).  Conclusions from the three studies 
appeared to coincide.  Prison industry personnel believed that rehabilitation, not profit, 
should be the primary goal of prison industries, although numerous factors were 
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acknowledged which served to impede progress.  Over-employment, low productivity 
levels, obsolete machinery and techniques, lack of investment capital—were but a few of 
the constraints identified by the studies.  Other barriers identified were lack of qualified 
staff, scarcity of skilled inmate employees with proper work habits, constant labor 
turnover, and restricted markets (the result of passage of the Hawes-Cooper, Ashurst-
Sumners and Walsh-Healy Acts).  At .027 percent, the total value of prison manufactured 
products was calculated to be a miniscule portion of all private manufactured products. 
 Parker (1976) reported a hierarchically arranged (in terms of importance) ranking 
of the problems associated with prison industries.  Political “realities” were cited as the 
single greatest barrier to progress, along with limited markets for prison-made products.  
A lack of defined goals and accountability standards were also cited as problems, as well 
as constraints imposed by institutional routine.  Finally, industry management and 
operations problems were seen as impeding progress. 
  The report found that there was no prevailing consensus as to the 
definition of prison industries, and no concurrence as to the distinction between prison 
industries and prison work programs.  Prison industries, the author found, were 
“whatever the State Legislature and administration define them to be.” 
 As already mentioned, the work ethic had been replaced by rehabilitation, in the 
view of many correctional administrators (Parker, 1976).  In the aftermath of the 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration Task Report of 1967, 
its findings seemed to be forgotten.  The possibility that perhaps both treatment and jobs 
were crucial to inmate reform was rarely addressed.  The treatment contingent and the 
industries contingent did not often commingle. 
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 A Batelle Institute study (Levy et al., 1975) found that in 1974 the average pay of 
state prison inmate employees was $ .13 per hour, “although prisoners in some states 
earn(ed) no pay.”  The same study reported that garment-making was the most common 
industry, along with furniture manufacturing and repair.  The third most common 
industry was tag and sign making, with printing in fourth place. 
 In a 1971 report, the John R. Wald Company had found that in 1970, prison state-
use industry products were valued at only .027 percent of the value of all products 
manufactured by private industry.  (The John R. Wald Company worked closely with 
prison industries throughout the U.S. for several decades.)  In short, it might be said that 
the only “success” story, if there was one in U.S. prison industries by the mid-70s, was 
that some inmates were not idle. 
 But a few states were already beginning to explore change (Parker, 1976).  One of 
these states, Oklahoma, initiated a 10-year plan in 1976 to attempt to increase prison 
industries profit to cover at least half of the state’s correctional budget.  The plan was 
dependent on an increase of fifty cents per license tag. 
 South Carolina correctional authorities were investigating the possibility of 
collaborating with private industry inside the prison (Parker, 1976).  A brochure was 
developed to elicit interest in locating a factory behind the walls.  Although the prevailing 
economic climate of the time was problematic, prison industries officials identified 
industries that had the potential to meet specific criteria set by the state.   
 Minnesota was a leader in prison industries and private sector collaboration, 
partly because the state had not passed legislation prohibiting the sale of prison-made 
goods on the open market.  According to one knowledgeable source, “Republican farmers 
44 
 
wanted the farm machinery and twine produced in the prison at Stillwater,” home to the 
state’s largest penitentiary.  This facilitated the private sector’s ability to establish 
industries within the state prison when the Justice System Improvement Act was passed 
in 1979.  Inmates were paid above the federal minimum wage requirement. 
 Other states involved in exploring improvements to prison industries were 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, and Texas. 
 Econ, Inc. (Parker, 1976) concluded its report by proposing the Free-Venture 
Model of prison industries.  The Model’s goals were described: 
• a realistic work environment, including: 
full work day; inmate wages based upon work output; productivity standards 
comparable to those of outside world business; hire and fire procedures, 
within the limits of due process rights; transferable training and job skills. 
• partial reimbursement of the state by inmates for custody and welfare costs, 
as well as restitution payments to victims. 
• graduated preparation of inmates for release into community. 
• fixing responsibility with financial incentives and penalties for job placement 
of inmates upon release into the community. 
• financial incentives to industry for successful reintegration of offenders into 
the community. 




The Free Venture Model was specifically cited in the Congressional Act that 































Part II.  The Development of Prison Industries Enhancement (PIE) 
 
The Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 
 A seismic shift in prevailing prison industries philosophy took place in 1979, 
when Congress passed the Percy Amendment (named after Illinois’ U.S. Senator Charles 
Percy[R]), also known a the Justice System Improvement Act.  (The Act was supported 
by both U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond (R) of South Carolina and U.S. Senator Ted 
Kennedy (D) of Massachusetts, among others.)  Not only did the Percy Amendment 
waive the Sumners-Ashurst and Walsh-Healy bans on interstate sale of prison industries 
products, it allowed sale to the federal government.  Certain limitations and rules applied: 
• Local labor union officials must be consulted prior to establishment of the 
prison industry; 
• Inmates were to be paid wages comparable to those paid in the locale for 
comparable work; 
• Local officials must agree that local (non-inmate) labor was not affected; 
• Industry products must be in a locale where unemployment was not a 
problem. 
 The Congressional Record of May 21, 1979, quoted Senator Thurmond of South 
Carolina: 
 . . . I think the Percy amendment would be helpful and would encourage many 
 prisoners.  I am very pleased to support it, and I congratulate the able Senator 




The Record goes on to describe the history of the Free Venture Prison Industries 
Program, attributing the original model to Econ’s research (Parker, 1976).  The goal, as 
stated in the Record, was to “replicate real world working conditions in a correctional 
environment.  The fundamental assumption is that a work experience which closely 
replicates the real world will provide the inmate with an opportunity to prepare himself 
for successful transition to the community and will provide the state with self-supporting 
industries (ibid).” 
 Senator Percy asked for ten states to be pilots, while Kennedy wanted five; a 
compromise of seven was reached.  In 1976, the first three states to participate in the Free 
Venture pilot had been Minnesota, Illinois and Connecticut.  In 1978, the three original 
states were awarded continuation grants, and four other states were added to the program: 
South Carolina, Iowa, Colorado and Washington. 
 A letter from the American Correctional Association voicing its strong support for 
the program was added to the Record.  The letter, signed by ACA President Anthony 
Travisano, noted that the legislation was “built upon the Free Venture Program developed 
by the LEAA.”  (The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration had funded the Econ 
research.) 
 The Justice System Improvement Act, based upon the success of the original Free 
Venture pilot programs, established the Private Sector/Prison Industry Enhancement 
Certification Project (PIECP), which came to be known as the PIE program.  Private 
companies were permitted to employ prisoners, but were required to adhere closely to 
restrictions.  Perhaps the most ground-breaking aspect of the PIE program was its 
authorization for inmates to be paid wages comparable to those paid in individual locales; 
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authorization was also given for individual states to require deductions from inmate 
wages to pay child support, room and board, taxes, and/or restitution to victims.  In this 
regard, Barbara Auerbach provided a brief history: 
Originally, restitution (versus victims’ comp) was not allowed under BJA’s 
interpretation of the statute.  There was serious politics involved at that time in 
that the then director of BJA came out of the victims’ movement and she made 
certain, via BJA’s program Guideline, that only state sanctioned victims’ comp 
programs could receive these monies (not victims’ assistance programs and not 
individual restitution orders).  That changed with the most recent (1999) 
Guideline, which included restitution under the victims’ comp section.3 
 
Ultimately, when the PIE initiative was established, however, it was left to the states to 
develop their own PIE deduction requirements.  This appeared, at least on its face, to 
respond to the long-time complaint of citizens that their taxes should not be used to 
support the comforts and maintenance of prisoners.   
 It cannot be said that there was a stampede by the states to implement the PIE 
program.  To the contrary, the constraints of PIE contributed to an apparent reluctance to 
participate on the part of most states.  In fairness it should be pointed out that enabling 
legislation—a difficult hurdle—was required in any state wishing to start a PIE program.  
(Note that the PIE initiative was designed for the states only—not the federal prison 
system.) 
 There were, however, some distinct advantages for the private sector.  They were 
not required to pay fringe benefits or the usual employment taxes.  Whereas interest in 
                                                 
3 Personal communication, September 2007. 
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inmate employment had been at a low for awhile, the benefits attached to PIE elicited the 
interest of at least some private business. 
  
Chief Justice’s Case for Prison Industries 
 The impact of a speech delivered by Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1983 cannot 
be minimized.  Still cited in correctional industries literature more than a decade later 
(Haas and Alpert, 1995; Cikins, 1996; Reynolds, 1996), Burger’s speech got the attention 
of Congress as well as the media. 
. . . (A)re we going to build more “human warehouses” or should we change our 
thinking and create institutions that are training schools and factories with fences 
around them where we will first train the inmates and then have them engage in 
useful production to prepare them for the future and to help pay for their 
confinement? 
 
Burger called attention to recent congressional action, where a rider was attached 
to a gas tax prohibiting the use of prison made products in construction of federally 
funded highway projects.  This, he predicted, would harm state prison industries where 
sign-making (for highways) was common.  In the same breath, however, he praised the 
House of Representatives for repealing the prohibition and opening the door for increases 
in prison industry projects.  Now, he said, it was all up to the Senate.  He praised the state 
of Minnesota for being an early participant in the PIE program.  Participants in the 
Minnesota correctional industries program would have jobs waiting for them when they 
were released, he said.  He called for transforming prisons into places for education, 
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training and factories.  He called for the repeal of laws constraining or limiting prison 
industry production, as well as the repeal of laws prohibiting the transport or sales of 
inmate-made products.  He urged business and labor leaders to cooperate in the 
development of productive prison facilities.  Finally, Burger called for paying reasonable 
compensation for such work, and requiring inmate workers to pay room and board.  This, 
he said, would enable inmates “to secure gainful employment” and allow inmates to live 
normal, productive lives. 
To the critics of correctional industries—those who complained that inmates 
should not be “coerced into work and training programs,”—Burger said that  
every inmate should be “induced” to cooperate by the same methods that are 
employed in many other areas.  Life is filled with rewards for cooperation and 
penalties for non-cooperation.  Prison sentences are shortened and privileges are 
given to prisoners who cooperate.  What I urge are programs in which the inmate 
can earn and learn his way to freedom and the opportunity for a new life. . . . At 
the core of the American private enterprise system is the idea that good 
performance is rewarded and poor performance is not.” 
 
  (In 1991, Burger was quoted in the Washington Post:  “To put people behind 
walls and bars and do little or nothing to change them is to win a battle but lose the war.  




The Path from Free Venture to PIE 
 The history of PIE cannot be told without acknowledging its strong links to the 
Free Venture program of the 1970s.  The original intent of Congress was to facilitate 
private sector involvement with prison industries, and the Free Venture program paved 
the way for the PIE initiative.  It seems fair to note that when the PIE legislation was 
passed in 1979, legislative intent to reduce recidivism was not clearly articulated, 
although it was implied by the scheduling of a future evaluation which would measure 
Free Venture (PIE) participants’ outcomes against the incomes of non-participants. 
 A close reading of the original legislation (Congressional Record, 1979) and its 
purpose is worthy of note (and quote): 
 It is the purpose of this program to develop prison industries that will 
duplicate the conditions of private industry as closely as possible.  The Free 
Venture Model includes the following points: 
a. A full work week 
b. Inmate wages based on worker output 
c. Real world productivity standards 
d. Hire and fire authority at the shop supervisor level and within the limits of 
due process 
e. Self-supporting or profit-making business operations 
f. Post release job placement mechanism. 
 The long range objective of the program is to effect a change in the role 
that work has traditionally played in the prison and concomitantly, to move the 
institution as a whole toward a more humane posture. . . . a richer and more 
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realistic work experience for the inmate than has been the case in the past: he is 
expected to function as a responsible adult member of the work force and he is 
regarded accordingly.  The institution is no longer able to view its industry 
programs simply as a solution to idleness—it must now attempt to provide a 
productive work experience in a profitable industrial setting . . . . (A)n institution 
must make basic changes in its attitudes, policies and procedures (pp. S 6217-18, 
May 21, 1979). 
 
 Clearly, the Free Venture Model was the prototype or forerunner of the PIE 
Model.  The first three Free Venture Models were located in the states of Minnesota, 
Illinois and Connecticut, while the next four were located in Colorado, Iowa, South 
Carolina and Washington State.  Two evaluations were mentioned in the original 
legislation, a “preliminary” evaluation to examine the quality of prison industry goods 
produced; productivity; effects on institutional management (in terms of scheduling 
conflicts); inmate accident levels; and the economic viability of the various prison 
industries operations. 
 The second evaluation (also mentioned in the original legislation) was to be 
completed in 1981, and would attempt to measure initial post-release employment; length 
of employment; income and recidivism, and more. 
 
The Impact of Free Venture (FV) Prison Industries: Two Studies 
 In January, 1981, the first (Grissom, 1981) of two studies of the Free Venture 
model of prison industries was published.  Its purpose was to evaluate the impact of FV 
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prison industries programs at 12 prisons in seven states: Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Iowa, Minnesota, South Carolina and Washington. 
 Characteristics of Free Venture industries were specified in the Executive 
Summary (p. i): 
• A full work week for inmate employees. 
• Wages based upon productivity. 
• Economic viability. 
• Hire/fire authority exercised by (civilian) shop supervisors. 
• Private sector productivity standards. 
• Post-release job placement mechanism to assist industries’ inmates in 
finding post-release employment. 
  
The report evaluated the impact of the FV program on inmate-participant behavior and 
attitudes during incarceration, compared to non-participant inmates. 
Program implementations differed considerably (as they continued to differ in 
2007). The percentage of inmates participating in the FV programs ranged from 2 percent 
to 65 percent, earning wages from $.20 to $3.74 per hour.  Work days varied from six to 
eight hours in length.  FV programs were established at minimum, medium and 
maximum security prisons.  In spite of such differences, however, the report’s author 
noted distinctions between FV industries and traditional industries: 
Work hours were longer, wages higher and featherbedding reduced in 
comparison to traditional prison industries.  Free Venture personnel procedures, 
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productivity expectations and shop psychosocial atmosphere were more similar to 
private sector enterprises. 
 
But problems were noted with FV programs: “inadequate planning, lack of 
coordination with other institutional programs and too little emphasis upon post release 
job placement mechanisms.”  (Similar problems continued to plague some PIE programs 
as recently as 2007.)4 
 
The report issued the following conclusions: 
1. Residents working in Free Venture shops are similar to non-Free Venture 
inmates on demographic and criminal history variables. 
2. Free Venture has a favorable effect upon the behavior of participating 
inmates while incarcerated, as reflected in disciplinary records.  The rate 
of disciplinary incidents for Free Venture inmates declined relative to the 
rate for a non-participating control group. 
3. In most states there is no evidence of program impact upon the behavior 
of non-participating inmates.  (In states with particularly large or well 
developed programs observers report a favorable impact upon non-
participating inmates5.) 
4. Implementation of Free Venture requires modifications to institutional 
operating procedures. 
                                                 
4 Personal communications to writer, Auerbach (2007) and Ellis (2007). 
5 Improved behavior of non-participants in larger programs was ascribed by some to inmate hopes of being 




5. Free Venture has had a favorable impact upon the tranquility of most 
institutions. 
6. Free Venture has had only minor impacts upon other institutional 
programs.  However, the potential exists for strong positive or negative 
impacts upon other programs.  (p. ii) 
  
Minnesota Free Venture Findings                                 
 The Minnesota Free Venture Evaluation (1981), funded by the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration (LEAA), was intended to explore and document the effects of 
the experimental Free Venture prison industries program on its participants, as well as the 
prisons where they worked and resided.  In particular, the researchers attempted to 
investigate the extent to which the program succeeded in replicating a “real world” 
working environment, and whether it contributed to the “post-release success” of its 
participants compared to controls.  The researchers concluded that there was scant 
evidence that the program was associated with either improved participant behavior, or 
reductions in recidivism.  The data, however, did support an association between program 
participation and post-prison employment.  Researchers reported a possible self-selection 
bias, believed to be the result of demographic variables that distinguished Free Venture 
participants from their peers in the general prison population. 
 To the extent that the 1981 research was fraught with problems, it is difficult to 
view the findings as conclusive.  Nonetheless, the study’s abstract did conclude that 
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. . .  the higher wages of Free Venture workers allowed them to send more money 
home, to pay taxes and, in certain cases, chargebacks for room and board, and to 
accumulate greater savings for their release . . . (ibid.) 
 
Minnesota Mission Statement for Institution Work Programs 
 Early in the evaluation report, Minnesota’s lengthy mission statement, detailed 
and surprisingly specific, was provided (See Appendix A: “Mission Statement for 
Institution Work Programs”).  The statement called for development of a sound inmate 
work ethic and a wage compensation equivalent to that for similar work outside of prison.  
With inmates being paid competitive wages, the mission statement also called for prison 
industries workers to “automatically” pay taxes and retirement insurance, family support 
and victim restitution.  In addition, inmate workers should be required to pay expenses 
associated with their upkeep (e.g., rent, food and laundry) 
 The Statement’s detail suggested that the State of Minnesota was somewhat 
unique, compared to many if not most states of that era (and even today’s). 
 In a personal communication to the writer, Auerbach (2007) provided some 
background for the state’s progressiveness: 
Minnesota’s (commissioner of corrections) was named Ken Schoen, and he was 
seen as pretty radical for a number of reasons, not least of which was his support 
of private sector prison industries.  He was responsible for pushing Minnesota 
into PIE . . . .  He dragged his industries director kicking and screaming into it, 
and created a truly creative program, mainly by using Control Data (a Minnesota 
corporation) to get the ball rolling.  Warren Burger was of course a Minnesota 
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man as well and it was no accident that he got behind the program.  (Schoen 
could be very persuasive.)  Burger came to Stillwater prison in Minnesota to 
make that speech about factories behind fences. 
 
 The authors (unknown) of the Minnesota Free Venture research acknowledged 
more than once that there were limitations to the methodology used in the evaluation: 
Our samples were far from clean in that membership in the Free Venture group 
was afforded by a mere ten-days experience in a Free Venture shop in 1976 or  
1977 regardless of where the individual was employed during the remainder of 
his or her sentence.  Consequently, it was possible for a Free Venture subject to 
have worked longer in a traditional industry or support service position than 
many of the individuals who represented those programs.  Furthermore, inmates 
who began working in traditional industry or support service jobs in 1976 or 
1977 and were selected on that basis for those respective groups might have 
worked in a Free Venture shop at a later point prior to release, without receiving 
credit for their Free Venture experience. (p. 15) 
 
 In addition, the author called attention to the fact that four “very different 
institutions were sampled” as well as both males and females, adding additional 
uncertainty to the comparisons that were made.  Further, groupings were made of 
individuals who had been involved for a week or more in assorted institution programs.  
(These groupings often overlapped in their membership.)  The groups included vocational 
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and educational programs, traditional and FV industries, support services, 
therapeutic/treatment programs, “permanent idle”, work release and pre-release. 
 Additionally, institutions often overlapped, and inmates who were ascribed to one 
facility had served part of their sentence in another facility, and vice versa.  The 
limitations of the overlaps were numerous enough to strain the reader’s confidence in the 
findings. 
 Another limitation was one of the earliest acknowledged by the evaluation’s 
author.  The evaluation’s Table 8 entitled “Number of Individuals in Free Venture 
Samples Who Were Also Included In Other Groups” revealed that of the 274 males who 
worked on Free Venture Operations: 
156 were involved in education (N = 373) 
 85 were involved in vocational training (N = 254) 
160 were involved in traditional industry (N = 340) 
190 were involved in support service (N = 455) 
 50 were involved in treatment program (N = 139) 
 62 were idle at some time (N = 251) 
 40 were involved in work release (N = 66) 
 72 were involved in pre-release (N = 153). 
 
 ANOVA results indicated a significant difference in number of days worked 
during the initial year following release from prison, although findings were mixed.  
Post-release workers with no FV experience worked a mean of 146.95 days, compared to 
222.97 days for releasees of 6 to 12 months FV participation.  The latter (FV participants 
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of 6 to 12 months) also worked significantly longer (222.97 days) than FV participants 
(139.82 days) with less than six months FV experience.  (Similar ANOVA findings were 
reported regarding “Days of Productive Activity During the First Year Post-Release.) 
 Multiple regression findings were that “the number of days of Free Venture 
activity bore a significant relationship to (2) measures of recidivism such that individuals 
who spent between 6 and 12 months in a Free Venture position fared best on the outside.  
Ironically, the men who had the longest experience with Free Venture did almost as 
poorly as those with much less experience or even none.6 
 The Minnesota FV evaluation’s authors (unknown) reported that the researchers’ 
regression analyses produced findings somewhat consistent with their prediction 
regarding long-term effects of FV participation in post-release work.  Calling the tests 
“somewhat preliminary” and necessitating “very cautious interpretation, they point to a 
positive relationship between Free Venture experience and post-release employment 
when the effects of critical background variables are [parceled] out.” 
 Ultimately, it was difficult to be optimistic about even the more positive findings, 
with so many acknowledged limitations of substantial import.  Additionally, the 
Minnesota evaluation findings were often inconsistent with the earlier (Grissom) report 
on Free Venture programs in seven states.  Also, the Minnesota findings were not 
consistent with much later findings of Smith et al. in 2006.  (Smith and her colleagues 
reviewed PIE programs in five states, with more positive findings than either of the FV 
reports.) 
 
                                                 
6 This finding reminds the writer of similar findings in the past, demonstrating that inmates who 
participated for 6-12 months in a prison-based drug treatment program did better than those who 
participated longer, suggesting that perhaps there is an “optimal dosage” of some programming. 
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Prison Industries in the 1980s 
 In 1986, Guynes and Grieser identified a typology of prison industries goals. 
• Offender-based goals stress the value of industry work for the individual 
offender.  These goals focus on elements of rehabilitation or preparation 
for reintegration into society. 
• Institutional goals generally stress the contribution prison industry makes 
toward maintaining an incarcerated population.  A central issue here is 
the degree to which industries can assist in reducing idleness and 
sustaining institutional order. 
• Societal goals center around an offender’s responsibility to repay society 
for the costs generated by criminal activity. 
 
 Guynes and Grieser explored the potential for conflict among, for example, 
offender-based goals and institution-oriented goals.  For example, good work habits—
appropriate goals for offenders—go well beyond the simple reduction of idleness.  
Similarly, the institution-oriented goal of reducing idleness falls short of restitution or 
child support.  Indeed, these goals may compete with one another, and it is the 
responsibility of correctional and legislative authorities to maintain a kind of macro-
vision that can encompass “all of the above.”  And, as Guynes and Grieser pointed out, 
both authorities need to be able to distinguish between profit-making and cost reduction, 
while simultaneously striving to achieve both.   
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 All of these issues, and others, must be addressed within the constraints of 
appropriate prison security, an added consideration and expense not normally required in 
the private sector.  Such considerations may conflict with production requirements. 
 Guynes and Grieser cited the President’s Commission Task Force Report (1967) 
as the line of “demarcation” for the Contemporary Era of prison industries, a time when 
the need for a return to an emphasis on prison industries was noted and called for.  The 
introduction of the PIE legislation in 1979 signaled Congressional interest in improving 
correctional industries by involving the private sector.  By 1986, though private sector 
involvement was minimal, its effects were far-reaching and profound.  At a minimum, 
private industry was seen as a role model for prison industry (Miller and Grieser, 1986).  
There was a general understanding among correctional officials that—to the extent they 
could enforce industry goals and standards in their industry programs—they might 
improve output, quality—and maybe even profit. 
 By the mid-1980s, 27 states reported efforts to recruit industry personnel from the 
private sector.  Another change could be seen in the trend toward payment of inmate 
wages.  By 1986, the average daily wage for a prison industries inmate had quintupled to 
$3.00 per day (Grieser et al., 1984), compared to approximately $ .60 per day in 1972 
(Congressional Research Service, 1973).  While the increase was primarily attributable to 
the move toward prevailing wage offered by the few Free Venture/PIE programs, it 
signaled a new day in prison industries approaches.  (Nevertheless, one might reasonably 
ask how such meager earnings might encourage the work ethic.) 
 Other changes were ongoing in the area of financial management of prison 
industries.  As the prison population increased in states across the country, so did the 
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costs associated with prison management.  Prison industries began to be seen as one 
means of resolving the mounting costs of managing expanding prison counts.  
Correctional and state officials saw the potential for prison industries to defray costs.  But 
major changes were needed.  Prison industry officials, if they were to manage profitable 
ventures, must model their programs after the private sector.  A new day had dawned in 
the evolution of correctional thought where it applied to prison industry and its full 
potential.  Gradually, old ways of managing prison industries gave way to the realization 
that a new way of doing business was mandated.  In some states, the department of 
corrections had often been awarded funding for correctional industry programs; this 
began to change, and the corrections department was charged for services and supplies 
that once were funded by the state (Guynes and Grieser, 1986). 
 Yet another change was in the relationship between vocational education/training 
programs and prison industries.  Increasingly, vocational training was required prior to 
prison industry employment.  Many states began to require coordination between their 
vocational programs and their prison industry programs. 
 The importance of quality control began to be appreciated.  In the past, prison 
industry products were often seen as inferior to those of the private sector.  However, 
with the advent of private sector involvement, quality control measures were 
implemented to assure the quality of prison-made products. 
 The role of the prison industries director gradually achieved greater status, as 
some states moved toward elevating prison industries to semi-autonomy.  Correctional 
industry directors were bumped up to deputy commissioner level in some states, or at 
least to the same level as warden.  According to Guynes and Grieser, by 1986, prison 
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industries directors attended executive-level departmental meetings in the majority of 
states.  This new status of prison industries and its directors occurred in the federal prison 
system as well. 
 Finally, the importance of prison industries came to be seen in the classification 
process as well.  Whereas in the past, prison industries were virtually ignored by 
classification staff, industry officials now had much more involvement, and often 
participated in classification committees (Guynes and Grieser, 1986). 
 A frequent problem confronted by prison industries, still unresolved in many 
quarters, was the interruption of work and production caused by lockdowns or callouts.  
While some states have succeeded in reducing such interruptions to a minimum, a 
complaint heard by the writer in one state (in 2005) related to the issue of lockdowns and 
callouts.  In some states, however, prison industries inmates are given priority status in 
terms of returning to work following a lockdown. 
 A separate but related problem is the issue of prison transfers.  When an inmate 
who has become fully trained to work at full capacity is suddenly transferred to another 
facility, the repercussions can be felt at both the individual (inmate) level, and the prison 
industries level.  Although in 2006 such problems continued, the new status of prison 
industries suggested that this issue may abate as departments of corrections strive to 
support their industries and the potential to make them more profitable.  Profitability, of 






U.S. Correctional Industries: Transition from the 1980s to the 1990s 
 As the eighties moved into the nineties, a survey conducted by the Correctional 
Industries Information Clearinghouse (CI-Net) focused on traditional prison industries (as 
opposed to the Private Sector/Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program, which 
collected its own data).  The purpose of the survey, published in 1992, was to facilitate 
development of prison industries in the United States (Correctional Industries Survey 
Report, 1992).  The survey had an 89 percent response rate in terms of completely filled-
out questionnaires, but at least partial data were obtained for 100 percent of those polled. 
 The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) facilitated in conducting the survey, 
reporting that U.S. adult state and federal prison populations had soared 144 percent 
between 1980 and 1991.  While the survey found that there had been “a 100 percent 
increase in offender employment in correctional industries since 1980,” the reality 
remained that the national average for prison industries employment was only 8 percent. 
The percentage was slightly above 12 percent when total number of inmates residing in 
prisons where prison industries programs were located was part of the equation 
(Correctional Industries Survey Report, 1992). 
 The survey distinguished between correctional industries and traditional prison 
inmate employment in several ways: 
 . . . (correctional industries) strive to operate according to private sector 
standards—in terms of organizational structure, management, training and 
product development  . . . Some correctional industries have formed joint ventures 
with private sector companies, in which inmates produce goods and use markets.  
However, prison-made goods can only be sold in interstate commerce if the 
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industry program is certified under the Private Sector/Prison Industry 
Enhancement Certification Program (PS/PIECP).  (CI-Net, 1992) 
 
 Acknowledging the difficulties associated with operating correctional 
industries—security issues and legal constraints—the survey also identified benefits:  
reduction of “idleness” among inmates, and sales exceeding $991 million in the most 
recent 12-month period.  This figure was offset by the total annual planned operations 
budget for the same industries, which was projected to be $839 million during the same 
period.  Eighty-two percent of correctional industries were required legislatively or 
administratively to be self-supporting. 
 Revolving funds were typically used for maintaining correctional industries 
operations.  Slightly more than three-quarters (76 percent) of prison industries’ capital 
improvements were covered for the most part by a revolving fund, although 54 percent of 
capital improvements were covered by state appropriations.  And although 84 percent of 
correctional industries were supported by revolving funds, 55 percent of industries were 
mandated to obtain approval from the legislature for expenditures (Correctional 
Industries Survey Report, 1992). 
 While most inmates were paid, inmates in correctional industries in Georgia, 
Texas and Arkansas were not paid.  The other correctional industries programs obtained 
their primary wage funding from their industries’ budgets, although a few (nine percent) 
received wage supplements from private sector partners. Almost as many (eight percent) 
were supplemented by DOC or state appropriations budgets. 
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 Fifty-eight percent of correctional industries did not withhold deductions from 
inmates’ wages, although 42 percent withheld deductions for court fines, victims and 
restitution, room and board, and family support.  Remaining funds could be retained by 
inmates for their future release from prison. 
 Change was in the air.  Nearly 40 percent of survey respondents reported the 
passage of new legislation to affect at least one aspect of their industries (e.g., inmate 
wage deductions, new market availability, or the right to work with the private sector). 
 Nearly 90 percent of respondents expressed interest in joint ventures, although a 
small minority reported that they had not explored the possibilities, or lacked interest in 
doing so.  Reasons given included excessive transportation costs and legal restrictions. 
 Additional findings: 
• 88 percent of correctional industries programs had written policies and procedures 
• 82 percent issued annual reports 
• 78 percent developed business plans 
• 78 percent reported automated information management systems. 
• 33 percent of respondents had conducted feasibility studies 
• 17 percent had conducted economic impact studies 
• 15 percent had tracked recidivism (presumably of inmate correctional industries 
participants). 
 
Another finding was that correctional industries programs hired their staff from 
various sources, including: 
• 58 percent from the private sector 
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• 33 percent promotions or transfers from existing correctional industries staff 
• 29 percent from prison staff 
• 6 percent from central office staff 
• 4 percent from administrative or state personnel connections. 
 
The report found that most (78 percent) correctional industries programs had catalogs, or 
planned to develop catalogs to promote their products.  Approximately one-third (32 
percent) telemarketed their products.  Seventy-one percent offered discounts to customers 
who bought in volume. 
 Inmate employees were likely to receive “on-the-job” training.  Twenty-nine 
percent of programs had established training, industries and education (TIE) programs in 
an effort to maximize development of inmate skills (Correctional Industries Survey 
Report, 1992).  Consistent with this finding, a different survey conducted at about the 
same time found that most correctional industries programs were “not part of an 
integrated plan.  The need for systematic educational and apprenticeship training that 
provides a foundation for quality work experience, and ultimately better employment 
prospects (was) a common theme of survey comments (Henry, 1991).” 
 Henry’s survey, which was meant to be an investigation of correctional industries 
and related issues in the late eighties, had an 85 percent response rate.  A questionnaire 
was mailed to 54 correctional industry administrators, and 46 questionnaires were 
returned.  The five most prevalent industries programs were (1) furniture manufacturing; 
(2) license tags and signs; (3) garment textile and upholstery;  (4) printing; and (5) farm 
enterprises (Henry, 1991). 
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 Thirty-seven of Henry’s survey respondents indicated specific markets for 
correctional industries goods or services; 43 percent of that number reported state and/or 
local governmental markets only; 24 percent indicated state use and/or nonprofit 
organizations; and 27 percent sold products on the open market also. 
 Yearly salaries ranged from $11,364 (the base income of a correctional industries 
financial management employee) to $125,000 (for a senior correctional industries 
administrator).  Salaries varied widely among states, with lower salaries tending to be in 
southern states.  Correctional wages could not readily be extrapolated or compared to 
wages outside of prisons. 
 Henry’s survey also reported that nine percent of respondents provided job 
placement assistance prior to release from prison, although “a means for tracking the job 
placement of former industry inmates after release (was) virtually nonexistent.”  
Additionally, respondents indicated that little was being done to track post-release 
recidivism of industry participants—only 10 percent of the respondents indicated a 
mechanism for obtaining recidivism rates for industry participants (or even the general 
inmate population). 
 Recurring themes in some of Henry’s open-ended questions included the 
following: 
1. Prison industries should be designed and operated in accord with private sector 
business practices and prevailing job opportunities upon release; 
2. pre-industrial vocational and educational training should be integrated with 
industry programs; 
3. “life skills” training should be offered to facilitate the transition after release; 
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4. teaching the “work ethic” should be a primary objective of industries; 
5. resources must be made available to implement preparatory programs that are 
often under-funded due to tight budgets. 
 
 Henry’s survey found that among respondents, the issue of post-release job 
placement was only one issue that needed to be addressed: 
. . . although arguably the most important. . . . Job placement has greater 
potential when conceived within a comprehensive effort to “reintegrate” 
exoffenders by building and maintaining their ties to the community. 
 
 In the CI-Net Survey, attention was called to an apparent dichotomy: while some 
members of the private sector were eager to explore involvement in correctional 
industries, others complained vigorously that correctional industries unfairly competed 
with private citizens and robbed them of job opportunities and earnings. 
 In 1990, voters in the state of California had rebuffed a $450 million bond issue to 
fund prison construction, but voted in favor of changing the state’s constitution to allow 
private sector correctional industries—as long as civilian workers were not deprived of 
work (Reynolds, 1996).  A few years later, an Oregon vote resoundingly approved an 
amendment to provide work for all inmates.  However, these events were not 




The Effectiveness of Correctional Industries Participation in Reducing Recidivism 
 In fact, a small body of evidence was growing to suggest that, as Henry pointed 
out, “Careful program evaluations typically have the unsettling result of demonstrating no 
significant effects of a given program.”  (Henry called attention to 1983 research 
conducted by Rossi and colleagues.)  In 1984, the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York issued its own indictment of prison industries; in the judgment of the Bar, 
there was “no empirical study showing lower recidivism rates among inmates who have 
participated in meaningful vocational training and/or prison industry programs.” 
 At approximately the same time, Johnson (1984) reported that a two-year follow-
up study of correctional industries participants found no significant difference in 
recidivism rates compared to industries non-participants.  In Ohio, Basinger (1985) found 
small but non-significant differences in the recidivism rates of prison industries 
participants and non-participants. 
 In Utah (also in 1984), the Governor’s Task Force on Correctional Industries had 
come to a happier conclusion:  a year after release, 13 percent of correctional industries 
participants had returned to prison, compared to 29 percent of non-participants. 
 Additional research by Flanagan and his colleagues (1989) and Maguire and her 
colleagues (1988) also raised questions as to the effectiveness of prison industries work 
in reducing recidivism in New York.  Flanagan, Thornberry, Maguire and McGarrell 
found that prison industry participants were likely to have long sentences, to be older 
than prison industry non-participants, and to have less serious criminal and substance 
abuse histories.  Thus, when the researchers compared recidivism among inmates who 
participated in prison industries and those who did not participate, they found that the 
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lower rates of recidivism “disappeared” when other characteristics were controlled (e.g., 
prison industry participant groups being older, or having less serious criminal and 
substance abuse histories).  Similarly, Maguire and her colleagues’ finding that industry 
participants had fewer felony rearrests (29 percent compared to 34 percent of non-
participants) was not statistically significant.  Maguire and her colleagues also found that 
correctional industries inmates frequently used inferior machinery and methods in the 
manufacture of their products, making it difficult for them to transition to post-release 
employment.  Additional problems associated with post-prison employment were related 
to certification or licensing requirements that were sometimes difficult if not impossible 
for inmates to obtain (Maguire et al., 1988; MacKenzie and Hickman, 1998). 
 
Meta-analytic Findings of Correctional Industries Effectiveness in the 90s 
 MacKenzie and Hickman conducted a systematic review of correctional 
programming in 1998, and rated the methodological rigor of correctional industries 
studies at that time.  Only Maguire et al.’s research was rated a “4”—the second highest 
rating—among then-extant studies. 
 In conducting their review of correctional treatment programs, MacKenzie and 
Hickman turned to a statistical technique known as meta-analysis.  The technique was 
useful for measuring effect sizes of treatment programs, and had the advantage of 
including large numbers of studies, both published and unpublished.  While research 
findings of “non-significance” were often overlooked in the past, the meta-analytic 
technique included such findings (of researched statistical non-significance) in its overall 
measurement.  Thus, research findings of non-significance can be combined with 
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significant findings to obtain an overall combined effect size of (in this instance) 
effectiveness of correctional industries participation.  MacKenzie and Hickman assessed 
only studies that met the following parameters: 
• The study must have been conducted within the past decade. 
• The study must have used a control group. 
• Studies employing a “high level of methodology would be accorded more weight 
than those using a “weaker methodology.” 
• Response rate, attrition rate, and appropriateness of statistical tests would be 
considered. 
• The University of Maryland Scale was used to rate seven dimensions based on the 
study’s ability to control for extraneous variables that might be misleading. 
 
 MacKenzie and Hickman’s assignment of a methods score, they reported, had the 
following (rank-ordered) features: 
1. Correlation between the program and measure(s) of recidivism crime and no 
control group. 
2. Temporal sequence between the program and recidivism can be clearly 
observed (e.g., pre-and post-program research design); or a comparison 
group is present but lacks a demonstrated comparability to the treatment 
group. 




4. Comparison between a program group and one or more control groups, 
controlling for other factors; or a nonequivalent comparison group that is 
only slightly different from the program group. 
5. Random assignment and analysis of comparable program and comparison 
groups, including controls for attrition. 
 
Random assignment, they wrote, would be the “gold standard”—a “5”.  The title of 
their 1998 paper was “What Works In Corrections?  An Examination of the Effectiveness 
of the Type of Rehabilitation Program Offered by Washington State Department of 
Corrections.” 
 MacKenzie and Hickman did not include Level One studies in their review, but 
they did include Level Two studies.  In their correctional industries and recidivism 
studies, recidivism reduction was the measure of effectiveness.  The programs they 
identified as effective were those that had a minimum of two Level Three evaluations 
with statistical tests demonstrating effectiveness, as well as “the preponderance of all 
available evidence.”  Programs were classified into four groups, “What Works,” What 
Doesn’t Work,” What’s Promising,” and “What’s Unknown.”  Ultimately, the researchers 
identified one prison industry study (Maguire et al., 1988) as a Level Four, and two 
studies by Saylor and Gaes (1992, 1996) as Level Threes. Two studies (Anderson, 1995a 
and Boudouris, 1985) were scored as Level Twos.  (They found no Level Fives.)  Hence, 
MacKenzie and Hickman reviewed a total of five correctional industries programs. 
 MacKenzie and Hickman scored the 1992 study by Saylor and Gaes as a “3” in 
terms of methodological rigor because it compared two groups, one with and one without 
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the correctional industries program.  Saylor and Gaes, in their study entitled “PREP 
Study Links UNICOR Work Experience with Successful Post-Release Outcome,” found 
that federal correctional industry participants had significantly fewer parole violations at 
six months and one year, following release from prison.  While statistically significant, 
however, the differences were slight:  4.9 percent of participants were revoked after six 
months, compared to 6.6 percent of non-participants, while at one year, 6.6 percent of 
participants had been revoked, compared to 10.1 percent of non-participants (Saylor and 
Gaes, 1992). 
 Saylor and Gaes in 1999, called the 1992 study “the most comprehensive and 
rigorous study of the effect of prison work and vocational training” conducted by the 
Office of Research and Evaluation of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons. 
Unlike previous studies . . . the Post-Release Employment Project (PREP) used a 
prospective, longitudinal design that featured careful matching of study group 
participants . . . and control cases . . . 
  
 (Fifty-seven percent of participants worked in correctional industries only, 24 percent 
received vocational and apprenticeship training, and 19 percent received both 
vocational/apprenticeship training and correctional industries experience.)  Saylor et al. 
(1999) described the evaluation of prison-based education and work programs as a 
complex and arduous undertaking, citing the difficulties attached to unraveling the “many 
diverse elements” of prison life.  (Undoubtedly a partial response to such considerations, 
Gaes and colleagues published a 2004 book entitled Measuring Prison Performance, 
which explored the myriad issues that need to be addressed when evaluating and 
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comparing prison programs.  The book sought to review the numerous factors that 
correctional researchers constantly confront in their work.) 
 Another study by Saylor and Gaes (1996) also scored a “3” by MacKenzie and 
Hickman.  Again, the study compared those who had participated in correctional 
industries with those who had not.   Like their earlier (1992) study, the number of 
participants was large (more than 7,000 in the 1996 study, and more than 4,700 in the 
1992 study). The second study reviewed “new offense recommitments” of industry 
participants after 8 to 12 years, and found that prison industries experimental subjects had 
a 24 percent lower risk of new offense recommitment than control subjects.   (The finding 
was statistically significant.)  Similarly, after the same period of follow-up, 
vocational/training/apprenticeship participants exhibited a 33 percent lower risk of new 
offense recommitments than matched non-participants.  The writer infers that the fact that 
the second study was longitudinal added to the strength of the researchers’ confidence in 
their findings.  (Although effect sizes of .07 and .13 were reported for the Saylor and 
Gaes 1992 study, effect sizes were not reported for the 1996 study.) 
 In another article, Saylor and Gaes concluded that the body of scientific evidence 
surrounding prison programs, education and work programs was persuasive in its ability 
to contribute to post-release success in the community (Saylor and Gaes, 1999).7
 MacKenzie and Hickman scored a 1985 study of correctional industries and 
recidivism by Boudouris and a study by Anderson (1995a) as Level Two studies; both 
Boudouris and Anderson were assigned “2’s” because although there were comparison 
                                                 
7 In a 1999 summit of economists (see Appendix A) called to examine the economics of inmate labor force 
participation, several of the country’s leading economists cited Saylor & Gaes’ studies as evidence of the 




groups in both studies, the comparison groups were not demonstrably comparable to the 
treatment groups. This introduced the possibility of selection biases due to the fact that 
many (if not most) correctional programs require academic achievement that may result 
in participants who are better educated than non-participants, and hence (in the view of 
many) more advantaged and therefore likely to exhibit better post-release performances 
(than less educated non-participants).  Similarly, attrition from a program (e.g., 
correctional industries) may be the result of differences (e.g., more or less serious 
criminal histories) that could explain contrasting findings when comparisons are made 
and interpreted.  Boudouris found that after two years, participants in prison-based 
vocational, industry or farm work experience were nine percent less likely to return to 
prison than those with education alone (of whom 23 percent returned to prison); the 
finding was statistically significant.  Also after two years, Boudouris found that 30 
percent of participants in prison-based vocational, industry or farm work were rearrested 
or had their paroles revoked, compared to the controls, 38 percent of whom were either 
rearrested or revoked; this finding was also statistically significant. 
Anderson (1995a) was ranked a “2” in methodology for his evaluation study 
findings—that those who completed a correctional industry program had a lower rate of 
return to prison (28.7 percent) than non-completers (30.1 percent) or non-participants 
(31.3 percent). 
 MacKenzie and Hickman’s findings were of crucial importance to prison 
industries advocates.  If certain prison industries programs were associated with 
recidivism reduction and increased post-prison employment, shouldn’t they be 
replicated?  Reasonable observers and knowledgeable others might infer that such 
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programs would be worth emulating and expanding.  Finally, if prison inmates could 
acquire job skills, be self-supporting, pay taxes, support their families, compensate their 
victims or make restitution, and be law-abiding, contributing citizens upon release, who 
could object?  But in fact, prison industries continued to have its detractors. 
 
Correctional Industries Detractors and Their Responders 
 In spite of the promising research findings of Saylor and Gaes and MacKenzie 
and Hickman—and the establishment of the Prison Industries Enhancement Certification 
Program (enabled by the Congressional legislation known as the 1979 Justice System 
Improvement Act), prison industries advocates continued to struggle.  The abuses of the 
past remained fresh in the minds of many, and the development of PIE programs within 
each state was complicated by the need to alter state statutes to facilitate PIE.  Unless 
each state had a proactive commissioner of corrections or prison industries director 
(preferably, both), the PIE program was unlikely to be implemented.  “Proactive” meant 
that the corrections commissioner and/or industries director must possess political and 
negotiating skills in addition to an in-depth understanding of correctional industries and 
PIE requirements.  Additionally, the state’s prison industries director must be able to 
overcome bureaucratic resistance to private sector involvement, and persuade union 
leaders and community leaders—not only that the PIE program would not harm them—
but that it could benefit the community, public welfare, and society-at-large. 
Opposition came in the form of labor leaders and prison advocates who still 
recalled the serious abuses of the early 1900s and the reasons for federal legislation 
banning interstate commerce of prison made goods.  Such opponents decried the 
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mistreatment and exploitation of inmate workers.  Congress had attempted to address 
such issues in careful deliberations and political deal-making to minimize  objections 
(Congressional Record, 1979) and to maximize the potential for rehabilitating inmates 
and overhauling a costly corrections system—one with soaring populations of long-term 
offenders (Reynolds, 1996; Beck et al., 2000; Gilliard, 1998).  But prison industries 
officials—even without PIE—often fought an uphill battle.8 
 PIE opponents have long complained also that the program takes jobs and wages 
away from law-abiding citizens (Reynolds, 1996; Washington Water Jet Workers v. 
Yarbrough, Administrator of Division of Correctional Industries, 2002; 2003).  In spite of 
the advent of the PIE Certification Project and its reported successes, Reynolds reported 
in 1996 that less than 2/10 of one percent of prison inmates were participating in PIE 
programming.  As Reynolds pointed out, approximately half of all inmates performed 
some kind of work, although much of the work was menial, e.g., maintaining the prison 
and prison grounds (See Figure 2, “Maximum Share of Prisoners at Work – 1990”).  
Such workers received only nominal compensation, and thus were unable to contribute 
toward the costs of incarceration.  Reynolds’ 1996 estimate (that half of all inmates were 
working) included those who were participating in vocational training.  Calling most 
work performed by inmates “shoddy”, Reynolds called for increased private sector 
involvement, citing the advantages of not only offsetting incarceration costs, but of 
rehabilitating prisoners and in the process, apportioning part of their wages towards 
                                                 
8 The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has long had to defend its industries program (UNICOR) from 
critics who maintain that federal inmate products have an unfair pricing advantage over private sector 
products (Nicknish, 1996; Reynolds, 1996).  However, FPI is prohibited from participating in the PIE 
Certification Project, which was established for state correctional systems only. 
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victim restitution and family support.  Economic gains would also accrue, not only to 
inmates but to taxpayers. 
 


















* Some inmates participate in more than one work program. The chart ignores such 
double counting, thereby maximizing the estimated share of prisoners in work programs 
and minimizing prisoners’ idleness.  
** Laundry, food services, office work, building maintenance, repairs, etc. 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal 
Justice Statistics 1993, p. 634.  
 
 
 Acknowledging some of the problems attached to hiring inmates (e.g., some 
inmates may be illiterate or of less-than-average intelligence), Reynolds proposed 
expanding private sector involvement in prison production. 
 Reynolds called an average of $5.00 per hour “feasible,” and projected that 
inmates working 40 hours a week could make $10,000 annually.  Projecting taxpayer 
compensation of 60 percent, he said that taxpayers would reap significant benefits, 
especially if 25 percent of inmates were involved in working for the private sector, and 
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the prison population continued its ascent.  Only then, he suggested, could inmate 
workers be realistically expected to pay restitution, as well.  After all, many probationers 
were required to pay restitution, but prison inmates could not be expected to pay 
restitution without at least a minimal wage income. 
 Correctional practitioners and researchers alike have long maintained that inmates 
prefer work to inactivity (Auerbach et al., 1998).  (In 2005, this writer found that PIE 
participants in South Carolina were particularly proud of their jobs, and of their ability to 
support their families; thus it seemed that such inmates were motivated by more than a 
preference for work over inactivity.) 
 Ultimately, some might say that the strongest case for correctional industries may 
be the increasing number of studies showing that recidivism among industries 
participants is less than that of non-participants (Saylor and Gaes, 1995 and 1996; 
MacKenzie et al., 1998; Smith et al., 2006). 
 The economics of inmate labor have been reviewed by economists from a policy 
perspective.  In particular, in a 1999 conference held at George Washington University, 
potential advantages and disadvantages were debated by five prominent economists.  (See 
Appendix A for a synopsis of the National Symposium on “The Economics of Inmate 
Labor Force Participation.”) 
 
A Decade and a Half of the PIE Program 
 By 1993, 32 correctional agencies had been certified by the Department of 
Justice, and approximately 1,000 inmates were employed in PIE programs (Sexton, 
1995).  In the years between 1979 (when Congress passed the enabling legislation for 
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PIE) and 1992, inmates had earned wages of more than $28 million [see Figure 3: 













By 1996, 1,944 inmates were employed in the PIE program, earning approximately $13 
million annually (Reynolds, 1996).  According to Reynolds, about half of inmate 
earnings were going to room and board, taxes, restitution to victims, and family support.   
 
Such “modest results,” he wrote, reflected the difficulties associated with the Percy 
Amendment which established PIE. 
 Sexton (1995), in a report on prison joint ventures with the private sector, studied 
successful partnerships between private sector companies and correctional agencies in 
three states: California, Connecticut and South Carolina.  He listed the “challenges” of 
PIE ventures: 
• Absenteeism and rapid turnover of employees. 
• Limited opportunities for training. 




 Sexton also saw some positive aspects: 
• A cost-competitive, motivated work force, which can continue to work after 
release from prison. 
• The proximity of a prison-based feeder plant to the company’s regular facility. 
• Financial incentives, including low-cost industrial space and equipment purchase 
subsidy that are offered by some corrections officials. 
• Safe work environment due to the presence of security personnel and a metal 
detector that keeps weapons out of the shop area. 
• The partial return to society of inmate earnings to pay State and Federal taxes, 
offset incarceration costs, contribute to the support of inmates’ families, and 
compensate victims. 
 
 Sexton in his 1995 report for the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) recalled the 
involvement of the private sector in prison industries in the early years of the 20th 
century.  He noted that one of the benefits of the PIE legislation was its potential to keep 
jobs in the United States that might otherwise be sent offshore.  The ability to put “made 
in the U.S.A.” labels on prison products played an important role in persuading 
purchasing agents of two large corporations to buy prison products over competing 
offshore products.  Sexton quoted an executive as saying that “keeping the jobs in the 





Characteristics of  Three Types of PIE Models 
 Sexton described three types of joint ventures (see Table 2, “Principal 
Characteristics of Three Types of Joint Ventures”):  the Manpower Model, the Employer 
Model and the Customer Model.  In the Manpower Model, inmates are employed by the 
state (typically, the DOC), and are supervised by correctional staff in prison-based 
industries.  Private sector companies are charged a burden rate for their labor.  This 
model is based on the concept developed by a well known temporary employee agency 
that allows companies to lease their workforce. 
 














Manpower Prison Company Prison • Workforce 
• Rent/utility 





• Overhead rate 
• Wage 
deductions 
• Payback on 
equipment 






Customer Prison Prison Prison • Product or service 
 
• Payment for 
finished 
Goods 
Source: National Institute of Justice (November 1995). Work in American Prisons: Joint Ventures With the 
Private Sector. NCJ 156215. 
 
 The Customer Model allows the private company to negotiate a contract with the 
correctional organization.  The corrections agency owns and operates the business, and is 
paid a price (determined previously by agreement) by the company for the products it 
manufactures.  (The Manpower Model is a category of the Customer Model.) 
 In the Employer Model, the private sector employer owns and operates the 
business in the prison, acting as both employer and supervisor of the inmate employees.  
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The state prison provides the space and qualified workers who are hired and paid by the 
private sector business. 
 Sexton reported that the customer model offers the least exposure to risk to the 
company, in that their involvement entails only payment for finished products or services.  
Corrections officials are more vulnerable in the customer model scenario because they 
must operate a viable business within the limits imposed by prison constraints.  In 
contrast, both the employer and manpower models require cooperation and collaboration 
between the business and prison officials to minimize risks and maximize rewards.  Both 
parties must make commitments to ensure the success of the joint venture. 
 Benefits accrue to both sides in such arrangements.  Prison officials benefit from 
improved inmate morale and reduced idleness.  The private sector benefits by gaining 
access to a labor pool of entry-level workers where absenteeism is low, and the “price” is 
likely to be “right”  when it comes to comparing the costs of work space in a prison-
based business versus work space in the community. 
 
South Carolina Leads Nation in PIE Numbers 
 Reynolds reported that in 1996, the state of South Carolina was leading the nation 
in number of inmates (325) employed in PIE programs.  California was second with 274, 
followed by Washington (201) and Nevada (198)—modest numbers when we consider 
that the PIE legislation was enacted 17 years earlier.  Interestingly, as these numbers 
suggest, state prison population size appeared to be unrelated to PIE growth. 
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 In its 1997 directory, the Correctional Industries Association (forebear of NCIA) 
published the dates of the states then-certified.  (See Table 3, “Certified Prison Industry 
Enhancement Programs: Fiscal Year 1996 Listings”.) 
 
Certified Prison Industry Enhancement Programs: Fiscal Year 1996 Listings 
Jurisdiction Certification 
Date 
Inmates  Jurisdiction Certification 
Date 
Inmates 
Arizona 8/81 31  Iowa 8/89 12 
Idaho 7/85   Colorado 1/90 24 
California 
YACA 
8/85 305  South Dakota 1/91 44 
Nevada 8/85 199  Tennessee 1/91 93 
Minnesota 11/85 113  Delaware 7/92  
Utah 12/85 94  Indiana 7/92  





11/85   Maryland 8/92 31 
Washington 3/87 233  Hawaii 10/92 19 
Oklahoma 7/87 11  Vermont 1/93 5 
Nebraska 10/87 41  Wisconsin 1/93 8 
South 
Carolina 
12/87 296  Texas and 
DCJ 
2/93 124 
Maine 10/88 6  North Carolina 5/93 32 
NH Belknap 
County 
10/88 4  Louisiana 1/94 12 
NH Stafford 
County 
10/88 16  Montana 1/94  
Connecticut 1/89 31  Virginia 3/95  
Missouri 3/89 42  Florida 1/95  
Oregon 3/89 102  Ohio 10/95  
Alaska 5/89 5   TOTAL 
INMATES:  
2078 
Source:  1997 Correctional Industries Association Directory 
 
 Table 4, “Characteristics of 1996 PIE programs” reveals that the average number 
of inmates in PIE states in 1996 was 343,640.  Reynolds (1996) called attention to the 
fact that the total was less than 2/10 of one percent of all prison inmates were 
participating in the PIE initiative, and that the average number of industries per state was 
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six.  Inmates worked an average of seven hours per day, for a pay range of $4.25 – 9.50.  
All 25 PIE states collected victim restitution or court costs from inmate wages, as well as 































































Alaska 3,571 1 7 7 75 5.00-7.80 No Yes Yes No 
Arizona 21,813 3 7.5 48 43,569 4.25 No Yes Yes Yes 
California 
Joint Venture 




9,724 6 5 128 168,997 4.25-5.12 Yes Yes Yes N/A 
Colorado 10,514 1 8 25 34,169 4.25-4.85 Yes Yes Yes No 
Connecticut 15,000 13 7 30  4.27-6.50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hawaii 2,228 3 8 30 N/A 5.25-7.00 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Iowa 6,193 2 8 15 N/A 6.00-9.00 Yes Yes Yes N/A 
Kansas 7,055 7 8 200 416,000 4.25-6.00 Yes Yes Yes N/A 
Louisiana 24,937 1 7 30 43,344 4.25 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maine 1,470 1 6.5 6 1,150 6.36 Yes Yes Yes No 
Minnesota 4,720 5 6 92 128,660 4.25-6.00 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Missouri 19,300 25 7 1206 2,185,000 4.25 No Yes Yes Yes 
Montana  1 8 9 8,837 4.25 Yes Yes Yes No 
Nebraska 3,125 4 8 60 90,000 4.25-9.50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nevada 7,500 20 7.5 350 N/A 4.25-8.50 Yes Yes Yes No 
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Oklahoma 14,200 2 8 25 40,000 4.35 Yes Yes Yes N/A 
Oregon 8,509 4 7.25 95 139,098 4.75-8.00 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
South 
Carolina 
20,000 4 7.5 325 308,999 5.00-5.50 No Yes Yes Yes 
South Dakota 1,795 10 7.5 80  Min-5.50 No Yes Yes No 
Tennessee 14,000 6 5.1 200 200,000 4.25-5.75 Yes Yes Yes N/A 
Texas* 128,140 3 8.3 152 163,416 4.25-6.00 - Yes Yes Yes 
Utah 4,294 3 7 77 170,235 4.25-5.05 Yes Yes Yes N/A 
Vermont 1,000 1 4 3 3,724 4.50 No Yes Yes No 
Washington 12,192 14 8 311 373,659 4.90-8.00 Yes Yes Yes N/A 




          
Total 343,640 156  3729 4809725  Yes 18 Yes 25 Yes 25 Yes 10 
Average 14,318 6 7 149 240486 4.25-9.50 No 6 No 0 No 0 No 8 
Note: Although certified in January 1995, Florida was not yet active at the time of the data collection for this chart 
Note: Original error in Texas prison population corrected above 














Economic Benefits of PIE Programs 
 In 2003, Petersik and colleagues published a study of the Prison Industries 
Enhancement (PIE) Program.  The study was conducted at The George Washington 
University Center for Economic Research for the National Correctional Industries 
Association (NCIA), and funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Assistance (BJA).  The research was aimed primarily at identifying the beneficiaries of 
PIE inmate incomes and the extent of their benefits, specifically responding to the 
question:  Who benefits from wage earnings of inmates working in the PIE program?  A 
secondary objective of the survey was to answer the question: What if PIE inmates 
earned average American salaries?  Information obtained was intended to assist 
policymakers, stakeholders, corrections departments and beneficiaries in establishing 
priorities.  Additionally, identification of the beneficiary groups could facilitate 
improvements or modifications of PIE programs in order to maximize the equitable 
distribution of available benefits (Petersik et al., 2003). 
The study was conducted to fulfill the call for collection of data to establish 
whether the PIE program was meeting its charge, as outlined in PIE Certification 
Program Guidelines: 
Through inmate wage deductions, to increase advantages to the public by 
providing departments of correction with a means for collecting taxes and 
partially recovering inmate room and board costs, by providing crime victims 
with a greater opportunity to obtain compensation, as well as by  promoting 
inmate family support. 
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The research was also a response to the need to clarify the specific beneficiaries 
of the PIE program for corrections departments, policymakers, and the public.  It was 
believed that clarification of the beneficiaries could enhance stakeholder and public 
support.  “Beneficiaries” were considered to be those persons or groups who received PIE 
monies deducted from inmate wages, or who realized savings from a reduction in the 
needs of inmates whose PIE earnings improved their ability to be self-sufficient.  
Beneficiaries, according to the researchers, would include those who realized tax 
reductions or savings, as well.  (Indirect or secondary beneficiaries were not explicitly 
researched.)   
 The study utilized records and information supplied by a statistical sample of 
state-operated PIE programs and employers.  In the study “inmate gross income” (gross 
inmate wages) referred to total inmates’ PIE wages for a single calendar year between 
1998 and 2001.  Research estimates used were based on inmate gross income and 
employer gross payroll (including PIE worker gross income plus employer contributions 
to Social Security, workers’ comp or employment compensation). 
 Sampling was based on individual state PIE inmate counts reported to NCIA for 
the year ending December 31, 2001.  The researchers’ assumption was that the static one-
day counts would have the same proportion of inmates in the U.S. total as the individual 
state’s unreported share of the total number of inmates who were employed at any time 
during the sample year (1998-2001).  The study used PIE payroll and other data recorded 
and provided by a 10-percent sample of PIE workers who were employed at any time 
during the selected year.  The sample was taken from a stratified random sample of PIE-
certified States.  GWU staff estimates of federal and state income tax liabilities rather 
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than recorded deductions were used (due to confidentiality constraints).  The study was 
based on state PIE worker wages as well as employers’ payroll tax contributions for an 
unspecified year between 1998 and 2001.  The PIE inmates were working in state prison-
based Employer and Customer (including Manpower) Model prison industries programs.  
State participation was voluntary.  State programs, individual firm industries, and the 
year of the study year were not revealed (although anonymity was not guaranteed).  
Inmate records were confidential.  
 At the outset, Petersik and his colleagues noted several reasons for difficulties 
attached to understanding PIE benefits.  They pointed out that PIE deduction categories 
were sometimes ambiguous, thus obscuring precise identification of beneficiaries and 
making it difficult for researchers to quantify benefits (e.g., it was unclear whether 
“taxes” included federal and state income taxes, or whether (or to what extent) Social 
Security and Medicare deductions were taken.  Petersik and his colleagues also 
maintained that PIE firms incurred “significant” employer payroll costs not manifest in 
national PIE data.  Also, they said, net benefits to beneficiaries might differ substantially 
from gross benefits identified by aggregate deductions.  They called attention to the fact 
that almost half (47 percent) of inmate gross incomes included an unspent residual that 
was unaccounted for among aggregate PIE data; the disposition of that income was, they 
said, “of interest.”  Anecdotally, they said, inmates often had PIE obligations (e.g., court 
costs, fines, etc.) over and above their ordinary deductions.  Ultimately, they said, the 
aggregate data obtained revealed “little of the potential PIE beneficiaries and benefits, 
were U.S. state prison inmates fully employed year-round in skills and jobs yielding more 
typical U.S. annual incomes.”  
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 The researchers acknowledged that their survey was limited to the financial 
benefits and identification of direct beneficiaries of PIE wages.  It was not meant to be a 
comprehensive assessment of the PIE program, nor was it designed to identify 




 Petersik and his colleagues found that “(v)irtually every American belongs to a 
group that benefits from PIE inmate work.”  Beneficiaries included victims of crime; 
taxpayers (both federal and state, household and business); as well as those individuals 
and programs who rely on state or federal income taxes or Social Security, Medicare, 
workers’ compensation, unemployment compensation, including all levels of education 
(elementary, high school or college), welfare programs, an extensive variety of state and 
federal programs maintaining medical and/or retirement services, and “other goods and 
services.” 
 Petersik et al. estimated that 53 to 57 cents of every dollar earned by PIE inmates 
benefited non-inmate recipients.  “Others, not the inmates, are the primary beneficiaries 
of contemporary PIE incomes,” they wrote.  The single greatest beneficiary of PIE 
incomes was the PIE employee (who received 43 percent of gross employer payouts and 
47 percent of his or her gross income), while the single largest non-inmate beneficiary 
group included state household and business taxpayers, as well as all state programs 
benefiting from state income taxes, accounting for approximately one-third of PIE inmate 
incomes.  The researchers maintained that about one-third of PIE incomes alleviated state 
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taxpayer costs as a result of deductions taken for room and board.  The second largest 
non-inmate beneficiary group benefiting from state inmate PIE employment included 
social security taxpayers and recipients.  Other beneficiaries, they found, were current 
crime victims and household and businesses bearing the costs of crime; these 
beneficiaries ranked as the third-largest non-inmate beneficiary group.  Federal income 
tax payers and programs dependent on the federal budget constituted the fourth largest 
beneficiary group, they wrote.  The researchers called attention to the fact that PIE inmate 
deductions for federal income taxes could be said to support national defense, income 
security (Supplemental Social Security, food stamps, Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families, , the earned income tax credit), and Medicaid—as well as others not listed here. 
[See Table 5, “Estimated Gross Employer Payouts, PIE Wages, and Deductions One 
Unspecified Year 1998-2001—Weighted Sample State PIE Programs Only 
(Revised)”] 
  
Estimated Gross Employer Payouts, 
PIE Wages, and Deductions One Unspecified Year 1998-2001 — 
Weighted Sample State PIE programs Only (Revised) 
Category ($ Million) Percent  
Gross Employer Payout: 32.04 100.0  
Social Security (OASDI) 1.42 4.4  
Social Security (HI-Medicare) 0.33 1.0  
Federal Unemployment Insurance 0.11 0.3  
State Unemployment insurance 0.11 0.4  
Workers Compensation 0.76 2.4  
Employer Contributions 2.74 8.6  
    
 ($ Million) Percent Percent 
Inmate Gross Income: 29.30 91.4 100.0 
Room and Board 9.60 30.0 32.8 
Taxes, Federal Income (Liability) 1.14 3.5 3.9 
Taxes, State Income (Liability) 0.12 0.4 0.4 
Social Security (OASDI) 1.42 4.4 4.9 
Social Security (HI-Medicare) 0.33 1.0 1.1 
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Victims Compensation 2.64 8.2 9.0 
Family Support* 0.23 0.7 0.8 
Other PIE deductions* 0.05 0.2 0.2 
Total inmate PIE deductions 15.53 48.5 53.0 
    
PIE Residual** 13.76 43.0 47.0 
* Some sampled States include other court-ordered deductions, interpreting the final 
deduction category as “family and other court-ordered deductions.” 
** Residuals are not net savings and do not equal the net amount accruing to the inmate 
because of the post PIE deductions not accounted by PIE.  
NOTE: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding. 
Source: Petersik, T.W., Nayak, T.K., Foreman, M.K. (July 31, 2003). Identifying 
Beneficiaries of PIE Inmate Incomes: Who benefits from Wage Earnings of Inmates 
Working in the Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) Program? Page xiii. 
 
 In addition to asking (and answering) the question, “Who benefits from wage 
earnings of inmates working in the PIE Program?” the researchers asked (and answered) 
a second question:  “What if PIE inmates earned average American salaries?”  Petersik 
and colleagues sought to estimate both the beneficiaries and the financial benefits that 
might accrue if state inmates were permitted to participate in open-market jobs 
comparable to national averages based on productivity, annual hours worked, wage 
levels, and skills.  Acknowledging that estimates of “potential incomes, beneficiaries, and 
benefits” were dependent on certain assumptions, the researchers devised a series of 
assumptions to establish a range of “low-to-high ‘reasonable’ incomes, benefits and 
beneficiaries which might be anticipated, in the event that the PIE program could be 
implemented throughout the United States. 
 “Critical assumptions” for both cases (high and low) were described: 
• In the low-case scenario, one half of PIE workers (700,000 inmates) would work 
full-time for the minimum wage of $10,500 annually.  In the high-case scenario, 
three-quarters of PIE workers (1,050,000) would work at the average yearly wage 
of $32,000.  (Calendar year 2000 was used in both scenarios.) 
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• In both scenarios, PIE workers would pay the marginal 28-percent federal income 
tax rate (about $7,150).  Petersik et al.’s low-case scenario assumed one-half of 
PIE workers would pay the average state income tax rate of 4.4 percent above 
$4,700 (bearing in mind that some states have no income tax); their high-case 
scenario projected that 67 percent of PIE workers would pay state income taxes. 
• Petersik et al. noted that some low- and high-case assumptions would be affected 
by the number of PIE inmates working in employer versus customer model prison 
industries, which would affect payroll taxes and deductions—assuming higher 
deduction rates in the high-case scenarios. 
[See Table 6, “Results: Low Case Assumptions . . . “ and Table 7, “Results: High Case 
Assumptions . . . “ for summaries of the results of low and high case scenarios.] 
  
Results: Low Case Assumptions, U.S. PIE income, Benefits, and beneficiaries, if PIE 
Were Generally Applied in U.S. Federal and State Prisons 
(Assumed Income per PIE Inmate $10,500 per Year) 
Category ($ Billion) Percent  
Gross Employer Payout: 7.68 100.0  
Social Security (OASDI + HI) 0.28 3.7  
Social Security (HI-Medicare)    
Federal Unemployment Insurance 0.03 0.3  
State Unemployment insurance    
Workers Compensation 0.03 0.3  
Employer Contributions 0.33 4.3  
    
 ($ Billion) Percent Percent 
Inmate Gross Income: 7.35 95.7 100.0 
Room and Board 2.08 27.1 28.3 
Taxes, Federal Income (Liability) 0.66 8.6 8.9 
Taxes, State Income (Liability) 0.09 1.1 1.2 
Social Security (OASDI) 0.28 3.7 3.8 
Social Security (HI-Medicare)    
Victims Compensation 0.78 10.1 10.6 
Family Support* 0.15 1.9 2.0 
Other PIE deductions* 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Total inmate PIE deductions 4.03 52.5 54.9 
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PIE Residual** 3.32 43.2 45.1 
**Total exceeds PIE deductions limit of 80 percent.  
Source: Petersik, T.W., Nayak, T.K., Foreman, M.K. (July 31, 2003). Identifying 
Beneficiaries of PIE Inmate Incomes: Who benefits from Wage Earnings of Inmates 
Working in the Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) Program? Page xvii.  
 
 
Results: High Case Assumptions, U.S. PIE income, Benefits, and Beneficiaries, if PIE 
Were Generally Applied in U.S. Federal and State Prisons 
(Assumed Income per PIE Inmate $33,250 per Year) 
Category ($ Billion) Percent  
Gross Employer Payout: 36.84 100.0  
Social Security (OASDI + HI) 2.57 7.0  
Social Security (HI-Medicare)    
Federal Unemployment Insurance 0.34 0.9  
State Unemployment insurance    
Workers Compensation 0.34 0.9  
Employer Contributions 3.24 8.8  
    
 ($ Billion) Percent Percent 
Inmate Gross Income: 33.60 91.2 100.0 
Room and Board 10.85 29.5 32.3 
Taxes, Federal Income (Liability) 7.31 19.8 21.7 
Taxes, State Income (Liability) 0.85 2.3 2.5 
Social Security (OASDI) 2.57 7.0 7.7 
Victims Compensation 3.70 10.0 11.0 
Family Support* 2.08 5.7 6.2 
Other PIE deductions* 0.07 0.2 0.2 
Total inmate PIE deductions 27.42 74.4 81.6** 
    
PIE Residual** 6.18 16.8 18.4 
**Total exceeds PIE deductions limit of 80 percent.  
Source: Petersik, T.W., Nayak, T.K., Foreman, M.K. (July 31, 2003). Identifying 
Beneficiaries of PIE Inmate Incomes: Who benefits from Wage Earnings of Inmates 
Working in the Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) Program? Page xviii. 
 
 Petersik and his colleagues found that (“if assumptions and outcomes occurred as 
depicted in either scenario”) benefits might accrue, including: 
First, were the United States to succeed in engaging a large share of the 
U.S. State and Federal inmate labor force, their gross labor contributions would 
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likely be much greater than currently realized.  Whereas PIE inmates’ annual 
gross incomes nationwide today total about $32 million per year, generalized 
State and Federal inmate PIE work suggests total U.S. prison inmate labor 
income potential ranging from about $7 billion to nearly $37 billion per year. 
Second, were U.S. State and Federal inmates generally successful in PIE 
at the assumed levels, (1) the primary beneficiaries of general PIE inmate work 
would be Federal and State taxpayers, Social Security contributors and 
beneficiaries, crime victims, families, and others than the inmate; and (2) the 
greater the inmates’ productivity and incomes, the greater the proportional 
benefits to others than the inmate.  Said otherwise, the greatest beneficiaries of 
widespread inmate PIE work would not be inmates but others than inmates, and 
the most significant stakeholders negatively affected by current non-work by 
U.S. prison inmates are these same groups. 
The researchers noted that since some benefits have more than one beneficiary, 
the likelihood was that (in those instances) both taxpayers and tax benefit recipients 
might be affected resulting in a sum total of beneficiary shares “much greater than 100 
percent.” 
If PIE inmate employment was successful in general, the single greatest non-
inmate beneficiary class was projected to be state taxpayers, both household and 
business, who would receive approximately a third of total benefits of general PIE inmate 
work.  However, Petersik and his colleagues called attention to the fact that the many 
inmates who were not PIE workers would still require maintenance, so that state 
taxpayers would continue to shoulder the preponderance of imprisonment costs.  In spite 
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of this, however, they maintained that between $2-11 billion in savings to state taxpayers 
would be realized from PIE workers’ room and board payments. 
The second greatest non-inmate beneficiary class was projected by Petersik to be 
“Social Security and other social safety net wage-earner and employer payees, and 
retired, widowed, disabled, dependent, and other Social Security recipients.  By 
combining worker and employer contributions, the researchers estimated PIE inmate total 
contribution levels at between $500 million and $5 billion annually. 
Depending on income assumptions for PIE workers, federal income taxpayers 
(and programs that depend on income tax collections) were projected to be the second or 
third largest beneficiaries group. 
Additionally, Petersik and his colleagues predicted that compensation funds for 
crime victims would “gain significantly” and that family support might also “increase 
substantially.” 
Overall, the PIE inmate workers would still likely  be the single largest 
beneficiaries of PIE employment, Petersik said, but the implications for policy appeared 
to be that whatever the benefits to inmate workers, non-inmate beneficiaries would gain 
“at least as much” as inmate workers. 
In a section entitled “Caveats” the researchers pointed out that while it was an 
interesting and informative exercise to estimate the benefits of PIE in a correctional 
world where PIE was widely accepted, there were some unknown issues to consider: 
• Changes that needed to be made by corrections to enhance safety, 
efficiency, profitability and competition in (correctional) workplaces; 
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• Enhancement of methods for supplying equipment, building, land and 
services; 
• Techniques to enhance the attractiveness and competitiveness of both 
correctional sites and PIE businesses; 
• Expanded assimilation of prisoner manufacturing into the overall 
economy. 
 
 While there were admitted hurdles still ahead (e.g., attracting public acceptance of 
PIE), the assimilation of inmate labor into the nation’s economy could produce benefits 
extending beyond those traditionally viewed by PIE proponents. 
 
Researchers’ Review of PIE Inmate Accounts in Single Month Period 
 In an attempt (separate from the primary research reported thus far) to obtain an 
introductory view of PIE inmate spending, the researchers sought account information of 
the 968-inmate sample, but obtained information for only 462 inmates, a total that 
included some data from every sampled state.  (Inmate post-PIE spending was a 
secondary component of this voluntary survey.)9  Researchers also attempted to obtain 
pre-PIE account information for the sampled population, but succeeded in obtaining the 
data from only 106 inmates (not every state provided the requested data).  The findings, 
in spite of these limitations, are of interest. 
                                                 
9 Petersik, in a personal communication with the writer, summarized the difficulties of obtaining the 
additional data: “Prudence, time, and resource constraints limited efforts for these data to that [already] 
provided by participating jurisdictions, and thus many records were not available in many instances.” 
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• Child support or victim restitution deductions did not appear to be 
substantially supported outside PIE deductions.  Indeed, the average state 
deduction beyond PIE worker deductions was just 3 percent. 
• PIE inmates appeared to acquire significant savings, 14 percent of their 
gross income and approximately a third of their discretionary PIE incomes 
after PIE deductions.  This was in marked contrast to non-PIE inmates, 
who saved virtually nothing (perhaps not surprisingly, given their typically 
limited earnings). 
• In spite of what might seem to be an opportunity for PIE inmates to 
exercise “normal” financial responsibility, inmate account data suggested 
that they did not do so.  It appeared that, thus far, PIE inmates continued to 
remain outsiders when it came to ordinary economic participation. 
 
 Nevertheless, PIE inmate earnings contributed substantially to crime victims, 
taxpayers, families, social support programs—and themselves.  Petersik and his 
colleagues concluded that “Comparisons of pre-PIE and PIE incomes and outlays (left) 
little doubt that PIE work yields significantly larger financial benefits to important 
National constituencies than idleness or traditional inmate work.” 
 
2006 Research Findings: Impact of PIE on Recidivism and Post-Release Employment 
 In June 2006 a report was released to address the paucity of policy research in the 
area of prison industries.  The authors (Smith et al., 2006) stated that their research 
constituted “the first national review of the recidivism and post-release employment 
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effects of the Prison Industries Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP).”  The 
findings of Smith and her colleagues are directly relevant to this study and its purpose, 
the identification of key factors in the implementation of a successful PIE program.  The 
research design was quasi-experimental, and used matched samples with sample PIE 
participants and two control groups: inmates working in traditional prison industries (TI) 
and inmates engaged in “other than work” (OTW).  The samples were matched in six 
criteria: race; gender; crime type (person and other); age; time served; and number of 
disciplinary reports.  A cluster sampling strategy was utilized and six states selected that 
had large numbers of PIE workers.  Researchers included all major U.S. geographic 
regions, rural and urban populations, each of the three PIE models, and genders.  Each 
state selected had PIE certification prior to 1996.  (One state was forced to drop out, and 
the study ultimately included five states.)  Smith’s PIE sample consisted of PIE workers 
(who worked for any length of time) in the five states and who were released between 
January 1996 and June 2001, permitting a minimum of a two year follow-up and a 
maximum follow-up of 7-1/2 years. 
 Note that under the MacKenzie-Hickman method rating system, the Smith et al. 
study would be considered somewhere between a “3” or a “4” because although it sought 
to compare “a program group and one or more control groups, controlling for other 
factors or a non-equivalent comparison group that is only slightly different from the 
program group”—this proved to be difficult and problematic for reasons outlined by the 
researchers.  A “3,” we recall, is “a comparison between two or more groups, one with 
and one without the program.” 
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 The research questions were: 
1. Does PIECP participation increase post-release employment as compared 
to traditional industries (TI) or other than work (OTW) activities? 
2. Does PIECP participation reduce recidivism as compared to traditional 
industries work or other than work? 
  
 Survival analysis was used.  Time to obtaining employment was measured, as 
well as time to loss of employment.  Time from release to first recidivism was measured.  
(Recidivism was considered to be arrest, conviction or incarceration.) 
 Smith et al. provided a rationale for use of survival analysis, stating that it 
measured failure rates of groups receiving different treatments, measuring time between 
release from prison to employment and/or recidivism, thus facilitating group 
comparisons.  Survival analysis, they wrote, had an advantage over fixed-period analysis 
because it provided details (“proportion”) about failure at any given point of analysis, 
instead of proportion at the end of a given point. 
 Primary findings were that PIE participants were “significantly more successful in 
post-release employment.  That is to say,” researchers wrote, “they became tax-paying 
citizens quicker and remain(ed) in that status longer than TI and OTW releasees.”  Smith 
and her colleagues found that approximately 55 percent of PIE participants and 40 
percent of the traditional industries (TI) and “other-than-work” (OTW) inmates obtained 
employment within the first quarter following release.  Similarly, 48.6 percent of PIE 
participants were employed continuously for at least one year following release from 
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prison, compared to 40.4 percent of TI releasees and 38.5 percent of OTW releasees. PIE 
participants obtained employment significantly faster than either TI or OTW, while TI 
participants obtained employment significantly faster than OTW. In addition, PIE 
workers earned significantly more than OTW releasees, and were employed significantly 
more post-release quarters than TI and OTW releasees. 
 Of equal interest was the researchers’ finding that PIE participants remained 
crime-free significantly longer than TI and OTW releasees.  (TI participants were not 
significantly different from OTW releasees, however.) 
 Smith et al. concluded that their results suggested that 
. . . work plays an integral part in successful re-entry upon release in terms of 
employment and recidivism.  Based on the employment survival analysis, 
employment assistance should be focused during the first year after release to 
assist those who obtain work more readily and additional research should be 
focused on the 20 to 30 percent who do not obtain employment for the remaining 
follow-up period to determine the causes. 
 
The researchers concluded also that both federal and state coffers benefited from room 
and board and taxes paid.  They maintained that private sector partnerships and the PIE 
program should be increased and carefully monitored. 
 Smith and her colleagues pointed out that since their matching techniques led to 
selection of TI and OTW inmates with characteristics that matched PIE participants, it is 
important for future researchers to determine the percentage of the general prison 
population that matches PIE participants, who are carefully selected based on specific 
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criteria.  This caused some concern among the researchers and others as to the 
generalizability of their results. 
 Smith wrote that “(i)n the strictest definition of research methods, we are able to 
generalize only to the five states involved and then only to the participants in the sample.  
However . . . (t)his study informs the stakeholders of the impacts of PIECP on a much 
larger scale than (was) currently known.” 
 
Smith Study Limitations 
 Smith and her colleagues called attention to limitations of their study.  For 
example, they pointed out that OTW inmates might have been involved “in education, 
vocational education, training, counseling, or other preparatory programs” or have been 
“idle.”  PIECP inmates might have been involved in some of these programs, too, as well 
as TI on one or more occasions, thus blurring the distinctions somewhat, or creating what 
Smith calls an “additive” effect (a term also used by MacKenzie et al. previously).  Other 
limitations were identified. 
 Overall the study selected inmates whose characteristics matched PIE 
characteristics; thus, they were not randomly selected, and as mentioned already, were 
not representative of the overall prison population.  Any inmate who participated in the 
PIE program at any time was considered a PIE participant, regardless of the length of 
time s/he participated.   
In particular, it was noted that PIE participation was limited to those without 
recent disciplinary infractions.  Also, PIE involvement was limited to voluntary 
participation.  Such criteria necessarily excluded general population inmates with 
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significant disciplinary write-ups or who refused to work, a process Smith and her 
colleagues referred to as “creaming.” 
Smith pointed out, too, that some work (e.g., laundry) might be considered TI in 
one state, and OTW in another. 
 It is not uncommon in some states (e.g., South Carolina) for some inmates to 
work part-time in PIE programming, and part-time in TI.  Similarly, they may also work 
sometimes in service industries and other times in PIE, or sometimes in service industries 
and other times in TI.  Such inmates are paid accordingly: PIE workers earn minimum to 
prevailing wage for PIE tasks; less for service tasks; and even less for TI.  (Some TI 
participants are not paid anything.)  Service work can be considered (and paid) as PIE 
labor, but federal law does not require it (because no goods are produced, and federal 
laws apply only to products that may cross state lines.).  However, service industries 
involve partnerships with the private sector, which means service workers are always 
paid more than TI workers.   In the Smith study, service workers were classified as TI 
workers (unless they were identified as PIE workers).  It seems reasonable to speculate 
that TI workers who may have also worked in service industries might have produced 
more positive findings than otherwise (had they not worked in service industries). 
 
PIE Participant Criteria of Smith Research 
 PIE criteria vary across states, prison, and industry.  However, Smith listed 
“general criteria that seem to fit most of the sites and industries” (though not 
consistently): 
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• PIE participants were free of disciplinary reports for at least six 
months; 
• PIE participants were primarily minimum and medium security levels; 
• They were enrolled in either high school or a GED program, or had 
completed one or the other; 
• They had at least six months remaining of their sentences; 
• They did not have major medical problems. 
  
PIE Stakeholder Benefits Identified 
 Smith noted that in 2004 the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) identified a 
range of stakeholders who benefit from the PIE program, over and above those identified 
by Petersik et al. in their 1999 research.  BJA’s stakeholders who benefit from PIE 
include corrections administrators, crime victims, the private sector, and the public. 
 
Attitudes Toward PIE Program: Changing or Solidified? 
    In spite of the PIE program’s potential to benefit taxpayers and many other 
groups, in 2007, resistance endured in many (if not most) jurisdictions.  Progress was 
impeded, also, by the apparent inability of prison industries in general to keep pace with 
the increase in the nation’s prison population.  Additionally, progress was hindered by a 
post 9/11 reduction in funding for prison programming in general, (e.g., decreases in 
prison-based drug treatment, educational programming, vocational training, and 
prerelease preparation [Reynolds, 2004]).  Nevertheless, researchers continued to 
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maintain that drug treatment, vocational, and work programs for offenders effectively 
reduce recidivism. (e.g., Seiter and Kadela, 2003; Wexler et al., 1999). 
 Some see a modicum of progress. Robert Greiser (2005), Chief Administrative 
Officer for UNICOR, has written extensively on prison industries and maintained that the 
PIE program has grown in recent years, probably the result of the funding and efforts of 
the NCIA.  This growth—and increasing interest in PIE—has been observed by the writer 
as well.  This growth and this interest have been particularly evident in escalating 
attendance at PIE presentations at the NCIA annual conferences of 2005, 2006 and 2007.  
Grieser also mentioned the success of the South Carolina PIE program, the result, he said, 
of the efforts of the state’s prison industries director (Tony Ellis), who has worked 
closely with the South Carolina business community, and who was “proactive” in 
marketing inmate labor.  But Grieser said that implementation of the PIE program in the 
northeast has been difficult, because of the resistance of unions in states like Rhode 
Island, New Jersey and Massachusetts. 
 Grieser was asked why the BOP doesn’t have PIE.  When PIE started, he said, the 
federal population was much smaller.  They didn’t push for it, probably because it didn’t 
seem necessary at the time.  However, FPI would now welcome the PIE program, he 
added (a sentiment echoed by Steve Schwalb, FPI Chief Operating Officer10).  Grieser 
also called attention to differences between the federal and state systems, noting in 
particular that the federal system has many more constituencies to consider and to 
negotiate with, and that these constituencies are “nationwide.” 
                                                 
10 Schwalb expressed this feeling in the presence of the writer on two separate occasions, at a meeting in 
the offices of the Bureau of prisons in 2005, and at a correctional industries conference in March 2007. 
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 One national prison industries expert11 reminded the writer of problems afflicting 
the PIE program at the national level.  In 2004, the budget of the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance (BJA) had been slashed by $1.5 million.  Additionally, the “new people” at 
BJA over prison industries had “no loyalty” either to the PIE program or NCIA—
particularly ironic considering the fact that the PIE program is “one of the few that gives 
back.”  (As mentioned in another section of this paper, political appointees often make 
major changes in funding or program emphasis when there is a change in 
Administrations.  Such changes often impede progress, and fuel the frustration of long-
time program administrators.) 
 In spite of the recent modest spate of interest in the PIE program among state 
prison industries directors and corrections officials in dire need of self-sustaining and 
profitable programs, the full potential of the PIE initiative seems tragically unrealized.  
The early promise associated with the passage of the 1979 Justice System Improvement 
Act—and the passage of a quarter of a century—seem to confirm the conclusion reached 
by the former Chief Economist of the U.S. Department of Labor, and author of a 2004 
study of post release job markets, who called “the tiny number of private sector PIE 
projects and jobs . . . a glaring deficiency in prison industry programs today (Reynolds, 
2004).” 
  
European Prison Industries: The European Industries Forum 
 As the new millennium approached, prison industries in Europe were undergoing 
many of the experiences common to U.S. prison industries.  While European correctional 
industries were (and are) not monolithic, a shared consensus existed—much like that in 
                                                 
11 The prison expert requested that I withhold his/her identity. 
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the United States—that inmate labor was important at a minimum because it facilitated 
management of inmates who—left to idleness—might be difficult to manage (Smartt, 
1998).  A review of correctional populations and criminal justice issues in several 
European countries (England, Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and The Netherlands) 
revealed that—other than the Nordic countries—there had been an increase in inmate 
populations in most countries (Smartt, 1998).  (See Table 8, “Summary details of selected 
correctional establishment systems” below.)  This was the result of more punitive 
criminal justice policies that resulted from a swing toward conservative values in most of 
those countries in the 1980s, as well as a less tolerant public attitude toward crime and 
criminal behavior.  (Again, the parallels to American attitudes and policies are difficult to 
overlook.)  Additionally, economic issues led many to conclude that the solution to 
correctional budgetary woes might be found in income-producing or self-sustaining 
correctional programs (Smartt, 1998). 
 
Summary details of selected correctional establishment systems1 











Total correctional establishment population 12/31/96  
 57,000 57,000 10,000 8,000 15,000 39,000 8,700 
No. of correctional establishments 12/31/96 
 135 187 20 24 48 74 68 
Young offenders (under 21) as % of population 
 8.2 9 7 14.2 NA NA 4.4 
Prison population as % of total population, 1996 
 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.5 
Prison population as % of total population, 1986 
 0.95 0.84 NA NA 0.34 0.65 0.49 
Prison population as % of total population, 1983 
 0.88 0.70 NA NA 0.28 0.39 0.43 
1 Total population of countries as per questionnaire returned 12/31/96 by each Ministry 
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of Justice and the HM Prison Service. Source for other figures: Council of Europe, 
Prison Information Bulletin, various years.  
Source: Ursula Smart, Privatization Explosion – Prison Industries in Europe: Is 
correctional establishment labour becoming big business? Paper presented at 
Correctional Industries Association Training Conference. Cincinnati, Ohio. October 29, 
1998.  
 
 In England, a seminal report (The Gladstone Report, 1895) a century earlier had 
promoted a strong belief in the efficacy of inmate work, although subsequent evidence of 
the implementation of a policy of inmate work was described as “patchy” (Smartt, 1998). 
But by 1995, an inquiry into a prison escape resulted in a call for increased productivity 
and higher wages to facilitate management and rehabilitation of inmates, and to reduce 
costs (The Learmont Report, 1995). 
 At a forum held in 1996 in London, the leaders of European Departments of 
Justice and Correctional Industries commissioned a survey of European prison industries.  
Countries participating in the 1997 survey included Belgium, England, France, Germany 
(Lower Saxony and Baden-Wurttenberg), Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden.  
Results of the survey demonstrated that increasing attention was being given to 
correctional industries and joint ventures with the private sector (Smartt, 1998).  While 
the author of the Forum report maintained that few countries continued in the almost 
“naïve” beliefs of the 60s and 70s that inmate work would enhance “diligence” and 
promote “honesty,” there was consensus that educational, recreational and other 
programming should be scheduled around inmate work. 
 In spite of recent empirical findings in the U.S., the author, Ursula Smartt, in a 
1998 presentation to the Correctional Industries Association Training Conference in 
Cincinnati, complained that there was “little research evidence” to indicate that prison 
industries were associated with reduced recidivism.  Smartt called the findings of the 
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1995 Post Release Employment Project (PREP) “unclear.”  Nevertheless, she conceded 
that policymakers in both the U.S. and Europe remained convinced that prison-based 
work was likely to be associated with post-release work success.  Additionally, a number 
of European policymakers maintained that inmates were more likely to benefit from 
prison employment if they received enhanced wages, or other incentives.  Again, 
however, Smartt maintained that empirical evidence of this was unavailable, although a 
research project was reportedly underway to determine whether the newly-established 
British “incentive regimes” were effectively operating.  (The “Incentive Regimes for 
Inmates in English Penal Establishments” was implemented in 1996, and consisted of a 
“basic and enhanced” regime for prisoners.  Good behavior incentives provided for a 
“room with a view” or other desirable cell accommodations, increased telephone time or 
visiting privileges, or more commissary spending money.) 
 
Variations in European Correctional Industries in the Late 90s 
 Smartt reported that in Sweden’s correctional industries, all contracts were with 
private sector businesses, and that Swedish Prison and Probation Service goods were not 
manufactured within penal institutions—unlike England, where virtually all such goods 
and articles were (and are) produced in prison.  The Prison Enterprise Services (PES), 
though not involved (since 1995) in management of prison-based workshops, instead aids 
in developing contracts between the private sector, and advises prison administrators in 
sales and marketing. 
 In France, at the beginning of the millennium, prison inmates were not legally 
required to work, the result of a new law passed in 1992.  French correctional industries 
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maintained an “open job market” wherein private sector contractors paid enhanced wages 
to inmates in exchange for free prison-based work space.  Wages were often linked to the 
French minimum wage, and inmate wages were the highest in Europe.  Similar to PIE in 
the United States, some of the inmate wages were withheld for “personal maintenance” 
and victim “reparations,” with the remainder set aside for inmates at release from prison.  
The Regie Industrielle des Establissements Penitentiaire (RIEP) in France is part of the 
Penitentiary Administration, and primarily monitors inmate maintenance work in the 
prison setting.  The French Prison Administration maintains a wide network of vocational 
training and education.  Prior to release, inmates are linked to outside employment by the 
Department for Inmate Labour and Vocational Training (ibid.). 
 Italian correctional industries were reported to be virtually “dormant” due to a 
vigorous and influential trade union lobby that led to inmate entitlement to wages 
reflective of external industry pay scales.  As a result, correctional industries in Italy were 
effectively priced out of the market (ibid.). 
 In the Netherlands, correctional industries were not emphasized.  Instead, the 
emphasis was on post-release employment of offenders, who were required by law to 
work a minimum of 26 hours per week in order to qualify for participation in other 
“regime [work] activities.”  The passage of a new Dutch penal code in 1997 paved the 
way for inmate “resettlement into the workplace” following release.  These changes have 
created an environment in the Netherlands where work and vocational training are 
perceived as incentives (ibid.). 
 In Sweden, the correctional industries work day provided a range of programs, 
including education, occupational rehabilitation, social-skills training, and inmate 
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preparation for post-release reintegration into the external workforce.  Swedish 
correctional industries contracted only with outside firms; prison-based manufacturing of 
goods was not allowed.  However, since the mid-40s, the Swedish emphasis on work for 
inmates has been the prevailing philosophy (ibid.). 
 Table 9, “Work places available and taken up, selected countries,” (below) 
reveals correctional populations for six countries as of December 31, 1996.  The 
countries include England, France, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany (Baden 
Wurttenberg = BWB and Lower Saxony = LSX).  The Figure “Summary details of 
selected correctional establishment systems” (pp.72-3) also reveals the prison populations 
as a percentage of the total population for each country in 1996, 1986 and 1983. 
 
Work places available and taken up, selected countries 










Total correctional establishment population12/31/1996 
 57,000 57,000 10,000 8,000 15,000 39,000 8,700 
Total work places available 12/31/96 
 13,8281 10,700 6,103 2,800 4,400 Not given 2,000 
Total number of work places taken up by inmates 
 10,265 10,700 4,739 2,600 4,400 Not given 1,600 
Percentage of work/industries places taken up by inmates 
 74.23 100 77.65 92.85 73.33 Not given 80.00 
1 The English figure includes 2,000 inmates employed in ‘Farms and Gardens.’ 
Source: Ursula Smart, Privatization Explosion – Prison Industries in Europe: Is correctional 
establishment labour becoming big business? Paper presented at Correctional Industries 
Association Training Conference. Cincinnati, Ohio. October 29, 1998.  
 
 The European Industries Forum called attention to the conflicting need of 
correctional facilities to collaborate with the private sector to obtain inmate employment, 
and the need to avoid competing with community industry.  As in the United States, the 
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Forum also stressed the avoidance of inmate idleness and the importance of keeping 
inmates productively occupied.  Also as in the United States, the Report referred to the 
“ever increasing correctional population” resulting from harsher (longer) sentences and 
reduced parole and home leaves.  The Forum noted that it might play an important role in 
working with key stakeholders in prison industries: trade unions, chambers of commerce, 
correctional authorities and the private sector. 
 Table 10, “Deductions from inmates’ wages/earnings” reveals that the 
Netherlands alone among European countries took deductions for room and board, victim 
and family support, social security, “compulsory savings” and “debts.”  England took the 
same deductions, minus social security, while Spain, the polar opposite, took no 
deductions whatever—in spite of the fact that (together with France) it paid the highest 
wages to inmates among the European countries.  But the issue of inmate wage 
deductions was of increasing interest in most countries, although it was not known 
whether they affected inmates’ motivation to work, or whether they might have 
unintended consequences (Smartt, 1998). 
Deductions from inmates’ wages/earnings 











yes 10% 33% yes Yes  yes 




  Yes   
Victim support yes 20%   Yes  yes 
Family support yes    Yes  yes 
Debts yes  Yes yes Yes  yes 
Social 
Security/state 
 Yes 3.25% yes Yes   
Tax (1)    Yes   
 115 
1When the Prisoner’s Earnings Act 1996 has been implemented via Secondary Legislation, social security, 
tax, etc. will be payable when an inmate earns wages high enough to do so. Usually this occurs only where 
an inmate is working outside the correctional institution prior to release. Although the subordinate 
legislation dealing with deductions is not yet in place, deductions are already being made at some open or 
semi-open correctional establishments such as HMP Leyhill in West England and HMP Latchmere House in 
London’s Richmond Park.  
Source: Ursula Smart, Privatization Explosion – Prison Industries in Europe: Is correctional establishment 
labour becoming big business? Paper presented at Correctional Industries Association Training Conference. 
Cincinnati, Ohio. October 29, 1998.  
 
 Non-monetary incentives were offered in many countries.  France, in spite of its 
high inmate wage rates, also offered the broadest range of non-wage incentives.  On the 
other hand, England—paying the lowest inmate wages—offered the fewest incentives. 
 While there are clearly similarities in correctional practices in European nations in 
the area of prison industries, there are also clear differences (e.g., France has ended the 
requirement for inmates to work, while the Netherlands have initiated it).  Similarities 
include efforts in many countries to link inmate wages to productivity; initiation of 
inmate wage deductions like room and board and “victim support,” as well as social 
security and taxes and attempts to collaborate with the private sector. 
 One perplexing finding is that not every potential inmate job is filled.  It is not 
known whether this is the result of inmates refusing to work (possibly because of 
inadequate wages) or structural shortcomings of undetermined origin. 
 Remarkably (from the U.S. point of view), there are no legal restrictions to the 
production of goods by the private sector in correctional facilities in any European nation. 
 
Conclusion 
 The significance of the history of prison industries in the United States cannot be 
overlooked if one is to have a substantive understanding of the development of prison 
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industries in the 21st century, particularly with regard to the PIE program.  Union 
resistance began early, along with resistance from those who considered their jobs to be 
threatened by inmate employment.  The fact that such resistance continues today does not 
mean that there has been no progress, only that progress has been tedious. 
 Additionally, the abuses of the past, particularly regarding the exploitation of 
inmate labor, are not forgotten, nor should they be.  At least one state (as we shall see) 
has discontinued its PIE program because of a constitutional amendment passed more 
than 100 years ago—the direct result of past abuses and exploitation of inmate labor. 
 If we are to reduce recidivism, the importance of cultivating the work ethic among 
inmates can be viewed as a crucial step in the rehabilitation process.  Knowledge of and 
familiarity with past problems and their causes is essential if we are to avoid them in the 
future.  Those whose task it is to implement effective prison industries are not unmindful 
of much of the history of inmate labor in the U.S. 
 As we have seen, our European neighbors have faced some of the same issues that 
we have—including get-tough-on-crime public attitudes and collateral growth in 
correctional populations—and explored comparable correctional programming.  As the 
trend toward globalization continues, the potential for sharing information and techniques 
may increase. 
 Political, economic and legal issues have affected the development of prison 









In this chapter, the study’s methodological rationale is introduced.  The 
researcher’s experience as an interviewer is described, and a detailed description 
of methods used for the study is provided.  Limitations of the study are itemized 
and specified. 
 
Case Study Methodology 
 A case study is most likely to be responsive to questions of “how’ or “why” (Yin, 
1994).  Whereas many case studies require the researcher to develop at least one 
proposition, an exploratory case study is often appropriately explained by its purpose 
(ibid.).  One purpose of this study is to identify legal, political and economic factors that 
may have contributed to the successful implementation and development of the PIE 
program in South Carolina.   
This study combines overlapping aspects of exploratory, explanatory, and 
historical case study.  It is exploratory in the sense that the PIE program, even after 
nearly three decades of existence, remains virtually unknown in the larger society; the 
general public, the media—and indeed, even policymakers—remain largely uninformed 
about the program, how it works, and what its full potential may be.  As a consequence, 
this study will explore and identify issues related to development and implementation of 
the PIE initiative. 
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The study is explanatory in that it seeks, ultimately, to respond to the “how” and 
“why” questions of the South Carolina PIE program (i.e., how were challenges met and 
overcome? How did the state become a leader in development of enhanced prison 
industries in the United States?  Why was the state’s PIE program the largest in the 
country, even though South Carolina is a mid-sized state?).  
Finally, this study is historical, in that it includes a macro-view of correctional 
history to facilitate analysis of prison industries, problems, and policies today. 
Yin tells us that 
(t)he case study relies on many of the same techniques as a history, but it adds 
two sources of evidence not usually included in the historian’s repertoire: direct 
observation and systematic interviewing.  And although case studies and histories 
can overlap, the case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full 
variety of evidence—documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations—beyond 
what might be available in the conventional historical study.12    
 
Much has been written—and much of it critical—about case study research.  The 
prevailing attitude of many researchers is to view the case study as a kind of stepchild or 
“weak sister” of (what critics view as) the stronger, more robust family of social science 
methodologies (ibid.).  In spite of this, however, many researchers continue to favor the 
case study method in certain kinds of research, e.g., when a “how” or “why” question is 
asked, or when improved understanding of a contemporary phenomenon is sought and 
the researcher has little or no control over the phenomenon being examined (ibid.).  
                                                 
12 Case Study Research: Design and Methods (1994), p. 8. 
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 For research purposes, my unit of analysis is the South Carolina PIE program.  
Yin recommends establishing “time boundaries” to define the beginning and end of a 
case study.  My time boundaries are 1996 to 2005. 
 
Methods 
 As a newcomer to the area of prison industries and as aspiring researcher, it was 
clear that I must begin with a literature review of both the research and the history of U.S. 
prison industries.  By the time I had conducted these reviews, I had a solid footing and 
sense of what the issues were, and who at least some of the key players and stakeholders 
might be.  I was now confronted by the need to begin my interviews, gain entry into 
actual PIE programs and prisons, specifically in South Carolina.  I knew, too, that I 
needed to access the resources of the National Correctional Industries Association to 
interview the executive director—and a host of others.  How could I persuade people I 
had never met to grant me interviews?  Indeed, how could I get them to even accept my 
calls?13 
But I was not inexperienced in the criminal justice field, and as a result of my 
years in the field as a state parole board member, as a federal parole commissioner, and 
as a researcher and writer, I was not without contacts, at least in the corrections 
community. 
 My experience as a journalist and writer for magazines like Parade and Reader’s 
Digest stood me in good stead.  It was as a result of my writing for Parade Magazine, in 
particular, that I had mastered the art of tracking down sometimes reluctant interviewees 
                                                 
13 Michael Agar (1996) refers to this as the need to “find a social trail from yourself to your first 
informant.” 
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and difficult-to-reach public figures (e.g., the civil rights icon, Rosa Parks, controversial 
New York City cop Frank Serpico, and others), persuading them to meet me and grant 
extended interviews.  I was not a person who gave up easily.  I prided myself on being 
“courteously persistent.”  I did not allow my pride to get in the way of an important 
interview, even when it took many calls to reach the subject I needed to interview. 
As a long-time student, I knew how to take notes, and as one whose magazine 
pieces were scrutinized by “fact checkers14” in the past, I knew that the ability to take 
accurate notes was even more important than the ability to take copious notes. 
 My criminal justice experience, above all, facilitated my efforts.  I started at the 
“top” by calling a former old friend from my days as chairman of the Tennessee Board of 
Pardons and Paroles, Bobby Vassar, the former chair of the Virginia Parole Board, who 
was now Legislative Counsel of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Bobby, I knew, had been very much involved with prison industries 
controversy associated with the Federal Prison Industries (FPI).  I contacted Tom Kane, 
Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)15, and asked for advice as to 
how best to proceed.  Both Bobby and Tom gave me a boost by encouraging me to use 
their names as I embarked on my preliminary search for appropriate interviewees. 
 From my literature review, I identified at least a dozen subjects who were “musts” 
in terms of interviews:  e.g., Tony Ellis, Director of S.C. Prison Industries, Gwyn-Smith 
Ingly, Executive Director of the National Correctional Industries Association (NCIA); 
Barbara Auerbach, National Prison Industries Enhancement Program Coordinator; Tom 
Petersik, George Washington University Professor of Economics, and one of the authors 
                                                 
14 Magazines like Parade and Reader’s Digest employ professional fact checkers whose job it is to verify 
and confirm virtually every possible detail of nonfiction articles. 
15 Tom Kane, Ph.D. was also a member of my dissertation committee. 
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of a recent, groundbreaking study of PIE program beneficiaries.  I resolved to attend 
NCIA annual conferences in order to “network”, attend workshops, and obtain a clearer 
picture of what the issues were.  (Note list of interviewees in Appendix.) 
 Having been in many prisons around the country, I was comfortable with inmates.  
As a member the Tennessee Parole Board, I had maintained a rapport with prisoners, and 
I was frequently invited to speak to such groups as the “Lifers Club,” a prison-based 
association whose membership consisted only of those with life sentences.  This kind of 
experience was invaluable, in that I knew the “culture” of prisons and the correctional 
bureaucracy, as well as the inmate culture itself.  I was not easily “conned16.” 
 I had been briefly involved in an ethnographic study of battered women in New 
York City in the 1990s.  As a former battered wife, it was not difficult for me to relate to 
my interviewees.  One ethnographer, Michael Agar (1996), has written: 
. . . group members are going to wonder who you are.  They will listen to you and 
watch your behavior and they will draw on their own repertoire of social 
categories to find one that fits you.  At the beginning, you will offer some 
explanation of what your interests are and what it is you intend to do.17  
 
This was precisely what I did.  On  first meeting—or calling—my subject, I would 
introduce myself as a long-time member of the criminal justice field, briefly citing my 
                                                 
16 There is no question that my years of professional experience in the criminal justice field facilitated my 
ability to evaluate what I saw. When, subsequently, I visited actual prison industries sites, and interviewed 
inmate workers, I was astounded by the industriousness and energy I witnessed—radically different from 
the inmates I had seen years earlier, indolently pushing mops around the floors of the reception area, for 
example, of the Tennessee State Prison. 
17 The Professional Stranger, 1996, pp. 104-05. 
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experience, and then explain that I was now conducting research for my dissertation.  I 
emphasized my interest in prison industries, and my awareness of its importance. 
Agar, a career ethnographer, maintains that cultural differences and similarities 
(between the interviewer and interviewee) are important in that they provide the initial 
framework with which the researcher/interviewer gauges his or her findings.  But I found 
this to be a two-way street.  My experience reassured them that I was not a novice.  As a 
member of the criminal justice system, I was accorded at least a modicum of respect as 
one who understood what the correctional administrator was up against; this engendered 
a willingness to give me the benefit of the doubt, and rightly so—as in fact, I understood 
very well what bureaucratic and political hurdles correctional officials must constantly 
make, having attempted some of those hurdles myself in the past. 
 On the issue of taking notes, Agar points out that that the ethnographer just 
beginning his study has a problem:  “because you don’t yet know what is significant, you 
don’t know what to record.”  While I found this to be true initially, over time I began to 
have a surer sense of what to ask, and what to record.  I tape recorded some (though by 
no means all) interviews.  (I sensed that a tape recorder would make most people uneasy, 
and thus less likely to extemporaneously expound.)  Instead, I asked questions, and 
allowed my interviewees to respond and elaborate.  Of course, some were less 
forthcoming than others, but on the whole, I succeeded in establishing a comfortable 
rapport with the people I talked to, virtually all of whom volunteered the names (and 
telephone numbers, email addresses, etc.) of other appropriate contacts. 
 I did not use a standardized questionnaire.  I considered this, but realized that the 
scope and breadth of experience and variety of roles of my subjects were too varied to 
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accommodate standardization.  In her research on private prisons in Texas, Cummins 
(2000) alluded to this reality.  ”I would argue,” she wrote, “that because of the 
uniqueness and complexity of implementing any given public policy, it is unlikely that 
any real methodological standardization is possible.  To standardize is to lose the richness 
and texture of the data.” 
 Agar, too, makes reference to the issue of systematic interviews or testing when 
conducting ethnographical research: 
Systematic means that each informant’s behavior is fit into the same 
framework.  The assumption is that if the framework is the same, then any 
differences among informants will be due to their response, not to changes in the 
framework.  Long ago we surrendered that fiction.  Even in the most carefully 
controlled situation, the ethnographer-informant relationship is too complicated 
to support that assumption. 
On the other hand, there are degrees of standardization.  In informal 
fieldwork, one strength is the ability to adapt questions to the personal and 
situational demands of the moment.18  
  
Agar maintains that better information may be obtained when the interviewer is 
able to adapt questions appropriate to individual situations, but he also emphasizes that 
difficulties accrue, related to recording nuanced meanings and interpretation.  But he 
reiterates that standardization is virtually impossible in informal fieldwork. 
 Other issues, of course, are associated with the interview process.  I found that 
many of those interviewed were articulate and wide-ranging in response to my questions.  
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 181. 
 124 
It can be difficult to record every word, of course, and I sometimes jotted down key 
words and phrases during my interview,   Afterward, I would adjourn to a private area as 
soon as possible, where I could review my notes, filling in and clarifying my notes.  My 
notes always indicated direct quotes from subjects. 
 A more complicated process was pulling together my interview notes into topical 
areas.  Obviously, when we’re conversing, most of us move freely from subject to 
subject, which can result in scattered note-taking.  To interrupt the informative 
interviewee may be to lose important data.  My solution for this (after ensuring that I had 
attended to the filling in and clarification in my notes as mentioned previously) was to 
circle topical areas, and number them by topic.  When writing, I tried to present related 
topics cohesively, crossing out each topic as I used it.  Agar describes this process: 
. . .  one should lay out the entire stretch of talk to see what one has . . .  
 The simplest way to begin is to take a pencil and go through the 
transcripts, marking off stretches of talk that cohere because they focus on the 
same topic.  This is not an automatic procedure by any means. . . . 
 As you go through the transcripts, you’ll begin to notice that some topics 
recur.19 
      
Data Sources 
 The interviews, documents, observations and artifacts that Yin calls “the full body 
of evidence” obtainable in case studies were all included in this study.  I gathered reports, 
documents and data from the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) and 
many other sources (listed in the Appendix).  Additionally, I obtained NCIA records that 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 153. 
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assisted in the development of several graphs to facilitate understanding of the extent to 
which South Carolina’s PIE program grew over the decade 1996-2005, compared to other 
states’ PIE initiatives. 
 I visited individual SCDC prison industries located around the state.  I visited the 
off-site offices of the state’s largest PIE program, Anderson Flooring, in Clinton, South 
Carolina.  I attended three consecutive NCIA annual conferences, observing and 
occasionally participating in PIE-related workshops.  I observed and listened to many of 
the country’s prison industries leaders in such workshops.  My presence was not 
advertised, but often after workshop presentations, I introduced myself to presenters, 
explaining my interest and asking for business cards, leads, and interviews. 
 Agar talks about the need for ethnographers to “always try to falsify their 
conclusions,” and Yin writes of the need to “triangulate” interviews and data obtained.  
Journalists approach the same challenges by maintaining a healthy skepticism, and 
constantly seeking additional information or witnesses to “back up” their findings.  (A 
good journalist is, after all, somewhat of an ethnographic researcher.)  This I did, even 
when I found my interviewees to be wholly credible.  By doing so, I was better able to 
ensure the accuracy and detail of my writing. 
 By visiting actual prison industries sites, I was able to observe the prison-factory 
setting firsthand, and to see the manufacturing process in all its iterations.  Inmates rarely 
glanced my way, as their work required focus and almost constant activity, and precluded 
loss of concentration. 
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I did not limit my prison industries observations to PIE programs; I also visited 
traditional and service industries, some of which were located at or near the PIE sites.  
Also, I collected brochures, business cards, and samples along the way. 
  
Limitations of This Study 
 As a student of research, I have made every effort to identify and explore key 
issues and factors essential to a thorough understanding of enhanced prison industries.  
Nevertheless, there are limitations to my study.  In particular, I regret not being able to 
reach the chairman of the South Carolina Penology Committee.  Although I called 
repeatedly, it eventually became clear that he did not want to be interviewed for this 
study.  Since the Penology Committee had spearheaded a critical review of South 
Carolina’s prison industries, my expectation was that the Chairman or his designee would 
be all-too-willing to explicate on their report.  This was not the case. 
 Eventually of course, I sought other interviewees who could address this issue, 
but I was not able to identify or locate a spokesman for the legislative report or its 
contents.  On the other hand, several people told me they were convinced that it was 
“politically motivated” although they were not knowledgeable about specifics.  My 
inclination, overall, was to wonder about the authenticity of the report itself.  And, 
granting that it had been critical, why was it that apparent good-faith efforts by SCDC to 
respond to the report were disregarded?  At any rate, as a researcher and as a 
professional, I can only speculate on this; it is not possible to make informed conclusions. 
 Other limitations relate to my efforts to contrast and compare South Carolina’s 
economic environment to that of the five other states I reviewed.  I did not visit the five 
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states’ PIE programs.  In particular, my study could have been enriched if I had been able 
to observe other prison industries models of such states.  Likewise, it would have been 
informative and helpful to have interviewed the PIE directors of the five state 
programs—and to have spent time with their staff (as I did in South Carolina)—but time 
and budgetary constraints made that impossible.  I wish to emphasize that virtually all of 
the contacts I established in the states of Florida, Iowa, Tennessee and Texas were helpful 
and forthcoming.  The one exception was the state of Washington, where, ironically, the 
PIE program had been abolished.  Perhaps this was the root cause of my unreturned calls 
and emails, but again, this is only speculation. 
 I would have preferred to interview chambers of commerce and labor 
representatives, although there was ample evidence and documentation of the 
complicated relationships that exist between and among these officials and PIE leaders. 
 In spite of these limitations, however, I believe this study contributes to the 















SOUTH CAROLINA PRISON INDUSTRIES: 1996 – 2005 
 
In this chapter, South Carolina’s PIE program, the largest in the U.S., is 
introduced.  Its economic conditions and political environment are described in 
order to establish differences and/or similarities with five states to be examined in 
the following chapter.  Many factors affect the successful implementation of a PIE 
program, and while most are common among other states, individual prison 
industries directors meet the challenges entailed in distinctly personal and 
contrasting management styles.  We will review how South Carolina’s director of 
prison industries has met such challenges. 
 
South Carolina: A Mid-Size State with a Large PIE Program 
 Before reviewing prison industries in South Carolina, it should be reiterated 
that—although there are often similarities among state criminal justice systems—there 
are also numerous differences.  It would be inaccurate to say that a specific state can be 
representative of all or even most other states.  As already mentioned, criminal laws vary 
among virtually all the states, and thus the definition of who may be designated a felon or 
a misdemeanant may vary among states. These differences (and many others) contribute 
to the difficulties attached to comparing state justice systems (Gaes et al., 2004). 
 Similarly, prison populations differ in important ways.  Some issues that relate to 
the study of prison industries participants include variations in gender, age, length of 
terms of imprisonment and security levels, as well as the kind of prison industry and its 
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requirements, including criteria for participation and other factors.  However, this study is 
of prison industries models and categories, and the identification of factors which explain 
or impede their progress. 
In 2005, South Carolina, a mid-size state with a mid-size prison population, had 
the largest Prison Industries Enhancement program in the nation, as well as a 
representative range of prison industries.  A telephone survey of knowledgeable prison 
industries leaders in the U.S.20 resulted in consensus that the state offered a thorough 
assortment of prison industries programs, whether traditional, service, or enhanced.  (The 
state also has four federal prison industries programs.) 
Indeed, the fact that this mid-sized state had an unusually well developed PIE 
program made it ripe for examination, especially because South Carolina’s establishment 
of the PIE program paved the way for other southern states, according to at least one 
knowledgeable PIE proponent, Barbara Auerbach (National Prison Industries 
Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) Coordinator.  While most states have had 
only modest success in establishing PIE programs, what factors contributed to South 
Carolina’s achievements?  Cumulative data maintained by the NCIA beginning in 1979 
through the second quarter of 2005 indicated that South Carolina ranked first (among PIE 
states) in gross wages collected ($46,660,876); victim program contributions 
($7,367,567); family support contributions ($5,312,225); taxes paid $6,364.460; total 
deductions $25,533,729); and Net Wages ($21,127,146).  The state ranked fifth in room 
and board collected, and second in mandatory savings ($2,775,283).  (See Graphic,   
                                                 
20 Those surveyed included the (then-current) executive director of the National Correctional Industries 
Association (NCIA), Gwyn Smith-Ingley; the National PIECP) Coordinator, Barbara Auerbach; George 
Washington University (GWU) Research Professor of Economics, Tom Petersik; Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law Professor Emerita, Joan E. Baker; Federal Bureau of Prisons UNICOR Chief 
Administrative Officer, Robert C. Grieser; and others. 
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“Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program Cumulative Data for 1979 through 
2nd Quarter 2005.”)   
 
 
Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program 











Deductions Net Wages 
Mandatory 
Savings 
AK 309,689 15,761 110,294 8,986 40,051 175,092 134,597 0 
AZ 9,157,764 934,164 2,395,665 74,337 1,328,879 4,733,045 4,424,719 1,139,751 
CA 29,642,066 4,847,092 5,015,196 2,974,347 4,678,974 17,515,609 12,126,457 1,293,133 
CO 2,538,350 486,043 486,087 128,564 201,318 1,302,012 1,236,339 167,111 
CT 2,272,845 114,941 460,008 33,496 261,838 870,283 1,402,562 0 
DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FL 3,353,772 510,852 1,334,935 107,390 330,317 2,283,494 1,070,278 11,459 
HI 1,507,923 126,954 300,516 58,974 265,465 751,909 756,014 37,842 
ID 5,556,298 295,399 2,079,743 248,550 697,845 3,321,536 2,234,762 100,478 
IN 14,943,297 1,495,518 5,988,827 321 2,486,725 9,971,391 4,971,906 2,823,511 
IA 17,929,981 1,649,518 6,156,296 1,595,973 3,696,641 13,098,428 4,831,553 1,480,612 
KS 35,341,341 1,525,329 8,187,128 205,178 5,989,799 15,907,435 19,433,906 858,543 
LA 1,294,237 113,074 339,133 0 204,837 657,045 637,193 84,691 
ME 852,430 42,589 166,785 18,550 41,010 268,935 583,495 0 
MD 384,507 37,767 115,355 8,458 16,898 178,478 206,029 0 
Hennepin 
County, MN  60,639 0 23,427 2,387 1,569 27,383 33,256 0 
MN 23,549,440 1,515,746 8,903,173 726,884 2,125,945 13,271,749 10,277,691 0 
MS 109,064 13,134 33,117 25 25 46,302 62,762 0 
MO 785,341 39,267 196,338 59,229 91,963 386,797 398,544 0 
MT 127,684 10,363 54,910 3,455 4,114 72,842 54,842 0 
NE 12,012,821 604,801 2,752,999 1,714,627 1,610,810 6,683,237 5,329,584 290,881 
NV 16,381,558 815,055 4,260,865 336,835 1,479,408 6,892,163 9,489,395 96,550 
Belknap 
County, NH 121,555 5,811 41,317 906 15,922 63,957 57,598 0 
Strafford 
County, NH 1,175,404 58,630 660,787 1,230 10,271 730,919 444,485 4,521 
NM 64,358 10,203 0 2,696 5,381 18,280 46,078 0 
NC 7,526,250 410,875 1,970,227 352,374 1,300,924 4,034,400 3,491,850 0 
ND 1,032,053 51,641 457,629 160,620 113,306 783,196 248,857 39,866 
OH 83,075 16,598 21,786 93 15,432 53,909 29,166 0 
OK 3,792,018 176,229 1,015,327 188,543 561,284 1941383 1,850,636 513 
OR 9,155,746 452,293 5,230,036 466,221 658,442 6,806,992 2,348,754 0 
SC 46,660,876 7,367,567 6,489,477 5,312,225 6,364,460 25,533,729 21,127,146 2,775,283 
SD 4,261,211 255,460 1,266,150 255,460 609,716 2,386,786 1,874,424 0 
TN  4,353,317 218,847 2,261,909 0 30,164 2,510,920 1,842,397 113,344 
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TX Oversight 
Authority  26,599,814 3,266,265 9,574,623 3,435,167 3,447,894 19,723,948 6,875,865 427,275 
Red River 
County, TX  43,565 2,178 7,908 4,726 7,909 22,721 20,844 0 
UT County  2,589,749 140,007 1,669,976 0 261,647 2,071,630 518,119 167,530 
UT 13,239,225 1,122,665 4,743,413 136,245 286,874 6,289,197 6,950,028 0 
VT 695,017 136,000 211,447 119,494 72,949 539,889 155,128 0 
VA 701,344 69,325 344,581 8,288 78,345 500,539 200,805 0 
WA 35,859,750 2,827,609 7,405,345 1,843,743 5,525,641 17,602,338 18,257,412 465,207 
WA Jail 
Industries  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WI 2,833,676 148,362 1,410,446 99,665 223,980 1,882,453 951,223 0 
WY 267,969 28,505 92,207 17,398 35,519 173,629 94,340 29,743 
 
TOTAL 339,167,019 31,958,437 94,235,388 20,711,660 45,180,491 192,085,979 147,081,040 12,407,844 
 
 
South Carolina Cumulative Data Compared to Five Other States 
 The Graphic   “Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program Cumulative 
Data, 2nd Quarter 1996 through 2nd Quarter 2005” reflects total inmate wages, 
contributions and deductions for the decade under review, 1996 through 2005.  (For 
informational purposes, five states to be contrasted with South Carolina later in this paper 
are included.)  The data demonstrate virtually the same profile for South Carolina:  for 
the ten year study period, the state (still) ranked 1st in gross wages ($38,777,503), victim 
program contributions ($6,973,238), family support contributions ($4,162,944), and total 
deductions ($21,518,761); it ranked 2nd in taxes paid ($5,058,215), and 5th in room and 
board paid ($5,324,365). 
 
Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program 
Cumulative Data for Six States 
 
2nd Quarter 1996 through 2nd Quarter 2005 
 
 Gross         Victim       Room &            Family    Total 
State Wages       Programs   Board   Support Taxes  Deducts 
 
FL      3,353,772      510,852        1,334,935        107,390 330,317        2,283,494 
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IA     17,751,544   1,640,554      6,144,549     1,558,100     3,675,146      13,000,349 
 
SC    38,777,503    6,973,238      5,324,365     4,162,944     5,058,215      21,518,761 
 
TN      3,180,180       153,429      1,591,603          -0-      7,197         1,752,229 
 
TX    25,154,703    2,940,030      8,998,510     3,134,236     3,156,152      18,288,837 
 
WA* 27,360,855   2,401,135       5,981,646    1,719,256     4,587,555       14,689,592 
 
 
Note:  Washington’s PIE program was terminated in 2004. 
 




Cost Benefits of Prison Industries in South Carolina 
 Cost benefits can be measured in several ways.  Benefits may accrue if the 
program that reduces idleness among prison inmates leads to a reduction in prison 
population management expenditures.  Cost benefits may be associated with the monies 
saved as a result of reductions in recidivism (e.g., a drop in the costs of crime, or a drop 
in the costs of prosecution and re-incarceration, etc.).  Cost benefits may accrue when 
prison industries graduates move into productive employment upon release, and become 
tax-paying citizens.  Obviously, the cost benefits associated with reduced recidivism 
combined with the cost benefits of increased post-release employment are greater than 
the cost benefits associated with only reduced recidivism or increased post-release 
employment. 
 Because there are three contemporary types of prison industries (traditional, 
service and PIE), the interested observer may anticipate a different level of effectiveness 
(in terms of cost benefits) for each and such differentials may have distinct implications 
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for public policy.  However, unlike many prison-based treatment programs (e.g., drug 
treatment or educational programming), prison industries have the potential to be both 
self-sustaining and profitable.  In this regard, it is reasonable, therefore, to examine 
whether one model (e.g., traditional prison industries) may be less cost beneficial than 
another model (e.g., the PIE model, or enhanced prison industries).  Indeed, while there 
are cost savings to be realized in identifying effective treatment strategies with almost 
any prison-based program, the potential for a program to be self-supporting or even 
profitable cannot be ignored. 
 Thus, a state that has a robust category of each type of prison industries 
(traditional, service or PIE) may provide rich investigative soil for academicians and 
researchers—and important policy implications associated with each category.  South 
Carolina is such a state. 
 To maximize and enrich our analysis of the state’s PIE program, the PIE 
initiatives of five other states (Florida, Iowa, Tennessee, Texas and Washington) will be 
examined subsequently.  These other states will provide differential PIE models and 
types, as well as economic, political and legal contrasts. 
 
State of the State of South Carolina: Crime, Jobs and Industry 
The U.S. Census Bureau’s 2003 Statistical Abstract of the United States revealed 
that South Carolina’s imprisonment rate was 17 percent above the national imprisonment 
rate.  The state ranked 42nd among the 50 states in Personal Income Per Capita, while the 
state’s unemployment rate of 6.1 percent was higher than the national unemployment rate 
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of 5.7 percent.  South Carolina lost 41,300 jobs the same year (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003). 
 According to data published by the National Institute of Corrections (NIC), in 
2004, South Carolina’s crime rate was approximately 29 percent higher than the national 
average.  For every 100,000 citizens in the state, 5,289 crimes were committed, compared 
to a national average of 3,983.  The state’s crime rate per 100,000 residents ranked 
second in the nation, at 5,289 compared to the national average of 3,983.  For a 10-year 
overview of South Carolina costs per inmate, see Graphic, “South Carolina Department 
of Corrections Cost Per Inmate* Fiscal Years 1996-2006.” 
 
South Carolina Department of Corrections 
Cost Per Inmate* Fiscal Years 1996-2006 
Fiscal Year 
Based on State Funds Spent Based on All Funds Spent** 
Annual Cost 
Per Inmate 




Daily Cost Per 
Inmate 
1996 $12,849  $33.83  $13,315  $36.38  
1997 $13,141  $36.00  $13,857  $37.96  
1998 $13,845  $37.93  $14,318  $39.23  
1999 $14,210  $38.93  $15,336  $42.02  
2000 $15,142  $41.37  $16,024  $43.78  
2001 $15,968  $43.75  $17,076  $46.78  
2002 $13,023  $35.68  $14,975  $41.03  
2003 $12,353  $33.84  $13,962  $38.25  
2004 $12,170  $33.25  $13,590  $37.13  
2005 $12,096  $33.14  $13,988  $38.32  
2006 $13,170  $36.08  $15,156  $41.52  
*Calculation of the SCDC per inmate costs is based on the average number of inmates in 
SCDC facilities and does not include state inmates held in designated facilities, institutional 
diversionary programs, or other non-SCDC locations. 
**State, Federal and Special Revenues (Excludes Permanent Improvement, Purchases for 
Resale, Canteen, Prison Industries, Improvement Enterprise Funds, and Interest and 
Principle Payments) 
Based on 365 days per year, except leap year when 366 days are used.  






In 2004, the FBI reported that the state ranked seventh in the nation in its 
incarceration rate: 539 state inmates per 100,000 residents, compared to the national 
average of 432.  The South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) managed 22,703 
inmates at that time.  In terms of cost per inmate, South Carolina ranked among the 
lowest, 11th in the nation in the same year.  (Additional tables depicting the state 
compared to the five other states mentioned above will be presented later in this study.) 
Reynolds (2004) described the state as “slightly advantaged” in terms of its post-
release job market for offenders, compared to Texas, Indiana, Utah and Rhode Island, 
part of his five-state study of post-release job markets (where South Carolina was 
selected to represent mid-size states).  His rationale was based on the state’s job 
opportunities for unskilled workers.  Reynolds reported that the state’s jobs were 
concentrated in the areas of construction, manufacturing, leisure/hospitality and 
government.  However, South Carolina’s 6.8 percent job decline in manufacturing 
exceeded the national decline of 3.9 percent, and was accelerated by the state’s loss of 
textile and apparel industries jobs (Reynolds, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) job 
growth projections from 2002 to 2012 anticipated a robust growth (nationally) in low-
skill and low-wage jobs; 60 percent of the expected growth was in work where on-the-job 
training could suffice.  This was not necessarily exciting news for inmates hoping for a 
better life on the outside, but it did suggest that at least some job opportunity existed. 
Not surprisingly, the BLS reported an inverse relationship between 
earnings/education and unemployment; the more advanced the degree (e.g., the range 
between “some high school, no diploma” and “Master’s degree), the higher the median 
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earnings (e.g., in 2001, $22,400 for the former and $56,600 for the latter).  As might be 
expected, the unemployment range inversely matched earnings and education (e.g., 2002 
unemployment range from 9.2 percent for college graduate level to 2.8 percent for “some 
high school, no diploma”).  Perhaps more surprisingly, college graduates who began their 
studies at a community college did almost as well as those who began in a four-year 
college (Gill and Leigh, 2003).  Since it’s presumably easier for offenders to attend a 
community college than a four-year college, they, their families and advocates might feel 
encouraged. 
It is common knowledge in the criminal justice field that minority population 
ratios are typically strong correlates of the crime rate (Reynolds, 2004); in 2003, BLS 
data showed that South Carolina ranked third in the nation in terms of its minority 
population. 
Research has shown that the birth rate of out-of-wedlock mothers are associated 
with future crime rates (Morse, 2003).  While a fatherless home may not be an inviolate 
predictor of crime, the majority of delinquent youth (more than 7 out of 10) are from 
single-parent homes (Reynolds, 2004).  In 2001, South Carolina led the nation in the 
percentage of total births to unmarried women; and in 2003, the state was also nearly 43 
percent above the national violent crime rate (BLS). 
 
South Carolina’s Strong Local Economy: 1996 – 2005 
 According to an article in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution in September 2006, 
South Carolina could boast of one of the 
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hottest local economies in the country.  Home to the new Federal Reserve Board 
chairman Ben Bernanke, the state historically has offered mostly agricultural and 
textile industries.  However, Interstate 85, which slices through the western third 
of the state, has attracted international manufacturers like BMW and Michelin, 
along with a host of related “job-rich feeder companies. (Pinkerton, Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution, 2006). 
 
 But even as far back as 1995, the National Real Estate Investor (Sinderman, M., 
1995) reported that the real estate market in the state was 
robust due to the strong local economy that has enhanced the state’s reputation 
as a site for businesses.  South Carolina’s positive reputation is attracting many 
firms that are relocating and are seeking a pro-business, economically vital 
location.  The relocation of businesses to South Carolina has offset the negative 
economic consequences of the demilitarization of the area.  (Sinderman, National 
Real Estate Investor, 1995). 
 
 In the early 1970s, the state’s population was 2.5 million, and by 2006 the 
population had grown to 4 million—a 60 percent increase.  South Carolina is also home 
to the Clemson Institute for the Study of Capitalism, and known for its pro-business 
attitude and nonunion environment (Pinkerton, 2006). 
 BLS data reveal that South Carolina’s labor force rose from more than 1.8 million 
in January 1996 to nearly 2.1 million in January 2005 (See Graphic, “BLS Local Area 
Statistics, 1996-2006, States of Florida, Iowa, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and 
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Washington”.)  Labor statistics also reveal that employment rose during the same decade, 
from 1.7+ million to 1.9+ million, although the unemployment rate also rose, from 5.4 to 
6.7 percent.21  In September 2006, Pinkerton reported that the unemployment rate for the 
state was at 4.7 percent.  (State comparisons described in next chapter.) 
 
BLS Local Area Statistics, 1996-2006, States of Florida, 
Iowa, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Washington 
Labor Force 
 Florida  
 
Iowa  South 
Carolina  
Tennessee  Texas  Washington  
1996 7,207,707 1,609,270 1,892,377 2,758,346 9,736,646 2,882,432 
1997 7,408,862 1,606,503 1,903,857 2,788,348 9,926,594 2,966,651 
1998 7,572,631 1,602,865 1,918,305 2,811,700 10,097,882 3,032,019 
1999 7,710,988 1,602,634 1,956,674 2,838,738 10,250,025 3,066,165 
2000 7,869,690 1,601,920 1,972,850 2,871,539 10,347,847 3,050,021 
2001 7,998,062 1,622,012 1,943,102 2,863,516 10,519,335 3,052,714 
2002 8,124,930 1,632,108  1,956,803  2,867,108 10,803,187 3,104,698 
2003 8,245,658 1,614,859  2,002,076  2,884,988 10,999,132 3,149,243 
2004 8,451,099 1,617,955  2,039,060  2,891,533 11,127,293 3,208,946 
2005 8,710,827 1,639,703  2,079,339  2,920,400 11,282,845 3,270,480 
2006 8,988,611 1,664,339  2,126,439  2,990,152 11,487,496 3,326,524 
Employment 
 Florida   
Iowa  South 
Carolina  
Tennessee  Texas  Washington  
1996 6,826,997 1,551,200 1,785,646 2,610,975 9,175,983 2,711,963 
1997 7,040,660 1,555,837 1,819,508 2,640,005 9,395,279 2,822,223 
1998 7,232,345 1,556,479 1,849,075 2,685,151 9,600,982 2,886,871 
1999 7,401,659 1,560,848 1,876,895 2,722,124 9,766,299 2,917,577 
2000 7,569,406 1,557,081 1,902,029 2,756,498 9,896,002 2,898,677 
2001 7,624,718 1,568,638 1,842,291 2,728,523 9,991,920 2,863,705 
2002 7,662,511 1,567,836 1,840,598  2,714,992 10,115,299 2,877,022 
2003 7,811,887 1,543,507 1,8683,09  2,720,676 10,260,318 2,916,045 
2004 8,056,259 1,542,342 1,900,122  2,733,793 10,456,224 3,008,352 
2005 8,375,993 1,568,561 1,939,646  2,758,184 10,677,171 3,089,953 
2006 8,692,761 1,602,849 1,988,378  2,835,530 10,921,673 3,160,350 
Unemployment 
 Florida   
Iowa  South 
Carolina  
Tennessee  Texas  Washington  
1996 380,710 58,070 106,731 147,371 560,663 170,469 
1997 368,202 50,666 84,349 148,343 531,315 144,428 
1998 340,286 46,386 69,230 126,549 496,900 145,148 
1999 309,329 41,786 79,779 116,614 483,726 148,588 
2000 300,284 44,839 70,821 115,041 451,845 151,344 
2001 373,344 53,374 100,811 134,993 527,415 189,009 
2002 462,419 64,272  116,205  152,116 687,888 227,676 
2003 433,771 71,352  133,767  164,312 738,814 233,198 
                                                 
21 1996 data reflect BLS’s new modeling approach and reestimation as of March 2005, while 2005 data 
reflect revised population controls and model reestimation through 2005. 
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2004 394,840 75,613  138,938  157,740 671,069 200,594 
2005 334,834 71,142  139,693  162,216 605,674 180,527 
2006 295,850 61,490  138,061  154,622 565,823 166,174 
Unemployment Rate 
 Florida   
Iowa  South 
Carolina  
Tennessee  Texas  Washington  
1996 5.3 3.6 5.6 5.3 5.8 5.9 
1997 5.0 3.2 4.4 5.3 5.4 4.9 
1998 4.5 2.9 3.6 4.5 4.9 4.8 
1999 4.0 2.6 4.1 4.1 4.7 4.8 
2000 3.8 2.8 3.6 4.0 4.4 5.0 
2001 4.7 3.3 5.2 4.7 5.0 6.2 
2002 5.7 3.9 5.9 5.3 6.4 7.3 
2003 5.3 4.4 6.7 5.7 6.7 7.4 
2004 4.7 4.7 6.8 5.5 6.0 6.3 
2005 3.8 4.3 6.7 5.6 5.4 5.5 
2006 3.3 3.7 6.5 5.2 4.9 5.0 
       
Source: U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
 A scan of the charts reveals that employment dropped in the state in early 2001, 
but re-gained its ascent in early 2002, and was still climbing from 2005 to 2006. 
 
Economic Indicators in the State in 1996 
 South Carolina’s average per capita personal income in 1996 was $19,977, 
compared to the national average of $24,426 for the same year (see Graphic, “Per Capita 
Personal Income Calendar Year 1996-2007”).  The state’s average state-local tax burden 
was 9.9 percent, compared to the U.S. average state-local tax burden of 10.5 percent.  
Also, while the national average total tax burden was 32.0 percent, South Carolina’s total 
tax burden was 30.2 percent (See Graphic, “South Carolina State-Local Tax Burden 
Compared to U.S. Average (1996-2007”). 
 
Per Capita Personal Income Calendar Year 1996-1997 
       
U.S. Average $24,426       
State  Amount Rank  State  Amount Rank 
Alabama  $20,131 39  Montana  $19,214 46 
Alaska  $24,398 19  Nebraska  $22,917 27 
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Arizona  $21,363 35  Nevada  $26,011 9 
Arkansas  $18,959 47 
 New 
Hampshire  $26,615 8 
California  $25,346 13  New Jersey  $31,334 2 
Colorado  $25,704 10  New Mexico  $18,803 48 
Connecticut  $33,875 1  New York  $29,181 4 
Delaware  $27,724 5 
 North 
Carolina  $22,205 32 
Florida  $24,226 20  North Dakota  $20,448 38 
Georgia  $22,977 26  Ohio  $23,457 21 
Hawaii  $25,404 12  Oklahoma  $19,544 45 
Idaho  $19,837 41  Oregon  $23,074 24 
Illinois  $26,848 7  Pennsylvania  $24,803 17 
Indiana  $22,601 28  Rhode Island  $24,572 18 
Iowa  $22,306 30 
 South 
Carolina  $19,977 40 
Kansas  $23,165 23  South Dakota  $20,895 37 
Kentucky  $19,797 42  Tennessee  $21,949 33 
Louisiana  $19,664 43  Texas  $22,282 31 
Maine  $21,011 36  Utah  $19,595 44 
Maryland  $27,618 6  Vermont  $22,470 29 
Massachusetts  $29,792 3  Virginia  $25,212 14 
Michigan  $24,945 16  Washington  $25,187 15 
Minnesota  $25,663 11 
 West 
Virginia  $18,160 49 
Mississippi  $17,575 50  Wisconsin  $23,320 22 
Missouri  $23,022 25  Wyoming  $21,544 34 
Source: Survey of Current Business, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, October 1998. Acquired from Washington 




State-Local Tax Burden Compared to U.S. Average 
(1996-2007) 




































1996 9.9% 35 20.3% 36 30.2% 41 10.5% 21.5% 32.0% 
1997 9.9% 33 20.7% 39 30.5% 41 10.4% 22.1% 32.5% 
1998 10.1% 30 21.2% 37 31.3% 40 10.5% 22.7% 33.2% 
1999 10.1% 32 21.0% 41 31.0% 41 10.5% 22.9% 33.3% 
2000 10.1% 31 21.1% 43 31.2% 43 10.5% 23.5% 34.0% 
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2001 10.1% 34 20.4% 41 30.5% 42 10.5% 22.5% 33.0% 
2002 9.9% 33 18.3% 41 28.2% 40 10.3% 19.9% 30.3% 
2003 10.0% 30 17.6% 39 27.6% 37 10.4% 19.1% 29.5% 
2004 10.2% 26 17.6% 38 27.8% 37 10.6% 19.1% 29.7% 
2005 10.5% 26 18.8% 42 29.3% 37 10.9% 20.6% 31.5% 
2006 10.5% 27 19.5% 40 30.0% 38 10.8% 21.5% 32.3% 
2007 10.7% 26 19.6% 40 30.3% 35 11.0% 21.7% 32.7% 
* May not add to total due to rounding.   




South Carolina’s Operating Expenditures Per Inmate in 1996 
 In 1996, the state’s estimated average daily number of inmates was 19,880; the 
state’s average operating expenditures per inmate per day was $38.29.  The state reported 
average operating expenditures per inmate per year of $13,977, substantially less than the 
national average annual operating expenditures per inmate of $20,100.  Only seven states 
(Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma and Texas) spent less 
per inmate in 1996.  (See Graphic, “State prisons: Total operating expenditures per 
inmate, fiscal year 1996,” presenting individual data for all 50 states.)  Bolded states 
include South Carolina and the five other states (Florida, Iowa, Tennessee, Texas and 
Washington) to be compared cross-jurisdictionally later in this study. 
 
State prisons: total operating expenditures per inmate, fiscal year 1996 
Region or jurisdiction Operating expenditures in 
dollars per inmate 
Estimated average 
daily number of 
inmates 1995-1996* Per year Per day 
TOTAL  $20,142  $55.18  1,029,595 
Alabama    $7,987  $21.88  20,753 
Alaska    $32,415  $88.81  3,466 
Arizona    $19,091  $52.30  21,433 
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Arkansas   $13,341  $36.55  9,333 
California   $21,385  $58.59  136,492 
Colorado  $21,020  $57.59  11,156 
Connecticut  $31,912  $87.43  14,896 
Delaware  $17,987  $49.28  4,851 
District of Columbia  $21,296  $58.34  9,962 
Florida   $17,327  $47.47  63,521 
Georgia  $15,933  $43.65  34,363 
Hawaii   $23,318  $63.88  3,599 
Idaho   $16,277  $44.60  3,380 
Illinois   $19,351  $53.02  37,870 
Indiana  $20,188  $55.31  16,133 
Iowa     $24,286  $66.54  5,920 
Kansas    $22,242  $60.94  7,124 
Kentucky   $16,320  $44.71  12,180 
Louisiana  $12,304  $33.71  25,476 
Maine      $33,711  $92.36  1,430 
Maryland    $22,247  $60.95  21,616 
Massachusetts   $26,002  $71.24  11,710 
Michigan   $28,067  $76.89  41,371 
Minnesota  $37,825  $103.63  4,874 
Mississippi    $11,156  $30.56  12,900 
Missouri   $12,832  $35.16  19,437 
Montana    $20,782  $56.94  2,015 
Nebraska    $22,271  $61.02  3,049 
Nevada  $15,370  $42.11  7,744 
New Hampshire   $20,839  $57.09  2,036 
New Jersey  $30,773  $84.31  26,878 
New Mexico  $29,491  $80.80  4,201 
New York    $28,426  $77.88  68,556 
North Carolina   $25,303  $69.32  28,999 
North Dakota  $17,154  $47.00  617 
Ohio       $19,613  $53.74  44,540 
Oklahoma    $10,601  $29.04  18,260 
Oregon   $31,837  $87.22  7,960 
Pennsylvania  $28,063  $76.88  32,151 
Rhode Island  $35,739  $97.92  3,041 
South Carolina  $13,977  $38.29  19,880 
South Dakota  $17,787  $48.73  1,888 
Tennessee    $22,904  $62.75  15,245 
Texas   $12,215  $33.47  128,140 
Utah    $32,361  $88.66  3,455 
 143 
Vermont    $31,094  $85.19  1,075 
Virginia   $16,306  $44.67  27,742 
Washington  $26,662  $73.05  11,669 
West Virginia   $17,245  $47.25  2,535 
Wisconsin  $27,771  $76.08  11,284 
Wyoming    $19,456  $53.30  1,389 
Note:  Expenditures exclude adult community corrections, juvenile corrections, and 
probation and parole services. Inmate counts used to calculate operating expenditures per 
inmate were based on prisoners under the jurisdiction of State correctional authorities from 
June 30, 1995, to June 30, 1996.  Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. 
Note: . . . .Less than 1%. 
Source: James, Stephan J. (August 1999). State Prison Expenditures, 1996. Bureau of Justice 
Statistics. Downloaded 3/4/07 from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/spe96.htm 
 
 
Union Membership in South Carolina in 1996 
 South Carolina ranked 49th in the nation in union membership in 1996 at 5.0 
percent; by 2005, the state ranked 50th.   At the national level, the labor union 
membership average was 16.2 percent in 1996, although by 2005 the country’s labor 
union membership was down to 12.5 percent.  Mid-range was considered to be 10 percent 
to 14.9 percent.)  (See Graphic, “Labor Union Membership\1, 1996”; for 2006 data, see 
Chart 1, “Union Membership rates by state, 2006 averages.”) 
 
State Rankings: Labor Union Membership, 1996 
 Labor Union Membership,* 1996 
 Union workers Workers covered by union 
 1,000 Rank Percent Rank 
United States  16269.4    X  16.2 X 
          
Alabama  200.7 22 12.8 27 
Alaska  54.7 42 24.9 3 
Arizona  106.8 32 7.5 48 
Arkansas  74.4 36 8.4 44 
California  2060.6 1 18.8 15 
Colorado  167.1 25 10.8 36 
Connecticut  239.5 19 17.2 18 
Delaware  40.0 46 14.0 26 
District of Columbia  39.5    X    19.4    X 
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Florida  429.8 12 9.9 41 
Georgia  242.1 18 9.1 43 
Hawaii   111.9 30 24.5 4 
Idaho    42.5 45 10.7 38 
Illinois   1043.1 3 21.5 8 
Indiana  395.2 14 16.1 23 
Iowa   168.7 24 15.7 24 
Kansas     105.8 33 12.3 31 
Kentucky   198.8 23 14.1 25 
Louisiana  133.4 29 10.0 40 
Maine      77.4 35 16.4 22 
Maryland     353.5 16 17.4 17 
Massachusetts   415.0 13 16.8 20 
Michigan  983.3 4 25.4 2 
Minnesota   437.4 11 21.2 9 
Mississippi  62.0 39 8.1 45 
Missouri  375.2 15 16.8 20 
Montana  52.0 44 16.9 19 
Nebraska  62.9 38 12.4 29 
Nevada   147.3 26 24.3 5 
New Hampshire  57.4 41 12.6 28 
New Jersey   768.0 7 23.7 6 
New Mexico    52.6 43 10.8 36 
New York  1942.0 2 28.2 1 
North Carolina  134.0 28 5.0 49 
North Dakota  24.4 48 10.5 39 
Ohio  933.2 5 20.8 10 
Oklahoma   135.5 27 12.4 29 
Oregon  246.2 17 19.5 13 
Pennsylvania  885.8 6 19.5 13 
Rhode Island  81.0 34 20.1 11 
South Carolina  58.2 40 5.0 49 
South Dakota  23.0 49 9.2 42 
Tennessee  219.2 20 11.1 34 
Texas   527.7 8 8.0 46 
Utah  71.1 37 11.1 34 
Vermont  24.9 47 11.3 33 
Virginia  200.8 21 8.0 46 
Washington   464.2 10 21.8 7 
West Virginia  109.7 31 17.9 16 
Wisconsin   469.7 9 19.8 12 
Wyoming  20.1 50 11.6 32 
X=Not Applicable 
Note: When states share the same rank, the next lower rank is omitted.  
States may share the same value but have different ranks due to 
rounding. 
* Annual averages of monthly figures.  For wage and salary workers in 
agriculture and nonagriculture. Data represent union members by place 
of residence.  Copyright by BNA PLUS.  See table A-22 for complete 
source. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State and Metropolitan Area Data 





Source: United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, news release, January 25, 2007, “Union 
Members, 2006” Downloaded 3/4/07 from: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf 
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Right to Work in the State of South Carolina 
 South Carolina has been a right-to-work state since 1954 (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2006).  According to the National Right to Work Newsletter (May 2005) and the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, personal income has been growing twice as fast in right 
to work states as in non right to work states.  (See Graphic, “1990-2004 Growth in Real 
Personal Income).  Commentary on the right to work issue follows later in this paper. 
 
  
Source: National Right to Work Newsletter (May 2005), Vol. 51, Number 5.  
Downloaded 3/4/07 from http://www.nrtwc.org/nl/nl200505.pdf 
 
Political Party Popular Votes Cast in South Carolina, 1996-2006 
 South Carolina’s presidential election victories throughout the eighties and 
nineties were consistently Republican, in contrast to the country’s voting patterns of 
Republican in the 1980s and Democratic in the 1990s (see Graphic, “U.S. Presidential 
Election, 1996”).  The state’s voting pattern held throughout the presidential elections of 
1996, 2000 and 2004. 
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U.S. Presidential Election, 1996 
Source: The National Atlas of the United States, U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey 
Downloaded 3/4/07from http://nationalatlas.gov/printable/elections.html#list 
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 Although the state had a Republican governor, David Beasley, from 1995-1999, 
Democrat James Hodges was governor from 1999 to 2003, when once again, the 
governor’s house was won by a Republican (Marshall Sanford) from 2003 to 2007. 
 In the South Carolina legislature, Republicans controlled the House throughout 
the decade, although the Senate was Democratic from 1994 to 2002, at which time it 
became Republican. 
  
South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) Adult Prison System 
As of January 30, 2005, the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) 
reported that 22,685 inmates were managed in 29 facilities, managed by 5,623 employees 
(Ozmint, 2005).  In FY 2004, the agency reported spending $314 million ($281 million in 
state funds) or $13,590 per inmate, a daily cost per inmate of $37.13, compared to the 
national average of $62.22 per inmate (Camp, C.G., 2002).  (Review Graphic “SCDC 
Cost Per Inmate:  Fiscal Years 1996-2005”.) 
SCDC has statutory responsibility for the state’s adult prison system which 
houses adult offenders aged seventeen and above, with sentences of three months or 
more.  In FY 2004, the inmate to correctional officer ratio was 9:4 (Ozmint, 2005), 
compared to the national average of 5.8 (Camp, C.G., 2002). 
South Carolina performance measures fall short of the national average in inmate 
health care, and are comparable in recidivism.  The 2004 Average per Inmate Health Care 
Cost was $6.99, compared to the 2002 national average of $8.03.  And in FY 2001 (the 
last year reported for recidivism), the state’s 3-Year Recidivism Rate was 32 percent, 
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compared to the 2002 national average of 32.7 percent (Ozmint, 2005).  (See Graphic 
“National Performance Measures for Corrections”). 
 
National Performance Measures for Corrections 







3-Year Recidivism Rate** 32.0% 32.7% 
Daily per Inmate Cost (Total 
Funds) 
$37.13 $62.22 
Average per Inmate Food Cost $1.13 $3.32 
Average per Inmate Health Care 
Cost 
$6.99 $8.03 
Inmate to Correctional Officer 
Ratio*** 
9.4 5.8 
* With the exception of Recidivism Rates, South Carolina 
figures are derived from FY2004. 
** Percentage among SCDC FY2001 releasees who returned to 
SCDC custody within 3 years.  
***Correctional Officers for South Carolina include cadets, 
Correctional Officers I & II, and Corporals I & II.  
Source: SCDC Report: Commitment to Safe and Secure Prisons, 
2005. Jon Ozmint, Director. South Carolina Department of 
Corrections 
 
Community supervision, including probation and parole, are under the jurisdiction 
of the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (DPPPS). 
 
SCDC Mission Statement 
The SCDC mission is outlined on its website as follows: 
 Safety - We will protect the public, our employees, and our inmates. 
Service -  We will provide rehabilitation and self-improvement opportunities      
for inmates. 
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Stewardship - We will promote professional excellence, fiscal responsibility, and 
self-sufficiency. 
 
 The SCDC mission statement is noteworthy for several reasons.  Gaes et al. 
(2004) maintain that a good mission statement is clear and precise, and to the extent that 
it expresses specific purposes or goals, an agency or jurisdiction should be held 
accountable for meeting those goals—especially when measuring performance.  
Acknowledging that some might defend those agencies or jurisdictions that don’t 
precisely meet their stated mission goals, Gaes and his colleagues maintain that the 
mission statement and its purpose should be thoughtfully conceptualized.  Standards and 
objectives should be articulated, they say.  One test of the efficacy of a mission statement 
can be observed by analyzing agency practices (e.g., if rehabilitation is stated as part of 
the mission statement, are programs funded toward that end?). 
  
History of South Carolina Department of Corrections 
 The state’s first penitentiary was established in 1866, when the Legislature named 
Thomas B. Lee as architect, engineer, and superintendent.  Sixty-five thousand dollars 
was appropriated for construction and maintenance of the facility.  Prior to 1866, counties 
in the state maintained custody of felons; subsequently, a legislative act mandated that 
control of sentenced felons be transferred to the state. 
 By the beginning of 1869, the population of the prison totaled 201, but by the end 
of the century it had virtually quadrupled to 795.  During the years following 
establishment of the facility, inmate farming operations supported the prison at what is 
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now the Wateree River Correctional Institution.  Prison industries—blacksmithing, 
carpentry, machine shops, and shoe and tailoring shops—were also established.  Inmate 
labor was used to build several colleges, including Claflin, Clemson and Winthrop. 
 In the three decades beginning in 1900, another farming operation began, at the 
site now known as Walden Correctional Institution, while prison industries added a chair-
caning factory.  Inmates also began manufacturing road signs and license tags.  This time 
period included establishment of a facility for women at the penitentiary, and the 
implementation of capital punishment, signified by the 1912 installation of the electric 
chair. 
 Chain gangs were operational across the state, and county supervisors had the 
right to retain convicts for construction of roads.  Because of this, the prison population 
decreased to 687 by September 1930. 
 The next 30 years saw the population in the penitentiary triple.  In 1937, a 
separate women’s facility was built, the Stevenson Correctional Institution, which also 
housed the state’s first pre-release center.  Twelve years later (1949), a bookbindery was 
developed by prison industries. 
 In 1960 the South Carolina Department of Corrections was created, following 
abuses of prisoner labor, specifically, the use of inmate labor on private property, a form 
of political patronage.  Governor “Fritz” Hollings called for the creation of a state 
correctional agency, and a State Board of Corrections to oversee its function.  At the 
time, the prison population numbered 2,044, including 111 women. 
 During the next decade and a half, the state’s prison system increased, along with 
policy emphasis on rehabilitation.  The state also had three nationally prominent 
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Directors, Ellis MacDougall (1962-1968), William D. Leeke (1968-1987) and Parker 
Evatt (1987-1995).  Under MacDougall’s leadership, the department implemented a 
number of policy changes, emphasizing rehabilitation and correctional education 
programming.  MacDougall eliminated inmate chains and striped uniforms, and 
implemented training for correctional officers (no longer to be called “guards”).  A 
reception and evaluation center was opened, and separate facilities built for females and 
youthful offenders.  Attention was also given to the need to prepare inmates for return to 
the community. 
 Leeke continued MacDougall’s policies.  The longest-tenured corrections 
commissioner in South Carolina (and U.S.) history, Leeke led the department while two 
research studies were conducted: Emerging Rights of the Confined (1972) and Collective 
Violence in Correctional Institutions: A Search for Causes (1973). 
In 1973, the Governor’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning recommended the 
elimination of the state’s dual prison system for shorter-term and longer-term offenders, 
and giving the Department jurisdiction of all long-term adult offenders.  A 
recommendation was also made to house inmates closer to their homes.  In 1974, the 
General Assembly passed enabling legislation, and all offenders with sentences of more 
than three months were placed under SCDC.  The new system, along with the state’s 
rising crime rate over the next 20 years, led to acute prison over-crowding.  This, in turn, 
led to expansion of the state’s facilities; 18 new facilities were opened during this period. 
 As was true for most of the nation, South Carolina initiated “tougher” policies, 
beginning in 1986, leading to longer sentences.  Class action suits22, the result of prison 
                                                 
22 In 1996, SCDC was the nation’s first corrections system to be released from federal consent decree 
requirements, the result of the recently passed Prison Litigation Reform Act. 
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overcrowding, led to the Department’s development of an objective classification system 
based on empirical data analysis.  Inmate security, custody and program assignments 
were based on a risk assessment and criteria to be consistently applied across the inmate 
population. 
 The appointment of a new director, Parker Evatt, for SCDC in 1987 (and a new 
director, Tony Ellis, for SCDC prison industries in 1988), followed by stricter policies 
affecting management of inmates, combined with truth-in-sentencing policies that 
resulted in massive change.  The SCDC website in 2005 described many of the changes: 
• Inmates were required to wear uniforms. 
• Stricter grooming. 
• Controlled movement within prisons – to prevent congregation of large 
groups of inmates in prison yards. 
• Enforcing work ethics among inmates. 
• Young offenders were required to attend education programs and 
participate in boot camp programs. 
• Supervised furlough program was suspended. 
• Violent offenders were banned from work release programs. 
• Shock incarceration program was discontinued. 
 
Change from Board of Corrections 
 During Director Evatt’s term, a significant change was made in the appointment 
process for SCDC directorship.  Since 1960, the Director of Corrections had been 
responsible to a Board of Corrections, but during Evatt’s tenure, the Board was dissolved.  
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Thereafter, the SCDC directorship was a cabinet-level position, and directly answerable 
to the governor.  The change made the likelihood of director stability less likely, in that 
the position was more directly affected by politics—a change in governors could be 
expected to result in a change in SCDC directors.  In fact, while Bill Leeke had served as 
SCDC director for 19 years (responsible to the Board of Corrections), the 19 year period 
following the new legislation brought with it six new directors, including an interim 
director who served for less than one year.  Leeke’s successor, Parker Evatt, served from 
1987-1995. 
 
Economic Downturns for SCDC 
 As we have already seen, the arrival of the new millennium brought with it severe 
declines in the state’s revenues, resulting in a 21 percent decrease in SCDC’s budget—
the largest decrease of any corrections department in the nation (Ozmint, 2005).  Two 
institutions were closed, and enforced staff attrition led to the loss of more than 1,000 
correctional employees.  The loss of 148 additional staff in 2003 was the result of 
continued departmental budget cuts. 
 SCDC’s budget reductions led to a staff reduction in the accounting department 
for Prison Industries, although the same work load was required.  In fact, when a 
subsequent (some said politically-inspired) audit resulted in criticism of company billing 
procedures in October of 2003, Jon Ozmint, SCDC’s Director, responded forcefully in 
writing: 
Due to Department of Corrections’ budget reductions and reductions in force, the 
Industries’ accounting department is 40 percent smaller than three years ago, 
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with no reduction in work load.  Some personnel had to be trained in areas in 
which they had not previously worked and other duties had to be realigned.  The 
mentioned missed and erroneous invoices occurred during a time of transition 
between employees.  (S.C. Legislative Audit Council, 2003) 
 
SCDC Prison Industries: Policy Statement and Oversight 
South Carolina’s Department of Corrections prison industries administrators 
strive to meet American Correctional Association (ACA) published standards, as well as 
its own Operations Manual PS-09.01, “Correctional Industries.”  In addition, the PIE 
program must meet the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) BJA Guideline. 
In its Operations Manual, the SCDC Correctional Industries Policy/Procedure 
describes its Purpose: 
To provide guidelines for the management and operation of correctional 
industries within the South Carolina Department of Corrections. 
 
Additionally, it lays out a Policy Statement: 
The South Carolina Department of Corrections will operate correctional 
industries within the Agency under the supervision of the Director of Programs 
and Services.  The Division of Industries will be authorized to purchase/sell 
products and services pursuant to all applicable Agency policies/procedures, 




PIE Final Guideline 
 The Federal Register of April 7, 1999 (Vol. 64, No. 66) published BJA’s final 
guideline following publication the previous year (1998) of the guideline offered for 
public comment.  In the Introduction, the PIECP Program Purposes and Objectives are 
stated: 
Prison administrators find PIECP participation an effective way to address 
idleness among ever-increasing prison populations and as a cost-efficient method 
for providing inmates with marketable job skills.  Taxpayers benefit because 
PIECP wage deductions result in reductions in incarceration costs.  Inmate 
wages benefit society, generally, in that deducted amounts are authorized to 
address victim compensation, inmate family support needs and taxes.  Lastly, 
PIECP industries obtain broad market access for their products because they are 
excepted from the Ashurst-Sumners Act prohibition against the interstate 
transport of prisoner-made goods and from the Walsh-Healey Act prohibition 
against certain contract sales of prisoner-made goods to the Federal government. 
. . . the agency [BJA] now publishes this Final Guideline to offer updated 
program clarification. . . . Refined administrative practices reflect experience 
gained by BJA over the past 14 years. 
 
In the Program Guidance section of the PIE Final Guideline, PIE Certification 
Purposes are specifically delineated: 
• To provide a cost-efficient means to address inmate idleness and to provide 
inmates with work experience and training in marketable job skills.  BJA 
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encourages private sector PIECP partners to consider post-incarceration 
employment to PIECP inmate workers. 
• Through inmate wage deductions, to increase advantages to the public by 
providing departments of correction with a means for collecting taxes and 
partially recovering inmate room and board costs, by providing crime victims 
with a greater opportunity to obtain compensation, as well as by promoting 
inmate family support. 
• Through PIECP participation conditions, to prevent unfair competition 
between prisoner-made goods and private sector goods. 
• To prevent the exploitation of prisoner labor. 
 
 Key changes in the new guideline included clarification of how to establish 
comparable wages for inmate labor; how to avoid displacement of civilian workers; and 
how to conduct the threshold test to distinguish between production and service labor.  
The executive director of NCIA reported that “organized labor responded favorably” to 
the new guideline. 
 
PIECP Compliance Reviews 
  The Guideline calls for Performance Reports to be submitted within 30 days 
following the close of each calendar quarter “in a form prescribed by BJA.”  In addition, 
a consolidated activity report (of all individual PIE industries) must be submitted within 
45 days following the close of each quarter.  Perhaps most onerous, on-site monitoring 
reviews (or desk reviews) may be conducted by BJA representatives “as deemed 
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necessary.”  On-site reviewers are authorized to access any and all information or 
documentation needed to verify compliance with the PIECP Guideline.  Those monitored 
are notified (in writing) subsequently of reviewers’ findings, and must take corrective 
action where necessary, and/or respond as otherwise required. 
 
South Carolina PIE Program Leads Nation: 1996 – 2006 
 A series of graphs depicts the lead (in number of PIE-employed inmates) that 
South Carolina has maintained nationally for the years 1996 – 2005.  (Their lead 
continued in 2007.)  The first graphic, “Number of inmates employed by Certified Prison 
Industry Enhancement Programs, 1996-2005” reveals the number of programs that 
employed more than 100 PIE inmates for at least 8-10 years of the decade.  While 
California was slightly ahead of South Carolina in 1996 (357 PIE inmates in California, 
compared to 327 in S.C.), the smaller, southern state moved ahead by the next year.  In 
1998, the state of Washington was slightly ahead of South Carolina, but its lead was soon 
overcome by the southern state. Overall, however, the graph clarifies the steady ascent 
that South Carolina made during the decade, as well as the lead it has maintained. 
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Texas  - Oversight Authority
Utah - Department of Corrections
Washington
 
*Programs are included in this graphic if they had more than 100 inmates in the program for 8-10 years. 
** Correct 2002 data for Minnesota was unavailable at time of computation. 
Source:   National Correctional Industries Association Quarterly Reports, 1996-2005. 
 
 The Graphic entitled “Number of Inmates Employed by Certified Prison Industry 
Enhancement Programs in Five Southeastern States: 1996 – 2005” serves to make the 
point that the state has maintained a distinct lead compared to other states in “similar” 
(southern) environments.  While the other states demonstrate consistent growth, the rate 
of growth is not as great as South Carolina’s.  The following Graphic, “Number of 
inmates employed by Certified Prison Industry Enhancement Programs in Eight 
Southeastern States, 1996-2005 further clarifies the state’s leadership in the southeast in 
general.  (Note that in 2007, both Georgia and Kentucky were in the process of working 
to develop the PIE initiative.  Georgia’s prison industries director was in frequent contact 
with Tony Ellis, SCDC’s director of prison industries.23) 
 
                                                 
23 Personal communication, Tony Ellis, 2006. 
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Number of Inmates Employed by Certified Prison Industry 































Source:  National Correctional Industries Quarterly Reports, 1996-2005. 
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 It must be acknowledged that the PIE numbers, overall, remain small, especially 
when measured by the potential that the program has to provide benefits to taxpayers, 
states, victims, inmate families and inmates alike.  Even in South Carolina, the nation’s 
largest PIE program, the prison industries director maintains a constant struggle 
promoting the initiative. 
  
Profile of the Director of SCDC Division of Industries 
 The director of the SCDC Division of Industries, Tony Ellis, is a congenial man 
who manages to convey a no-nonsense approach to running one of the country’s premier 
correctional industries systems.  Well-regarded nationally—and recipient of the 1998 
Rodli Award for outstanding contributions to the field of correctional industries—he is 
liked and respected by his peers.  At home, he fights the same up-hill battles that they 
fight.  It’s difficult to overlook, however, that Ellis’s efforts appear to meet with more 
success than others.  In particular, while many states can be said to have ostensibly 
successful traditional prison industries programs, Ellis has few peers when it comes to 
implementing the Prison Industries Enhancement (PIE) program—the largest in the 
country.  (The program was certified in 1987 a few months before Ellis’s arrival.) 
 According to the National Correctional Industries Association’s (NCIA) 2005 
Directory, South Carolina has paid $46,660,876 in (cumulative) gross wages since the 
inception of the PIE program in the state—more than any other state in the nation.  
(Second-place Washington State ($35,859,750) lost its PIE programs in 2005.)  Third-
place Kansas ($35,341,341) was followed by California, Texas and Minnesota. 
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 In 2005, SCDC’s PIE program also claimed more PIE inmate workers than any 
other state—1,301 compared to 682 in Kansas, 466 in Texas, and 236 in Nevada. 
 Cumulative data compiled by the NCIA revealed that South Carolina’s PIE 
program also led the nation in cumulative funds collected for victims’ programs 
($7,367,567); family support ($5,312,225); taxes ($6,364,460); total deductions 
($25,533,729) and net wages ($21,127,146). 
 Barbara Auerbach, National Prison Industries Enhancement Certification Program 
Coordinator, maintained that South Carolina was “probably the most sophisticated—and 
impressive” of the state PIE programs, mostly a result of the fact that “Tony (Ellis) has 
done an excellent job of liaison work between the prison system and entrepreneurs” in the 
State.  She called attention to the “180-degree” shift that took place in South Carolina, 
noting that SCDC went from not paying inmates anything for their labor, to embracing 
the PIE program.  She told me how important it was for the South when Ellis took over 
the reins in SCDC Prison Industries.  “Until then,” she said, “the southern states were 
completely uninvolved.  But when South Carolina’s PIE program took off, [most of] the 
other southern states followed . . . “ 
 After reviewing the statistics and talking to prison industries leaders and experts, I 
called Ellis and asked for a meeting.  He was accessible and forthcoming, and agreed to 
meet with me.  Subsequently, staff and peer interviews (combined with personal 
observation) contributed to my impressions of his leadership style. 
 In addition to his responsibilities as director of South Carolina’s prison industries, 
Ellis has been a national consultant and seminar leader for over 12 years for both public 
and private sector clients in the areas of training, marketing, management, procurement, 
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contracting, auditing and technology.  Clients have included Southern Bell, Diebold, Inc., 
Xerox, National Institute of Governmental Purchasing and Bid Net.  (He periodically 
conducts audits of prison systems across the country for the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance Prison Industries Enhancement Certification Project.)   In 
short, a cursory review of his background and experience reveals that he has substantial 
experience in both the public and private sector.  He received a Distinguished Service 
Award in 1987 from the National Institute of Governmental Purchasing and was chosen 
Outstanding Procurement Official for South Carolina in 1981. 
 Prior to becoming Director of Prison Industries for SCDC, Ellis was Director of 
another state agency, the S.C. Division of General Services, where he managed state 
procurement of $300 million in goods and services.  While there, he became the first 
Certified Public Purchasing Official (CPPO) in the state.  Following that, he was 
executive vice president charged with administrative management of a $50 million 
contracting/construction management company. 
 In a communication with a leading prison industries economist and researcher, I 
asked for an opinion of the reasons for the success of South Carolina’s PIE program.  The 
response I received was  
“. . . in response to your question – The PIE model is probably successful in 
[South] Carolina because (1) it has an effective champion, (2) it has an effective 
champion and (3) it has a well designed aggressive entrepreneurial plan.”   
 
 The thesaurus lists a handful of synonyms for the word “champion.”  They 
include defender, supporter, campaigner, advocate and guardian.  It is difficult to spend 
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time with Tony Ellis without concluding that he is all of these, when it comes to South 
Carolina’s PIE program.  Ellis also works hard to maintain the success and growth of the 
state’s other prison industries (traditional and service). 
 Following the above-described communication with the economist, I talked to a 
labor lawyer who had visited Ellis’s PIE program.  “I was just amazed—it was 
outstanding in every respect.”  (The speaker had conducted PIE audits around the 
country, although not of the South Carolina program.) 
 I heard only one criticism of Ellis during the course of my interviews: the speaker 
expressed misgivings that the state sometimes appeared to “try to keep PIE wages as low 
as possible,” and cited the Kansas PIE program as a “favorable example of a state trying 
to pay as much as possible.”  The same critic pointed out that “the fact that the private 
sector partner does not have to pay health insurance or pension is increasingly 
significant” and further precludes the need for PIE directors to “cut as close to the bone” 
as many do. 
I do understand (the) view that wages should be as low as is legal . . . to attract 
customers, but I have never agreed with that view.  I don’t accept that wages are 
the only, or even the main, thing that attracts private sector companies to prison 
labor.  I think it’s much more than that—availability of labor that can be laid off 
when necessary, rehired when necessary is one factor that is underestimated by 
PIE managers, I think.  And the quality of that labor, in the sense that they are not 
drunk or high, that they care inordinately about their work given how little else 
they have to do, and so can be highly productive. . . . Especially in manpower 
model projects like those in SC, which have heavy private sector involvement, I’m 
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not convinced they need a special wage break.  That said, I do agree that it’s an 
important PIE site, perhaps even remarkable, so I have no overall quarrel with 
(this writer’s) findings. 
 
   The state of South Carolina, however, continues to maintain its growth as well as its 
lead.  Indeed, the aforementioned speaker spoke glowingly of Ellis and the importance of 
the South Carolina program many times over a 2-1/2 year span.   
 The observer may wonder how much of South Carolina’s PIE program’s success 
is driven by its charismatic director, and whether it will continue to thrive under new 
leadership in the future.  It is not uncommon to find that programmatic success is often 
tied to the energies and skills of a charismatic leader.  It is also not uncommon to find 
that the program stumbles upon the departure of the same leader. 
 Ellis, when asked about this, is unwilling to speculate.  It will be interesting to see 
what the future holds for the agency after he leaves, he says.  He acknowledges a hand in 
“setting the foundation” for the program.  During his 19-year tenure, he has taken the 
agency from $6,000,000 to over $31,000,000 in revenues in 2007. 
 In an interview with a member of Ellis’s prison industries staff, I was advised that 
“Tony is a unique individual.”  When I asked for clarification, I was told that “Tony has 
tried to teach me—and others—everything he knows.”  Unlike many managers and 
administrators, he said, Ellis is eager to share “everything he knows.” 
 When I asked what this person thought will happen to prison industries in SCDC 
if Ellis leaves in the future, I was advised that because of his efforts to train others in 
every aspect of the job he does, the Division would probably be able to “carry on. 
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 “There might be a temporary setback, but then Tony’s training will kick in, and 
we’ll probably be all right.”  Nevertheless, the writer was advised that the full potential of 
South Carolina’s PIE program was still unrealized.  The relatively new director of SCDC 
and his aides were “not very familiar with prison industry issues.”24 
This same person (who had been with SCDC for 28 years—a decade longer than 
Ellis) spontaneously told me that “Tony built this program [SCDC prison industries].”  
This was in response to my inquiry about what SCDC prison industries was like at the 
time of Ellis’s arrival in 1988.  “When he arrived, Tony had to borrow money from 
SCDC just to make payroll.”  (South Carolina law requires prison industries to be self-
sufficient.) 
 Ellis has a master’s in management, and a degree in business administration and 
marketing.  His experience, while broad, did not include corrections until he joined 
SCDC.  In a communication with an expert in prison industries, I was advised that debate 
in the past had centered on the issue of whether it’s more desirable to have an 
administrator from the private sector run prison industries, or to have one from 
corrections do so.  (I was advised that it was probably more desirable to have the latter.)  
If so, Tony Ellis would appear to be an exception. 
 He first came to SCDC as a consultant, invited by Dr. Hubert Clements, deputy 
commissioner of administration for SCDC, to conduct an analysis of prison industries in 
the state—how they were managed, the problems, and the “state of the state” of 
operations.  He was also asked to propose solutions. 
                                                 
24 In the writer’s experience and observation, this is a common phenomenon, not just in S.C. but in other 
states as well, whenever there is a change in administration.  Typically, a new governor (and/or DOC 
director) may arrive and apply brakes to many existing programs until they and their staff are able to judge 
for themselves whether or not the programs are “effective” or should be curtailed—often a political 
decision, ultimately. 
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 “I looked at it for several weeks,” he said later.  “I interviewed several levels of 
staff and wrote a report.  Afterwards, I went over the findings with Dr. Clements.  (I 
thought) things were essentially in poor shape as a business and revenue-generating 
industry.  The product line was stagnant.  There seemed to be no plan for increasing 
market share; overall, it was a dismal state of affairs. 
 “I left the report with him.  A week or two later he called me to ask me to come 
on as a contract employee to take over operations and to ‘put the ship in order.”  I told 
him I would do it for a short term—that was 19 years ago. 
 “I saw a tremendous number of problems, and that I hadn’t even scratched the 
surface.  I needed to persuade them to make a $400,000 transfer to make payroll.  The 
biggest problem was that there was no definitive direction for the staff to follow, no plan 
in place to move the division forward.  There was poor communication between sales and 
marketing and production, with sales and marketing selling two for one, without any 
approval.  Desks were stacking up in the warehouse, yet they were making desks one 
after the other. 
 “It took me two years to turn attitudes around and get everybody on the same 
page—two tough years to win back customer support (because customer service was 
failing).”  Eventually, he said, he “did establish a plan.”  He revised product offerings, 
and established sound financial controls, put a marketing plan in place, and improved 
customer service. 
 Asked about economic influences of the era, he responded that there have been 
“budget cuts at various times,” particularly “in the early nineties and more recently in 
2002 – 2004.”  At one point, he said, “state government froze procurement.  That was the 
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impetus for me to diversify.”  He reported that they were forced to reduce traditional 
industries staff.  “Both the national and South Carolina economies were slowing down.  
Jobs went away.  Tax revenues were decreasing.  We got into the mode here (in S.C.) to 
provide food and medicine, but to cut back education, etc. 
 “I saw two new areas:  PIE and leasing inmate labor.  We could only use so many 
(license) tags, but we could capitalize on the one thing we did have: an abundant inmate 
labor force.” 
 Ellis says that after his arrival, there was a learning curve.  “I had to parlay my 
business and government experience” into the correctional field.  He continues, “I had to 
figure out how to market to the private sector.”  One method he tried: “I wrote a lot of 
letters—more than 1,000—to S.C. companies.  I sent letters to Georgia, North Carolina 
and Tennessee and other southern belt states.  I figured I would generate interest.  I got 
probably 10-15 responses.  It gave me a chance to work with some companies, to learn 
what their concerns were, and what the availability of labor was.”  Together they 
identified security and pay issues. 
 “Strangely enough,” he says, there was “minimal” business or labor concern 
about the (PIE) program.  I took the time to assure them how we would not displace 
existing jobs.  Labor saw that it was such a small program that it was no real threat.  
Labor per se has never been an opponent.” 
 Eventually, other states, particularly in the south, became interested in what he 
was doing, and traveled to South Carolina to see for themselves.  (As already mentioned, 
Kentucky and Georgia were exploring the SCDC program at the time of our interviews.)  
“We have a track record to show people how it works,” he says.  “It’s an educational 
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process, really”—one that took approximately two years in South Carolina.  “I tell them 
[visitors] that the work should be at the entry level, not capital-intensive.”  He stresses 
that products should be environmentally safe, and that the work should be repetitive in 
nature. 
 Companies tend to come in and stay, he says, although “to this day we only have 
about 10 companies.”  But these companies tend to want to stay and expand.  He cites 
two examples, Anderson Flooring and Kwalu, a South African company.  “It’s been an 
interesting process,” he says.  They had the marketing “down pat—most success was 
ultimately the result of networking.  The South African company (Kwalu) was originally 
headed to another state.”  Now, he reports, the company has expanded twice, and is about 
to do so again.  “It’s the same with Anderson Flooring,” he says.  “(We’ve) offered a 
proven track record of stability.”  He refers to the 10 companies based in SCDC prison 
industries as their “mainstay.”  He adds that this is true around the country, and cites the 
states of Iowa, Texas and Minnesota as examples of states where companies tended to 
come in and stay. 
 Auerbach maintains that she is “fascinated” by “this notion of companies staying 
a long time.  I think it’s really key, and it says a lot about Tony that he makes it a point to 
find the right fit for his institutions.  This is his great skill.” 
 He draws a profile of the kind of business he looks for.  “Stable with 
approximately 50-100 employees.  I network and deal with the CEO.”  Some companies, 
he says, are “layered with bureaucracy.”  In the past when he saw that the “top corporate 
people—larger corporations—feared public perception would be negative,” he made a 
conscious decision to go to family-owned or small private companies, where the decision 
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maker was the CEO.  “Closely held companies, or privately held companies,” he says, are 
best.  He makes one perhaps superfluous statement:  “I am entrepreneurial in nature.” 
 There have been challenges.   One company’s “competitor tried negative 
publicity.”  They put out the word that “convicts” were making the product.  “I advised 
(the PIE company) to counter with the positive”—taxes, restitution, rehabilitation, etc.  
“The company brought customers in—they saw the plant looked like any other plant.  
Now our companies regularly invite their customers in to visit and observe.  They’ve 
turned the negative into a positive.” 
 Again and again, he stresses the importance of marketing.  “You can’t be a total 
bureaucrat, and you can’t be totally business—you’ve got to be a hybrid.  And you have 
to understand the political process.” 
 Ellis does not paint a rosy picture of the inmates’ attitudes about the PIE 
certification program: “They didn’t want deductions.”  Inmate lawsuits, he indicates, are 
a “big headache.” 
 Returning to an earlier theme, he reiterates his rationale for maintaining service 
and traditional industries: “don’t have all your eggs in one basket.”  Service and PIE are 
the income producers, he said, but traditional industries have their place.  “It’s kind of 
like guiding a big ship—you can’t turn on a dime.”  There are contracts, legal and 
financial considerations, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, he says.  “In this job, you have 
to have patience. 
 “You have to implement a plan, but it takes time.  It can’t be done overnight.  
This organization is dependent on outside economic forces.   If the economy does well, 
government (can accomplish more) . . . 
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 “We are revenue-based.  When the economy goes down, I shift over to PIE.  
There’s always a demand in education, a market in schools (desks, etc.).  For the last 
several years, the money has been in PIE and service (industries).  You have to stay 
attuned to outside market forces, and you have to change from time to time.” 
 For awhile, he says, he went to more leased labor (the PIE “manpower” model), 
rather than traditional industries, but “now that the economy is coming back, (I’ll have) 
more traditional industries for more inmates. 
 “Leased inmate labor is a very valuable tool for us.  It produces revenue for our 
agency.  SCDC taps revenue funds to pay medical bills for inmates, and bedding, 
clothing, and officer salaries.”  Later, he points out that “it’s exactly like Chief Justice 
Warren Burger said: (we) create jobs.” 
 Out-going inmate telephone calls, he says, generate revenue for the agency.  Also, 
inmates pay for canteen products—cookies, cigarettes, etc.  Their families send money, 
he says, to some inmates, while the greater bulk of canteen sales are purchased by 
inmates who earn money in either service or PIE programs. 
 One thing becomes apparent: Ellis is skilled at just about every aspect of prison 
industries, including aspects not frequently associated with correctional administrators.  
The ability to work with the private sector, for example, is a skill not often cultivated in 
correctional staff. 
 A former parole commissioner myself, I have observed the inherent difficulties 
attached to training probation and parole field staff to combine both “counselor” and 
“cop” approaches to managing offenders.  A comparable adjustment may be even more 
difficult for the correctional administrator asked to work with the private sector.  As Ellis 
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pointed out in our discussions, it is sometimes challenging to combine the correctional 
bureaucrat’s approach with the private sector’s entrepreneurial spirit.  Likewise, company 
presidents are often reluctant to attempt to navigate government bureaucracy.   
 Ellis called attention to a range of contrasts.  In the private sector, he said, you’re 
rewarded if you do well; managers and administrators are encouraged to use initiative 
and resourcefulness to compete in industry.  However, in correctional industries, the 
manager or executive is regulated and constrained from any appearance of 
competitiveness with the private sector.  In particular, with PIE programs, there are 
severe limits that must be observed at all times.  As Ellis put it, he must constantly ask 
himself what he can do that isn’t threatening [to unions or local business].  He said that 
he looks for prison industries that don’t pose a threat to industries in the state.  You have 
to be good at what you do, he said, but “not too good.”  There are few accolades, he said, 
but plenty of complaints.  He knows he’s done “too good a job” when he receives a 
complaint.  “You’ve got to make sure you’re not endangering or threatening another 
industry or company.” 
 In one interview, Ellis spoke to the problems encountered by most prison 
industries directors.  “We all have them, to different degrees,” he said.  He added that 
“being able to penetrate different markets” was one challenge they all share.   For 
example, he said, in North Carolina they have lots of furniture businesses in the state, so 
their prison industries do not make furniture.” 
 When asked to give reasons for his success, he reiterated that he searched for 
companies that had only a few owners, or were family-owned.  Also, he said, “you need a 
warden that believes . . .”  Then, “You’ve got to have a certain type inmate.”  For 
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example, he said, for the jobs that require a lot of training, it’s better to turn to maximum 
security inmates, because they’re likely to be there longer.  For simple tasks or work, he 
said, it was desirable to use minimum security inmates.  “It’s like a giant puzzle—you’ve 
got to put the pieces in place,” he said.  Some wardens, he said, may pay only lip service.  
An important key: the state director of corrections must be supportive of the PIE 
philosophy and program. 
 A big problem, he reports is the moving of inmates from medium to maximum or 
minimum security.  This can (and often does) adversely impact PIE inmate employment. 
 When asked about the program’s outstanding national reputation, he said, “In 
South Carolina, people take it for granted.” 
 One requirement for prison industries directors, he said, was to “never, ever forget 
that you work in a political environment.”  He described one elected official he’d heard 
from.  The official was displeased because his constituent complained that Ellis had 
gotten an order that caused the constituent to lose business.  Even though the order saved 
the taxpayers money, Ellis said, the official complained because his constituent was 
unhappy. 
 At a subsequent meeting, Ellis maintained that “some legislators feel we 
shouldn’t’ have this (PIE) program at all.  ‘That person killed my daughter-in-law and 
now he’s earning $10 an hour,’ they’ll say.”  His tone is matter-of-fact, not bitter, as if he 
realizes that this is part of the territory associated with the PIE program that can be 
neither avoided nor ignored. 
 In 2003, a report on SCDC prison industries by the State’s Legislative Audit 
Council created a mild sensation, resulting in adverse publicity for the agency.  Ellis is 
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convinced that the report was “political”, a complaint that is reiterated subsequently by 
several people in a position to judge (including an SCDC administrator) and others.  (The 
LAC report is described in a following section of this paper.) 
 My attendance at three annual conferences (2005, 2006 and 2007) sponsored by 
the NCIA revealed that this kind of complaint is common among prison industries 
directors.  Yet in South Carolina, as in other states, Ellis stated that prison industries must 
“pay as you go”—there is no state funding. 
 “I’ve learned to navigate the political minefield,” he says.  The topic of political 
influences on correctional progress is raised.  He talks about the prison industries director 
of Indiana: “a new governor, and new DOC director came in, and she was among the first 
to go.  She’s now out of the loop.”  He adds that he sees it happen more with DOC 
directors:  “ . . . (I)f things are going bad, there’s a very high turnover . . .”  In Texas, he 
adds, “everybody serves at the pleasure of the director of TDCJ.” 
 He reminisces about the past.  “During Parker (Evatt’s) administration, the 
legislature gave more power to the governor.  As a result, he says, things became more 
political.  “Every four years, there are changes in philosophy.”  The changes are from the 
top down, he says, and the effects are far reaching.   “It affects stability,” he says.  
Philosophies change, and become the philosophy of the agency director.  “Nationwide, 
this happens, too, he says, and it affects prison industries.”  Sometimes you can stay 
below the radar, he says, but not always. 
 “I work around it,” he says.  I don’t worry about my tenure.  I put my energy into 
making the program work.  If I were starting out again,” he confesses, “I wouldn’t do this 
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[job] because of the risks and uncertainty, but I don’t regret what I’ve done. . . . but if I 
had to start today—in the current environment—no. 
 “Being an administrator of inmates is the ‘low end of the food chain,” he says.  
“But I see past that—to changing attitudes, lives—I see our jobs as taking those who 
society failed and (we) try to turn around.  You take little victories one by one and wait 
for the next, day by day or week or month. 
 “The PIE program is a personal challenge to me, to change people’s attitudes.” 
 “I don’t see myself as an expert, but I believe the PIE concept works.” He says he 
has networked with the business community, and that he’s taught his plant managers to 
do so.  You need a vision,” he says, citing Martin Luther King, Jr. as a visionary.  “I 
study leaders like Jack Welch, MLK, what they do, and how.” 
 He talks about the Christmas bonuses some PIE workers have received, and the 
Christmas dinner (sponsored by Anderson Flooring’s CEO) where the food is catered in 
for the inmates.  He talks of a 4th of July barbecue they’ve had. 
 “When quotas are met, he says, on Fridays those inmates [responsible] get Cokes 
and the pizza of their choice.” 
 Ellis does not limit his praise to the PIE program, however.  He has much positive 
to say about other SCDC prison industries.  For example, he reports that they received 
international ISO900 certification in manufacturing (“out of three in the country”).  One 
of their projects has received the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.   
 Among the many impediments to PIE programs, labor unions have ranked high.  
The primary objection has been that prison industries threaten dues-paying unionists.  As 
one prison industries director explained it, the perception is that “the average American is 
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losing a job to a criminal.”  But the real threat to unions, Ellis says, is not PIE, but 
imports. 
 Ellis is perceptive as well as innovative—the latter trait a prerequisite for success 
in the private sector, according to the research of Borins (2001), Light (1998), Mulgan 
and Albury (2003). 
 “For the PIE program to continue and grow” Ellis says, “we need to educate 
legislators to how PIE can help the American people.  Congress is hearing one side of the 
story—‘They’re putting us out of business’”—but Ellis says there are solutions.  One is 
to explore the possibility of giving only part of the work to PIE.  “Let the final stage, or 
the labor-intensive part, be done in prison.”  Segregate or separate the tasks, he says.  If 
there are 10 steps, let the private sector handle seven of them, and PIE the other three.  
He cites golf shirts as one example.  The hard part, he says, is the collar, and the easy 
(low-skill) part is (e.g.) the sleeve, or cutting threads.  He reports that one or two of his 
facilities have divided these tasks. 
 When asked how he has managed to overcome union objections in South 
Carolina, he doesn’t claim credit.  In the Deep South, he says, unions are not as powerful 
as in the northeast. 
 Ellis, who has studied the history of unions, is optimistic about the future of PIE.  
Successful PIE models will be emulated, he predicts.  He cites Iowa—a state where 
unions have supported PIE programming and training—as an example of what can 
happen.  But it will take time, time to educate legislatures and time to build case studies 
that demonstrate how PIE can work.  Smart entrepreneurial businesses will have to say, 
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“they’ve got something here”—and then PIE concepts may move into schools of higher 
education, he predicts. 
 He takes particular pride in the PIE program.  He says PIE inmates are learning to 
manage money, and he notes a distinction between the money management skills of PIE 
workers and other inmate workers.  He is convinced that the PIE workers are more 
acutely aware of their finances; to illustrate this, he shares an anecdote about a PIE 
inmate whose check to his wife was missing.  (The inmate manifested a strong sense of 
responsibility and concern for his family.) 
 When the PIE inmates begin their new jobs, he says, change in their willingness 
to be responsible is “almost immediate.”  He reports that PIE inmates also begin to 
develop a sense of self respect, which he says is “probably the highest benefit.” 
 There are 50 applicants for every (PIE) job, he says.  One requirement is that 
inmates remain disciplinary-free.  “If you screw up, you’re fired,” Ellis says.  “The 
wardens will tell you that there are fewer discipline problems, and that PIE programs are 
much easier to run—inmates are more accountable.” 
 He acknowledges the problems associated with inmates.  Typically, they are 
unmotivated and uneducated.  Society has failed them, he says, and correctional 
authorities are expected to rehabilitate them with limited resources—a challenging task.  
In this regard, he maintains that the PIE program model teaches inmates responsibility, 
money management skills, and self-esteem.  They have failed in society, he points out, 
but PIE gives them a second chance.  
 There are always problems, he says, including operations interruptions caused by 
unexpected inmate transfers or facility lockdowns.  Ellis requires inmates to earn their 
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GED (if needed) to qualify for PIE.  This may require working days and going to school 
at night.  Some inmates objected and filed a lawsuit, but the court upheld his position, he 
says. 
 He provides a contrasting anecdote, describing a 55-year-old inmate who’s been 
in prison most of his life.  He had told Ellis that he “hated his guts” several times, but he 
finally acquired his GED.  He stopped Ellis one day recently, to report that he’d “walked 
across the stage and gotten a piece of paper (GED). 
I didn’t lie, cheat or steal to get it.  I hate to admit it, but I cried in my cell when I 
couldn’t get a problem.  You don’t know the amount of confidence I have now.  
I’ve got savings, I’ve got my GED—I’ll never be back.  I’ve learned that I can 
accomplish something.  You forced me to take responsibility.  If I’d met you 20 
years ago, I might not have been here these last 20 years. 
 
 Ellis said there were tears streaming down his face.  “I encouraged him to talk to 
the younger inmates.”  (One prison industries expert I spoke with stated that Ellis’s 
commitment to helping inmates was obvious, and a key to his success.) 
 Ellis maintains that success is dependent on the commitment of the correctional 
agency director, as well as facility wardens.   (He reports directly to Director of Programs 
and Services, Geraldine Miro.) 
 There are contrasting prison industry organizational structures, he reminds me, 
referring to TRICOR in Tennessee and PRIDE in Florida, both respected agencies, with 
contrasting philosophies reflected in their organizational structures.  (Ellis believes that 
various prison industry organizational structures should be studied to determine which 
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are associated with better outcomes.)  Both TRICOR and PRIDE are autonomous 
agencies, separate from the state corrections departments, to be distinguished from (e.g.) 
states like South Carolina and Iowa, both of which are part of their state correctional 
agencies.  The head of Tennessee’s TRICOR answers to a board of directors.  (In 
contrast, Ellis’s salary and the agency are governed by state regulations.) 
 He feels strongly that a successful prison industries director needs to understand 
profit and loss statements, and how to navigate government bureaucracy.  Additionally, 
s/he must have political skills.  Of his peers he says, “we all have the same challenges.  
Will the legislature leave you alone and let you do what you do?  Will the agency director 
leave you alone? 
 “You’ve got to have business skills and political skills, because you’re constantly 
barraged.” 
 Ellis is convinced that PIE inmates are perfectly suited to the contemporary 
reentry emphasis in correctional circles.  “Someone has got to marry these inmates into 
reentry programs.  In ACA, they’re trying to [move] traditional prison industries workers 
into reentry programs, but PIE inmates are much better prepared (something this 
observer, a former parole official, had noted also).  “Your most successful reentry 
(inmate) will be the PIE inmates—they’ve already worked for several years, and have 
been more involved with their families.” 
 He is not stingy with his praise for other programs, and encourages me to call the 
director of Iowa prison industries.  In Iowa, he says, inmates wear civilian clothes, and 
are dropped off (to work) at Des Moines factories.  Afterwards, they take buses back to 
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the facility.  Ellis, who has visited the Iowa program, speaks highly of the program and 
its director.  Although some inmates work in prison, most work on the outside, he says. 
 Ellis maintains a strategy of what he calls diversity in SCDC prison industries.  
He also stresses that “security is always #1.”  After that, he says, he tries to maintain a 
“3-tiered program: 1/3 traditional industries, 1/3 service industries, and 1/3 PIE. 
 “Don’t have all your eggs in one basket,” he says.  When asked, he says that their 
PIE program is the most profitable, followed by service industries—with traditional 
industries being “the most costly.”  All three programs areas—traditional, service and 
PIE—are “revenue generated,” he says.  They “don’t rely on PIE because if the market 
goes flat, then what?”  He explains that his strategy is to have three tiers to work with as 
the economy rises and falls. 
 “In an ideal world,” he says, inmates would be trained in vocational education 
classes to prepare for PIE.  The reality, I learn subsequently, is that the new SCDC 
director had been forced to RIF teachers and curtail vocational and education programs—
although he was beginning to bring a few teachers back (in 2006).  (Previously, classes 
had been filled.) 
 Ellis says that the PIE program is audited every two years.  The Bureau of Justice 
Assistance (BJA) selects and sends practitioners (who are not paid) to ensure the integrity 
of the program. 
 “Labor unions, in conjunction with the legislature, are looking at us, waiting to 
see if we screw up.  We don’t want a bad audit.”  After the audit, he says, they are de-
briefed.  (They are required to document and verify criteria established by BJA.) 
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 In the future, Ellis says that prison industries will see more turn-over.  “A lot of 
knowledge will walk out the door.”  (He’s referring to retirements, etc.)  But “there’s 
always room for more different philosophies.  What you’ll see, in my opinion, are prison 
industry directors with shorter terms.”  He calls attention to a well-known prison industry 
director whose PIE program started making money.  “The legislature took it,” he says.  
“This was a disincentive.  That legislature will destroy that program. 
 “If we could run (prison industries) with business principles, we would break 
records.”  But the political barriers are too numerous, he adds. 
 He reiterates that the gains are not immediate, but long-term.  “You’ve got to have 
vision and commitment.” 
 But he also finds rewards:  “(t)here are very few jobs where the opportunity exists 
to affect policy . . . (but) now, what I’ve accomplished will be left behind.”  That, he 
indicates, is all that matters.  If an inmate says “thanks, you gave me an opportunity—
that’s enough for me.”  When asked what his biggest accomplishment has been, he 
doesn’t hesitate:  “Seeing the program grow.  I wanted to take it as far as I could, and I 
have.”  His objective from “Day One,” he says, was “to build the most successful (PIE) 
program in the country.” 
 It was not difficult to obtain his assistance in arranging for me to visit several 
facilities, so that I could observe the state’s industries first hand.  Clearly proud of the 
achievements of the Division in all three models (traditional, service and PIE), he 
arranged for me to visit several facilities, where I was free to interview industries 
managers, and afforded time alone with individual inmate workers. 
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An Interview with SCDC Prison Industries Administrative Manager 
 Rickie Harrison, a former warden for 18 years, has been with the Division of 
Prison Industries for three years.  He looks at prison industries, he reports, from a 
“security point of view” as well as an “operational point of view.” 
 Many inmates, he says, will work in traditional prison industries “just to get away 
from the hassling and heckling of other inmates.”  Some inmates, he says, don’t work—
inmates with medical problems or those who refuse to work (who are sent to lock-up). 
 He maintains that “service prison industries workers want to be in the PIE 
program, but you don’t have that problem with traditional workers because they know 
they don’t qualify.”  Inmates in facilities that have both service industries and PIE are 
first required to work in service.  When asked, he says that they don’t usually have a 
problem with service workers.  The work ethic, he says, is basically the same in the 
service and PIE programs. 
 “My rewards,” he says, “are in seeing the guys change.  I was strict (as a warden).  
I made folks responsible for their actions.  At first, he says, they resisted, but over time 
they saw others (and themselves) make meaningful changes.  Now, he says, “I see guys 
on the street all the time.  I may not recognize them, but they recognize me, and come up. 
 “’Man, (they say), I really appreciate what you did.  If I’d had a father like you I’d 
have never come to prison.’  I’ve never had one to approach me in a disrespectful 
manner.” 
 Harrison says that some PIE graduates get jobs in the community and /or return to 
work at their old job in the prison. 
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 He makes one wry observation about the drawback of mandatory savings for the 
long-term inmates: “Lifers may never get their savings.” 
 Another unrelated observation provides food for thought, on the differences 
between female and male inmates:  “Women just want you to listen, but the men are very 
different.  They want you to listen, but they’ll also file a grievance.” 
 (Harrison is my guide through the SCDC prison system.  Everywhere we go, he is 
greeted with obvious affection by the inmates.) 
 
South Carolina Prison Industries 
 A visit to one of the prison-based factories is both instructive and memorable.  If 
it were possible to bypass the fence, barbed wire and locked metal doors of the prison 
exterior to gain entry to the manufacturing section of the facility, a visitor might easily 
forget that s/he was in a penitentiary.  The inmates appear to be as industrious and 
capable as workers in any factory.  Indeed, the visitor must admit that no clear distinction 
can be made between the apparent energy and industry of the “service” inmate workers 
(paid $1 per hour) and the PIE inmate workers (paid minimum to prevailing wage). 
 “Service” work in prison industries is to be distinguished from the manufacturing 
of a product.  The distinction is crucial due to state and federal laws that prohibit the sale 
of prison-made products across state lines.  Interested observers and the federal Bureau of 
Prisons maintain that provision of service falls outside the restrictions of such laws, and 
South Carolina officials (and those of other states) appear to agree. 
 As already mentioned, the SCDC Division of Industries operates three models of 
prison industries: traditional, service and PIE.  Prison inmates working in traditional 
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industries are not paid for their work manufacturing bookcases, credenzas, desks, chairs, 
mattresses and modular office systems—all sold to municipal, state and county 
governments, and school districts.  Traditional industries also provide printing services 
for a broad range of customers and businesses. 
 Service industries inmates earn from $ .35 to $1.00 per hour, and rebuild and 
reupholster furniture for public and private sector customers.  They also package gloves, 
Christmas decorations, plastic cutlery, tennis balls, hosiery, and attach UPC labels to 
plumbing parts.  Because service work is distinct from manufacturing of products—and 
hence does not fall under federal minimum wage requirements--inmate wages can be 
negotiated with private sector companies. 
 Opponents of service prison industries maintain that they are more than a 
loophole between traditional prison industries and enhanced prison industries.  (In Texas, 
commercial services are required to adhere to PIE requirements.)  But in states where 
critics say that service industries employees are cheated of receiving prevailing wages, 
service industries proponents respond that many of the service programs would move 
offshore (if required to meet PIE requirements), leaving inmates with only traditional 
industries.  Service industries, they maintain, allow inmates to receive more than they 
would otherwise receive (in traditional industries). 
 Prison Industries Enhancement (PIE) inmates earn from $5.15 (increased to 
$5.85 on July 24, 2007) to $10.00 per hour, manufacturing hardwood flooring, apparel, 
furniture, computer wire harnesses, and faucet handles.  The PIE program must follow 
strict guidelines, set by the state to meet federal requirements.  Inmate participation is 
voluntary; PIE employees agree to deductions from their wages for taxes, victim 
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compensation, and room and board.  They are paid prevailing wage (in the locale) for the 
work they do.  PIE regulations require that inmate employees not displace community 
workers in the same industry. 
 In 2006, 2,221 inmates were employed in traditional, service or PIE programs, 
generating $29,945,267 (by 2007, $31,000,000) for the Division.  According to the 
SCDC website, the Prison Industries Program is completely self-supporting, and provides 
training for inmates while generating funding for the Agency. 
 
SCDC Prison Industries: Relevant State Code and Court Holdings 
 South Carolina’s Prison Industries code (Article 3) acknowledges that “the means 
now provided for the employment of convict labor is inadequate to furnish a sufficient 
number or convicts with employment . . . “  Section 24-3-310 therefore stipulates that the 
intent of Article 3 is to 
(1) further provide more adequate, regular, and suitable employment for the 
convicts of this State, consistent with proper penal purposes; 
(2) further utilize the labor of convicts for self-maintenance and for reimbursing 
this State for expenses incurred by reason of their crimes and imprisonment; 
(3) effect the requisitioning and disbursement of prison products directly through 
established state authorities with no possibility of private profits therefrom; 
and 
(4) provide prison industry projects designed to place inmates in a realistic 
working and training environment in which they are able to acquire 
marketable skills and to make financial payments for restitution to their 
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victims, for support of their families, and for the support of themselves in the 
institution . 
 
 Section 24-3-315 requires certain determinations to be made prior to use of 
inmate labor, ensuring that 
. . . inmates participating in any prison industry program pursuant to the Justice 
Assistance Act of 1984 is on a voluntary basis. . . . [and that such inmate labor] . . 
. will not displace employed workers, that the locality does not have a surplus of 
available labor for the skills, crafts, or trades that would utilize inmate labor, and 
that the rates of pay and other conditions of employment are not less than those 
paid and provided for work of similar nature in the locality in which the work is 
performed. 
 
 Section 24-3-410 precludes sale of prison-made products on the open market, 
except for  
. . . products sold intrastate or interstate produced by inmates of the Department 
of Corrections employed in a federally certified private sector/prison industries 
program if the inmate workers participate voluntarily, receive comparable wages 
and the work does not displace employed workers. . . . The Department of Labor 
shall develop guidelines to determine if the work displaces employed workers. 
 
(The Section also provides for piece-price compensation for the handicapped or aged.) 
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Section 24-3-430 provides requirements and conditions: 
(A) The Director of the Department of Corrections may establish a program 
involving the use of inmate labor by a nonprofit organization or in private 
industry . . . . No violent offender shall be afforded the opportunity to perform 
labor for nonprofit organizations if such labor is outside the confines of a 
correctional institution. . . . 
(B) . . . The contractual agreements may include rental or lease agreements for 
state buildings or portions of them on the grounds of an institution or a 
facility of the Department of Corrections and provide for reasonable access 
to and egress from the building to establish and operate a facility. 
(C)  An inmate may participate in the program established pursuant to this 
section only on a voluntary basis . . .  
(D) No inmate participating in the program may earn less than the prevailing 
wage for work of a similar nature in the private sector. 
(E) Inmate participation in the program may not result in the displacement of 
employed workers in the State of South Carolina and may not impair existing 
contracts for services. 
(F) . . . No inmate compensated for participation in the program is considered an 
employee of the State. 
(G) No inmate who participates is designated by the Director of the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance pursuant to Public Law 90-351 is eligible for 
unemployment compensation upon termination from the program. 
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(H) The earnings of an inmate authorized to work at paid employment pursuant 
to this section must be paid directly to the Department of Corrections and 
applied as provided under Section 24-3-40 (which specifies the disposition of 
wages for prisoners allowed to work at paid employment). 
 
 Lake Summers, an attorney who has represented SCDC prison industries in a 
number of lawsuits, summarized much of the code with a simple statement:  “In our state, 
the labor of inmates is the property of the State.” 
 Summers discussed two S.C. private sector prison industries cases in particular, 
Adkins v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Wicker v. South Carolina 
Department of Corrections.  In the Adkins case, the State’s Supreme Court ruled that 
South Carolina’s statutes provided  no private right of action for inmates, who had filed 
tort claims action against the DOC for alleged violations of prevailing wage statutes.  The 
Court held that inmates had no private civil cause of action, but that they were not 
without a remedy—they might file an inmate grievance to protest DOC’s failure to pay 
wages in accordance with mandatory statutory provisions.  As Summers pointed out, on 
the same date that the Court issued that holding it also issued a holding in the Wicker 
matter.  In the Wicker case, Wicker had filed a grievance with the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ), who ruled that the inmate was entitled to be paid prevailing wage while 
working in a (private sector) prison industries program; the Supreme Court affirmed the 
ALJ’s ruling. 
 “The philosophical conundrum that I face in trying to reconcile Adkins and 
Wicker is this,” Summers said, “in Adkins, our Supreme Court said that inmates may not 
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use the applicable statute, 24-3-430 as a statute that gives the inmate a private right of 
action.  It means you cannot sue and invoke that standard.  If you recall from the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) . . . it says specifically that employees may sue. . . . There’s 
nothing like that in 24-3-430 [the section that addresses private prison industry]. . . .  
 “Look at 24-3-410 and 24-3-420 and 24-3-430 . . .  unlike the FLSA provision.  . . 
. there’s nothing . . . that gives an inmate the remedy of a lawsuit under those statutes. . . . 
The predominant purpose of those statutes . . . (was not) for the special benefit of the 
inmates, unlike the FLSA which was enacted for the special benefit of employees. 
The Supreme Court in Atkins recognized that the statutes at play in the case (the prison 
industries statutes) were enacted to prevent unfair competition. . . . inmates cannot use 
24-3-430 or any other prison industries statute as a private right of action. 
 “I was thrilled when I saw Adkins.  Then I went to Wicker, and very interestingly 
. . . our Supreme Court did not schedule an argument as it did in Adkins.  The attorneys 
argued before the Court in Adkins (but) there was no argument of any kind undertaken in 
the Court by Wicker, so the Court issued its opinion in Wicker on the same day [that 
Adkins was issued].  So in Wicker . . . our Court sanctioned the remedy and the 
mechanism that inmate Wicker came up with all on his own, without a lawyer.  Wicker 
chose a different course: Wicker filed a grievance; Wicker didn’t file a lawsuit.  Our 
Supreme Court sanctioned that and said, ‘Wicker, you did the right thing.’  But at the 
same time, in my mind, philosophically, our Supreme Court let in through the back door 
what it wouldn’t let in through the front door.  And so I think that tension, that 
philosophical difference at least as I see it, will be the subject of further litigation whether 
it’s with our Court of Appeals, our Supreme Court, or both.” 
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 Summers referred me to a Maryland case cited in Adkins: Harker v. State 
Industries, in which Harker (and other inmates) argued that inmates working in state 
prison industries [not private sector prison industries] must be paid federal minimum 
wage, per the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The United States District Court for the District 
of Maryland disagreed, adding that “(i)f the FLSA’s coverage is to extend within prison 
walls, Congress must say so, not the courts.” 
 Summers also alluded to the Washington Water Jet Workers case, to be discussed 
in a following section of this paper.  (In that case, union involvement was easily inferred.) 
 
SCDC Prison Industries Products and Services Catalog 
 Like other state industries, the South Carolina Department of Corrections has a 
catalog of products and services for its traditional and service prison industries.  Offered 
in CD-ROM format as well, the catalog is available as a large binder, divided into 
separate, labelled sections: General Information, Case Goods, Seating, Modular 
Furniture, Institutional Bedding, Janitorial, Dormitory Furniture, Apparel, Reupholstery, 
Printing, Signs, Retread and Framing.  The catalog is attractive and professional in 
appearance, with glossy pages and expertly rendered photographs of products. 
 An introductory letter from the Director states: 
 It is with a great deal of pride that Prison Industries (PI) presents this 
catalog of products and services.  PI, a division of the South Carolina 
Department of Corrections, has a proud history of more than forty years serving 
the State of South Carolina. 
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 PI is a major element of the inmate programs in the South Carolina 
Department of Corrections.  Using structured employment and training 
programs, PI provides a broad range of products to governmental agencies 
(wholly or partially tax supported), and non-profit organizations.  PI offers 
formalized training through on-the-job experience, teaching a job skill and work 
ethic otherwise foreign to many in the inmate population. 
 We offer a variety of products and services, competitively priced with 
quality assurance guaranteed.  PI continues to grow by expanding present 
facilities, developing new industries and adding new products and services. 
 
 Under General Information, the question “What is PI?” is answered: 
 We are the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Division of 
Industries, serving the State by employing and training inmates and returning 
them into society as useful citizens.  In pursuit of the course, we reduce the cost of 
prison operation and offer products and services of a substantial savings to 
qualified businesses and organizations. 
 
 Information and instructions are provided concerning placement of orders by 
telephone (including an 800- number), fax number, email address and mailing address.  
Orders for new products are limited to 
• Any office or agency that is wholly or partially tax supported 
• Any non-profit business or organization 
Any appointed jobber or broker doing business solely within South Carolina. 
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 Orders for services are limited to 
• All those who qualify to buy new products 
• Any business or organization 
 
(The copy, however, specifies that tire retreading services are available to state agencies 
only.) 
 The prospective customer is invited to visit sales offices located in Columbia.  
(“Call in advance and we’ll have your personal representative standing by to answer your 
questions and design a solution for your office needs.”)  Specialty and customized items, 
the reader is advised, may be available.  (“For information, please contact Customer 
Service or your sales representative.”) 
 PI pays South Carolina sales tax on all orders, as well as shipping costs.  PI 
warrants that all products are defect-free in material and workmanship for one year.  
Finally, merchandise may be returned (subject to approval by PI).  If approved, 
merchandise will be picked up at no charge (within 30 days of purchase).  Otherwise, a 
15-percent restocking fee may be charged.  (No returns after 6 months.) 
 Many PI products are available online. 
 
Products and Services 
 The Case Goods section of the binder reveals glossy photographs of handsome 
office furniture: bookcases, desks, credenzas, file cabinets, tables, etc.  The Citadel 
Collection ranges in price from $219.00 for a foyer table (without drawer) to $1,150.00 
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for an executive “L” desk.  (The Lancaster and Calhoun Collections are priced in a 
slightly lower price range.) 
 The Seating section of the binder offers an impressive array of good-looking 
executive swivel chairs and side chairs, loveseats, office deluxe chairs, “T.U.F. Cop” 
chairs, ergonomic seating, stackable chairs, complete with fabric samples for upholstered 
chairs. 
 The Modular Furniture, Institutional Bedding, and Janitorial sections are all 
attractively displayed, and straightforward.  The Dormitory Furniture ranges from a 
$131.00 “student chair” to $700.00 for a “Wardrobe.”  Mattresses range in price from 
$69.75 to $77.50, all manufactured with “Staph-Chek Ticking.” 
 Apparel is limited to institutional clothing for inmates, as well as undergarments, 
bed linens, and clothing designed for hospitalized inmate patients. 
 The Printing section offers a range of services, including graphics.  “Standard 
Features” include desktop publishing design service, single and multi-part forms, 
envelopes and letterheads, brochures and newsletters, a quick copy center, high volume 
copying, color copies, collating, folding and binding.  Other services include shrink wrap 
and special packaging, off-set printing, carbonless forms, and “Rush Services.” 
 The Sign Center offers traffic, highway, and street signs; decals, desk markers, 
name plates and name tags, and customized signs.  No Parking signs start at $5.00 each 
(in lots of 25 or more), while a single 48x48x48” sign costs $34.75; custom signs (6x12) 
cost as little as $3.25 each in lots of 25-plus, while a single 48x72 custom sign may cost 
as much as $216.75. 
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 The copy for tire retreading services, offered only to state agencies, compares the 
cost of buying and replacing a new tire ($182.00) twice, for a total of $546.00, with the 
cost of buying the same new tire ($182.00) and retreading it twice (@ $86.23 both times), 
for a total investment of $354.46. 
 The Frame Shop offers “custom framing at very affordable prices,” including 
documents, diplomas, prints, posters, photographs and state seals. 
 
South Carolina Division of Prison Industries Programs (Specific Models) 
 
Traditional Prison Industries 
 Visits to SCDC traditional prison industries (based at Broad River Correctional 
Institution) revealed unexpected and interesting variations in how prisoners may be paid.  
All automobile tags are manufactured in prison, as required by South Carolina law.  The 
tags account for approximately 10 months’ work out of each year; approximately 
1,000,000 tags are manufactured per year.  Inmates also manufacture reflective street 
signs, as well as name tags, office signs and desk markers for state agency or non-profit 
purchase. 
In this regard, Barbara Auerbach told me that she believes that the manufacture of 
license tags has gotten a “bad rap” in the past (from critics) because in fact, inmate 
workers learn skills (like sign-manufacturing) that are valuable upon release.  She 
acknowledged that there are some “fabulous” traditional prison industries throughout the 
country.  However, she added that there is “something intangible that is critical” gained 
by inmates who work for the private sector: “dignity.” 
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 The labor in the Broad River facility is divided into traditional (TI) and PIE 
industry employment; 55.5 percent of hours worked are paid 50 cents per hour, while 
44.5 percent of hours worked are paid at the PIE scale of $5.15 per hour.  Inmates rotate, 
and therefore, sometimes earn the lower rate, and other times earn the PIE rate.  
However, most TI inmates are unpaid.  While at one time they may have been, the wages 
were stopped, with those who were already paid being grand-fathered in. 
 Another example of variations in paying inmates can be found in laundry 
employment at the Manning Correctional Institution.  Although laundry labor for the 
State or SCDC is unpaid, laundry for a nearby hotel is paid at the “service” rate.  
(“Service” prison industries were developed in the early 1970s, and are discussed in the 
following section.) 
 When the writer visited another, smaller traditional industry program at a different 
facility, the inmate who showed me around said that there was “no motivation to improve 
or upgrade work or equipment because “no one expects [us] to make money.”  There are 
no incentives to get more customers or a larger market share.  Their only incentive, he 
said was that the Director says they must improve or be shut down.  An additional 
incentive is that inmates working in traditional prison industries have an opportunity to 
prove themselves, and perhaps qualify for working in a service industry—which may 
lead to the most prized opportunity of all: a chance to qualify for the PIE program and its 
wages and status.  In spite of such claims, however, it appeared to this novice observer 
that the inmates were doing a fine job. 
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Service Prison Industries 
 The Lieber Correctional Institution, opened in 1986, is located in Ridgeland, 
South Carolina.  A Level 3 (high security) male facility, it has a single fenced perimeter 
and electronic surveillance.  The state’s Death Row population is also housed at Lieber, 
as well as a licensed infirmary for deaf and blind male inmates.  Twenty-four hour 
coverage for “routine” medical and dental care is available.  Literacy and GED classes 
are available, along with vocational training in carpentry. 
 As previously mentioned, the provision of a prison industries “service” is to be 
distinguished from the manufacturing of a product; thus, South Carolina (and other states, 
as well as UNICOR) use the resultant loophole as a means of partnering with the private 
sector while not requiring minimum or prevailing wages.  Inmates who might otherwise 
be unpaid are eager to earn something more than nothing, and thus the service prison 
industry program endures—in spite of the objections of those who see it as an 
underhanded means of obtaining cheap labor.  Corrections authorities, however, see it as 
a means of providing a small wage to inmates who might otherwise be unpaid. 
In 2005, three service prison industries programs constituted Lieber’s industrial 
complex:  the Tire Retread Plant; Evans Rule, a spool recycling program25; and Williams 
Technologies, an automotive transmission disassembly operation.  The tire retread plant 
and the spool recycling programs are described below. 
 Inmate workers are paid by the hour, with a range of opportunities available to 
earn bonuses.  Bonuses are intended to provide incentive for inmates to increase 
productivity and quality workmanship.  Bonuses are also linked to attendance and 
seniority as measured by length of time with the program.    
                                                 
25 Closed in 2006; a new program will soon replace it. 
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 Base rate is $0.35 per hour, the minimum that an inmate employee can receive.  
This rate increases with seniority and completion of special certification programming.  
The base rate also establishes over-time hourly rates.  An inmate who transfers between 
industries can maintain eligibility for seniority bonuses.  This “longevity” rate is $0.15 
per hour after 6 months; $0.10 per hour after 12 months, and $0.05 per hour for each 
subsequent 12-month period. 
 Bonuses are based on performance reflecting worker attendance and disciplinary 
issues, and completion of a probationary period.  Leadman bonuses are also available, 
along with completion of a “Precure Retread Certification” program. 
 
Inmate Service Industries Contract 
 The South Carolina Department of Corrections Prison Industries Inmate 
Agreement for service, one page in length, includes several stipulations.  Each inmate 
service worker voluntarily agrees to terms and conditions regarding the disposition of 
wages received: 
1. Twenty percent (20%) contribution to court-ordered payments to a specific 
victim(s) or if restitution has been satisfied, to a particular victim, ten percent 
(10%) must be applied to the Victims’ Compensation Fund. 
2. Ten percent (10%) for room and board26. 
                                                 
26 South Carolina’s Code, Chapter 1, Title 24 was amended August 1, 2007 by the addition of section 24-1-
290.  The result was a bipartite provision which differed for service industries inmates with or without 
children, and which was virtually identical to the state’s PIE inmate deductions.  Those with children have 
deductions of 20 percent for victims’ compensation, 35 percent for child support and 10 percent for 
interest-bearing inmate accounts; those without children will have deductions of 20 percent for victims’ 
compensation, 25 percent for room and board, and 10 percent for interest-bearing inmate accounts.  Any 
remainder will go to inmate canteen accounts, known as “Cooper’s accounts). 
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Inmate service workers agree to work up to eight hours per day for a minimum of one 
year, providing they meet production and quality standards, maintain “a cooperative 
attitude and adhere to the conduct rules and all policies and procedures established” (by 
SCDC).  They agree that they may be terminated for security, safety or custody reasons.  
They further agree that should they be transferred out of the Prison Industries Service 
Program and returned to the general population, their pay will revert to the regular inmate 
work scale.  They sign agreements attesting to these stipulations, and further agree that 
institution work assignments (in the general population) are mandatory, not voluntary. 
Finally, each worker agrees that he understands that he is not employed by the 
Service Sector Industry, to which his labor is leased, and that any grievance or complaint 
related to the Program will be addressed to SCDC.  Signatures are dated and witnessed by 
the P.I. Business Manager. 
 
Training for Tire Retread Plant Program 
 Initial training and continuous training for all tire retread plant inmate employees 
is mandatory.  New employees begin training within a week of being hired, and have 45 
days to fulfill qualification requirements.  The Tire Retread Plant’s “Synopsis of Precure 
Retreading and Repairing Tire Certification Program” describes training objectives as 
follows: 
• Provide classroom training and extensive hands-on skill development in the 
precure tire retreading industry. 
• Ensure that technicians are trained in OSHA mandated safety requirements and 
tire retreading/repair industry procedural standards. 
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• Facilitate individual technical skills and development through continuing 
education. 
• Obtain commercial certification in Precure Retreading and Tire Repair. 
 
 Inmate employees are encouraged to achieve industry certification in order to 
receive bonus pay.  On-the-job refresher training sessions must be completed every six 
months to maintain certification.  Failure to complete training results in cancellation of 
performance or certification bonuses.  Bonuses can be reinstated when requirements are 
met and approved by the supervisor of the plant. 
 
Tire Retread Plant 
 At the Tire Retread Plant, inmates work from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm Monday 
through Friday, excluding state and federal holidays.  The plant is monitored and 
managed by a former Marine (whose responsibilities also include the Evans Rule 
program described below). 
 According to a glossy brochure entitled Retread, features include: 
• Recognized “A” rating with national Tire Dealers and Retreaders Association. 
• All tires must pass a 12- step PI (prison industries) quality assurance and testing 
program. 
• All radial tires are high pressure tested. 
• Recapping of radial and bias ply tires for most fleet vehicles. 
• A nationally recognized tread supplier. 
• PI’s tire staff is professionally trained by factory representatives. 
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• Electrostatic pre-treatment exams are conducted. 
• All rims are steam cleaned at no charge and painted upon request for a nominal 
charge. 
• Tires carry a DOT and PI identification code along with manufacturing 
completion date. 
• Customer ID-Logo’s stenciled or branded at no charge. 
 
Benefits, according to the same brochure, include: 
• A standard reached by only 30 percent of the tire retreading facilities in North 
America. 
• The highest manufacturing quality and tire safety possible are maintained. 
• Fleet service is not interrupted and tire inventories can be reduced. 
• Technicians have a broad base of experience in fleet vehicles including highway 
maintenance, sanitation and school buses. 
• Only the highest quality compounds are used in the retreading procedure. 
• All the latest technologies and industry applications are used. 
• Tire soundness is evaluated to avoid unnecessary processing. 
• Tires offer above-average safety and appearance. 
• Identification markings allow casings to be tracked throughout the manufacturing 
process. 




Under a brochure section captioned “Satisfaction Guaranteed,” the text assures the 
reader that “(f)or more than 30 years, PI has been committed to complete customer 
satisfaction.  The products we offer are of the highest quality, made in our own factories, 
and meet our strict specifications; similarly, our services are second to none.  We have an 
extensive Quality Assurance program and inspectors spot check shipments to ensure 
accuracy and quality.  Our modern Distribution Center allows us to keep a large 
inventory, ready and available to ship when we receive your order.  And our Customer 
Services are unsurpassed.  We want every customer of PI Products & Services to be 
completely satisfied in every way.  Place your order with confidence.”  Delivery is 
guaranteed within 15 working days, and PI pays South Carolina tax, regular shipping and 
handling charges on all orders delivered within the state (“unless otherwise specified”). 
The reader is informed that resource conservation is observed, in that 15 gallons of oil 
are saved every time a truck tire is recycled.  “Retreading conserves 400 million gallons 
of oil annually in the United States and Canada (The Retread Information Bureau, Pacific 
Grove, CA)”. 
 
South Carolina Division of Motor Vewhicle Management Policy  
In November 1993, South Carolina’s Division of Motor Vehicle Management 
(DMVM) completed a study of the use of retreaded tires.  The purpose of the study was 
to determine whether it was cost effective for the state to use retreaded tires on state 
vehicles exceeding 10,000 lbs.  The study’s conclusions were that tires should be 
replaced before or when tread depth reached 1/8th of an inch; tires with tread less than 
1/8th of an inch should be discarded and destroyed.  The DMVM found that the 
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approximate cost for the state for a new Goodyear tire (size 10R-22.5) was $195.00; for a 
retreaded tire not furnished by the state, $165.00; and under the then-current DOT 
contract, a retreaded tire furnished by the state, $60.00.  The agency’s new policy 
stipulated that effective not later than July 1, 1994, all vehicles with a Gross Vehicle 
Weight Rating (GVWR) of 10,000 lbs. or more should use retreaded tires on non-steer 
axles.  (The policy did not affect passenger cars or vans.) 
 
Evans Rule 
 A division of Starret Industries, Evans Rule maintains a service contract with 
SCDC (Lieber) Prison Industries to disassemble, clean, sort and re-package returned 
merchandise (tape measures).  The program’s purpose is to recover recyclable materials 
from used products.  The sound of yards and yards of metal tape measures, pulled from 
old casings, and flung to the floor, reverberates throughout the area.  Inmates gather huge 
bundles of the metal tapes and crush them into bundles for shipment to other recycling 
destinations, while the tape measures’ outer shells are retained for regrinding.  Each tape 
measure’s spring spool is also retained for processing, while screws and other 
miscellaneous parts are discarded.  Belt clips are retained, also for additional processing 
purposes.  Recycled components are inventoried and recorded.  The bustling atmosphere 
has the familiar feel of any such operation.  The visitor might easily forget that the 
workers are inmates. 
 Quality control standards are maintained by a Program Assistant, whose 
responsibilities include maintenance of accurate production records, compliance with 
safety standards, and provision of daily production reports to the Program Coordinator.  
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The Program Assistant also ensures that a trained inmate work force is available to meet 
production schedules. 
 Spools are hand cleaned and inspected for broken parts, rust and corrosion, then 
sorted by weight and color, and packed for shipping. 
 The Program Assistant maintains production records, while a clerk inmate assists 
the supervisor.  The supervisor establishes the rate of production, and ensures that inmate 
time cards are completed and maintained. 
 Security is emphasized.  Incoming and outgoing shipments are supervised and 
monitored by industry staff.  Incoming shipments are inspected by correctional officers 
and prison industries staff before being turned over to inmate workers.  Correctional staff 
randomly search for contraband.27 
  
Interview with CEO of U.S. Textiles, Prison Industries Service Program 
 Hans Lengers stated that he was CEO and partner of the textiles (service) prison 
industries initiative in South Carolina, where he said they have two programs.  He stated 
that they opened their first program in North Carolina in 2002.  Lengers said that most of 
their products are knit and sewn in North Carolina then sent to South Carolina where they 
are dyed, inspected and packaged.  He confirmed a report to the writer (by SC State 
Senator Chauncey Gregory) that he was having difficulty competing with offshore 
companies based not only in China, but in Vietnam, Korea and Turkey as well. 
                                                 
27 The program, however, was terminated in 2006 when the industry was relocated offshore.  (It seems 
ironic that even service prison industries appear to be threatened by offshore labor.)  In its place, a new 
service program was to be established, called “Removing Nails and Sawing Used Boards.”  The new 
industry represented the expansion of one of the Prison Industries Division’s long time private sector 




 Lengers said that U.S. Textiles continues to maintain community-based facilities, 
but that whenever there is a shortage of employees, he moves the job to the prison.  He 
maintained that he has never laid anyone off [in order to employ an inmate], and that it 
would be inconsistent with his personal philosophy to do so.  However, he said that in 
some instances, men resisted jobs like sewing as “women’s work” but that he had found 
that inmates offered no such resistance. 
 He said that Tony Ellis had approached him regarding the possibility of 
employing prisoners.  He said that a lot of U.S. Textiles products could be packaged by 
machinery, but that some had to be hand-packed, and that he had found that he couldn’t 
compete with countries like China and Vietnam—that is, until he worked out an 
arrangement with Ellis that was advantageous to all: U.S. Textiles, South Carolina, and 
inmates. 
 When asked for his opinion about how the state’s legislature felt about the 
program, he said that he was “pretty sure” that they were supportive.  He remembered an 
adverse audit (conducted by the Legislative Audit Council), and felt that it was politically 
motivated.  However, he maintained his conviction that most legislators would be 
supportive of the program if they were familiar with its benefits.  He pointed out recent 
reports of involvement of more than two million Americans in the criminal justice 
system.  How, he asked, could anyone oppose employing inmates in a program that paid 
for itself?  Otherwise, he said, inmates are a “drag to society.”  With his program, he said, 
there are three beneficiaries: the state, the inmate, and industry.  He also said that if 
stockholders analyze the situation, it’s easy to see how the state benefits.  “Whatever 
stays in [this country] remains in the state”—the benefits are obvious. 
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 Lengers pointed out that Chinese currency is getting stronger.  This, he said, 
means that Chinese products are costing more.  “Eventually,” he said, “we will be held 
hostage to their pricing.” 
  He spoke highly of Tony Ellis: 
 It really is nice to work with him.   He’s accommodating—on one occasion 
when there was a lock-down, he managed to provide another work site right 
away. 
 Tony is doing a super job.  He’s one of the few people I know that’s doing 
it from the heart.  He’s very well-respected by inmates and the people working for 
him.  He changes people’s lives.  For him, it’s a mission. 
 He’s always there.  He gave me his personal cell phone number, and told 
me I could call him anytime there was a problem day or night. 
 
 Lengers acknowledged that he himself considers it a kind of mission also.  He 
reiterated that he would never fire anybody to give a job to a prisoner, but said that he can 
feel good about it when he is able to hire an inmate. 
 He described trying to persuade a business friend to explore a prison industries 
program comparable to his own, but said that the friend was intimidated by the possibility 
of negative media exposure or public reaction.  He said that he thinks there should be 
more of an effort made to educate the public, politicians, and business.  He expressed the 
view that the program is not well understood, and that its benefits are either unknown or 
under-appreciated. 
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 He returned to the topic of jobs leaving the country, referring to the shoe industry, 
especially sports shoes, which he said are virtually all manufactured offshore.  “I believe 
we should bring the shoe industry back [to the U.S.].  We should make special 
arrangements to take this (shoe) industry back, and bring it into prisons and let inmates 
perform the labor.”  How, he asked, could anyone object to hiring inmates if it could 
bring jobs back from outside the country? 
 He related an anecdote about an Hispanic inmate who came up to him and 
thanked him very emotionally, and profusely, for “giving us a chance.”  Lengers said that 
he listened to the inmate with “tears in my eyes.”  His statement was followed with a 
quiet pause. 
 
SCDC  Prison Industries Enhancement (PIE) Program 
In 2005, the SCDC PIE programs numbered 10 active, with two pending 
applications.  The two largest programs were hardwood flooring, based at three separate 
facilities, and furniture, based in the southern part of the State in Ridgeland.  The sites 
described below are at the Tyger River Correctional Institution and the Ridgeland 
Correctional Institution.  
 
SCDC PIE Inmate Agreement 
 Participation in the SCDC PIE program is voluntary (as is required in all PIE 
initiatives). The inmate acknowledges his understanding that the Director of Corrections 
will specify deductions from his wages in the following priority: 
1. State and Federal Income Taxes; 
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2. Social Security deductions; 
3. Twenty percent (20%) contribution to 
a. Court ordered payments to a particular victim(s) 
b. Court ordered restitution; or 
c. Victim’s Compensation Fund; 
4. Thirty-five percent (35%) for child support 
    OR  Twenty-five percent (25%) for room and board; 
5. Ten percent (10%) to long term savings; 
6. Remainder to Inmate Cooper Account. 
 
The inmate agrees to work up to eight hours per day28.   The inmate also agrees 
that he will be paid only for days worked, that he may be required to work shifts and a 
“reasonable amount” of overtime.  He acknowledges that as an inmate, he is not 
considered an employee of the State and is not eligible for State benefits.  He agrees that 
his assignment will be for a minimum of a year and that he may be terminated for 
”security, safety or custody reasons, failure to meet established production and quality 
standards, failure to maintain a cooperative attitude or failure to adhere to the policies, 
procedures and conduct requirements of the Department of Corrections.” 
                                                 
28 Barbara Auerbach reports that “one major difference between the Free Venture model and the PIE 
(model) requirements is the lack of insistence on the 8 hour day. . . . The researchers put great stock in the 
8 hour day because you need it to emulate the real world.  If other needs were to shorten the word day, 
then it was clear that it was business as usual, just another program that could be manipulated to fit 
institutional needs.  The hope of the Free Venture authors and their supporters was to use work to 
transform the institution.  Thus, if shorter hours became the norm, one might suppose that not much was 
going to be accomplished.” 
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The inmate agrees also that he is not an employee of the private sector industry to 
which his labor is leased, and that if he has a grievance or complaint, he will address it to 
SCDC rather than the private sector company. 
Perhaps the most sobering acknowledgement that the inmate makes in signing this 
agreement is that he understands  
. . . that should I be transferred out of the Private Sector/Prison Industry 
Program, and returned to the general population of the Institution, my pay will 
revert to the regular Inmate wage scale.  I also understand that Institutional work 
assignments are not voluntary (they are mandatory), and I will be expected to 
work at a job within the Institution.  Furthermore, I understand that I will not be 
guaranteed the same job. 
 
In spite of the contract, however, the Director of Prison Industries reports that 
there are 50 applicants for every PIE job. 
 
Other PIE Program Requirements  
 The Division of Prison Industries is required to maintain a certification checklist 
for each PIE program.  This is to ensure that BJA, statutory and program regulations are 
followed.  A letter must be sent to the state’s Employment Security Commission (ESC), 
describing the planned industry, and requesting the provision of a wage plan for the 
number of inmates who will be performing the work.  The ESC must provide wage and 
displacement assurances to BJA, so that, in turn, BJA can approve the request to 
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authorize a new business.  Thus, one of the ESC’s key tasks is to provide assurance that 
the work described will not displace currently employed workers in the area. 
 The state office of the AFL-CIO is also contacted in writing, prior to 
establishment of the program.  The work and salary range of the anticipated industry is 
described, and assurance given that “This project will not displace any employed workers 
and taxes will be generated.”  The form letter closes with the statement:  “I invite your 
comments.” 
 The State Chamber of Commerce is also sent a form letter with virtually the same 
information provided the AFL-CIO. 
 The Bureau of Justice Assistance PIECP program manager is also notified, in 
writing, that a new “Cost Accounting Center” (PIE program) is being implemented at a 
(specified) facility.  An “application for categorical exemption” is enclosed with the letter 
and a request for advice if anything else is needed.  (A copy of this letter is sent to the 
NCIA in Baltimore, Maryland.) 
 Other certification checklist items include meeting the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); notification of the SC Department of 
Archives and History (which manages and retains state agency and local government 
records); obtaining a FEMA Flood Plain map; development of a history and drawing of 






SCDC Enhanced Prison Industries (PIE): Kwalu and Anderson Flooring 
 Site visits were conducted at South Carolina’s two largest PIE programs, Kwalu, 
based at Ridgeland Correctional Institution in the southeastern corner of the state, and 
Anderson Flooring, located in the northwestern section at Tyger River Correctional 
Institution; both Ridgeland and Tyger River are Level 2 medium security facilities for 
males. 
 Ridgeland provides literacy, GED and high school courses, in additional to 
vocational training in carpentry and small appliance repair.  A vocational program called 
IMPACT (Inmates Providing Animal Care and Training) is also offered.  Twenty-four 
hour medical coverage is available for “routine” medical and dental care. Ridgeland’s 
website states that “a private sector industry produces PVC-based furniture for the 
contract furnishings market,” but the private sector company is not identified.  The 
contract furnishing’s market is, the website explains, “hotel, motel, restaurant, fast food, 
resorts and institutional markets.” 
 
Kwalu 
 A visit to Ridgeland Correctional Institution’s PIE operation is an eye-opening 
experience.  Only the walk through the yard and into the plant operation serve to remind 
the visitor that s/he is in a prison setting; inside the plant, one may easily forget that the 
workers are inmates.  The sound of machinery, the steady stir of activity, the 
concentration of the workers, the coordination of individual tasks and movement is 
striking.  The degree of creative energy is almost palpable, a conspicuous contrast to the 
deadening inactivity of other prison settings. 
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 Kwalu, formerly based in South Africa, relocated to this facility in 1994.  Tony 
Ellis persuaded them to visit South Carolina to determine whether the advantages of 
being based in the United States might supersede the advantages of being offshore.  
Apparently, they liked what they saw.  Kwalu representatives are cordial and 
accommodating to the visitor.  It becomes evident that they are accustomed to having 
visitors.  The inmate workers, too, seem undistracted by my presence; it is clear that they 
must maintain focus on their work. 
 A comfortable camaraderie among prison staff and Kwalu staff is manifest.  I am 
offered the opportunity to ask questions of prison and/or Kwalu staff.  When I ask to 
interview a few inmate workers, I detect no resistance.  The only questions: how many?  
Together or separate?  I opt for individual interviews, and am left alone for the 
interviews, without time constraints or limitations. 
 I am provided a large loose-leaf binder of Kwalu informational materials: 
“seating, casegoods, tables, wall protection systems.”  The Product Overview section of 
the binder provides company history, noting Kwalu’s “early South African roots.”  They 
offer a 10-year warranty on construction and finish, along with: 
• Complementary casegoods, seating tables and wall protection systems 
• 32 standard finishes 
• Custom capabilities: color, dimensions and design 
• Patented products 
• Made in the USA. 
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They offer an environmental commitment:  “non-toxic finish, no VOC’s, fully 
recyclable, recycled content in all products, preserves internal air quality.” 
The word “Kwalu,” the reader is informed, derives from the Xhosa word for 
“bamboo” which is known for resilience, durability, flexibility and eco-friendly 
properties.  (The copy states that “Kwalu” is pronounced “qua-lew”—“Think ‘qua’ for 
‘quality.’”) 
Nowhere in the copy is there mention of the plant’s prison-based location. 
The company’s commitment to the environment is reinforced repeatedly when 
perusing the catalog and binder.  Kwalu tables, we learn, contain no wood, but have a 
longer life cycle, do not release formaldehyde or VOC’s, preserve internal air quality, 
contain post-industrial recycled material, and can be fully recycled.  A Kenyan proverb is 
quoted in the catalog:  “Treat the earth well.  It was not given to you by your parents.  It 
was loaned to you by your children.” 
A video developed by the NCIA to promote the PIE initiative, includes an 
interview with David Horwitz, owner of Kwalu, Inc..  “The situation here,” Horwitz says 
in the video, “allows us to control our costs far more than we could in the past.”  The 
decision to relocate from South Africa to South Carolina, he says, “was a financial one.”  
They did consider relocating to China or the Far East where labor costs are exceptionally 
low, but in the end, they chose to relocate to Ridgeland Correctional Institution where 
they found a “select group of energized and motivated inmates. 
“We are literally running at 94-96 percent productivity every day,” he says.  
There are “no problems with babysitters not showing up” and the inmates are 
 213 
“hardworking and reliable.”  The arrangement, he says, “allows us to control costs far 
more than we ever could before. 
“Inmates are interviewed and hired selectively,” he adds, “with on-the-job 
training and supervision.” 
 
What the Inmates Say 
 Informal interviews with several PIE participants in the Kwalu program reveal a 
sense of pride in the work.  The first inmate I talk to says that he is saving for 
transportation and other needs he’ll have when he is released from prison in two years.  
The program, he says, helps him stay out of trouble, and feel productive.  The experience 
here, he says, “makes a difference—whether or not I make it, or do life here on the 
installment plan.”  He is now 30, he says.  When you first arrive in the program, he says, 
your attitude in general is going to change.  He says he looks at the guys in the dorm—
this gives guys hope, a better outlook in general.  On the other hand, he says, he’s seen 
resentment from the guys sitting in the dorm for eight hours a day.29 
 A second inmate says that he pays court-ordered child support.  He’s been in 
prison for a year and in the PIE program for 10 months.  He says that he prayed for the 
PIE program.  He has a 10 year sentence, he says, and (with truth-in-sentencing) won’t be 
eligible for release from prison until 2012.  There’s a 12-18 month wait list for Tyger 
River, he says, and it was easier to get into the Kwalu program. 
                                                 
29 Note:  Rickie Harrison, Administrative manager of SCDC prison industries and a former warden, told me 
he believes PIE inmates should be segregated from the general population.  “You don’t want the ‘haves’ 
living with the ‘have-nots,’” he said. Besides, “it may lead to stealing.”  Additionally, he said, if the PIE 
inmates are living together and there’s a lockdown, “they can still go to work.” 
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 He says he has seven children, and pays child support for three.  Just being in the 
PIE program makes him want to stay out of trouble, he says, and he stays in his cell as 
much as possible to keep out of trouble.  He says he works 40 hours a week, but stays late 
sometimes.  He rooms with his cousin, who is also in the PIE program.  He says his 




 Anderson Flooring is located at the Tyger River Correctional Institution in 
Enoree, South Carolina.  The facility has two yards; the Upper Yard opened in 1980, 
while the Lower Yard opened in 1983.  Tyger River is an all-male institution, where 
GED preparation and high school courses are available, along with literacy classes.  Two 
private sector industries operate: a buffing operation for faucet handles and a hardwood 
flooring plant, Anderson Flooring. 
 John Carson, manager of Tyger River’s prison industries, states that the Anderson 
plant is the largest PIE program in the U.S.  The PIE program, he says, is a “win-win” for 
the state and inmates, too.  While he says it’s often hard to tell the difference in TPI and 
PIE inmate workers30,  PIE inmates are motivated to work for money, and they try to 
train them to have a good work ethic.   He says they operate three shifts, five days a 
week.  He also says that the PIE inmate workers have “fewer problems and are easier to 
manage.”  He acknowledges that “they can buy dope—they’ve got the money,” but they 
know if they do they’ll be fired, and that it’s easy to hire somebody else.  Carson makes 
                                                 
30 Gwyn Smith Ingley, former NCIA Executive Director, suggested that “one reason S.C. traditional 
workers appear to be (as) industrious (as PIE workers) is that in order to obtain PIE employment, they must 
do well at traditional employment.” 
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an additional observation: “Killers are the best workers.  Guys doing life sentences are 
some of my best workers.” 
 Carson also refers to what he calls a “two-edged sword”:  if the inmates remain 
disciplinary-free long enough, they may be reclassified and transferred out of the facility, 
and thus out of the PIE program.  He says that Classification can require them to move 
even when they want to stay, which makes the private sector unhappy but there is nothing 
that they (Ellis or Carson) can do about it.  He expresses frustration that it appears that 
Classification sometimes “ignores or is indifferent to PIE.”  Another problem:  
sometimes Security calls to say they’re transferring an inmate. 
 Such problems do not appear to have harmed the program’s reputation.  Anderson 
Flooring’s PIE program has received national attention.  In the September 15, 2003 issue 
of Forbes Magazine, the author focused on “Business Behind Bars.”  One of the PIE 
programs highlighted: 
 Opening a factory inside South Carolina’s Tyger River Correctional 
institution enabled Anderson Hardwood Floors to reduce labor costs, improve 
productivity, and bolster its bottom line.  “Turnover used to be a huge problem 
for us,” says chief executive Don Finkell.  “In prison we hardly have any.”  
Inmates earn at least $5.15 an hour—about $2 after deductions for room and 
board, victim’s restitution, child support, and taxes—to produce labor-intensive, 
handcrafted floors now sold by Home Depot (EXPO), Lowe’s and other retailers.  
“Prisoners get really involved in their work,” says Finkell.  “This isn’t just a day 
job for them.  It’s their whole life.”  (Stein, 2003) 
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 The June 2003 issue of Wood & Wood Products, describes the plant in more 
detail: 
 The scene looks like any large shop that works with hardwoods.  Veneer is 
graded and glued; plans are cut.  Employees lift and load sheets of veneer into 
presses, push buttons and check the results. 
 Instead of jeans or khaki, however, these employees wear uniforms 
emblazoned with SCDC on the backs . . . Barbed wire and guards surround their 
workplace.  When the workday ends, they head for a cell instead of a home.  
(Miller, 2003) 
 
 Tony Ellis is quoted: 
The idea was to put inmates to work in a real-world working environment.  They 
learn how to maintain production, job skills and quality control.  They learn to be 
responsible for completing a job. 
 
You want to incarcerate them and let them pay whatever penalty is imposed on 
them by society, but you want to hopefully change the behavior that got them 
there in the first place. 
 
 The article mentions that the inmates are paid $7 to $10-an-hour wages, and that 
Anderson has paid $7.3 million in inmate wages since 1996. 
 Anderson Flooring operates a total of 10 prison-based plants in the U.S.  Sites 
include Patten, Maine and Port Gibson, Mississippi.  The company is most heavily 
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invested in South Carolina, however, with plants located at several different facilities in 
the state.  The Tyger River facility employs the largest number (410) of inmate 
employees in a 90,000 sq. ft. plant, not far from Anderson’s headquarters in Clinton. 
 Anderson Flooring is a family-owned business, and the third largest engineered-
hardwood flooring manufacturer in the country.  (A reminder: Tony Ellis recommends 
working with family-owned companies when possible; otherwise, he says, there may be 
too many layers of bureaucracy to negotiate.) 
 In 2003, handcrafted product labor—much of it inmate labor—accounted for 
approximately a fifth of sales (Miller, 2003).  Finkell maintained that they were 
developing products in prison that they couldn’t do on the outside.  Originally (in 1996), 
he said, they approached the project with caution, installing equipment that could be 
quickly removed, if necessary.  They did so with 14 inmates who volunteered for a task 
that Anderson employees were reluctant to do: cutting out defects from imperfect pieces 
of flooring.  (Finkell later told me that their civilian employees did the job until they 
found a “better one,” but the inmates did high quality work, and were glad to have the 
opportunity. 
 After seven years, the Tyger River experiment was so successful that 60 percent 
of Anderson’s production was moving through the prison.  
 Finkell reported that they typically had 10 applicants for every job, and that they 
have hired six inmates following their release, a couple of whom he described as 
“superstars.” 
 In August 2003 they opened an automated finish line at Tyger River in a $1 
million building built by the state and leased by Anderson.  In addition, they opened a 
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new handcrafting operation at Allendale Correctional Institution—all in addition to its 
two “real world” plants in Walterboro and Clinton. 
 The prison operations enable Anderson to have scheduling flexibility when 
needed.  If business slows at their Clinton plant, for example, hours would be curtailed at 
the prison rather than at the main plant.  However, this has apparently not been a 
problem, judging from the steady growth of the company in Tyger River and Allandale 
(another SCDC facility where Anderson is now based). 
 Initially, Finkell was apprehensive about how his customers would react.  His 
apprehensions were assuaged when he discovered that they were supportive of the 
program as well as the output.  Another advantage he reported related to employment 
problems that are universally shared by many: absenteeism and substance abuse.  
Because inmates are screened for drugs and alcohol, “(w)e’ve never even had anybody 
late, much less absent.  We’ve never had a lost time accident.” 
 “These guys learned it, took to it and have been really enthusiastic.  It didn’t take 
us too long to figure out it was going to work.  I quickly decided I was in there for 
keeps,” he stated. 
 In a 2005 interview, Tony Ellis told me that “the waiting period for Tyger River 
[Anderson Flooring] is 18 months.  The inmates have heard about it from other inmates. 
 “Inmates can ‘prove’ themselves in traditional prison industries to qualify for PIE.  
The plant managers can help, and do.  If they see a good worker, they may recommend 
moving [him] to a PIE program.” 
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Interview with Anderson Flooring CEO 
 A meeting with Don Finkell, Anderson’s CEO, revealed an enthusiastic PIE 
supporter.  If the “voice of experience” is worth anything, Finkell is a walking 
advertisement for the efficacy of the PIE program.  He related that he had received a 
letter from Tony Ellis, and decided to explore the feasibility of operating a prison-based 
plant.  His initial meeting was with Ellis and the Director of Corrections.  He describes 
that first meeting, attended also by his father-in-law (the founder of Anderson 
Flooring)—who “left the meeting and drove away.”  
 He related that he had learned to see inmates as “people” but that he had 
originally had reservations about whether inmates would be productive.  Other issues that 
concerned him were safety factors, and questions about whether the prison program was 
the morally correct path to take.  He recounts the “sense of fear” he felt, when he heard 
the gates clang” shut for the first time.  But then he describes an incident with an inmate 
who had wept, telling Finkell that he was “a good man.”  Clearly moved by the 
encounter, Finkell went to some of his customers.  “They were supportive,” he says—
whether they were Republicans or Democrats.  They saw the program as an opportunity 
to rehabilitate inmates 
 “I have lots of respect for what they do in corrections,” he says.  He adds that he 
wants them to feel the facility is safer because “we’re there.”  The “worst thing that could 
happen,” he says, would be an escape. 
 The Tyger River program began in the Lower Yard but ran out of space and 
eventually moved to the Upper Yard.  Even after expanding, however, he said that they 
still didn’t have enough space.  He mentioned that there is little in the way of storage 
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space, and that it works as a disadvantage to both the warden and them.  He pointed out 
that trucks coming in and out (as a result of inadequate storage space) requires “lots of 
logistics—it’s a pain and it’s costly, just keeping up with it.”  One inmate had escaped, he 
said, on a day when the plant manager was absent, and the thinking was that he had 
locked himself in the truck prior to its exit from the plant.  While it turned out that the 
inmate had not escaped in their truck after all, “it was a ticklish situation”, he said.  “It 
really dawned on me—the risk, the security issues . . . (in particular) the political risks.  
He said by then they had been through seven or eight wardens who had “always read us 
the riot act” about the potential security issues. 
 All Anderson employees, he said, have to go through a security course.  By 2006, 
Finkell reported that the company had gone from 14 to 605 employees at the prison. 
 In 2001, he said, customers had begun asking for hand-scraped floors.  Other 
competitors had gone to China where labor was cheaper, but the quality fluctuated, 
whereas the inmates did high quality work that could be more easily monitored. 
 Finkell made the statement that “long-termers” [inmates] were best.  The short-
termers, he said, left before earning their keep.  (Ellis, too, had acknowledged the 
advantages of employing inmates with long sentences.) 
 Inmate employees take pride in their work.  “Inmates will ask if the customer is 
happy with the product.  How can they improve?  They identify with the product and the 
company, and they’re proud of it.”  Meanwhile, he said, “Our customers feel like they’re 
contributing to society.” 
 (Ironically, in 2006 a fire in the community-based plant was set by one of 
Anderson’s “free world” employees.  The resultant damage forced the company to turn to 
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Ellis for emergency help in the form of increased numbers of inmate-employees to 
maintain operations normally performed in the community-based plant.)   
 Finkell referred to the Fortune Magazine article.  He had been “afraid,” he said, of 
what the writer would say, but his fears turned out to be groundless.  (The article was 
positive.)  On the other hand, he said, the Black Caucus said that “it looked like slavery . . 
.”   (Some prisoner advocates are critical of the PIE program and its requirements that 
inmates pay room and board, etc.)   He told a story about the death of a mother of four 
sons, three on the “outside” and one in prison.  The PIE-employed inmate had paid for 
their mother’s funeral. 
 “I really believe in this program,” he said, and described an inmate who had 
managed to save nearly $22,000.  “He was the richest guy here.” 
Finkell appeared at NCIA’s annual meeting in 2007, where he was a participant in 
the heavily-attended PIE track of the conference.  His presentation—from the point of 
view of the PIE partner—was based on his experience working with inmates inside a 
prison.  He indicated his intention of expanding his program in the near future. 
 
Anderson Flooring Inmate Workers’ Perspectives 
 Inmate workers at Tyger River come from a variety of backgrounds, as 
exemplified by the first inmate I interviewed.  He held a bachelor’s degree in science 
from a prominent southern university.  He has a life sentence, which in South Carolina 
translates to a 20-year minimum to qualify for parole eligibility.  “My parents and family 
are well to do compared to the families of most other inmates, but my parents retired and 
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I thought I should try to support myself.  At that point, I became interested in PIE.”  He 
reports that he initially came in as a general worker. 
 When asked about the work ethic of his peers, he said that some had a “real world 
work ethic” and some still had a bad attitude.  “Some men you just can’t reach,” he said, 
but it was “evident that some really were grateful for the chance [that PIE provides].”  
But he expressed the view that a “better work ethic is required (in PIE). . . . A lot of guys 
really do take pride in being able to send money home.  A lot of child support does go 
out. . . I think what’s going on here really does have a positive effect.”  He said that he 
had worked in a bank prior to prison, and “there are whiners wherever you go.”  He 
talked about success stories.  “We have guys who’ve left here and gotten jobs with the 
parent company.  The lead I.T. guy here went to work with Anderson on the street” 
(when he was released from prison). 
 A second inmate reported that “the guys in the yard try to stay disciplinary free 
just to be in PIE.”  He said that he had been in prison since 1999, and couldn’t believe 
how much he was earning.  In Indiana at the state farm he said he had told them about the 
PIE pilot program in South Carolina and “they didn’t believe me. 
 “Every inmate in the state is working hard to get into Tyger River because they’ve 
heard about PIE. 
 “The reason this job means so much to me is—before, I couldn’t send nothin’ 
home—now I send $150-160 a month.  Also, I will have $5,000 when I leave here.” 
He said that an inmate gets up to three warnings in the program, but then can be booted 
out.  A major charge, he said, could get you fired.  “A guy got kicked out with a dirty 
urine.” 
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 But he described “one of the biggest drug dealers” (at the prison), who had “never 
worked nowhere.  He got here, and now the boss man says he’s one of the best workers 
here.”  Now, he says he sends money home to (his) little girl every two weeks. 
 The inmate describing the drug dealer says he has two little girls of his own.  “My 
parents raised the girls,” he says, but he doesn’t like them to come to the prison . . . “the 
barbed wire . . . “ etc. so every couple of days he calls them.  “They’re 15 and 17 years 
old now.  They want to go to summer camp, and I’m saving up now. . . .The only thing 
you’ve got to spend [your earnings] on in here is the canteen. 
 “Being inside of this plant, you almost forget you’re in prison.  It’s basically a 
work place.”  He described the tours that come through from time to time: 
Anderson Hardwood brings tours here sometimes—they’re picking up the wood 
and lookin’ at it, and you feel pride.  It kinda makes you feel good when the 
supervisor from Anderson knows your name—not number.  It’s a much more 
personal level than with the administration. 
 
 He tells me that he’ll max out in 21 months then go back to the trucking industry.  
“I’ve talked to Anderson,” he says.  “They told me I could be a foreman.” 
 
Interview with S.C. Legislator 
 Repeated calls and emails to the chairman of South Carolina’s Penology and 
Corrections Committee failed to elicit a response.  At one point the writer was advised 
that the committee’s research director would be calling; however, his call failed to 
materialize.  Eventually, I contacted a member of the Penology and Corrections 
 224 
Committee, Senator Chauncey Gregory.  When asked about an unfavorable audit of the 
state’s prison industries conducted by the Legislative Audit Council in 2003, Senator 
Gregory stated that he didn’t remember the details, but that it might have been caused by 
an unhappy constituent of a member of the legislature.  He described the state’s 
legislature as “conservative,” reminding me that the state had a very high—and violent—
prison population, percentage-wise (compared to other states). 
 When asked about prison industries in the state, he maintained that he thought 
prison industries were worthwhile, and that the only problem or complaint he had ever 
heard related to occasional businesses who felt that the state’s prison industries were 
unfairly competitive.  I inquired about the PIE program, and whether he was familiar with 
it.  He stated that he was aware of it.  The person I should talk to, he offered, was a 
gentleman named Hans Lengers.  Mr. Lengers, he said, was involved in the PIE program 
in South Carolina, and was “very pleased.”  He stated that Lengers was trying to compete 
with the Chinese. 
 Mr. Lengers’ prison industries involvement, however, proved to be with service 
industries (described previously), not the PIE program.  The mix-up appeared to the 
writer to be emblematic of the uncertainty and confusion that surround not only the PIE 
program, but prison industries in general--uncertainty and confusion found even within 
the statehouse. 
 
SCDC Prison Industries Review by Legislative Audit Council 
Authorized by the South Carolina Code of Laws, the Legislative Audit Council 
(LAC) was created in 1975 to review state agencies’ operations and fiscal matters to 
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inform the state’s General Assembly.  The Council consists of five public members; at 
least one must be an attorney, and one must be a practicing certified or licensed public 
accountant.  Additionally, four members of the General Assembly serve ex officio. 
In October 2003, the General Assembly issued a request for an audit of SCDC 
prison industries.  The request was the result, ostensibly, of interest among some 
members of the Assembly who expressed concern with the interaction and effect of 
prison industries with the private sector in the state.  The review was sharply critical.  
According to its published Synopsis, findings included: 
• SCDC does not have adequate goals or performance measures for its prison 
industries program.  Without adequate goals and performance measures, 
effectiveness of the program cannot be accurately assessed. 
• Under federal law, the use of inmates for manufacturing jobs by private sector 
companies involved in interstate commerce may not displace private sector 
workers.  Also, wages must be comparable to those paid for similar work in the 
community.  The Employment Security Commission needs to improve its 
methodology for determining comparable wage levels and for ensuring that 
displacement does not occur. 
• We reviewed whether the prison industries program is operated in a manner 
which results in a competitive advantage over private sector workers.  We found 
that the employment of SCDC inmates may create a competitive advantage over 
private sector workers because companies that employ inmates pay low wages, do 
not pay fringe benefits, and receive subsidized rent and utilities.  Whether this 
competitive advantage results in the displacement of private sector workers by 
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SCDC inmates also depends on whether a company would transfer its operations 
out-of-state or to a foreign country if it were not employing inmates.  [Note: this 
section refers to SCDC traditional and service industries workers.] 
• SCDC has not adhered to the requirements of the Prison Industry Enhancement 
(PIE) program by dividing the cost of inmate training between SCDC and a 
private sector company.  In addition, SCDC has not consulted with the 
Employment Security Commission before establishing the training period for 
inmate workers. 
• Contrary to state law, SCDC has not consistently made deductions from the 
wages of inmates in its prison industries who work for private organizations.  As 
a result, funding has been reduced for items such as child support, victim 
restitution, and inmate room and board. 
• South Carolina limits competition between SCDC and private vendors in the sale 
of goods and services to government entities.  As a result, there is a reduced 
incentive for SCDC and its private competitors to limit the prices they charge to 
government entities. 
 
While the findings were well publicized, the SCDC Director’s detailed response to 
the criticisms was not as well publicized.  The (Columbia, SC) State (newspaper), in an 
article captioned “Inmate Work Program Gets Low Marks In Audit,” quoted liberally 
from the text of the LAC Review, reinforcing its criticisms: 
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The Corrections Department’s major inmate work program has 
shortchanged the state, prisoners, victims of crime and private businesses, South 
Carolina’s watchdog agency said Thursday. 
Most inmates in Prison Industries are underpaid and some who are 
learning job skills through the program will never get out of prison, the 
Legislative Audit Council said. 
Corrections officials have routinely failed to take money from inmate 
paychecks to pay for restitution and child support—a violation of state law, 
auditors said. 
Further, Corrections and state labor officials do not have a way of 
properly determining how much inmates should be paid in order to comply with 
federal wage laws, the auditors said. . . . 
Prison officials dismiss the criticisms as misinformed and the 
recommendations as unrealistic in tight budget times. 
 
An inspection, however, of the appendix to the full document revealed a detailed, 
six-page letter of response to the criticisms leveled by the LAC Review.  The text of the 
letter, signed by the Director of Corrections, addressed the criticisms leveled by the 
Legislative Audit Council point by point: 
The (LAC) report fails to note . . . that our Mission Statement . . . clearly 
stated on our web site and posted on the walls of each prison includes ‘Delivering 
value by becoming more self-sufficient and by constant evaluation and 
improvement in the operations, services and programs.’  Our Mission includes 
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self-sufficiency and rehabilitation that is required by enabling statute, SC Code 
Section 24-1-20.  Promoting self-sufficiency and rehabilitation, and reducing 
recidivism are clearly part of our Agency Mission and are, therefore, part of the 
primary mission of PI. 
 
The Director’s response referenced studies that have demonstrated that inmates 
who work are less likely to recidivate, and referred to the then-ongoing national study 
(the Smith et al. research, released in 2006) comparing the recidivism rate for PI inmates 
to those of other groups of inmates. 
In regard to the LAC accusation of inmate competition with private sector 
workers creating a competitive disadvantage for private business: 
. . . PI has worked closely with the Employment Security Commission 
(ESC) which resulted in the ESC approving a wage plan for each cost accounting 
center (that is, each PIE project within our correctional institutions).  The wage 
plan ensures inmates receive comparable wages, and complies with the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance Guidelines . . .  
 
The Director’s response informed the Council that ESC had analyzed the “degree 
of complexity, level of control by the worker, cross training, independent decision-
making in the various jobs and other factors. 
ESC learned from the companies that inmate tasks were more entry level, 
repetitive, heavily supervised, with little independent decision-making.  Not all 
skill tasks performed by civilians were performed by inmates. 
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Accordingly, the Director wrote that the ESC established a wage plan that was 
adopted by PI in 2002 that provided that inmates with few or no skills be allowed to work 
a job for 90 days, be evaluated by PI and the private sector company, and (if retained) 
receive annual reviews for a raise. 
In reply to the LAC allegation that Prison Industries failed to adhere to the 
requirements of federal law by dividing the cost of inmate training between SCDC and a 
private sector company, the Director stated unequivocally that “This conclusion is 
wrong.”  PI, he wrote, required its private sector partners to pay the cost of inmate 
training.  However, in one instance, a single company—strapped financially as the result 
of the 2001 downturn in the economy—had asked PI to share the cost of training.  
Approval was granted by BJA.  However, during the LAC audit, the approval was 
rescinded; PI notified the company that the split system was to be terminated, and the 
company resumed payment of full training costs. 
In response to the allegation that SCDC had not made appropriate deductions 
from wages of inmates who work for the private sector, the Director stated flatly:  “This 
conclusion is wrong. 
SCDC is currently in compliance concerning all wage deductions.  
Additionally, SCDC has passed three compliance reviews by the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance in its PIE operations.  Furthermore, inmates who work in the PIE 
program are paid through the Comptroller General’s (CG’s) payroll system as 
are all SCDC employees.  Periodically, DSS runs a computer program against the 
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CG’s payroll to detect any potential child support discrepancies.  These 
discrepancies are then reported to the various agencies. . . .  
 
Responding to the LAC’s allegation that SCDC did not have adequate procedures 
for checking to see whether inmates earning wages had court-ordered obligations to pay 
child support/or victim restitution, the Director continued, “This statement is also 
incorrect.  Inmate records are examined when an inmate is being hired into an Industries 
position.” 
Finally, in regard to the LAC criticism that accused SCDC of violating South 
Carolina laws limiting the ability of private companies to compete with prison industries 
in the sale of goods and services to state agencies: 
In Articles 1 through 21 of the South Carolina Consolidated Procurement 
Code and accompanying regulations, the process is clearly set forth for the 
acquisition of goods and services by governmental entities from any source.  State 
procurement law clearly allows the Budget and Control Board, upon 
recommendation of the Division of General Services, to exempt governmental 
bodies from purchasing certain items through the respective chief procurement 
office’s area of responsibility in Section 11-35-710. 
 
The SCDC response to the LAC Report called attention to the fact that the Prison 
Industries Division was operating under the same budgetary constraints as the agency as 
a whole, but that in spite of the current SCDC inmate-to-staff ratio—“well over double 
the national average”—the Prison Industries program was a model for the nation. 
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In fact, a subsequent (April 2004) letter from the Director of Corrections to the 
Chairman of the Senate’s Corrections and Penology Committee, reported that SCDC was 
(then) “managing over 3,000 more inmates than we were in 1998, before the budget cuts 
started.  We are doing so with 1,500 fewer staff.” 
 As already mentioned, several SCDC employees maintained to the writer that the 
LAC audit was politically motivated. 
 In May of 2006, the LAC issued a “Follow-Up.”  Referring back to the original 
2003 audit entitled “A Review of the Department of Corrections’ Prison Industries 
Program,” the background statement maintained that “we found that 5 (38 percent) of our 
13 recommendations had been implemented.”  However, careful reading of the Follow-
Up revealed that, included among the 13 recommendations, and noted as not yet 
implemented, were two recommendations that had been made to the General Assembly 
itself; one to the Employment Security Commission, and one to the Budget and Control 
Board.  It is difficult for even the most objective observer to avoid wondering whether the 
report was politically motivated, since the report’s Background statement (that only five 
of LAC recommendations had been implemented) failed to note that nearly as many—
four—of those not implemented were the responsibility of other agencies (including the 
General Assembly), and not SCDC.  
 The Follow-Up virtually ignored the detailed responses from SCDC Director Jon 
Ozmint in 2003 in all instances, but—after leveling additional criticism at both SCDC 
and the Department of Social Services (DSS)—eventually conceded that the two agencies 
had renewed efforts to ensure universal child support wage deductions from inmates.  
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(Ozmint had unambiguously stated in his 2003 response to the LAC that inmate records 
were examined when an inmate was hired into a prison industries position.) 
 
The Past Speaks to the Present 
Hugh Clements, former Deputy Commissioner of Administration in SCDC, was 
among the last of the interviewees contacted by this writer.  His commentary provides an 
unusual opportunity to review the evolution of South Carolina corrections in recent 
decades from the perspective of a “major player” in the 1980s.  When asked about the 
history of the PIE program in the state, he wrote: 
I must warn you that I’ve been away from SCDC for more than 12 years.  
I have no files, and I expect that few still exist there.  Tony Ellis is in the best 
position to know if there is any paper trail. 
 Be aware of the fact that the following people provided critical support: 
• SCDC Commissioner (retired) William D. Leeke; 
• Former SC Governor Richard Riley; and 
• SC State Chamber of Commerce. 
As Deputy Commissioner for Administration under Commissioner Leeke, [prison 
industry] was one of my areas of responsibility.  The Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration, US Department of Justice, and the American Correctional 
Association sponsored a workshop in DC to stimulate interest.  I attended.  It was 
obvious that “real” work opportunities provided by the private sector inside 
prisons would be effective in reducing idleness and make-work jobs as well as 
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providing real opportunities for rehabilitation.  It also promised to be a boon for 
the private sector in their efforts to complete with off-shore competition. 
 
In response to my questions, he wrote again subsequently: 
Yes, Senator [Strom] Thurmond was in office and provided invaluable assistance.  
The private sector industries program began under Commissioner William D. Leeke and 
continued and expanded under Commissioner Evatt. 
Tony Ellis was hired as a consultant because he had skills and experience in 
market research that our staff lacked.  He was also very knowledgeable and experienced 
with SC state government and legislative matters.  Making him Prison Industries 
Director was a logical and necessary step toward achieving agency and state objectives 
in making the private sector an active partner in [the] prison industries program. 
Mr. Leeke retired . . . after Governor  Campbell took office. . . . Mr. Evatt 
replaced Mr. Leeke. 
The SC Board of Corrections ended during the Campbell Administration when 
legislation was passed abolishing the Board of Corrections and several other boards.  
The Commissioner of Corrections was then appointed and served at the pleasure of the 
Governor.  From a governor’s perspective, that was probably a very necessary and good 
move.  In my opinion, it was neither necessary nor good. 
Running prisons is a tough, long-haul job.  There must be checks and balances to 
prevent abuses and to make  concerted efforts to send those who’ve finished their 
sentences back into their respective communities as contributing citizens or at least, no 
worse than when they entered prison.  That takes knowledgeable, experienced, capable 
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and relatively stable leadership over the long term, not leadership that changes [with] 
every election. 
If I were running for governor, I’m sure I’d want control of all agencies, but that 
doesn’t mean it would necessarily be a good idea. 
From a different perspective, the SC Board of Corrections, and I suspect several 
other Boards, were set up to give the General Assembly more power than the Governor.  
Board members’ terms were staggered so that the governor—until Governor Riley—
couldn’t appoint a majority of the members and gain control of the agency.  If a new 
member wasn’t appointed or an existing member reappointed, that member continued to 
serve until he/she was reappointed by the next governor. 
When Governor Campbell took office, this enabled him to immediately appoint a 
majority of the Board and take control of the Department of Corrections.  Not too long 
thereafter, the Board of Corrections was abolished, and Corrections became a cabinet 
position. 
While I believe our Board of Corrections was a good and effective one, there are 
possible dangers to the board system.  If members view their positions as honorary and 
do little more than attend monthly meetings, abuses of power could occur that would be 










CONTRASTING STATE PIE MODELS 
Florida, Iowa, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington 
 
 There are a number of variations of the PIE model throughout the states, 
several of which will be examined here.  Although most prison industries are a 
component of the state departments of corrections, a few are unique enough in 
their design to be highlighted; these will be briefly described.  These models are 
offered primarily as contrasts to the South Carolina model.  Each state’s economy 
(as measured by per capita income, per capita state and local taxes, and state tax 
burdens), union representation, and state prison expenditures will be reviewed, as 
well as other relevant (e.g., political) factors. 
 
Contrasting PIE Models: Florida, Iowa, Tennessee, Texas and Washington 
 The selected states represent a cross-section of the types of PIE models and 
contrasting factors.  Each state maintained a PIE program during the past decade.  Several 
were included in the Smith review of PIE programs.31  States will be compared to one 
another and/or South Carolina.  At least one state, Washington, is included because of its 
formerly robust PIE program which was terminated in the latter part of the decade (1996-
2005) being examined. 
 The states presented here represent the central part (Iowa) of the United States, 
the northwest (Washington), the southeast (Florida, South Carolina and Tennessee) and 
                                                 
31 Although the Smith research participant states were not disclosed, several of the states acknowledged to 
me privately that they were included. 
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the southwest (Texas).  These states also represent a cross-section of state and prison 
population sizes; Florida and Texas are among the largest; Iowa and Washington are 
among the smallest, and South Carolina and Tennessee are approximately mid-sized.  All 
are “right to work” states, except for Washington.  This might seem to suggest that so-
called “free bargaining” states like Washington are unlikely prospects for the PIE 
initiative.  However, closer inspection of free bargaining (known by opponents as “forced 
unionism”) states reveals that several (e.g., California, Minnesota, Oregon, Indiana and 
Arizona) have been among the PIE success stories in the past decade (NCIA Quarterly 
Reports, 1996-2005). 
 Data and graphics for the states of Florida, Iowa, Tennessee, Texas and 
Washington will be presented in this chapter, and will reflect comparable data already 
considered in our review of South Carolina. 
 Half of the states examined in this section are from the southeast.  A common 
theme among those who speculate about the success (or lack thereof) of the PIE program 
is that it is largely due to the strength or weakness of union membership in individual 
jurisdictions.  In short, these observers say, the overall strength of unions in the 
northeastern section of the United States explains why there are so few PIE programs 
there, whereas the comparative weakness of unions in the south explains the stronger 
showing of PIE programs in the southern part of the country. (Another measure of the 
same phenomenon might be to identify “right-to-work” states.)   
 At first blush, this reasoning appears to offer one explanation for PIE success or 
failure.  However, more in-depth evaluation of relevant issues suggests that while the 
explanation is often true, there are other factors at play. 
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 We have learned that historically, unions have opposed prison labor.  The reasons 
unions have opposed prison labor have been twofold: 
• belief that prison labor unfairly competes with “free-world” labor, and 
• belief that prison labor exploits inmate workers. 
 
However, we have already learned that Iowa’s apprenticeship program was not only 
approved but eventually sponsored by the state’s union leadership.   This suggests that a 
capable prison industries director (e.g., Iowa’s Roger Baysden) can work collaboratively 
with union leaders to overcome union resistance. 
 The PIE program pays inmates minimum to prevailing wages; thus—unless we 
object to inmates being required to pay taxes, room and board, and child support, like the 
rest of us—it may be said that PIE workers are not exploited.  By virtue of the design of 
the project, they work voluntarily.  Also, as demonstrated in the state of Iowa, union 
wage requirements can be satisfied, so that inmate labor does not unfairly compete with 
citizen workers.  We will examine some of these factors in the following state 
evaluations. 
 
Right to Work States and Issues 
 Most of the state right-to-work statutes were enacted in the 1940s and 1950s.  
However, a few were enacted more recently: Idaho in 1985; Texas in 1993; Indiana 
(applied only to school employees) in 1995; and Oklahoma in 2001.  (Slightly less than 
50 percent of the states are free-bargaining or non-right-to-work states.)  The issues 
 238 
associated with right-to-work laws ebb and flow enough that the National Right to Work 
Legal Defense Foundation posts the following advice on its website: 
NOTE: State laws are in a constant state of flux.  Before relying on the text of any 
state Right to Work statute, you should check the most recent edition of your state 
laws. 
 
 Generally speaking, right-to-work is a Republican Party issue, while union issues 
have long been considered Democratic turf.  Both claim to hold the advantage.  The 2007 
AFL-CIO website posted the following claims: 
 Right to work laws lower wages for everyone.  The average worker in a 
right to work state makes about $5,333 a year less than workers in other states . . 
. Weekly wages are $72 greater in free-bargaining states than right to  work 
states . . . 
 Federal law already protects workers who don’t want to join a union to 
get or keep their jobs. . . . 
 Right to work endangers safety and health standards that protect 
workers on the job by weakening unions that help to ensure worker safety by 
fighting for tougher safety rules. . . . 
 Right to work laws just aren’t fair to dues-paying members. . . . 
 
 The AFL-CIO has “Fact Sheets” that maintain that right-to-work hurts people of 
color and that unions increase wages for all workers.  Several Fact Sheets are based on 
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the topic “The Truth About Right to Work for Less.”   The union’s website presents 
Bureau of Labor Statistics data to make its case. 
 The Center for Policy Alternatives alleges that “Right to Work laws are designed 
to financially cripple the union movement” and that “It is in states’ economic interest to 
keep unions strong.”   
 In sharp contrast, the National Right to Work Newsletter maintained in its May 
2005 issue that “Forced union dues cannot be justified” and that personal income was 
growing twice as fast in Right to Work states.  The newsletter featured on its front page a 
chart entitled “1990-2004 Growth in Real Personal Income,” using data from the U.S. 
Departments of Commerce and Labor (Review Graphic “1990-2004 Growth in Real 
Personal Income”).  The caption under the chart maintained that “Right to Work states 
have long outpaced forced-unionism states in real personal income growth.  And 
inflation-adjusted Census Bureau data show the Right to Work advantage has grown 
wider in recent years.” 
 In 2004, the newsletter reported that “candidates who took public stands in favor 
of compulsory unionism lost hotly contested Senate races in South Dakota, South 
Carolina, Florida, Louisiana and Oklahoma.” 
 The National Institute for Labor Relations Research, in an article captioned “Real 
Earnings Higher in Right to Work States: Evidence from the AFL-CIO Empire” 
maintained that a study conducted by an American Federation of Teachers (AFT) 
researcher [indirectly and inadvertently] demonstrated that employees in Right to Work 
states have lower living expenses.  The article presented tables to demonstrate the 
article’s claims: 
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 The index for 2000, the most recent one available at this writing, shows 
that living expenses for employees in non-Right to Work states are overall 4.4% 
higher than the national average.  Overall living costs in Right to Work states are 
7.1 % more affordable than the national average.  (See Graphic “Average Cost of 
Living Index in 2000: Right to Work vs. Non Right to Work”). 
  
Average Cost of Living Index in 2000: 
Right to Work vs. Non Right to Work 
 
Non-Right 
to Work States 
2000 AFT Cost 
of Living Index 
Right 
to Work States 
2000 AFT Cost 
of Living Index 
Alaska 1.230 Alabama 0.910 
California 1.219 Arizona 0.959 
Colorado 1.081 Arkansas 0.891 
Connecticut 1.087 Florida 0.942 
Delaware 0.970 Georgia 0.938 
Hawaii 1.312 Idaho 0.938 
Illinois 0.992 Iowa 0.921 
Indiana 0.924 Kansas 0.921 
Kentucky 0.910 Louisiana 0.936 
Maine 0.992 Mississippi 0.896 
Maryland 1.009 Nebraska 0.927 
Massachusetts 1.144 Nevada 0.934 
Michigan 0.974 North Carolina 0.931 
Minnesota 0.989 North Dakota 0.924 
Missouri 0.930 South Carolina 0.930 
Montana 0.979 South Dakota 0.917 
New Hampshire 1.062 Tennessee 0.915 
New Jersey 1.057 Texas 0.904 
New Mexico 0.962 Utah 1.017 
New York 1.070 Virginia 0.954 
Ohio 0.964 Wyoming 0.997 
Oklahoma* 0.898 Average 0.929 
Oregon 1.036   
Pennsylvania 0.937   
Rhode Island 0.987   
Vermont 0.999   
Washington 1.073   
West Virginia 0.907   
Wisconsin 0.964   
Average  1.044   
 
*Oklahoma became a Right to Work state in September 2001.   
In the AFT's index, a state whose average cost of living is exactly equal to the U.S. average would score 
1.00. If the average cost of living within a state is 10% higher than the national average, it will score 1.10. If 
living expenses are 10% lower than the national average, it will score .90.    
Source of data s: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 2001; U.S. Bureau of Labor 
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Statistics, Employment & Earnings, May 2001; AFT Survey & Analysis of Teacher Salary Trends, 2001.  
Source: Greer, Stan (2001). Real Earnings Higher In Right to Work States:  Evidence 
from the AFL-CIO Empire, The National Institute for Labor Relations Research 
(NILRR), Springfield, VA.  Available on NILRR website at 
http://www.nilrr.org/archive/200101. 
 
 In 2000, employees in Right to Work states earned a mean of $638 a week, 
after adjusting for the cost of living, compared to $632 in non-Right to Work 
states. (See Graphic “2000 Mean Weekly Earnings Adjusted for Cost of Living: 
Right to Work vs. Non Right to Work). 
 
2000 Mean Weekly Earnings          
Adjusted for Cost of Living:  Right to Work vs. Non Right to Work 
 
Non-Right 
to Work States 
Weekly Earnings 
Adjusted for 
Cost of Living    
Right 
to Work States 
Weekly Earnings  
Adjusted for 
Cost of Living    
Alaska 600 Alabama 610 
California 567 Arizona 630 
Colorado 648 Arkansas 568 
Connecticut 686 Florida 640 
Delaware 637 Georgia 629 
Hawaii 425 Idaho 563 
Illinois 669 Iowa 621 
Indiana 663 Kansas 632 
Kentucky 636 Louisiana 598 
Maine 551 Mississippi 568 
Maryland 723 Nebraska 580 
Massachusetts 620 Nevada 637 
Michigan 682 North Carolina 629 
Minnesota 680 North Dakota 518 
Missouri 669 South Carolina 605 
Montana 471 South Dakota 563 
New Hampshire 610 Tennessee 642 
New Jersey 693 Texas 686 
New Mexico 558 Utah 558 
New York 632 Virginia 722 
Ohio 634 Wyoming 520 
Oklahoma 607 Average 638 
Oregon 573   
Pennsylvania 667   
Rhode Island 655   
Vermont 545   
Washington 603   
West Virginia 583   
Wisconsin 627   
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Average 632   
NOTE: In 2000, employees in Right to Work states earned a mean of $638 a week, after adjusting for the 
cost of living, compared to $632 in non-Right to work states.      
Sources: 
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 2001; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment & Earnings, 
May 2001; AFT Survey &Analysis of Teacher Salary Trends, 2001; BNA Union Data Book, 2001 edition.           
Source: Greer, Stan (2001). Real Earnings Higher In Right to Work States:  Evidence 
from the AFL-CIO Empire, The National Institute for Labor Relations Research 
(NILRR), Springfield, VA.  Available on NILRR website at 
http://www.nilrr.org/archive/200101. 
 
 After subtracting state income taxes and all federal taxes, the 2000 cost-
of-living-adjusted mean weekly earnings of employees in Right to Work states was 
$484, compared to $468 in non-Right to Work states. (See Graphic “2000 Mean 
Weekly Earnings Adjusted for Cost of Living, State & Federal Taxes: Right to 
Work vs. Non Right to Work”). 
 
2000 Mean Weekly Earnings Adjusted for  Cost of Living, State & 
Federal Taxes:    
Right to Work vs. Non Right to Work 
 
Non-Right to Work 
States 
Weekly Earnings  
Adjusted for 
Cost of Living, State 
and Federal taxes    Right to Work  States 
Weekly Earnings  
Adjusted for 
Cost of Living, State 
and Federal taxes    
Maryland 539 Virginia 531 
Michigan 508 Texas 526 
Missouri 507 Tennessee 496 
Minnesota 503 Florida 481 
Pennsylvania 502 Nevada 479 
Indiana 500 Kansas 477 
New Jersey 499 Arizona 476 
Illinois 495 North Carolina 475 
Rhode Island 491 Iowa 474 
Kentucky 487 Georgia 470 
Ohio 482 Alabama 466 
Colorado 480 Louisiana 465 
Connecticut 477 South Carolina 462 
Delaware 471 Mississippi 443 
Oklahoma 467 Nebraska 439 
Alaska 463 South Dakota 437 
Wisconsin 462 Arkansas 434 
New York 460 Idaho 429 
New Hampshire 456 Utah 424 
West Virginia 454 North Dakota 405 
Massachusetts 447 Wyoming 378 
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Washington 440 Average 484 
New Mexico 429   
Oregon 427   
Maine 418   
California 413   
Vermont 407   
Montana 354   
Hawaii 326   
Average 468   
Sources: 
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 2001; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment & Earnings, 
May 2001; AFT Survey &Analysis of Teacher Salary Trends, 2001; BNA Union Data Book, 2001 edition; Federal Tax 
Burdens & Expenditures, Tax Foundation, July 2002; State Policy Institute of NY State, www.bcnys.org.        
Source: Greer, Stan (2001). Real Earnings Higher In Right to Work States:  Evidence 
from the AFL-CIO Empire, The National Institute for Labor Relations Research 




The Tables listed as Sources the U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 
2001; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment & Earnings, May 2001; AFT Survey 
& Analysis of Teacher Salary Trends, 2001; BNA Union Data Book, 2001 edition; 
Federal Tax Burdens & Expenditures, Tax Foundation, July 2002; State Policy Institute 
of NY State. 
 But as recently as January 2007, the Center for Policy Alternatives on its website 
maintained that 
Because workers’ organizing rights are diminished in states with Right-to-Work 
laws, an average worker earns about $7,131 a year less than workers in free 
bargaining states ($30, 656 versus $37,787).  Across the nation, union members 
earn $9,308 a year more than nonunion members ($41,652 versus $32,344).  
Clearly these laws only provide a right to work for less. 
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 As already mentioned, the right to work issue traditionally has been a Republican 
issue, while support of unions has been a Democratic Party issue.  These issues may be 
presumed to have an affect on jurisdictional receptivity to the PIE program.  We have 
seen that unions have long opposed the PIE program, with few exceptions.  Indeed, 
unions have long been among the most vociferous critics of UNICOR, or Federal Prisons 
Industries (FPI), as well, maintaining that UNICOR products harmed the rights of union 
workers.  The issue, however, has become increasingly complex, and is no longer a 
simple “cut and dry” or “black and white” issue.  The criticisms historically leveled at 
UNICOR undoubtedly paved the way for the negative response of unions toward the PIE 
certification program, which at first blush may have appeared to threaten union workers. 
 While PIE proponents are often encouraged by conservatives (i.e., Republicans) 
and opposed by liberals (i.e., Democrats)—justified in the first instance as encouraging 
inmates to be self-supporting and responsible—and justified in the second instance as 
“exploitive of inmate labor”—those in a position to look closely may find ample cause 
for reconsideration.  The union in at least one state, Iowa, has been surprisingly 
supportive of the PIE initiative, as we have noted.  And we cannot overlook the fact that 
Ted Kennedy—a prominent Democratic liberal—was an early supporter—indeed, 
sponsor—of the creation of the PIE legislation. 
 Some (including the writer) might say that the PIE initiative holds the potential to 
be a “win-win” for everybody: inmates, their victims and families, the state and taxpayers 
alike.  And, as exemplified in Iowa, there is plenty of room for union involvement, and 
indeed, potential for important contributions unique to union concepts of fairness and 
worker protections and rights.  The 1999 George Washington University Symposium on 
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Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation called attention to what some of those 
contributions might be: arbitration and resolution of inmate complaints and collateral 
reductions in inmate litigation; and apprenticeship programs to facilitate training of new 
inmate workers, and to foster links to the community and employment upon inmate 
workers’ release from prison.  (See Appendix A.) 
 As we review the jurisdictional environments of other states, these issues will be 
revisited.  Although the controversy between union and right to work proponents and 
opponents has yet to be resolved, for our purposes, it is worth noting that there appears to 
be a relationship between the success of the PIE program in right to work states:  the right 
to work environment appears to be more hospitable to the PIE initiative—and a strong 
union presence appears to be less hospitable--although the relationship is not across-the-
board. 
 In summary, the right to work vs. union issue has a direct impact on the 
implementation (or lack thereof) of PIE programs in virtually every state, including the 
five states examined in this chapter.  Each one of the selected states represents one or 
more of a variety of enhanced prison industries models, and each state’s prison industries 
director has dealt with the slings and arrows associated with union resistance or support.  
As might be expected, each administrator has met with varying degrees of success. 
  
Florida Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises, Inc. (PRIDE) 
 In 2005, Florida had the third largest correctional population in the U.S., 81,000 
more than 3-1/2 times South Carolina’s prison population (NCIA 2005 Directory).  Of 
that number, 26,000 were eligible for employment, but only 1,990 were employed in 
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traditional prison industries, and 49 in the state’s PIE program (certified in 1995).  During 
the decade between 1995 and 2005, the state sustained a 2.5 percent decrease in the 
percentage of the prison population employed. 
 Florida’s prison industries program, PRIDE, is a non-profit (501c 3) corporation 
established in 1981.  Jack Eckerd, President and CEO of Eckerd Drug Stores, was 
influential in its development, together with former Governor Bob Graham and the state’s 
legislature.  Prison industries were transferred from the Department of Corrections to the 
corporation, which has managed the state’s prison industries ever since.  The PIE project 
(consisting of customer and employer models) is a rather small component of PRIDE, 
which describes its mission as follows: 
 
PRIDE’s  Statutory Missions (Florida State Statutes, Ch. 946) 
 Provide work training programs and post release job placement . . .  
 Reduce inmate idleness . . . 
 Reduce cost of state government . . . 
 Simulate a real-world working environment . . .  
 CORPORATE MISSION 
 To teach job skills and develop work ethics that will enable inmate workers to 
 become productive citizens upon release from incarceration. 
 VISION 




 Quality Driven 
 Customer Focused 
 Helping Others 
 Respect for Individuals 
 Integrity of Conduct 
 Honesty in Actions 
 
The entity, PRIDE, has been beset with problems and negative publicity for years, the 
result of legislative and Inspector General audits and coverage by the St. Petersburg 
Times. 
 PRIDE’s leadership was accused of inappropriate business dealings which led to 
substantial net losses to the PRIDE agency.  In particular, PRIDE lost $19.2 million 
between 2002 and 2004 (Florida Government Accountability Report, 2006).  PRIDE’s 
president and CEO were asked to resign in July 2004, but the agency suffered from 
negative publicity and related lawsuits for years.  The 2006 Report did not mention the 
state’s PIE program, and reported that “inmates who work in PRIDE industries earn 
between 20 cents and 55 cents per hour, depending on their skill level and length of 
service.”  The agency reported that it pays 15 cents in restitution on behalf of inmates for 
every $1 earned. 
 The Florida Inspector General’s report found 
• Inadequate internal controls 
• Inappropriate and/or poorly documented organizational and financial links 
• Excessive executive compensation. 
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 Although the agency appeared to be on solid footing by the beginning of 2007, 
the PIE program had not yet achieved its full potential.  The situation, however, seemed 
likely to improve, and the program’s coordinator and support staff remained committed.  
 The former CEO (who developed the PIE program and who was fired) was 
described by one interviewee as “autocratic,” a manager who assigned responsibility but 
was not personally involved in day-to-day management or decision-making. 
  
Economic and Political Indicators for the State of Florida in 1996 
 In 1996, the first year of the decade being examined, the state ranked 20th in the 
nation in per capita personal income: $24,226, compared to the U.S. average of $24,426 
in the same year (Review Graphic “Per Capita Personal Income Calendar Year 1996-
1997”).  The state ranked 38th in its state-local tax burden of 9.8 percent, compared to the 
U.S. average of 10.5 percent and South Carolina’s average of 9.9 percent (See Graphic 
“Florida State-Local Tax Burden Compared to U.S. Average [1996-2007]”). Florida’s 
total federal tax burden ranked the state 5th in the nation at 22.8 percent.  The state’s total 
tax burden was 32.6 percent (compared to the national average total tax burden of 32.0 
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1996 9.8% 38 22.8% 5 32.6% 12 10.5% 21.5% 32.0% 
1997 9.7% 39 23.7% 4 33.4% 11 10.4% 22.1% 32.5% 
1998 9.7% 42 24.2% 7 33.9% 12 10.5% 22.7% 33.2% 
1999 9.6% 42 24.2% 8 33.8% 15 10.5% 22.9% 33.3% 
2000 9.5% 42 24.7% 9 34.2% 15 10.5% 23.5% 34.0% 
2001 9.5% 43 23.6% 9 33.1% 15 10.5% 22.5% 33.0% 
2002 9.5% 39 20.8% 9 30.3% 17 10.3% 19.9% 30.3% 
2003 9.9% 35 20.1% 8 30.0% 14 10.4% 19.1% 29.5% 
2004 9.9% 35 20.5% 5 30.4% 11 10.6% 19.1% 29.7% 
2005 10.1% 36 22.3% 5 32.4% 11 10.9% 20.6% 31.5% 
2006 9.9% 38 23.3% 5 33.2% 12 10.8% 21.5% 32.3% 
2007 10.0% 38 23.7% 5 33.6% 12 11.0% 21.7% 32.7% 
* May not add to total due to rounding.   
Source: Tax Foundation calculations based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of 
Commerce 
 
BLS Local Area Statistics, 1996-2006, Florida 
 Labor force Employment Unemployment Unemployment 
rate 
1996 7,207,707 6,826,997 380,710 5.3 
1997 7,408,862 7,040,660 368,202 5.0 
1998 7,572,631 7,232,345 340,286 4.5 
1999 7,710,988 7,401,659 309,329 4.0 
2000 7,869,690 7,569,406 300,284 3.8 
2001 7,998,062 7,624,718 373,344 4.7 
2002 8,124,930 7,662,511 462,419 5.7 
2003 8,245,658 7,811,887 433,771 5.3 
2004 8,451,099 8,056,259 394,840 4.7 
2005 8,710,827 8,375,993 334,834 3.8 
2006 8,988,611 8,692,761 295,850 3.3 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Florida Correctional Operating Expenditures per Inmate in 1996 
 250 
 It is worth remembering that state correctional costs across the country more than 
doubled between 1985 and 1996.  Also, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(James, 1999), in 1996 high overall inmate-to-staff ratios were typically associated with 
low average costs per inmate.  The national average annual operating expenditure per 
inmate in 1996 was $20,100. 
 In 1996, Florida reported an estimated average daily number of inmates of 
63,521—the fourth largest in the country (behind California, Texas and New York, 
respectively).  Florida’s operating expenditures per inmate per day was $47.47, and the 
state’s operating expenditures per inmate per year was $17,327.  (By comparison, South 
Carolina’s reported estimated average daily number of inmates in 1996 was 19,880, with 
operating expenditures per inmate per day of $38.29, and operating expenditures per 
inmate per year of $13,977.) 
 Florida ranked 4th in the nation in terms of prison expenditures in fiscal year 
1996; the state spent a total of $1.2 billion (just behind Texas’s $1.7 billion). 
 
Union Membership in Florida in 1996 
 In 1996, the state of Florida ranked 41st in the nation in terms of the percentage of 
workers covered by unions: 9.9 percent (Review Graphic “Labor Union Membership\1, 
1996”).  This compared to the percentile of all U.S. workers covered by unions: 16.2 
percent.  It compared also to South Carolina’s 49th ranking, with only 5.0 percent of state 
workers covered by unions. 
 By 2005, Florida still ranked in the second tier of states with the smallest 
percentages (5 percent to 9.9 percent) of union membership annual averages. 
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Political Party Popular Votes Cast in Florida (1996-2005) 
 In 1996, as in 1992, the presidential elections included three parties: the 
Democratic, Republican and Reform Party (of Ross Perot).  Although Florida’s voters 
had voted Republican in presidential elections throughout the 1980s, election results were 
somewhat impacted by Perot’s 3rd-party candidacy in 1992 and 1996.  Although the 
Republican candidate won Florida’s majority in 1992, this was not the case in 1996, 
when the Democratic candidate (Clinton) won the majority of the state’s votes.  The 
Democrat’s majority was 48 percent, compared to the Republican and Reform parties’ 
percentages of 42.3 percent and 9.1, respectively. 
 Florida’s presidential voting patterns were similar to South Carolina’s voting 
patterns: Republican presidential victories throughout the 1980s as well as 1992, but with 
a clear Republican victory of almost 50 percent in the 1996 election, in spite of the third 
party candidacy of Ross Perot.  Unlike Florida, South Carolina appeared to lean 
Republican as the new millennium approached.  Some might say that this is significant, 
as Republicans are believed to be more receptive to the PIE program.  However, as we 
shall see, this is by no means an ironclad “rule of thumb.” 
 Nationally, Republican presidential candidates received a majority of the votes 
throughout the 1980s, but in both 1992 and 1996, Democratic candidates secured 
majorities of 43 percent and 49.2 percent for the respective years. 
 In 1996, Democrat Lawton Chiles was governor of Florida, although in 1998, he 
was replaced by Republican Jeb Bush who served until 2006. 
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 In 1996, the Republicans gained control of the state senate, and were still in 
control 10 years later.  (Republicans controlled the Florida House for the entire decade 
(1996-2006). 
 When asked for his opinion in early 2007, Brian Connett, PRIDE’s business 
development and programs manager stated: 
I believe that the control of the legislature of either house was not a factor nor 
had an effect on the development of PIE in Florida.  The Florida Department of 
Corrections initially had the PIE Certificate for the State of Florida and [it] was 
transferred to PRIDE sometime later.  I believe the Florida state PIE legislation 
was initially pushed through inclusive as a total Corrections package.  Again, I 
do not believe the party controlling the legislature had a direct effect on the PIE 
legislation. 
 
Iowa Prison Industries (IPI) 
 IPI Mission Statement: 




It is this commitment to excellence that will allow our business to remain self-
funding, achieve growth, provide more jobs for inmates and staff and assume a 
national leadership role in correctional industries. 
Vision: 
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By ensuring our mission is achieved, we will have assisted the Department of 
Corrections in protecting the public, staff, and inmate safety through vital work 
programs that will ensure the offenders’ chances of a successful return to society 
as tax-paying citizens upon their release. 
 
 According to the NCIA 2005 Directory, Iowa Prison Industries employed 435 
inmates in traditional industries, and 213 in Private Sector (PIE).  The state’s PIE 
initiative was certified in 1989.  The Directory reported the State’s prison population at 
9,400—less than one-half the size of South Carolina’s prison population.  Iowa’s Director 
of Prison Industries is Roger Baysden, who represents IPI with the IPI Advisory Board, 
which consists of seven representatives from the AFL/CIO, Voc-Tech Education; 
Governor’s Office; Parole Board, and the financial, manufacturing and agricultural 
community.  The Advisory Board meets quarterly, rotating between all prisons where 
industries are located.  The Board approves new business ventures, overall operations, 
farm and private sector operations.  The governor appoints five members, and the parole 
board and state director of corrections each appoint one member.  Terms are staggered; 
the governor appoints two members for terms of two years, and three members for terms 
of four years.  Parole and state director appointees serve at the pleasure of their 
appointing authority. 
 Unlike South Carolina, where a variation of the PIE customer model—the 
manpower model—is in place, Iowa’s PIE program is based on the employer model.  
This means that private employers provide all supervision (without state assistance).  In 
Iowa, the private employer may employ inmates, and is required to pay prevailing wage.  
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Significantly, private employers are obligated to offer inmates a job upon release from 
prison. 
 IPI’s Director Roger Baysden enjoys a remarkably congenial relationship with the 
State’s regional AFL-CIO, which has contributed to development of a widely-praised 
apprenticeship program for inmates.  The program, spearheaded by the union, was the 
product of a spirited debate in Iowa union halls. 
 Because it is well known that states with strong unions often reject the PIE 
program (as is generally true of the northeastern part of the country, where the PIE 
program is all but non-existent), I was particularly curious as to how IPI’s Director Roger 
Baysden had managed to obtain union collaboration in establishing the apprenticeship 
program.  Baysden stated that he did not actively pursue private companies and 
responded only to inquiries.  In response to the question of whether this was a 
philosophical or political decision on his part, he said that it was philosophical.  “By 
doing this I never intrude on the notion that we are taking jobs from the public.  The 
union recognizes that enquiries are genuine and that I prefer the jobs go to citizens and 
we are pretty much of a last resort option for the employer.” 
When asked whether his philosophy might be part of the secret of his success with 
Iowa’s unions, he said simply, “Good government is open government.  I have a personal 
policy of informing every interested party (unions, churches, Democrats, Republicans 
and so on) on what I am doing and who I am working with.  I do believe that this 
philosophy of openness has reduced barriers.” 
 A story about the Iowa PIE program ran in the May 15, 2000 issue of Fortune 
Magazine.  At the time, Iowa had the lowest unemployment rate (2.2 percent) in the 
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country (Harrington, 2000), compared to the national average of 4.1 percent.  The article 
highlighted the issue with a graph of the United States entitled “Where the Jobs Are (and 
the People Aren’t),” suggesting the reason for Iowa’s apparent openness to the PIE 
initiative: 
The flip side of this labor shortage, of course, is an unprecedented opportunity for 
workers.  Today someone like David Townsley, who scraped around on the 
fringes of society for a decade, can get a second chance.  A high school dropout 
who spent most of his young life in search of a methamphetamine high and easy 
money, Townsley was on his second tour of the Iowa prison system when he heard 
about the chance to work at Rock Communications.  He worked for six months as 
a stacker before completing his two-year term for drug dealing.  He stayed on 
after his release.  Today, at 27, he’s newly married, learning graphic design, and 
making $12 an hour. 
 
Economic Indicators for the State of Iowa in 1996 
 In 1996, Iowa’s per capita personal income averaged $22,306, compared to the 
U.S. average of $24,426 and South Carolina’s average of $19,977 (Review Graphic “Per 
Capita Personal Income Calendar Year 1996-1997.”).  In the same year, Iowa ranked 11th 
in the U.S. in its 10.9 percent state-local tax burden, compared to the U.S. average state-
local tax burden of 10.5 percent, and South Carolina’s state-local tax burden of 9.9 
percent (See Graphic “Iowa State-Local Tax Burden Compared to U.S. Average (1996-
2007”).  Iowa’s federal tax burden was 20.0 percent, and its total tax burden was 30.9 
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percent (again, compared to the national average total tax burden of 32.0 percent, and 
South Carolina’s total tax burden of  30.2 percent). 
 
Iowa 
State-Local Tax Burden Compared to U.S. Average 
(1996-2007) 




































1996 10.9% 11 20.0% 42 30.9% 32 10.5% 21.5% 32.0% 
1997 10.6% 17 20.5% 42 31.1% 37 10.4% 22.1% 32.5% 
1998 10.6% 19 21.1% 38 31.7% 35 10.5% 22.7% 33.2% 
1999 10.6% 16 21.2% 37 31.9% 31 10.5% 22.9% 33.3% 
2000 10.8% 15 21.4% 39 32.1% 32 10.5% 23.5% 34.0% 
2001 10.9% 12 20.6% 38 31.5% 30 10.5% 22.5% 33.0% 
2002 10.4% 15 18.2% 42 28.6% 34 10.3% 19.9% 30.3% 
2003 10.4% 15 17.8% 34 28.2% 29 10.4% 19.1% 29.5% 
2004 10.4% 23 17.3% 44 27.6% 39 10.6% 19.1% 29.7% 
2005 10.9% 18 18.8% 41 29.8% 34 10.9% 20.6% 31.5% 
2006 10.8% 17 19.5% 39 30.4% 33 10.8% 21.5% 32.3% 
2007 11.0% 18 19.6% 39 30.6% 33 11.0% 21.7% 32.7% 
* May not add to total due to rounding.   




BLS Local Area Statistics, 1996-2006, Iowa 
 Labor force Employment Unemployment Unemployment 
rate 
1996 1,609,270 1,551,200 58,070 3.6 
1997 1,606,503 1,555,837 50,666 3.2 
1998 1,602,865 1,556,479 46,386 2.9 
1999 1,602,634 1,560,848 41,786 2.6 
2000 1,601,920 1,557,081 44,839 2.8 
2001 1,622,012 1,568,638 53,374 3.3 
2002 1,632,108 1,567,836 64,272 3.9 
2003 1,614,859 1,543,507 71,352 4.4 
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2004 1,617,955 1,542,342 75,613 4.7 
2005 1,639,703 1,568,561 71,142 4.3 
2006 1,664,339 1,602,849 61,490 3.7 
Source:  U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Iowa’s Operating Expenditures per Inmate in 1996 
 (It is important to bear in mind that expenditures-per-inmate typically mirror 
disparities in wage structures, cost of living and various other issues over which the state 
director of corrections has no control.)  
 In fiscal year 1996, Iowa’s estimated average daily number of inmates was 5,920.  
The state’s operating expenditure per inmate per day was $66.54, and its operating 
expenditure per inmate per year was $24,266—compared to South Carolina’s estimated 
average daily number of inmates (19,880) for the same year, and South Carolina’s 
operating expenditures per inmate per day of $38.29 and its operating expenditures per 
inmate per year of $13,977.  (The national average annual operating expenditure per 
inmate was $20,100.) 
 
Union  Membership in Iowa in 1996 
 In 1996, the state of Iowa ranked 24th in the nation in percentages of workers 
covered by unions: 15.7 percent, compared to the national labor union membership 
percentile of 16.2 percent, and South Carolina’s ranking of 49th in the nation, with labor 
union membership at 5.0 percent (Review Graphic “Labor Union Membership\1, 1996”). 
 In 2005, Iowa was in the mid-range of union membership rates by state in terms 
of annual averages (10 percent – 14.9 percent); at the same time, the U.S. rate of union 
membership was 12.5 percent. 
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Political Party Popular Votes Cast in Iowa, 1996-2006 
 Although Iowa had voted Republican in 1980 and 1984 in presidential elections, 
by 1988 the state voted Democratic.  The trend continued in 1992 and 1996, 
uninterrupted even by the arrival of the 3rd party candidate, Perot.  The Democratic 
candidate, Clinton, won decisively in 1996, with 50.3 percent of the vote, compared to 
the Republican candidate’s percentage of 39.9 percent, and the Reform Party’s 
percentage of 8.5 percent.  (Compare to South Carolina’s Republican voting patterns in 
presidential elections for the 1980s and 1990s; and bear in mind the national voting 
patterns of Republican victories throughout the 1980s, changing to Democratic victories 
in 1992 and 1996.) 
 In Iowa, Republicans have controlled the state’s House and Senate throughout the 
decade (1996-2006) in question.   However, the governor during the same period has 
been a Democrat.  (Terry Branstad (D) was governor from1983 till 1999; he was 
followed by another Democrat.) 
 
Tennesssee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction (TRICOR) 
 Tennessee’s PIE program, TRICOR, is described in the NCIA 2005 Directory as a 
“quasi-state entity governed by a Board of Directors independent from the Department of 
Correction.”  The State’s prison population for 2005 was 19,670, making it a mid-size, 
mid-south state somewhat comparable (in size and geography) to South Carolina (minus 
the beach).  The number of traditional inmate workers in 2005 was 838; PIE inmate 
workers numbered 61.  (Tennessee’s PIE program was certified in 1991.) 
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 TRICOR has been described as “hybrid” in organizational structure.  When asked 
for a clarification, Pat Weiland, CEO for TRICOR, responded in some detail: 
Even though prison industries have existed in Tennessee for decades, 
TRICOR (as currently structured) was statutorily created in 1994. . . . TRICOR is 
a standalone state entity governed by a Board of Directors appointed by the 
Governor.  It is not part of the Department of Correction; however the 
Commissioner of Correction is an ex officio member of the Board.   The statute 
gives TRICOR and the Board considerable autonomy to operate consistent with 
“free enterprise” rather than government.  We receive no state appropriated 
funds and are required to be self-supporting.  This is why TRICOR is often 
referred to as a “hybrid” because even though it is considered a state entity, we 
do not have to follow many of the state regulations governing hiring, contracting, 
purchasing, etc. 
 Iowa, South Carolina and the majority of other state industry programs 
are a division with in the Department of Correction and most have to abide by all 
state government rules.  Some have a Board of Directors but it is usually an 
advisory board (e.g., Iowa) rather than a governing board. 
 TRICOR is responsible for operating all of the industries in the state 
prisons in Tennessee.  TRICOR also holds the PIE certificate for the State of 
Tennessee; therefore, any entity outside of the state prison system, such as county 
jails, would have to operate a PIE program under TRICOR’s certificate [note: in 
2006, there were no other entities operating PIE programs in the state]. 
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 When asked, Ms. Weiland acknowledged that she was appointed by the Board 
and served at the Board’s pleasure with no protection.  The governor, she said, cannot 
“dissolve” TRICOR since it is statutorily established; legislation would be required to 
abolish it. 
 At the 2005 annual conference held by NCIA, Tennessee received substantial 
recognition for its prison industries. 
 
Economic Indicators for the State of Tennessee in 1996 
 In 1996, Tennessee’s per capita personal income average was $21,949, ranking it 
33rd in the nation (Review Graphic “Per Capita Personal Income Calendar Year 1996-
1997”).  This compared to the national average of $24,426, and South Carolina’s per 
capital personal income average of $19,977, which ranked 40th in the nation. 
 Tennessee’s state-local tax burden for 1996 was 8.3 percent, ranking it 49th in the 
country, compared to the national average of 10.5 percent, and South Carolina’s state-
local tax burden of 9.9 percent, 35th in the nation (See Graphic “Tennessee State-Local 
Tax Burden Compared to U.S. Average [1996-2007]”).  Tennessee’s total tax burden was 
29.6 percent, compared to the national average total tax burden of 32.0 percent (and 
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1996 8.3% 49 21.2% 24 29.6% 44 10.5% 21.5% 32.0% 
1997 8.3% 48 21.6% 28 29.9% 45 10.4% 22.1% 32.5% 
1998 8.3% 48 21.9% 28 30.3% 46 10.5% 22.7% 33.2% 
1999 8.2% 48 21.5% 30 29.7% 48 10.5% 22.9% 33.3% 
2000 8.3% 47 21.9% 35 30.1% 48 10.5% 23.5% 34.0% 
2001 8.3% 47 21.1% 30 29.4% 47 10.5% 22.5% 33.0% 
2002 8.2% 47 19.0% 29 27.2% 47 10.3% 19.9% 30.3% 
2003 8.3% 47 18.2% 29 26.5% 45 10.4% 19.1% 29.5% 
2004 8.4% 47 18.2% 29 26.6% 44 10.6% 19.1% 29.7% 
2005 8.5% 48 19.3% 30 27.8% 46 10.9% 20.6% 31.5% 
2006 8.4% 48 20.1% 31 28.5% 45 10.8% 21.5% 32.3% 
2007 8.5% 48 20.3% 31 28.8% 46 11.0% 21.7% 32.7% 
* May not add to total due to rounding.   
Source: Tax Foundation calculations based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of 
Commerce 
 
BLS Local Area Statistics, 1996-2006, Tennessee 
 Labor force Employment Unemployment Unemployment 
rate 
1996 2,758,346 2,610,975 147,371 5.3 
1997 2,788,348 2,640,005 148,343 5.3 
1998 2,811,700 2,685,151 126,549 4.5 
1999 2,838,738 2,722,124 116,614 4.1 
2000 2,871,539 2,756,498 115,041 4.0 
2001 2,863,516 2,728,523 134,993 4.7 
2002 2,867,108 2,714,992 152,116 5.3 
2003 2,884,988 2,720,676 164,312 5.7 
2004 2,891,533 2,733,793 157,740 5.5 
2005 2,920,400 2,758,184 162,216 5.6 
2006 2,990,152 2,835,530 154,622 5.2 
Source:  U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Tennessee’s Operating Expenditures per Inmate in 1996 
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 In fiscal year 1996, Tennessee’s estimated average daily number of inmates was 
15,245—somewhat smaller than South Carolina’s 19,880, and roughly 2-1/2 times the 
size of Iowa’s 5,920.  Tennessee’s operating expenditure per inmates per day was $62.75, 
and its operating expenditures per inmate per year were $22,904—compared to South 
Carolina’s per day expenditures for the same year of $38.29 (and $13,977 per year), and 
Iowa’s per day expenditures of $66.54 (and $24,266 per year).  Remember that in 1996 
the national average annual operating expenditure per inmate was $20,100. 
 Tennessee allocated less than 1 percent of total expenditures to capital projects in 
1996 (compared to the 13 percent allocated by the state of Washington). 
 
Labor Union Membership in Tennessee in 1996 
 In 1996, the state of Tennessee ranked 34th in the nation in percentage of workers 
covered by unions: 11.1 percent, compared to the U.S. percentage of 16.2 percent, and 
South Carolina’s percentage of 5.0 percent (Review Graphic “Labor Union 
Membership\1, 1996”). 
 In 2005, Tennessee was in the second lowest tier of states in terms of union 
membership rates (5 percent – 9.9 percent).  At that time, the U.S. annual average rate of 
union membership was 12.5 percent. 
 
Popular Votes Cast by Political Party in Tennessee, 1996-2005 
 Tennessee’s presidential voting patterns were Republican throughout the 1980s, 
but switched to Democratic in both the 1992 and 1996 elections; in both elections, some 
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suspected that Perot’s role as a third-party candidate might have had a “spoiler’s” effect 
on election outcomes. 
 The state’s voting patterns may be compared to its neighbor’s South Carolina’s 
consistent Republican victories throughout the decades of the eighties and nineties.  
However, Tennessee voting patterns appeared parallel to the national patterns of 
Republican victories throughout the 1980s, changing to Democratic victories in both 
1992 and 1996.  
 In 1996, Tennessee’s governorship changed from Democrat to Republican 
although both the state’s house and senate were Democratic throughout the decade 1996-
2005. 
 
Texas Correctional Industries (TCI) 
 Texas Correctional Industries is a division of the Texas Department of Criminal 
Justice (TDCJ) which dates back to the passage of a senate bill in 1963 authorizing the 
sale of prison-made products to tax-supported agencies and “political subdivisions.”  
According to its website, TCI’s statutory objectives can be summarized as follows: 
• Provide work program participants with marketable job skills to help reduce 
recidivism through coordinated program of: 
Job skills training; 
Documentation of work history; 
Access to resources provided by Project RIO and the Texas Workforce 
Commission, including access to resources provided through assistance to local 
workforce development boards in referring work program participants to the 
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Project RIO employment referral services provided under Section 306.002, Labor 
Code. 
• Reduce department costs by providing products and articles for sale on a for-
profit basis. 
 
 Although the TCI website does not mention the PIE project, it can be found under 
“Programs.”  Two programs are listed: the PIE Certification Program and the Work 
Against Recidivism (WAR) Program. 
 The PIE program has been part of TCI since 1993, at which time it was under the 
state’s Parole Division.  In 2000, it was moved to the Manufacturing and Logistics 
Division.  The TCI website reports that the program “more than doubled” the number of 
offender employees, and is expected to “quadruple” the amount of money paid for room 
and board by inmate employees to the state.  [See “TCI-PIE Chart for 2005” and “TCI-
PIE Offenders’ Contributions 1993 thru 12-31-95”.] 
 The WAR Program is described on its website as a joint effort between Parole, 
Manufacturing and Logistics, the Texas Workforce Commission and the “private sector” 
with a goal of facilitating successful post-prison offender reentry to the community.  The 
most recent post-release findings for FY 2001 WAR participants (N=241) after three 
years were: 
Successful reentry rate of 81.7 percent. 
88.6 percent of those unsuccessful were technical violations. 
Employment rate of 90.6 percent. 
Average hourly wage of $10.57. 
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 The 2005 NCIA Directory reported that there were 5,075 inmate workers in 
TDCJ, 466 of which were PIE workers.  In the same year, Texas had a correctional 
population of 144,989 (second only to California).  The PIE program was certified in 
1993. 
 
Interview with Former Texas State Representative 
 A former Texas legislator, Ray Allen, is credited by many as being instrumental 
in starting the PIE program for the state.  Allen agreed to be interviewed in late 2006, and 
began by saying that some of the principal issues involved in establishing a PIE program 
are technical, for example, federal laws that deal with non-displacement of civilian 
workers and also ensure that inmates are not subjected to (so-called) slave labor.  “My 
view is that the federal law is clear . . . the guidelines are clear . . . these issues have been 
resolved.”  However, he went on to say, at the political level, there is always a political 
“agenda,” or there may be a “basic misunderstanding” about what the PIE program is. 
 Allen said that it is “a challenge to have legitimate discussion regarding the facts.”  
He stated that he had worked with labor.  Texas, he pointed out, was a “late comer” to the 
PIE scene.  He said that since certification (in 1993) there had been no real problem.  
Originally, he said, opposition came from labor unions in the state, and it took two years 
to gain expansion. 
 We discussed Lockhart briefly, where there are two PIE programs: one where 
inmates make computer components and one where they make heating and air 
conditioning components. 
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 Allen said that it took time, but that he eventually developed a good working 
relationship with the representative from the state AFL-CIO.  He said they had a mutual 
respect for one another, and that he had worked closely with (the labor representative) to 
craft legislation to address his concerns. 
 He related how his original legislative intention was to require inmates to pay 
room and board, and that this quest led to the discovery of the PIE initiative.  He was 
very taken with PIE, and contacted BJA to learn all he could about it.  Over time, he 
became convinced that this was the way to go, but it took him years of hard work. 
 Although originally the state of Texas had more than one certificate—TDCJ, a 
county jail, the Texas Youth Authority—BJA eventually asked them to combine under 
one umbrella agency, and that agency became known as the Texas Private Sector Prison 
Industries Oversight Authority (TOA).  The Texas Oversight Authority (1995) was a new 
entity, with members representing TDCJ, TYA, the House, the Senate, the Texas 
Workforce Commission, inmates and their families, organized labor, business, etc.  The 
entity also includes at-large memberships.  (Originally, he said, the PIE programs were 
overseen by Texas Correctional Industries under TDCJ, but then PIE supervision was 
channeled to TOA.) 
 Allen stated that following that, there were very few negative articles, although 
since his retirement from the House, this appeared to be changing.  The Texas prison 
industries director had recently retired and thus he said it was difficult to predict what the 
future holds for Texas.  The state, he said, is “very political”—but he maintained that this 
is basically true for a lot of the  states, and that ultimately, the PIE program can succeed 
only to the extent that it has a capable, politically astute prison industries director, who is 
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able to sell the PIE concepts to legislators, the public, unions, and local business.  If the 
unemployment rate is high, the state is likely to be less receptive to the PIE program.  But 
even when the existing economic climate may suggest the efficacy of the PIE program, if 
the prison industries director is not good at marketing the program, it is unlikely to 
succeed.  Facilitating legislation is often called for, he pointed out, and that means the PI 
director has to be savvy enough to persuade policymakers to pass the appropriate 
enabling legislation.  Sometimes, he said, the PI director must first persuade his own 
director of corrections, who may not be knowledgeable, or receptive to the program. 
 Allen told me that as a Texas state representative he became convinced that 
inmates should pay room and board whenever possible.  In researching this philosophy, 
he learned about the PIE program, and was immediately interested in it.  That was when 
he contacted BJA to learn as much as he could about the program.  He decided that if 
paying room and board was desirable, paying taxes, victim restitution, and child support 
were even more desirable.  He saw it as a “win-win” for everybody concerned, and 
immediately embarked on a path to bring the program to Texas. 
 He saw right away that the key to making it palatable to his colleagues in the 
Texas House of Representatives was to encourage implementation of the PIE program in 
rural areas, where there was more likely to be a surplus of labor (high unemployment).  
Happily, most state prisons in Texas are located in rural areas, where such conditions are 
often found.  Ultimately, Texas’s 107 prisons had agreed to employ PIE inmates only 
where it was clear that, in fact, there was not a labor surplus—which was (after all) 
consistent with BJA and PIE stipulations. 
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 Allen maintained that although it may be easier to start the PIE program in a 
right-to-work state like Texas or S.C., or where unions are not dominant—neither is a 
guarantee that the program will be welcome.  I asked him whether most states with 
successful PIE programs were non-union or right-to-work states, and he said there was 
not necessarily a clear pattern.  He cited Texas and Iowa as examples of states with 
successful PIE programs in strong union states. 
 When asked what the single biggest challenge to starting up the PIE program was, 
he said that since it is such a “small program” that “few details were clear to 
policymakers.”  In short, he had to work from the bottom up to sell the concept. 
 He said that “every successful PIE program has a Tony Ellis or a Roger Baysden 
or a Ray Allen or former Texas TDCJ PI Director Benestante, whom he described as the 
“primary TDCJ PIE proponent.”  As a result, he said, Benestante had been “at war with 
his own agency.”  He referred more than once to the former California Director of Prison 
Industries, who was eventually “sacked;” thereafter, he said, the California program 
began to deteriorate.  He also mentioned Lenny Ewell of Kansas (now retired) who had 
developed a strong Kansas program.  (Both Ewell and Allen, like Tony Ellis, have 
worked as consultants with NCIA.) 
 In discussing union hurdles facing most states that seek to implement the PIE 
program, Allen said that California has strong correctional officers’ unions; as a result, 
although “Texas has three times as  many correctional officers as California—California 
pays their correctional officers three times as much.” 
 The bottom line, he said, is that “you’ve got to have at least one local champion 
(to implement an effective PIE program), and even then, it’s a constant battle against 
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bureaucracy and inertia.”  He said that the “reality is that most issues are not as important 
as politics.”  Republicans, he said, tend to be uncomfortable with the PIE concept, and 
the Democrats are always watching to be sure that “you’re not exploiting the inmates.”  
He said that you can look at individual state economies and unions, etc., but in the end, 
the most important prerequisite for a successful program is that “you’ve got to have 
strong leadership ability, and support either insides the political arena, or inside the 
agency.”  He called attention to the tendency of the prison bureaucracy to be “controlling, 
while true entrepreneurship needs to be loose and somewhat free-wheeling.” 
 Allen maintained that traditionally, Democratic states tend to be strong union 
states, and that Republican states often have strong business representation.  The PIE 
program has the unusual potential to accommodate both local businesses and unions—the 
point is, he said, that only someone politically adept can accommodate both groups.  
(Allen said that Reagan was the only Republican within memory who succeeded in 
obtaining the support of the Teamsters in a presidential campaign.)  He said that unions 
can be expected to oppose any kind of low wages, and to be watchdogs for what they call 
“inmate exploitation.” 
 He spoke admiringly of Tony Ellis, how he had built a large PIE program around 
a South African manufacturing industry that he successfully solicited to move to South 
Carolina—thus, not only did he not displace S.C. workers, but he spurred the growth of 
related industries in the state. 
 Allen said that some states are “more aggressive” about who they let into their 
PIE programs.  Florida, for example, has implemented some practices that he said would 
never succeed in Texas.  When asked, he cited split-wages (groups of inmates making 
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parts may be paid PIE wages for one part of their work, and traditional wages for another 
part); group wages (one group of inmates may be paid PIE wages for the same task for 
which another group of inmates is paid only traditional wages); and the use of PIE 
contracts for both the “free world” and government alike.  Also, he reported, the Florida 
program sometimes pays piece wages (inmates are paid per number of products, or 
pieces, that they make or assemble). 
 Ultimately, Allen maintained that “all PIE issues are unique to each state, whether 
in business, labor unions, or laws.”  He quoted a statement made by someone in the PIE 
hierarchy about the state of New York: “There will never be a PIE program in New York, 
because they are unwilling to fight the political battles that would be required.” 
 He concluded our conversation by stating that his conviction that the “real world 
experience (of PIE inmate employees) probably reduces recidivism more effectively than 
any other program.” 
 
Economic Indicators for the State of Texas in 1996 
 In 1996, the per capita personal income for Texas was $22,282, 31st in the nation, 
which compared to South Carolina’s per capita personal income of $19,977, 40th in the 
nation (Review Graphic “Per Capita Personal Income Calendar Year 1996-1997”).  
Texas’s state-local tax burden was 9.5 percent, 42nd in the nation, compared to the 
national average state-local tax burden of 10.5 percent, and South Carolina’s state-local 
tax burden of 9.9 percent, 35th in the nation (See Graphic “Texas State-Local Tax Burden 
Compared to U.S. Average [1996-2007]”).  The state’s total tax burden was 31.0 percent, 
while the national total tax burden average was 32.0 percent. 
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Texas 
State-Local Tax Burden Compared to U.S. Average 
(1996-2007) 




































1996 9.5% 42 21.5% 18 31.0% 30 10.5% 21.5% 32.0% 
1997 9.2% 45 21.8% 21 31.1% 38 10.4% 22.1% 32.5% 
1998 9.2% 45 22.5% 20 31.8% 33 10.5% 22.7% 33.2% 
1999 9.1% 45 22.4% 23 31.5% 37 10.5% 22.9% 33.3% 
2000 9.1% 46 22.7% 24 31.8% 36 10.5% 23.5% 34.0% 
2001 9.4% 44 21.9% 20 31.3% 32 10.5% 22.5% 33.0% 
2002 9.5% 40 19.6% 20 29.1% 26 10.3% 19.9% 30.3% 
2003 9.4% 40 18.8% 19 28.2% 30 10.4% 19.1% 29.5% 
2004 9.4% 42 18.6% 22 28.0% 33 10.6% 19.1% 29.7% 
2005 9.4% 43 19.7% 26 29.1% 40 10.9% 20.6% 31.5% 
2006 9.1% 43 20.2% 26 29.4% 42 10.8% 21.5% 32.3% 
2007 9.3% 43 20.5% 27 29.8% 41 11.0% 21.7% 32.7% 
* May not add to total due to rounding.   
Source: Tax Foundation calculations based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of 
Commerce 
 
BLS Local Area Statistics, 1996-2006, Texas 
 Labor force Employment Unemployment Unemployment 
rate 
1996 9,736,646 9,175,983 560,663 5.8 
1997 9,926,594 9,395,279 531,315 5.4 
1998 10,097,882 9,600,982 496,900 4.9 
1999 10,250,025 9,766,299 483,726 4.7 
2000 10,347,847 9,896,002 451,845 4.4 
2001 10,519,335 9,991,920 527,415 5.0 
2002 10,803,187 10,115,299 687,888 6.4 
2003 10,999,132 10,260,318 738,814 6.7 
2004 11,127,293 10,456,224 671,069 6.0 
2005 11,282,845 10,677,171 605,674 5.4 
2006 11,487,496 10,921,673 565,823 4.9 




Texas Operating Expenditures per Inmate in 1996 
 In fiscal year 1996, Texas’s estimated average daily number of inmates was 
128,140 (second in the nation), compared to South Carolina’s average daily number of 
inmates of 19,880.  Texas’s operating expenditure per inmate per day was $33.47, and its 
operating expenditures per inmate per year were $12,215.  (This compared to South 
Carolina’s operating expenditures per inmate per day of $38.29 and its operating 
expenditures per inmate per year of $13,977—and the national average annual operating 
expenditure per inmate of $20,100.) 
 In spite of the fact that Texas ranked 3rd in the nation in terms of largest state 
prison expenditures—$1.7 billion—the state was among the five lowest in terms of 
operating costs ($12,215) per inmate for the same year.  (Texas and South Carolina were 
among eight states with annual operating costs per inmate below $15,000.) 
 
Labor Union Membership in Texas in 1996 
 In 1996, the state of Texas ranked 46th in the nation in terms of labor union 
membership.  The percent of Texas workers covered by unions was 8.0 percent compared 
to the 16.2 percent of all U.S. workers covered by unions, and the 5.0 percent of South 
Carolina workers covered by unions in the same year (Review Graphic “Labor Union 
Membership\1, 1996”). 
 In 2005, Texas (like Florida) was in the second lowest tier of states in terms of 
union membership rates and annual averages (5 percent – 9.9 percent).  Iowa was in the 
mid-range (10 percent – 14.9 percent), while South Carolina was in the lowest range (4.9 
percent or less).  The state of Washington, on the other hand, was in the second highest 
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tier of states in terms of union membership rates and annual averages in 2005:  15 percent 
– 19.9 percent (as we shall discuss below). 
 
Popular Votes Cast by Political Party in Texas, 1996 - 2005 
 Texas, like South Carolina, produced an unbroken string of Republican victories 
for presidential candidates throughout both the 1980s and 1990s, including 1996, in 
contrast to the national patterns of Republican victories throughout the 1980s, changing 
to Democratic victories in 1992 and 1996. 
 In 1995, Republican candidate George Bush succeeded Democrat Ann Richards 
as governor of Texas.  He remained governor until his election to the U.S. presidency in 
2000.  Prior to 1994, both the Texas House and Senate were controlled by Democrats; by 
the beginning of the new millennium, both the House and Senate were controlled by 
Republicans.  (Former Texas State Representative Ray Allen told me that he managed to 
pass legislation for the PIE program in a Democrat-controlled House in 1993. 
 
Washington State Correctional Industries (CI) 
 In an article captioned “Let prison inmates earn their keep,” in the May 1, 1996 
issue of The Wall Street Journal, former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese called the 
Washington State Correctional Industries program “one of the most advanced prison 
industry programs in the country, with involvement from private companies.”  (He also 
cited the Lockhart prison industries program in Texas.)  In spite of these and other 
accolades, however, eight years later the PIE program was declared unconstitutional by 
the State’s Supreme Court.  The program was promptly terminated, to the consternation 
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of many onlookers around the country.  The Washington State Department of Corrections 
Secretary was quoted as saying, “The Court has concluded (Class I programs) are 
contrary to provisions of the constitution and the Department is obligated to terminate 
this class of industry.  It is important to hold offenders accountable.  We want as many 
prison inmates as possible doing useful work.  The Court’s decision makes it harder to 
reach that goal (Lehman, J., 2004).” 
 Long one of the country’s PIE showpieces, the program—certified in 1987—was 
challenged by a local industry that alleged it was forced to compete unfairly with an 
unconstitutionally established program.  In the case, Washington Water Jet Workers 
Association v. Howard Yarbrough in his official capacity as the Administrator of the 
Division of Correctional Industries, Washington State Department of Corrections, 
attention was focused on the Washington Constitution, article II, section 29: 
After the first day of January eighteen hundred and ninety the labor of convicts of 
this state shall not be let out by contract to any person, copartnership, company 
or corporation, and the legislature shall by law provide for the working of 
convicts for the benefit of the state. 
 
 At issue in the Washington Water Jet Workers case was the question of whether 
the PIE contract system of labor in the state violated the (state) constitution.  Under the 
contract system of the time (pre-1890), the State had leased involuntary inmate labor to 
private contractors who exercised virtual complete control of the inmates.  Eventually, 
the system had been found to be corrupt and inhumane.  In 2003, the Court, in examining 
the (PIE) system subsequently established by the State Legislature, found that 
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By contrast, the Washington Legislature has created a system where prisoners 
may be gainfully employed by private business.  This system is entirely voluntary 
and the statute requires that prisoners be paid a fair wage.  We find that our 
constitution bars the State from selling the involuntary labor of prisoners by use 
of the contract system of labor.  We also find that the contract system of labor 
bears no resemblance to the program established . . . and therefore, the 
legislature had the power to establish this beneficial employment program. 
 
 The five-to-four majority found that the Washington State PIE program was “not 
the [pre-1890] contract system revitalized. 
It explicitly provides for voluntary labor at a competitive wage, for the express 
goal of rehabilitation, under the custody and control of the State for the benefit of 
our State.  We therefore conclude that [the state’s PIE program] is constitutional. 
 
 Subsequent to that holding, however, the case was brought before a new Court, 
one whose membership had changed in a recent election (Summers, 2005).  The new 
Court over-turned the original decision less than a year later (in 2004), and Washington 
State’s PIE program was terminated.  (The controversy surrounding the case continued in 
2006.) 
 Referring to the Washington State Supreme Court decision, South Carolina’s 
legal counsel Lake Summers subsequently observed, “It (the ruling) reflects that the law 
is a human endeavor—you can bring different interpretations, different meanings and 
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different reactions and different philosophies to bear, and it’s not a science, it’s an art.  
You have to be cognizant of that human endeavor at all times.” 
 What Summers didn’t say but the writer inferred, is that the PIE program—even 
after 25 years—may be an endangered species in that it is constantly exposed to political 
influences.  Even in Washington, viewed by many as a progressive state, alterations in 
the Court’s membership resulted in the termination of a program designed to aid citizens, 
state departments of corrections, administrators, taxpayers, and inmates alike. 
 
Washington State Correctional Industries Today 
 The 2005 NCIA Directory reported that Washington State’s correctional 
population was 15,406, with 1,574 inmates employed in traditional industries.  The 
Washington DOC website, under “Correctional Industries Program” in April 2005 
referred the reader to the May 2004 Class I Industries Supreme Court Ruling.  However, 
in January 2007, the ruling was no longer cited, although an excerpt from Meese’s 1996 
article in The Wall Street Journal remained—a shining example of a quote taken out of 
context:  “The state of Washington has one of the most advanced prison industry 
programs in the country.” 
 In August of 2007, the state’s DOC released a recruitment announcement for a 
new director of correctional industries. 
 
Washington Correctional Industries Mission Statement 
 In 2005, Washington’s CI mission statement was posted on its website: 
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 As a business, Correctional Industries is committed to maintain and 
expand offender work training programs which develop marketable skills, instill 
and promote a positive work ethic and reduce the tax burden of corrections. 
 
Some might say that the state’s recent constitutional ruling made it more difficult to 
“reduce the tax burden of corrections.” 
 
Economic Indicators for the State of Washington in 1996 
 In 1996, the average per capita income for Washington was $25,187, which 
ranked the state 15th in the nation (review Graphic “Per Capita Personal Income Calendar 
Year 1996-1997”).  (The U.S. average per capita income was $24,426.) 
 Washington’s state-local tax burden was 11.5 percent, 8th in the country, 
compared to South Carolina, with a 1996 tax rate burden of 9.9 percent, 35th in the 
country, and the national average state-local tax burden of 10.5 percent (See Washington 
State-Local Tax Burden Compared to U.S. Average [1996-2007]”).  The state’s 34.1 
percent total tax burden ranked 3rd in the nation, compared to the national average total 
tax burden of 32.0 percent.  (South Carolina’s total tax burden was 30.2 percent, ranking 
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1996 11.5% 8 22.6% 7 34.1% 3 10.5% 21.5% 32.0% 
1997 11.3% 8 23.5% 6 34.8% 3 10.4% 22.1% 32.5% 
1998 11.1% 11 24.9% 3 36.0% 2 10.5% 22.7% 33.2% 
1999 10.7% 15 25.8% 3 36.4% 2 10.5% 22.9% 33.3% 
2000 10.5% 20 26.1% 4 36.7% 5 10.5% 23.5% 34.0% 
2001 10.6% 17 24.2% 5 34.8% 6 10.5% 22.5% 33.0% 
2002 10.4% 17 21.3% 6 31.7% 5 10.3% 19.9% 30.3% 
2003 10.4% 17 20.5% 4 30.9% 5 10.4% 19.1% 29.5% 
2004 10.4% 22 20.2% 7 30.6% 9 10.6% 19.1% 29.7% 
2005 11.0% 17 22.1% 7 33.1% 7 10.9% 20.6% 31.5% 
2006 10.9% 16 22.7% 7 33.6% 9 10.8% 21.5% 32.3% 
2007 11.1% 16 22.9% 7 34.0% 9 11.0% 21.7% 32.7% 
* May not add to total due to rounding.   




BLS Local Area Statistics, 1996-2006, Washington 
 Labor force Employment Unemployment Unemployment 
rate 
1996 2,882,432 2,711,963 170,469 5.9 
1997 2,966,651 2,822,223 144,428 4.9 
1998 3,032,019 2,886,871 145,148 4.8 
1999 3,066,165 2,917,577 148,588 4.8 
2000 3,050,021 2,898,677 151,344 5.0 
2001 3,052,714 2,863,705 189,009 6.2 
2002 3,104,698 2,877,022 227,676 7.3 
2003 3,149,243 2,916,045 233,198 7.4 
2004 3,208,946 3,008,352 200,594 6.3 
2005 3,270,480 3,089,953 180,527 5.5 
2006 3,326,524 3,160,350 166,174 5.0 
Source:  U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Washington State Operating Expenditures per Inmate in 1996 
 In fiscal year 1996 the state of Washington’s estimated average daily number of 
inmates was 11,669, roughly twice the average daily number of Iowa inmates (5,920) for 
the same year, and substantially less than South Carolina’s average of 19,880.  
Washington’s operating expenditure per inmate per day was $73.05, and the state’s 
operating expenditure per inmate per year was $26,662.  These amounts were more than 
twice the expenditures reported by Texas, and almost twice South Carolina’s operating 
expenditures as well.  The state’s average annual operating expenditure per inmate was 
well above the national average ($20,100) reported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance in 
1996. 
 As already mentioned, the state of Washington allocated 13 percent of its total 
expenditures to capital projects in 1996. 
 
Labor Union Membership for the State of Washington in 1996 
 In 1996, the state of Washington ranked 7th in the country in labor union 
membership; 21.8 percent of the state’s workers were covered by unions (review Graphic 
“Labor Union Membership\.1, 1996”).  This compared to the national percentage of U.S. 
workers covered by unions: 16.2 percent and the 5.0 percentage of South Carolina 
workers with union coverage. 
 In 2005, Washington was in the second-highest tier of states in terms of union 
membership rates and annual averages (15 percent – 19.9 percent)—again, compared to 
the national U.S. rate of 12.5 percent.  In the same year, South Carolina reported the 
lowest union membership rate: 2.3 percent. 
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Popular Votes Cast by Political Party in Washington State, 1996 - 2005 
 Washington Republican presidential candidates carried the day in both 1980 and 
1984, but by 1988, the pattern changed: Democratic candidates won the majority in the 
presidential elections of 1988, 1992 and 1996.  Again, we may contrast with South 
Carolina’s consistent Republican victories throughout the 1980s as well as the 1990s, and 
national voting patterns of Republican presidential victories in the 1980s, changing to 
Democratic presidential victories in 1992 and 1996. 
 In 1996, Washington’s governor was Democrat Michael Lowry; however, the 
state’s House and Senate were both Republican-controlled. 
 
Washington PIE Ruling: Worst Case Scenario? Or Portent of the Future? 
 While some might see the Washington State court ruling that terminated the PIE 
program as cause for alarm, a more optimistic view is that the acceptance and growth of 
PIE may prove, ultimately, to be inevitable—due to the desperate need of many states to 
find innovative ways to fund their prison systems.  Nevertheless, the debate and 
controversy engendered by the Washington case demonstrate the difficulties long 
associated with the PIE program.  While the appeal to taxpayers appears to be obvious 
and irresistible, the perceived threat of inmates taking jobs away from “law-abiding 
citizens” is easily manipulated by opponents—especially, as in Washington, when those 
opponents may be politically well-connected.  It is perhaps unfair to infer or 
inappropriate to imply that the membership of the Court was the well-planned, successful 
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result of a maneuver to destroy the state’s PIE program; nevertheless, that is how it was 
perceived by some, both inside and outside the state. 
 A careful reading of the decision reveals that the Court was closely divided over 
whether legislation passed to stop the abuse of inmate labor in the late 1800s was 
applicable to the state’s PIE initiative, a program designed to help both inmate workers 
and taxpayers—a program monitored by the federal Bureau of Justice Assistance as well 
as the state.  What seems equally clear is that the resistance of the Washington State 
Water Jet Workers was a political force to be reckoned with. 
 At the national level, other prison industries leaders watched—but few expressed 
surprise, at least not at the 2005, 2006, and 2007 NCIA conferences attended by the 
writer.  Instead, the news was met with disappointment and chagrin.  While many states 
may not have state constitutional barriers to contend with, their correctional industries 
directors all know the difficulty of overcoming the obstacles and hurdles associated with 
implementing and maintaining the PIE program.  To paraphrase Tony Ellis, they cannot 
afford to do too good a job. 
 
Other Problematic Issues for Aspiring PIE State Administrators 
 Other issues include the inclination of many correctional directors—or even 
legislatures—of investing prison industries profits in other programs, rather than re-
investing in prison industries.  One director (as reported to the writer) had told a 
colleague in disgust—following his state legislature’s takeover of prison industries profits 
(which were then invested in other, non-correctional state programs or entities)—that he 
was going to curtail his energy and efforts to expand the PIE program.  Why should I 
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work myself to death, he asked, when we aren’t even allowed to reinvest our profits in 
growth?  While many prison industries directors appear to see the efficacy of reinvesting 
in corrections (if not industries), few are motivated by the drive to bankroll other, 
unrelated disbursements to the state. 
 One business executive told me that he often promotes the PIE program to other 
businessmen in other states.  But he referred specifically to two states in the northeast, 
where he said that there was an “immediate wall” when the prospect of initiating the PIE 
program was suggested—the result, he was informed, of Mafia influences that would 
require a “slice” of any such endeavor. 
 
Summary and Recapitulation 
 It is perhaps not surprising that South Carolina in 1996 was ranked 49th among the 
states in workers covered by unions, presumably making it less vulnerable to union 
objections and controversy.  And perhaps it is also not surprising that Washington—the 
state where the PIE program was terminated—ranked 7th (see Chart, “Workers Covered 
by Union, Percent and Rank, and Right to Work, 1996” in Chapter Six). 
 At the beginning of the decade 1996 – 2005, the state of Texas, with by far the 
largest prison population (128,140) of the states reviewed, recorded the least individual 
inmate expenditures per year ($12,215).  South Carolina, with a population of 19,800, 
spent $13,977 per inmate per year.  Iowa, the smallest prison population (5,920) of our 
six reviewed states, spent $24,286 per inmate.  Tennessee, with a prison population of 
15,245, recorded expenditures of $22,904 per inmate, while the state of Washington 
(prison population of 11,669) spent the most per inmate ($26,662) (see Chart, “1996 
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Correctional Population for Six States and Per Year/Per Day Individual Inmate 
Expenditures” in Chapter Six).   
 The structure and organization of the PIE programs of the six states we’ve 
examined in this study varied.  At the beginning of the new millennium, South Carolina’s 
PIE initiative (like those of Iowa, Texas, and Washington32) were components of each 
state’s DOC, while Florida’s and Tennessee’s initiatives were separate entities.  Both 
South Carolina and Tennessee used the customer/manpower PIE models, while Iowa, 
Texas and Washington used the employer model.  Florida used both the customer and 
employer models (see Chart, “PIE Organizational Structure and Model for Six States, 
2004-5” in Chapter Six). 
 Because the five states examined in this chapter are disparate in many (if not 
most) respects, it is difficult if not impossible to generalize.  However, the states (Florida, 
Iowa, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington) were selected partly because of their 
differences, and also because each provides a variation of the PIE model and the 
problems and issues typically associated with all PIE programs.  In other words, although 
they are different in many ways, they confront most of the controversies and obstacles 
common to all PIE initiatives.  South Carolina’s PIE program is no exception.  Its 







                                                 
32 Washington’s PIE program was terminated in mid-2004. 
 284 
CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter presents a brief review of the original purpose of the study, 
the questions posed, and their answers.  It summarizes the findings, and 
from them develops a conceptual model for use by those interested in 
future research.  Implications and conclusions are presented. 
 
Review of Original Purpose of Research 
The purpose of this study was to determine how and why the enhanced prison 
industries (PIE) model prospered in South Carolina for the decade 1996 – 2005, while it 
struggled to survive in other states.  Indeed, in at least one state, Washington, the PIE 
program was terminated altogether. 
Legal, economic, and political factors have been reviewed, along with the 
leadership style of the director of prison industries for South Carolina.  (As documented 
in the body of this study, the extraordinary evolution of South Carolina’s PIE program 
occurred under the tenure of Tony Ellis.) 
 
Research Questions and Issues 
Several questions in the mind of the writer culminated in this paper.  Why didn’t 
the PIE model flourish across the country?  Why weren’t Congressional expectations 
fulfilled?  What have been the impediments?  Why is it that after more than a quarter of a 
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century, only a fraction (less than one percent) of U.S. inmates participate in the PIE 
program?  What other kinds of prison industries programming do we provide in the U.S.? 
In reviewing national PIECP data, I observed that a mid-sized southern state, 
South Carolina, had the largest PIE program in the country.  Initially, I wondered whether 
this might be a one-time fluke, or exception, but a review of earlier data revealed that the 
state had ranked among the nation’s top two or three largest PIE programs for more than 
a decade.  That observation led to this study.  My intention was to explore the 
implementation and development of South Carolina’s PIE program in an effort to identify 
the factors that contributed to its growth and prosperity.  I found, however, that while the 
program has been a consistent leader among the states for many years, the prison 
industries director must be diligent in monitoring economic influences, and constantly 
vigilant in piloting his agency around political landmines. 
Additional objectives accrued in the course of this study.  Analysis of the 
distinctions between the three types of prison industries seemed important.  How did they 
compare?  What were the advantages or disadvantages of each?  Also central to my 
analysis was a resolution to the question of whether such industries have the potential to 
relieve the financial distresses engendered by budgetary shortfalls among the states.  
Which type of prison industries—traditional, service or PIE—has the most potential to 
contribute meaningfully to state correctional coffers? 
 
Review of Framework and Methodology 
 A review of national data established that South Carolina’s PIE program, in terms 
of size, was ranked at or near the top of all the states for the decade 1996-2005.  A 
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graphic clarified the steadiness of the state’s PIE program compared to other states.  
While there are several excellent PIE programs in the country, South Carolina has 
maintained its position as a leader for more than 10 years (still true in 2007).  This study 
sought to account for that fact.  While it is perhaps not surprising that establishment and 
implementation of the PIE program in any state may be difficult and subject to the rise 
and fall of political and economic influences, I sought to learn what this mid-size 
southern state’s “secret of success” might be. 
In the preliminary stages of the study, I observed that South Carolina—like other 
states—had three types of prison industries: traditional, service and PIE.  Among the 
states that had PIE programs, many were comparatively small (e.g., Virginia, Vermont, 
Wyoming, and other states not included in this study).  Preliminary exploration revealed 
that the PIE programs could not be taken for granted—often, they struggled to survive.  I 
wondered whether South Carolina had encountered the same problems as other states, 
and if so, how the state had dealt with those problems. 
This review noted the links between post-release employment and recidivism.  
While the association between inmate employment and reduced recidivism was 
questioned by some (Maguire et al, 1988; Flanagan, et al., 1989), the relationship was 
demonstrated by others (Saylor and Gaes, 1992, 1996).  While Saylor and Gaes reported 
that the association was small but significant, Smith et al. (2006) found larger effects. 
A brief review of the characteristics of effective treatment for offenders was 
reported in an effort to provide context for our evaluation of prison industries and its 
potential rehabilitative effects.  Findings to demonstrate the costs and benefits of prison 
industries (Aos et al, 1999; MacKenzie and Hickman, 1998) were reported. 
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Discussion of the Study’s Major Questions and Findings 
 Questions that needed to be answered were identified: 
1. What were the prevailing models of prison industries at the beginning of the new 
millennium?  What are the advantages and disadvantages of each?  What are the 
economic and rehabilitative benefits and/or shortcomings of prison industries?  
What are the obstacles to improving extant prison industries? 
2. How did it happen that South Carolina has the largest PIE program in the U.S.? 
 
Research Questions and Discussion: 
(1) Advantages and Disadvantages of Prison Industries Models 
 We have learned much about the advantages and disadvantages of the various 
types of prison industries.  Advantages of traditional prison industries are associated with 
keeping inmates from being idle, and instilling the work ethic and a sense of productivity.  
Advantages associated with service industries include the same benefits as traditional 
industries but also provide opportunities for inmates to earn more money, along with the 
state, than is typical with traditional industries.  Research has suggested that participation 
in some industries may be associated with reduced recidivism and increased post-release 
employment (Saylor and Gaes, 1992, 1996 MacKenzie et al., 1997). 
 Finally, we have learned that the PIE program provides many benefits to the 
inmate, to the state, and to taxpayers.  Specifically, inmates who are paid prevailing 
wages are able to pay room and board to the state DOC; federal and state taxes; court-
ordered (or voluntary) child support; and victim restitution.  The state, together with the 
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private sector, is encouraged to make profit-making part of its goal.  Inmates may link 
with the private sector to facilitate post-release employment. 
 Disadvantages to traditional prison industries include the poverty-level “wage” 
paid most inmates workers—barely enough to fund commissary purchases.  Legal 
limitations abound; prison-made goods produced in traditional prison industries may not 
be sold in interstate commerce.  Of the three categories of prison industries, the state 
profits least from the traditional model.  Often, traditional correctional industries are 
ridiculed as “make-work” for inmates, due to a shortage of jobs.  Inadequate or obsolete 
machinery may limit the ability of inmates to participate in jobs that may lead to future 
post-release employment (Maguire et al., 1988). 
 Although service industries allow the state to make more profit than traditional 
industries, they are still prohibited from making PIE-level profits.  Also, advocates of 
service industries are sometimes criticized for not insisting that service industries be 
changed to PIE industries—a charge countered by service proponents as unrealistic—
indeed, proponents maintain that most efforts to transform service industries into PIE 
industries would result in termination altogether of the service industries program, and 
movement of service jobs into third world countries. 
 We have also seen that the advantages which accrue to the state from the PIE 
program are frequently associated with political disadvantages (e.g., the struggle to 
demonstrate the rationale for changing state laws to facilitate PIE programming; 
difficulties associated with obtaining the approval of industry and union leaders; constant 
monitoring to ensure that the PIE industry does not encroach on the ability of ordinary 
citizens to remain gainfully employed, etc.).  Other problems encountered by the PIE 
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program are operational; lockdowns, callouts, or inmate transfers may interrupt work.  In 
addition, the list of BJA requirements can be tedious, yet must never be overlooked.  
Security issues and legal constraints also serve to complicate the PIE process. 
 
Variations of the PIE Model 
We have seen that there is more than one PIE model.  The three most common models 
include the Manpower Model (where inmate workers are employed and supervised by the 
state, while private sector companies pay for inmate labor); the Customer Model (the 
DOC owns and operates the business, and is paid by the private sector company for 
products as part of a contractual agreement between the company and the correctional 
agency); and the Employer Model (the state supplies the space and qualified inmate 
workers who are hired and paid by the private sector company, which owns and operates 
the business).   
 The benefits of the PIE program, as we have seen, are considerable.  From the 
perspective of the private sector, absenteeism is low, and the costs of prison-based work 
space are typically lower than community-based work space.  From the perspective of 
prison staff, improvements in inmate morale and reductions in idleness facilitate 
management of prisoners. 
 
Economic Benefits of PIE 
 In addition, a review of the economic benefits of the PIE program has 
demonstrated the considerable advantages to taxpayers, the state, victims, and inmate 
families alike.  Petersik and his colleagues in 2003 published a study that sought to 
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identify primary beneficiaries of the PIE program.  The study found that the single largest 
group of beneficiaries proved to be taxpayers.   
Taken together, others, not the inmate, are the primary beneficiaries of 
contemporary PIE incomes. . . . The single largest non-inmate beneficiary group 
benefiting from PIE incomes includes State household and business taxpayers and 
all State programs benefiting from State income tax payments accounting for 
about one-third of PIE inmate incomes.  About one third of PIE incomes reduce 
State taxpayer costs via the PIE room and board deduction. 
 
This finding alone may offer a rationale to market the program more energetically than in 
the past.  Ironically, however, the PIE program continues to be a virtual “rare exception” 
in correctional circles, although the pendulum appears poised to swing the other way. 
 The Petersik study called attention to the fact that (in spite of the positive 
implications of the findings), the aggregate statistics “reveal(ed) little of the potential 
[number of] PIE beneficiaries and benefits were U.S. State prison inmates fully employed 
year-round in skills and jobs yielding  more typical U.S. annual incomes.” 
 Overall, however, the authors concluded that PIE inmate earnings contributed 
substantially to crime victims, taxpayers, families, social support programs—and inmates 
themselves. 
 
Rehabilitative Implications of 2006 Prison Industries Post-Release Findings 
 A report released by Smith and her colleagues in 2006 compared post-release 
recidivism and employment among a sample of PIE participants, traditional industry (TI) 
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participants, and inmates engaged in “other than work” (OTW).  Major U.S. geographic 
regions were included, as well as each of the three PIE models.  The PIE programs had 
all been certified prior to 1996. 
 PIE participants were found to be significantly more successful in obtaining post-
release employment.  They also obtained employment significantly faster than the TI or 
OTW control groups.  (TI participants obtained employment faster than OTW 
participants.)  PIE workers also earned significantly more than OTW releasees and were 
employed significantly more post-release quarters than TI and OTW releasees. 
 Additionally, PIE participants remained crime-free significantly longer than TI 
and OTW releasees.  (TI participants were not significantly different from OTW 
releasees in remaining crime-free.) 
 Like Petersik and his colleagues, Smith and her colleagues called attention to the 
fact that both federal and state coffers benefited from room and board and taxes paid by 
PIE workers.  Smith concluded that private sector partnerships and the PIE program 
should be expanded and carefully monitored. 
 
Obstacles to Progress 
 Nevertheless, as 2006 drew to its close, the PIE Certification Program was 
confronting problems at the national level.  Funding changes at the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance resulted in reduced funding for the National Correctional Industries 
Association, thus threatening the work of the National PIECP Coordinator as well as the 
stability and life of the initiative.  However, the combined efforts of key PIE leaders 
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(including the prison industries directors of both Iowa and South Carolina) and NCIA’s 
executive director appeared to have gathered momentum enough to rescue the program. 
 In spite of the political mileage that might be expected from a program that 
virtually pays for itself, and provides benefits to the state, taxpayers, victims and families 
alike, the struggle to maintain the initiative continued into 2007—not only at the level of 
individual states, but at the national level as well. 
 
Related Issues 
 In an era when politicians continue to link the problem of crime to successful 
campaign strategies, this observer has long wondered why more attention is not paid to 
programs that have been shown to effectively reduce crime and the costs associated with 
it.  At the time of this writing, an on-going television ad was running regularly in one 
southern state that promised voters that the candidate—if elected—would sponsor a 
“constitutional amendment” to ensure that violent criminals served longer sentences 
(quote from Georgia gubernatorial campaign).  Inflammatory rhetoric is often chosen 
over scientific evidence that certain programs are associated with reducing crime, and the 
public may be subjected to a barrage of carefully worded oratory designed to instill fear 
and uncertainty in the hearts and minds of those not well-acquainted with state laws (e.g., 
“state inmates are serving only a portion of their sentences” when in fact, the amount of 
time served by inmates is governed by carefully-crafted laws).  A pledge is made by the 
candidate to abolish parole for all violent offenders, regardless of the fact that many 
crimes of violence may not merit a life sentence—and no mention is made of the costs to 
the state and taxpayers of life sentences for all such offenders. 
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 “Taxpayers” have complained for years about the cost of maintaining prisoners 
and prisons.  One of the rationales for the death penalty given by many proponents is that 
“we [taxpayers] shouldn’t have to pay for their upkeep.”  Yet few people are 
knowledgeable about the PIE program and the benefits associated with it, including its 
potential to reduce the costs of both crime and prison management. 
 The same candidate who runs on a platform of promises to “throw away the key” 
often exhibits little interest in learning about the evidence available to support a pledge to 
ensure that effective programs (to reduce repeat crime or drug use or unemployment) are 
expanded and replicated. 
 The media contribute to this conundrum by describing the horrific crime 
committed by a single parolee, rather than calling attention to the crime-free lifestyle of 
the majority of parolees.  While this may be understandable to journalists, the fact 
remains that the public is provided with a distorted view of reality. 
 The regularity with which the “crime problem” is incorporated into campaign 
rhetoric offers a prime example of why a state correctional board of directors may be 
superior to gubernatorial appointment of correctional agency heads.  The SCDC board of 
directors that functioned during the 1970s-1980s allowed the state a period of unremitting 
stability in its correctional system.  Bill Leeke, the longest-serving correctional 
commissioner in history, was able to focus on improving and strengthening the 
Department of Corrections through several gubernatorial administrations, Republican and 
Democratic alike.  It should be noted, too, that the extraordinary length of his term 
facilitated opportunity for him to work more closely with the state’s U.S. Senator Strom 
Thurmond (one of the early sponsors of the 1979 Justice System Improvement Act). 
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 Leeke’s successor, Parker Evatt, was not so fortunate.  He may have enjoyed 
being “promoted” to cabinet-level status, but that status was short-lived; the next 
governor, appointed his successor.  As already mentioned previously, Bill Leeke served 
as SCDC Director for 19 years, reporting to a bipartisan board of directors, while his 
(several) successors over the following 19 years served under several governors and 
several ever-evolving and contrasting political landscapes.  The important issue here is 
the fact that historically and traditionally, correctional progress is often hindered by 
political influences.  This is not startling news; virtually any high-ranking corrections 
official will admit the political perils and difficulties associated with his or her office.   
 In the mid-seventies, the writer worked briefly in the office of the newly-elected 
governor of Tennessee.  The experience was memorable, as it provided a glimpse of the 
inner workings of the inner sanctum of the state seat of power in its infancy.  The 
activities of each day could be described as ranging from “hectic” to “chaotic”—not 
because of ineptitude, but because of inexperience. The new governor and his aides were 
consumed with a drive to replace as many state employees as possible with new ones of 
the governor’s choice.  This included correctional positions as well.  I (with no relevant 
experience) was named extradition officer for the state.   Subsequently, when the term of 
a member of the state board of pardons and paroles expired, I was asked whether I would 
like to seek the appointment.  Surprised (to say the least) and unprepared for the question, 
I asked what was wrong with re-appointing the out-going member?  After all, I noted, she 
had experience already and seemed to have done a fine job.  I was assured that it didn’t 
matter—if I wasn’t interested in the position, they would appoint someone else—but not 
the experienced board member. 
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 The point of this anecdote is to provide context to a rationale for why corrections 
should not be subjected to political whims and caprice.  Shouldn’t certain positions (e.g., 
correctional directors, parole board members, prison industries directors) be insulated 
from politics?  But partly because they’re not protected from political influences, the field 
of corrections pays a heavy price, and sometimes jeopardizes public safety, as well. 
 This is particularly true for prison industries.  While on its face the PIE program 
appears to be a win-win for all concerned, the political maneuvering required can be 
difficult.  Our review of the South Carolina PIE program has driven home this point.  
When the day comes that Tony Ellis retires33, there are no guarantees that he will be 
replaced with a knowledgeable, experienced candidate.  This holds true as well for 
appointment to most states’ correctional directorships (not only S.C.).  And if a newly 
appointed corrections commissioner is not knowledgeable or interested in prison 
industries, it will be the task of the director of prison industries to attempt to promote the 
strengths of the PIE program—and that can happen only if the prison industries director 
has the necessary skills, and takes the initiative.   
 When we observe the experiences of Tony Ellis and other prison directors in 
recent years, we see how daunting the challenges can be. 
 
Other Issues 
 To further complicate these kinds of issues, those who manage even the most 
successful and effective programs are often reluctant to participate in research and 
evaluation.  The writer, a consultant to correctional treatment programs in the past, often 
found that data collection in many programs was handled sloppily or ignored altogether.  
                                                 
33 Tony Ellis retired as South Carolina’s prison industries director in March 2008. 
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In fact, treatment clinicians were not often trained in—or interested in—data collection 
(just as parole officers are often unwilling or unable to be both “cop” and “counselor”).  
Often, too, clinicians are threatened by the prospect of evaluations (much as “taxpayers” 
may be threatened by an IRS audit). 
 For the state administrators of PIE programs, this observer initially saw only a 
“win-win” situation.  The state stood to benefit—from taxes paid by the offender.  The 
correctional department stood to benefit—from room and board paid, and from having a 
program that virtually paid for itself.  The community stood to benefit—from reductions 
in post-release crimes committed and from increased employment of released offenders 
who might otherwise require law enforcement services (e.g., rearrest).  Victims stood to 
benefit—from receipt of restitution, and a concomitant sense of reassurance that the 
criminal has literally paid for his offense.  The children and families of inmates stood to 
benefit—from receipt of monetary and eventually even physical support provided by 
their erstwhile imprisoned family member.  The inmate himself stood to benefit—from 
being trained in a “real” (prison-based) working environment to prepare for post-release 
employment—and from having proved to himself and others that he could (and had) 
developed a track record of responsibility and achievement. 
 
No Good Deed Shall Go Unpunished 
 The writer, however, eventually came to see that many PIE administrators face a 
constant array of challenges—not only internally (e.g., programmatic challenges, as 
might reasonably be expected)—but externally.  The programmatic challenges are only 
the beginning.  When the governorship changes, a new correctional commissioner can be 
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expected—and thus a renewed effort by the prison industries director to justify, promote 
and maintain the PIE program will likely be required.  Calls from legislators’ constituents 
can lead to months of friction, necessitating renewed efforts to justify the program once 
more to both the legislature and even the media.  A politically-inspired, well-publicized 
audit can be time-consuming and destructive—even if there’s little merit to allegations. 
 The “positives” seem frequently to be out-weighed by the “negatives.”  For even 
the most capable and committed PIE program director—one who successfully 
implements a  profitable, successful PIE program—may receive little in the way of 
encouragement or compensation for his or her efforts.  The private sector executive who 
brings in profits to his or her agency, is often rewarded with bonuses, pay raises, and 
promotions.  At a minimum, typically, s/he can use the profits to strengthen and enhance 
his or her organization, which may lead to even more bonuses, pay raises, and 
promotions. 
 In contrast, however, the public sector PIE administrator may not be allowed to 
use PIE profits to further enhance or strengthen the program—instead, profits may be 
used by the correctional director for other prison programs.  While this is often 
appropriate, perhaps, the PIE administrator (in some cases) may not receive even a small 
percentage of the profits s/he brings in to strengthen or enhance his or her program.  Thus 
the PIE director—instead of being rewarded—may be frustrated.  Is it any wonder that at 
least one PIE director confided that he was no longer going to toil to expand his 




Research Question and Discussion: 
(2) The Importance of the South Carolina PIE Program  
 
 If replication of successful programming is to take place, we have ample cause to 
focus on SCDC prison industries.  The most recent research demonstrates the efficacy of 
the PIE program, and South Carolina has the largest PIE program in the country.  As we 
have seen, the program has ranked at or near the top for more than a decade. 
 The primary findings of the report by Smith and her colleagues are best 
summarized in their own words: 
The primary findings of this research are that the state prison inmates who 
worked in open-market jobs in the PIECP were found to be significantly more 
successful in post-release employment and in reducing recidivism than either 
inmates working in TI or involved in OTW. . . . findings for the PIECP releasees 
stood alone. . . . PIECP releasees were employed significantly more quickly after 
release . . . and remained employed significantly longer . . .  PIECP participants 
recidivated significantly more slowly and less frequently . . . 
 
 Long before the Smith research was completed, Ellis had told me that South 
Carolina was one of the states being studied.  He revealed a guarded optimism about the 
outcome of the report, but felt strongly that it was long overdue.  From his point of view, 
the study had the potential to add to his arsenal of effective munitions, or reasons to 
support the growth of PIE in the State of South Carolina.  In fact, the study should 
strengthen the argument for bringing the PIE program to most states. 
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 But—again, as we have seen—the political hurdles are considerable.  Although 
apprehensions related to the economic feasibility of the program appear to be waning, 
political factors appear to be the biggest challenge.  Ultimately, of course, requisite 
statutory changes in many states cannot be passed without successful behind-the-scenes 
lobbying efforts.  Lawmakers are politicians first, and constituent opposition to any 
program frequently overcomes reason.  While Ellis may have peers of comparable ability 
(e.g., Baysden of Iowa or Crawford of Kansas), the political hazards of elections offer 
little hope for the longer terms and stability that are likely to facilitate effective program-
building.  In 2007, Ellis’ 20-year tenure was as extraordinary as it was rare. 
 But the lessons provided by our survey of prison industries in South Carolina has 
shed light on a program (PIE) that continues to be virtually unknown, in spite of its 
extraordinary potential to remedy many correctional ills.  While California, Texas and 
Florida are examples of large prison systems with PIE programming, Iowa, Kansas, 
Minnesota and Nevada are examples of smaller prison systems with successful PIE 
programs.  (In 2005, South Carolina had the largest PIE program (1,301 participants), 
followed by Kansas (682) and Texas (466).) 
 
The Growth of PIE 
 In spite of the challenges recorded in this study, the writer has concluded that a 
new era in U.S. prison industries has begun and is on-going: the Era of the Growth of 
PIE.  Evidence of the PIE Era is substantiated by the growth of the program during the 
decade beginning in the mid-90s and continuing into the new millennium, and the 
currently prominent PIE track which has been on-going at the NCIA conferences of 2005, 
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2006,t and 2007.  The fate of the PIE initiative in the state of Washington 
notwithstanding, the prison industries’ directors in other states apparently view it as a 
cautionary tale, but not as cause for capitulation.  To the contrary, at the 2007 NCIA 
conference, Tony Ellis’ three-day track presentation on PIE certification was heavily-
attended.  Presenters were peppered with questions, and experienced attendees were 
generous in sharing their advice and experience.  Today, PIE statutes exist in most states.   
 The 1999 Symposium on Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation 
(Appendix A) produced a consensus among leading economists that inmate labor force 
participation would be good for the economy, and that such participation would be likely 
to reduce recidivism.  The Symposium’s findings provided fertile soil for the growth of 
the PIE program. 
 To reiterate: Petersik et al.’s research identified the beneficiaries of PIE inmate 
incomes, and found that 
Virtually every American belongs to a group that benefits from PIE inmate work . 
. .  (including) crime victims, State and Federal household and business 
taxpayers, all persons or businesses paying for Social Security and Medicare, and 
all persons and programs dependent upon State and Federal income tax funding 
or the social safety net (Social Security, Medicare, Workers Compensation, 
Unemployment compensation), including elementary, secondary, and college 
education , welfare, a wide range of State and Federal programs supporting 
medical and retirement services, and other goods and services. 
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 And again:  Smith et al.’s research showed that participants in PIE programs in 
five states were “significantly more successful in post-release employment,” and 
remained crime-free significantly longer than inmates who participated in traditional 
industries or inmates who participated in programs “other than work”. 
 These findings constitute significant evidence that the time is right for the 
continued growth of PIE in the United States. 
  
Challenges Ahead 
 When we combine the Smith findings with the economic findings of Petersik and 
his colleagues, the implications are strengthened.  The PIE program appears to have the 
extraordinary potential—not just to reduce recidivism and increase post-release 
employment, but to provide benefits to key stakeholders, including departments of 
correction, the state, taxpayers, victims and inmate families.  The rationale for increasing 
PIE research is ample and compelling, although there continue to be challenges. 
 As Saylor and his colleagues point out in their 2004 volume (Measuring Prison 
Performance: Government Privatization and Accountability), and as we have already 
observed previously, there are many inherent difficulties attached to measuring prison 
program performance.  Not only is it difficult to compare programs, but inmate-matching 
has its own attendant difficulties.  In the Smith research, attention is called to the fact that 
many of the PIE participants may also have worked in traditional industries, or 
participated in other kinds of related (and unrelated) programming (e.g., vocational 
training, etc.). 
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 MacKenzie and her colleagues (1998) also call attention to the challenges of 
determining program effectiveness when study participants may have benefited from 
other services like educational and vocational training, producing what they call “additive 
effects.”  The same additive effects may be associated with other kinds of programming 
(e.g., drug treatment). 
 But the writer is reluctant to constrain PIE workers from participation in other 
services.  Admittedly, as MacKenzie and others maintain, random assignment and 
analysis of comparable program and comparison groups is the “gold standard.”  
However, practically speaking, practitioners and policymakers may be more receptive to 
what might be called the “gold-plated” standard:  Comparison between a program group 
and one or more control groups, controlling for other factors; or what MacKenzie calls “a 
nonequivalent comparison group that is only slightly different from the program group.” 
 The “gold-plated” method has the advantage of already being possible with many 
existing programs.  (Smith et al. and others have used it, though not without problems.)  
This writer’s willingness to accept the “gold-plated” method of analysis is a result of an 
admitted bias toward providing inmates with as many rehabilitative services as possible.  
Also, from practical and policy perspectives, any potential for expediting rehabilitation 
and reducing recidivism is more desirable than delay. 
 Medical randomized research is often cited by criminologists as an ideal to strive 
for, and appropriately so.  However, to carry the analysis/analogy further, once the 
benefits of a medication or treatment have been scientifically demonstrated, it becomes 
medically unethical to withhold the effective treatment from trial participants.  Should 
correctional treatment known to be effective be any different?  Should it be withheld?  
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Withholding effective treatment from offenders penalizes not only them, but the 
communities they return to, and Society at large. 
 In South Carolina and other states, PIE workers are required to obtain their GED 
to be eligible for participation in the program.  Likewise, PIE participants are often 
selected from traditional and service industries.  The requirement that PIE workers be 
disciplinary-free is unlikely to be rescinded.  Researchers for years have worried about 
such issues, and whether they lead to what Smith calls “creaming” of program 
participants.  Nevertheless, it seems desirable from a rehabilitative (clinical) perspective, 
to provide as many inmates as possible with something to work toward—much as most 
employees strive for a “raise” or a promotion.  After all, incentives are considered to be 
important elements in most correctional treatment programs. 
 Also, contemporary statistical methods and meta-analytic techniques offer 
potential to factor in such considerations.  Knight et al., Martin et al., and Wexler et al. 
demonstrated in 1999 that prison-based drug treatment completers who received aftercare 
(including assistance in finding employment) did better than completers who did not 
receive such assistance.  Their research is a natural springboard for the researcher who 
wishes to explore the post-release success of PIE participants who have participated in 
other kinds of programming, including vocational education and training and/or drug 
treatment, as well. 
 Progress in the criminal justice system can be expedited if practitioners and 
researchers find mutually acceptable ways to collaborate, and when necessary, search for 
a middle ground—one that is as close to the gold standard as possible—but that can be 
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implemented sooner rather than later.  The advantage to this strategy is that it has the 
potential to be implemented “here and now.” 
 
Thinking Outside the Box 
 Many therapeutic communities are composed of “phases”—which require clients 
to start at the “bottom,” so to speak, and work (earn) their way up, with completion of the 
final phase culminating in a “graduation” of sorts. 
 Ellis maintains that for the time-being, it is advantageous to him (and the DOC 
and, presumably, the state) to have available all three prison industries models: 
traditional, service and PIE.34  
 Is it possible that prison work could be designed in a kind of continuum of 
phases?  Perhaps inmates could start their work careers in institutional maintenance, then 
traditional prison industries, with service industries and—the ultimate prize—the PIE 
program being a goal.  Inmates who do not perform well, or who receive disciplinary 
write-ups, obviously would not advance, while attrition (e.g., via releases or transfers) 
might help to alleviate the potential bottleneck that could be anticipated by too many 
inmates seeking too few jobs. 
 While we may be a long way from being able to implement a process like this in 
most states, it appears that SCDC may have unofficially and informally (and perhaps 
even unintentionally) embarked on a comparable path for prison industries workers.  The 
inmates and correctional officers and those in management that I spoke with in that state 
made it clear that inmates were aware of the importance of working hard and remaining 
                                                 
34 When asked his opinion of this, economist Petersik nodded approvingly, and said, “yes—a free market!” 
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disciplinary-free—this appeared to be part of their motivation to work hard, whether in 
traditional or service prison industries. 
 
Principles of Effective Treatment 
 When Tom Petersik looked at inmate account data (of PIE participants), he found 
that PIE inmates still did not exercise “normal” financial responsibility.  In short, PIE 
workers remained outsiders when it came to ordinary economic participation.  What, if 
anything, can be done to affect this phenomenon? 
 A review of the characteristics of effective treatment for offenders at the 
beginning of this paper found that a successful treatment program seeks to address 
dynamic criminogenic client characteristics.  Effective treatment programs often 
emphasize social learning principles; such programs often include training and role-
modeling.  However, in one area of the PIE program, it may be said that inmates are 
constrained from active emulation of the exercise of “normal” economic responsibilities, 
or tasks.  For example, instead of “paying their bills”—a task exercised by virtually all 
working Americans—PIE inmates instead have “deductions” taken from their wages.  
Although they earn the wages from which deductions are made, they are involved only 
passively in paying their own “bills.” 
 Perhaps a process could be considered to require more active involvement by PIE 
workers in the payment of their “bills.”  Specifically, the writer suggests implementation 
of a pilot project within the PIE program, wherein PIE inmates might maintain a ledger of 
their “expenses” (now called deductions); they might also write checks (that require the 
co-signing of a prison administrator) to pay their “bills”—thus transforming what is now 
 306 
a passive process (the inmate has deductions taken from his earnings) to an active one, 
requiring his involvement—and, by the way, the practice of a process by which millions 
of ordinary Americans manage their affairs.  The simple act of maintaining a ledger could 
be a therapeutic step in the right direction—the future—even without managing a 
checking account.   
 Little has been said thus far about the reality that countless numbers of inmates 
lack even basic knowledge or experience in managing mundane tasks like bank accounts 
and paying bills.  Why not explore the possibility of building such tasks and experiences 
into the PIE program? 
 
Implications and Conclusions 
 At the beginning of this study, several questions were posed: 
• What were the prevailing models of prison industries at the beginning of 
the new millennium?  What are the economic and rehabilitative benefits 
and/or shortcomings of prison industries?  What are the barriers to 
improving extant prison industries?  Do PIE inmates have improved 
recidivism rates compared to participants of traditional prison industries 
programs? 
• One mid-sized state, South Carolina, has the largest PIE program in the 
country.  How did this happen? 
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 We have answered the question of which were the prevailing models of prison 
industries at the turn of the century—traditional, service and PIE—and we have reviewed 
examples of each as implemented in South Carolina. 
 We learned from our review of SCDC’s prison industries that the PIE program is 
the most profitable, followed by service industries, and then traditional industries.  We 
learned from Smith’s 2006 study that the PIE program, when compared to traditional 
prison industries, was significantly more likely to be associated with post-prison 
reductions in recidivism than traditional  industries. 
 We learned that the barriers to improving prison industries are manifold, 
particularly when it comes to the PIE program.  The requirements imposed by the Bureau 
of Justice Assistance are onerous, and complicated.  The ingenuity needed to get all the 
key agencies “on the same page” would be challenging to even the most savvy and 
dexterous of politicians—and the role of the prison industries director is fraught with 
peril in this endeavor. 
 Our review of some of South Carolina’s peer states suggests that “right to work” 
states are more hospitable to the PIE program than “free-bargaining” states.  Collaterally, 
it suggests that a pro-union environment may be less likely to provide fertile soil for 
implementation of the PIE program.  But while this may be generally true, there are 
exceptions.  The state of Minnesota, for example, has maintained its PIE program from 
the virtual beginning (of PIE certification), yet it ranked 9th in the nation in percent of 
workers covered by unions in 1996—and it was not a right-to-work state.  Washington, 
too, ranked 7th in percent of workers covered by unions the same year—and it was not a 
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right to work state—yet it was home for years to the third largest PIE program in the 
country. 
 Iowa, also a state with strong union presence, has had notable success in working 
cooperatively with union leaders. 
 In contrast, in 2006 South Carolina was a right-to-work state with the smallest 
union presence in the country.  But these factors alone fail to provide a complete 
explanation for South Carolina’s longstanding record of successful implementation of the 
PIE program. 
 We have reviewed other potential explanations, including state per-inmate 
expenditures and state per capita income.  Again, while these factors appear to be 
relevant, the state of South Carolina and its prison industries director have overcome 
numerous obstacles—not the least of which was a well-publicized, excoriating legislative 
audit. 
 Other factors we have reviewed include Tony Ellis’s long tenure as SCDC’s 
Director of Prison Industries.  As of this writing (2007), Ellis had entered his 20th year as 
prison industries director, a feat not often matched.  He has served during the terms of 
several governors, both Republican and Democrat.  And although his position was 
originally civil service with all the protections that implied, that changed in 2006, when 
his position was changed to serve “at the pleasure of the governor”, and thus became 
more vulnerable to political influences. 
 So why is it that Ellis has not only survived, but succeeded in establishing the 




Public Sector Innovation  
 In a 2001 report authored by Sanford Borins, “The Challenge of Innovating in 
Government,” five characteristics associated with successful, innovative public sector 
organizations were outlined (as mentioned in Chapter One of this paper): 
The use of a systems approach 
The use of new technology 
Process improvement 
The involvement of organizations or individuals outside the public sector to  
  achieve public purposes 
The empowerment of communities, citizens, or staff. 
 
Tony Ellis, as steward of SCDC prison industries, has developed and cultivated virtually 
every one of these characteristics in the state’s correctional industries program—
particularly in the PIE program. 
 
Ellis’s Systems Approach 
 Borins, in a table developed to summarize the number of times he found the five 
characteristics of innovation used by sample respondents, described what he called a 
“total systems approach” thus: 
Total systems approach = uses a systems analysis of a problem or coordinates 
organizations or provides multiple services to clients. 
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 When Tony Ellis first arrived at SCDC to discuss prison industries in the state 
with the SCDC Deputy Commissioner of Administration, Hugh Clements, he was asked 
to evaluate and analyze the system of prison industries as it was practiced at that time 
(1987).  Ellis complied, and spent considerable time reviewing the state’s prison 
industries programs.  He made recommendations which he was subsequently invited to 
implement as the state’s new prison industries director.  Thereafter, we know, he 
developed the PIE program from its infancy, along with traditional industries.  He 
identified the problems of the state’s traditional prison industries, and addressed them one 
by one with his staff.  As both he and a high-level assistant subsequently reported, he was 
forced to “borrow” money to keep existing industries going.  He found that, as he put it, 
“the left hand didn’t know what the right hand was doing.”  Although there was a 
superfluity of office furniture, for example, the industries’ inmates were continuing to 
produce even more furniture—which was “piling up,” unsold and unused.  Ellis rectified 
these and other problems. 
 Meanwhile, he began to search for ways to implement the new PIE model.  He 
conducted a search of prospective businesses, and wrote letters to CEOs.  One by one, he 
began to sell the PIE concept to them.  Simultaneously, he began the laborious process of 
fulfilling BJA/PIE requirements: contacting other South Carolina agency heads whose 
cooperation was essential; calling and meeting with state legislators to explain the 
program; coordinating with the SCDC Director and/or Deputy Director; contacting union 
leaders, etc. 
 At the same time, and at all times, he monitored the state’s traditional industries to 
ensure their prosperity, and implemented service industries in several prisons.  These 
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activities called for sure-footed coordination of multiple organizations as well as multiple 
services. 
 By turning to the private sector to establish both the PIE program and service 
initiatives, he was able to take advantage of the private sector’s more advanced 
technologies, and faster and more efficient processes.  And, to the extent that SCDC 
prison industries were involved with the private sector, new management philosophies 
were ensured and facilitated. 
 Borins’ third characteristic of successful and innovative programs he calls 
“process improvement.”  This refers to innovative procedures developed to facilitate 
governmental processes.  Governmental bureaucracies, traditionally, do not often 
encourage innovation, and the criminal justice system is, some might say (e.g., Barbara 
Auerbach), more inflexible than others.  The correctional environment, in particular, is by 
nature controlling in the literal sense of the word.  Openness to new methods and ways of 
doing things are not words frequently used to describe the prison milieu.  Nevertheless, 
Ellis has consistently attempted to facilitate prison industries’ processes across a wide 
range of initiatives and systems.  He searches for ways to accommodate the needs of 
private sector businesses, while simultaneously maintaining security.  In so doing, he has 
won the respect of the private sector, prison industries staff, and workers alike. 
 Borins’ fourth characteristic of successful and innovative programs he describes 
as “the involvement of organizations or individuals outside the public sector to achieve 
public purposes.”  Again, the very existence of the public/private sector PIE initiatives in 
South Carolina (and service industries as well) is proof-positive of Ellis’s 
accomplishments in this regard.  Borins’ described specific examples of “initiatives 
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opening up some public sector activities . . . to private sector competition; partnerships 
entailing private sector delivery . . . the use of voluntary or non-governmental 
organizations for program delivery . . . “  (He could easily have been writing about the 
South Carolina PIE program.) 
 Finally, Borins’ fifth characteristic of successful, innovative programs is “the 
empowerment of communities, citizens, or staff.”  To the extent that reduced recidivism 
(associated with post-release PIE participants) empowers communities, it empowers the 
individuals within it, the citizens.  And although Ellis himself did not describe his 
approach to empowering staff, a close working colleague did.  Unlike many 
administrators, he said, Ellis shared information freely.  For this reason, he predicted, if 
and when Ellis retires, the prison industries program is likely to survive.*  Unfortunately, 
the individual who said this has since retired himself, and the writer does not feel as 
optimistic about the future of SCDC industries without Ellis. 
 
Marketing of the PIE Program 
 Perhaps the most difficult challenge has been the marketing and dissemination of 
the success stories that the PIE program has generated.  While it is clear that Ellis has 
overcome hurdles in implementing new ideas and strengthening the state’s prison 
industries, it is also clear that—as he himself acknowledges—the program is not given 
the credit that many might say is due; if ever there was a “prophet without honor” in his 
own locale, that prophet appears to be Tony Ellis.   
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 Borins, however, points out that the instigation of major awards to innovative 
public sector organizations by several non-governmental agencies may bring about 
needed change.  Such awards, he says, share two key objectives: 
countering media criticism of and political hostility to the public service and 
encouraging the development and dissemination of innovations within the public 
sector.  The best known award in the United States is the Ford Foundation’s 
Innovations in American Government program, administered by Harvard 
University’s Kennedy School of Government (Ford-KSG awards)35  
 
 Borins has analyzed the reasons for the differences in attitudes toward innovation 
and creativity in the private sector, compared to the public sector.  For one thing, he 
points out, the private sector often benefits from venture capital—funding designed to 
encourage and protect so-called intellectual property rights in the development of 
copyrights and patents intended to facilitate profit for the organization and/or its 
innovators. 
 Contrast this with the traditional situation in the public sector.  
Innovations developed by public servants in the employ of government are 
generally government property.  Public sector organizations are funded by 
legislative appropriations; there are no venture capitalists to seed public 
management innovations.  There is no shared ownership in the public sector, and 
public servants are paid fixed salaries, with bonuses that, at best, are minuscule 
                                                 
35 Borins utilized data from the Ford-KSG awards in his statistical survey, along with data from an awards 
program in the U.K., CAPAM. 
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in comparison to those in the private sector.  In other words, the rewards for 
successful innovations in the public sector are meager. 
 On the other hand, the consequences of unsuccessful innovation are grave.  
The media and opposition parties are always eager to expose public sector 
failures and pillory the public servants involved, with potentially disastrous 
effects on their careers. . . . the public sector (is) a far less fertile ground for 
innovation than the private. 
 
 Alan Altshuler offered similar observations in 1997: 
The predominant view of innovation in government has been one of suspicion. . . . 
(M)ajor obstacles to innovation . . . are deeply ingrained in the structure and 
practice of American government.  Four, especially stand out: 
 First . . . (government agencies) . . .  seldom experience an urgent need to 
abandon familiar routines. 
 Second, a paramount dread of government officials is newsworthy failure.  
Old programs may be inadequate, but their familiarity insulates them from much 
media attention. . . . 
 Third, the public sector lacks a common measure of success, such as 
profitability in the business world.  As a result, very few departures from current 
practice—regardless of how effective they may prove in relation to their target 
objectives—escape controversy. 
 Fourth, Americans tend to be deeply ambivalent about encouraging non-
elected bureaucrats to exercise discretion. . . .  (The) most common expression in 
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the practice of public administration is routinization—insistence on compliance 
with vast numbers of rules and regulations designed to address every imaginable 
situation in which discretion might be exercised.  Routinization, of course, is 
anathema to innovation. 
 In the private sector, by contrast, it is an article of faith that what is 
excellent today will be inadequate tomorrow. 
 
 As Borins and Altshuler seem to suggest, ultimately the phrase “public sector 
innovation” is a virtual non sequitur.  General public sector innovation characteristics and 
concepts—observed, recorded and described by Borins and others—appear to predict the 
resistance that Ellis has so frequently encountered. 
 Then how, one may ask, do we account for the success of SCDC prison 
industries, particularly the PIE program?  By virtue of his efforts to develop a successful 
PIE initiative, Ellis has shown himself to be an “innovation champion” (Howell et al., 
2005).  An innovation champion is that person in authority who has a macro-view of both 
his role and his organization; a broad understanding of strategic issues necessary to 
implement the innovation; the ability to obtain the involvement and commitment of 
stakeholders; and who is not intimidated by new ideas or challenges.  “Champion” was 
the word used by a leading prison industries economist/researcher to describe Tony Ellis.  
(Recall that when I asked this individual why he thought the South Carolina PIE program 
was successful, he replied:  “ . . . The PIE model is probably successful in [South] 
Carolina because (1) it has an effective champion, (2) it has an effective champion and 
(3) it has a well designed aggressive entrepreneurial plan.”) 
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 Borins defines innovation as the adoption of an idea by an organization.  Clearly, 
the organization administrator must support and facilitate the idea.  Borins maintains that 
innovation depends on the ability to see things differently.  Again, it seems clear that the 
administrator must have that ability. 
 
Developing A Conceptual Model 
 Having reviewed a host of issues and factors known to be associated with 
enhanced prison industries, we find ourselves asking whether a conceptual model can be 
developed and described to predict a successful PIE initiative.  Our review suggests that 
the PIE program is more likely to be found in right to work states where, conversely, 
unions are not a powerful presence.  A cursory review of the six states covered in this 
study reveals that in 2005 two of the three36 largest PIE programs in the country could be 
found in the southern states of South Carolina and Texas.  Indeed, in 1996, the beginning 
of the decade examined in this study, South Carolina ranked 49th and Texas ranked 46th, 
nationally, in percentage of workers (5.0 percent and 8.0 percent, respectively) covered 
by unions.  (See chart below.) 
 
Workers in Six States Covered by Union, Percent and Rank, 
and Right to Work, 1996 
 Percent Rank Right to work  
(yes or no) 
Florida 9.9 41 Y 
Iowa 15.7 24 Y 
South Carolina 5.0 49 Y 
Tennessee 11.1 34 Y 
                                                 
36 Kansas was also in the top three. 
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Texas  8.0 46 Y 
Washington 21.8 7 N 
 
U.S. Average 16.2   
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book 1997-98, 
table A-22; BNA Union Data Book, 2001 edition. 
 
  
           
PIE Organizational Structure and Model for 
Six States, 2004-5* 
State Structure PIE Model 
Florida extra-DOC Employer and Customer 
Iowa intra-DOC Employer 
South Carolina intra-DOC Customer/Manpower 
Tennessee extra-DOC Customer/Manpower 
Texas intra-DOC Employer 
Washington intra-DOC Employer 
Note:  Washington’s PIE program was terminated in mid-2004. 
 
Organizational Structures of PIE Initiatives 
 In our search for a conceptual model of PIE likely to be associated with success, 
we must consider organizational structure.  A brief review of our six states reveals two 
types that can be described as extra-DOC or intra-DOC.  Extra-DOC refers to the fact 
that a few states’ prison industries—Florida and Tennessee among them—are managed 
by agencies outside the state departments of correction.  Intra-DOC, of course, refers to 
the fact that the PIE programs are managed within and by the department of corrections 
itself.  Four of our states, including Iowa, South Carolina, Texas and Washington, are 
part of the state departments of correction.  The observer might conclude that the DOC-
based programs appear to be more likely to flourish, but there are so few extra-DOC 
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models that it’s difficult to state this unequivocally.  (The majority of prison industries, 
including enhanced prison industries, are intra-DOC.) 
 
Length of Tenure of Prison Industries Directors 
 The writer would expect the success of a PIE program to be strongly linked to the 
length of tenure of its director.  In the six states examined in this study, NCIA records 
revealed the length of prison industries experience for each state’s prison industries 
director:    
 
PIE Directors’ Experience for Six States 
State PIE Director’s Experience in Years 
Florida 10 years 
Iowa  9 years 
South Carolina 17 years 
Tennessee  9 years 
Texas 15 years 
Washington 10 years 
Source:  National Correctional Industries Association 2005 Directory 
  
     
The Kansas prison industries director had 11 years experience at the same time, thus 
strengthening the writer’s expectation, since again, the three largest PIE programs (S.C., 
Texas and Kansas) also had the most experienced prison industries directors among the 
states reviewed.  Next in line were Washington, where the PIE program was abolished in 
2004, and Florida, an extra-DOC structure organization.   
 However, the writer is obliged to call attention to the fact that the most 
experienced prison industries directors in 2005 were often at the helms of prison 
industries with no PIE programs at all:  e.g., Alabama’s PI director had 20 years’ 
experience; Arizona’s PI director had 36 years’ experience; Arkansas’ PI director had 22 
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years’ experience; Kentucky’s PI director had 26 years’ experience; New Jersey’s PI 
director had 24 years’ experience; New York’s PI director had 28 years’ experience; 
West Virginia’s PI director had 24 years’ experience. 
 Nevada’s PI director, Howard Skolnick and the state’s PIE program, are both 
well-regarded in PIE circles; in 2005, Skolnick had 26 years’ experience in prison 
industries, and 236 PIE workers. 
 So do the above data disprove the writer’s thesis that PIE programs with PI 
directors of substantial prison experience are likely to be more successful than those with 
less experience?  I conclude that the factors involved in the development and growth of 
any PIE program are inter-related in complex ways, and difficult to separate.  Multiple 
regression or other statistical techniques may be useful for analysis of specific predictors 
or antecedents of the PIE initiative, but much more research and study is needed.  
 
Correctional Population and Expenditures per Inmate 
 Additional factors we might expect to relate to PIE success (or failure) might be 
correctional population and/or inmate expenditures.  The chart below suggests that, for 
our six states at least, only Expenditures per Inmate appeared to be associated with PIE 
success.  Specifically, South Carolina and Texas, two of the three largest programs in 
2005, paid only $13,977 and $12,215 per year in individual inmate expenses, 
respectively.  This translated into only $38.29 per day for South Carolina, and $33.47 per 
day for Texas. 




1996 Correctional Population for Six States and Per Year/Per Day Individual 
Inmate Expenditures 
  Expenditures 
State Correctional 
population 
Per year Per day 
Florida 63,521 $17,327 $47.47 
Iowa 5,920 24,286 66.54 
South Carolina 19,800 13,977 38.29 
Tennessee 15,245 22,904 62.75 
Texas 128,140 12,215 33.47 
Washington 11,669 26,662 73.05 
    
U.S. Average  -- 20,142 55.18 
Source: State Prison Expenditures, 1996: Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Justice Programs. 
 
Conceptual PIE Model 
 As stated at the beginning of this paper, my study was meant to be exploratory, a 
preliminary effort to identify which economic, political or legal factors (variables) might 
be important, and how they might relate to one another.  I believe I have met my goal, 
and laid the groundwork for future research. 
 I am willing to present a conceptual model, and leave it to others to add to it or 
tear it apart.  Based on my study, my conceptual model of a successful PIE program 
suggests that a PIE program will more likely succeed if: 
1. It is spearheaded by an innovative and politically astute Director of Prison 
Industries. 
2. The Director of Prison Industries has substantial years of prison industries 
experience. 
3. It has a supportive Commissioner of Corrections. 
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4. It has at least one committed and knowledgeable legislator to negotiate and 
facilitate necessary legislative changes. 
5. The state has a right-to-work environment. 
6. The state has a commitment from union and business leaders to support the 
initiative, or to negotiate key provisions essential to PIE implementation. 
7. The PIE initiative is an intra-DOC model. 
8. The PIE program, its workers AND its director have incentives.  The program 
should receive a percentage of the profits to maintain growth; the director should 
oversee how such monies are allotted.  PIE workers should also have incentives 
in the form of rewards (e.g., pizza on Fridays, etc.) or promotions. 
9. The PIE director and/or his designees work closely with the warden and prison 
classification to forestall unnecessary work interruptions. 
10. The PIE program has a robust marketing plan. 
 
Generally speaking, the South and West as regions appear to be more hospitable to the 
PIE initiative, while the Northeast and Central regions’ attitudes toward PIE appear to 
range from “less hospitable” to “hostile,” largely, one suspects, due to union strength in 
those parts of the country. 
 But Roger Baysden of Iowa and the state’s union-sponsored apprenticeship 




 The purpose of this study was to determine why the enhanced prison industries 
(PIE) model has prospered for more than 10 years in South Carolina, when in other states 
it has struggled to survive—or even been abolished.  Legal, economic, and political 
issues have been reviewed, as well as the leadership style of the director of prison 
industries for the state, under whose tenure the PIE model has developed and flourished.  
 My objective was not to critique struggling PIE programs in other states, but to 
identify and describe hallmark characteristics of an “ideal” prison industries program. 
 We have learned that right-to-work, Republican-led states may be more 
hospitable to the PIE program, and that states with a strong union presence appear to be 
less receptive.  We have learned also, however, that there are exceptions—that strong 
unionized, free-bargaining states like Washington, Iowa and Minnesota have maintained 
successful PIE programs in the past.  Likewise, we have seen that some states during the 
decade examined (1996 – 2005) alternately changed from Republican to Democratic 
majorities, or vice versa.  Ultimately, however, it seems clear that states with a strong 
union presence, generally speaking, are somewhat hostile to the PIE program. 
 We can study NCIA annual directories and statistics, and learn that, in fact, there 
are very few flourishing PIE models in place anywhere—and that even the most  
successful of these programs—e.g., South Carolina, Texas and Kansas—have relatively 
small PIE programs when measured in percentages.  (In 2005, South Carolina reported 
that 6 percent of all inmates were PIE workers.)  Other states, with well-regarded PIE 
programs, exhibited smaller percentages (e.g., Iowa and Minnesota, both two percent in 
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2005).  These issues, and many others considered in this study, deserve further 
exploration in meaningful research. 
 South Carolina, however, remains a stand-out because of the vigor and variety of 
its prison industries overall.  If replication and expansion of model programs is the name 
















Remember that 90 percent of them are going back [into the community].  If they 
can go out with money in their pocket and a good attitude . . . if they’ll go out and 
work and pay taxes—I am fulfilled.  I may not be rich, but I’ll be fulfilled—and 
when I walk out the door at the end of my career that will be my legacy. 
 
       Tony Ellis, Director 
       South Carolina Prison Industries 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
POLICY AND PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The justice system in this country is often fraught with challenges and 
frustration, and the rewards are few.  This study provided the writer with an 
opportunity to focus on what is best in corrections today, and how it can be 
replicated and expanded.  My findings suggest a range of policy and program 
recommendations.  The ones that follow are not meant to be exhaustive; rather, 
they are meant to be a beginning, a guide to be developed further by future prison 
industries researchers and advocates, particularly those interested in PIE. 
 
PIE Incentives and Marketing 
 In the course of my research, I found that some prison industries directors are 
frustrated because their PIE profits are often taken to be used for other state expenses 
unrelated to their correctional goals.  My recommendation is that PIE administrators 
should reap rewards for the work they do.  At a minimum, they should be guaranteed a 
percentage of their program profits to reinvest in further development and 
refinement of PIE programs and related initiatives.  Borins (2001) called attention to 
the need for the public sector to reward innovation and success; otherwise (as we have 
learned), prison industries directors may curtail their efforts at developing PIE initiatives 
out of sheer frustration and/or exhaustion. 
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The NCIA should meet with state PIE administrators and appropriate others 
to plan a course of action leading to possible legislation in this regard.  Development 
and promotion of model legislation (providing incentives) should be the goal. 
We have learned that the PIE initiative has been profitable, not only for individual 
DOCs but for the states, yet its implementation and growth are hampered by union 
resistance and poor marketing. 
 The PIE program has significant potential to contribute to the 21st century 
dilemma confronted by the American labor market: the export of jobs to Third World 
countries.  South Carolina’s Tony Ellis presents a model worth emulating: he imported 
jobs from overseas.  The Chinese manufacturing market has appeared to be vulnerable in 
recent years (2007 and 2008), presenting an opportunity to resourceful PIE directors—
who might benefit from a presentation sponsored by NCIA with Tony Ellis at the helm. 
Congress and state legislatures should ask states without a PIE program to explore 
the potential for implementing enhanced prison industries, and offer funding incentives 
for those that do.  However, this study has found that the PIE program and its successes 
are neither well known nor understood.  The writer urges the National Correctional 
Industries Association (NCIA) to sponsor a roundtable on how to more effectively 
disseminate the research findings and benefits of PIE to policymakers and 
appropriate others.  Some emphasis should be on marketing, and those with marketing 
expertise should be included at the roundtable for planning purposes.  The benefits of the 
program should be identified and publicized.  This would facilitate and enhance the 
receptiveness of state legislatures and correctional administrators to the PIE initiative.  As 
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things now stand, the PIE initiative and its benefits are unclear to policymakers and 
citizens alike.   
As a longtime member of the criminal justice system, I have observed that most 
members of the American Correctional Association (ACA), the Association of Paroling 
Authorities International (APAI), and the American Probation and the Parole Association 
(APPA) are unfamiliar with PIE.  I recommend that the NCIA and its members 
request opportunities to present at their conferences.  Common concerns should be 
explored and identified, as well as methods of enhancing communication and improving 
coordination among relevant agencies.  Relevant PIE research findings should be 
disseminated at professional meetings, and attendees invited to provide input.  
Enhanced prison industries “best practices” should be investigated, described, and 
disseminated.  States like South Carolina, Kansas, Texas, and Iowa provide fertile soil for 
evaluation. 
I recommend that national PIE data collection be modified (to fulfill the 
needs of other correctional groups whose support and involvement is sought), 
expanded, and disseminated to a wider audience, including the media (to engender 
public support). 
 
Reentry and Transition to the Community for PIE Participants 
As Tony Ellis pointed out, the current emphasis on reentry in correctional circles 
presents an opportunity that is greatly under-utilized for PIE program administrators and 
those promoting the importance of reentry opportunities.  The PIE program is a “natural” 
ally of reentry proponents.  Appropriate representatives from the ACA, the APAI and 
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the APPA should be identified and invited to a roundtable of state PIE and NCIA 
representatives.  At least one pilot program should be established to facilitate ties 
between reentry and the PIE initiative, and research findings describing the pilot 
should be disseminated. 
I recommend that closer attention be paid to special transitional services for 
PIE inmates on release from prison in order to maximize recidivism reductions and 
increased post-prison employment; otherwise, the progress achieved via the PIE program 
may dissipate over time.  PIE company representatives should be involved, to facilitate 
entry of PIE participants to post-release jobs in the community.  In Iowa (an employer 
model state), employers are obligated to offer inmates work on release from prison.  The 
effectiveness of this requirement deserves evaluation.  Can it be replicated in other states?  
Can it be replicated with the customer or manpower PIE models? 
 
Union Resistance to PIE 
We have learned that union resistance to the PIE program is a frequent 
impediment to PIE implementation and growth.  I urge that Iowa’s apprenticeship 
training program be reviewed, and its development and implementation process 
replicated where feasible.  At least one pilot program should be funded and 
implemented to facilitate collaboration between a single state’s union leaders and 
enhanced prison industries.  Such a cooperative endeavor might explore a range of 
potential purposes and functions, e.g., from the mediation of inmate work grievances with 




Improving Communication and Coordination of Services 
 As we have learned from this study, a recurring problem has often been difficulty 
in the area of communication and coordination among PIE and prison staff (e.g., when 
PIE participants are transferred to another facility).  My recommendation is that the 
NCIA focus on this problem in one of its training tracks at a future conference.  
Emphasis should be on developing improved communication and coordination between 
current PIE programs and prison classification and vocational and educational staff.  
Clear lines of communication should be established, to facilitate identification and 
training of potential PIE inmate participants.  The development of a written 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) could minimize the problems caused when 
PIE participants are transferred.  Related issues include prison lockdowns or call-
outs. 
We have learned that where the PIE program is in place, inmates compete to get 
in.  This presents an opportunity to explore the concept of a kind of progression of 
“phases”, based on the possibility that those who work hard and do well in traditional 
industries jobs will be the first to be considered for promotion into the PIE program.  In 
state systems where service industries already function, they could be an intermediate 
step, following traditional industries, on a path toward eventual PIE participation.  In 
some states, e.g., South Carolina, an informal progression appears already to be in place, 
but the potential for formalizing phases should be explored.  I recommend that PIE 
administrators begin to collaborate with administrators of other (within-state) 
prison industries, to search for ways to coordinate program concepts.  Incentives 
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could be explored and developed to facilitate inmate interest in such phases.  The efficacy 
of tying together vocational training, pre-industrial training, on-the-job training, and post-
release planning should be reviewed and considered. 
 
Active vs. Passive Management of Earnings 
 This study confirms that PIE participants are learning the work ethic, and the 
benefits associated with hard work.  They are not learning, however, basic skills that 
most of us take for granted.  In particular, instead of being actively engaged in managing 
and paying their “bills,” they are “passive payers”, meaning that funds are deducted from 
their earnings.  For this reason, they are unfamiliar with fundamental bookkeeping skills.  
The current process appears to fall short of the mark.  A method to more actively involve 
inmates in their tax, room and board, restitution and child support payments would 
provide needed experience that many inmates have never had.  In this sense, the inmate’s 
experience of managing his own income would be “habilitative” (as opposed to 
rehabilitative).  As a means of addressing these issues, I recommend that PIE inmates 
be trained to maintain ledgers of their income and outgo.  Even more desirable might 
be the establishment of a kind of inmate “banking” system wherein participants write out 
“requests for payment” of funds to be handled by designated prison staff.  While this 
additional burden may be unwelcome from the point of view of prison staff, it fits well 
with treatment principles and concepts of training and role modeling.  The writer agrees 
with Petersik and his colleagues that “the continued absence of PIE inmates from normal 
economic behaviors even in the presence of growing incomes may suggest a need for 
additional education and guidance for PIE inmates in the future.” 
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 Training and Technical Assistance 
During the course of my study, Tony Ellis was frequently contacted by other 
states (e.g., Georgia) seeking his advice and counsel as they explored implementation of 
the PIE program.  I recommend that the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) be 
contacted and asked to work with PIE advocates to plan and develop training for 
PIE planners and administrators.  Technical assistance is needed for new state PIE 
program executives and managers; for example, assistance and training should be made 
available to those whose mission it is to promote the PIE concept among state legislators.  
Specific implementation steps for developing a PIE program should be identified 
and disseminated via training for new PIE administrators and staff.  The NIC is a 
natural source of technical assistance and training.  (The writer is familiar firsthand with 
the training they have long provided for new parole commissioners.)  Given the political 
realities associated with corrections (e.g., a lack of continuity in leadership in DOC and 
prison industries directors), I urge that special training be offered to new corrections and 
prison industries directors.  If necessary, a special “training track” could be offered at 
NCIA’s annual conference.  (If the NIC can’t be enlisted to provide the kinds of training 
and technical assistance proposed above, the NCIA might explore and facilitate 
development of a Board composed of knowledgeable prison industries researchers, state 
PIE administrators, and at least one ex officio member of the NCIA and the Bureau of 




This study and recent research demonstrate a number of benefits associated with 
the PIE initiative.  Such benefits appear to include advantages to the state and taxpayers 
alike, including profits realized not only from PIE businesses, but the savings associated 
with reductions in recidivism and enhanced post-prison employment.   For these reasons, 
I advocate that future research be encouraged, funded, and disseminated.  (Specific 
components of prison employment associated with reductions in recidivism should be 
identified in such research.) The Office of Justice Programs (e.g., the National Institute of 
Justice and/or the Bureau of Justice Assistance) should issue requests for proposals 
(RFPs), as well as grants for students and researchers seeking to replicate and improve 
ongoing research. 
We have learned that service prison industries are functioning in a number of 
states, yet little is known about them.  I recommend that service industries be 
surveyed and studied in order to clarify the effects of diversification on correctional 
industries.  Ellis maintains that diversification is an important component of his 
programs’ success.  Economic downturns can harm PIE initiatives, he says; therefore, a 
diversified program may provide a useful “fallback” position.  Additionally, they may 
hold a key to unlock the gateway to PIE in those states where PIE has been rejected. 
We have learned that there are three PIE models.  I agree with Tony Ellis that the 
advantages, shortcomings, and challenges associated with each should be studied.  I 
recommend that the effectiveness and distinctions of the three PIE models 
(employer, customer and manpower) be explored, described, and documented.  The 
effects of the three PIE models on inmate wage deductions (victim programs, room and 
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board, family support, taxes and savings) should be studied.  At least one knowledgeable 
PIE administrator, Bob Carter of Texas, maintains that employer model programs collect 
more room and board than the other models; indeed, 2005 cumulative data compiled by 
NCIA demonstrated that Texas collected more room and board than any other state, 
followed by Kansas (second, also employer model) and  Minnesota (third, customer and 
manpower models). Washington37 (employer model) ranked fourth.  South Carolina 
(manpower and customer models) ranked fifth in room and board collections.38  While it 
might seem intuitive that Texas would rank near the top, it does not seem intuitive to find 
that Kansas, a far smaller state, ranked second.  These issues raise questions that merit 
study and evaluation. 
Because of the many variations in correctional systems and economic and 
political environments in which PIE programs must function—not to mention varying 
managerial styles of prison industries directors, differences in PIE models (e.g., 
employer, customer and manpower), and numerous differences in types of labor, 
individual state case studies are needed to demonstrate how such variations affect the 
development and growth of the PIE program.  Other factors include differences in levels 
of supervision of inmate participants, drug/alcohol and educational histories of inmate 
participants, etc. 
More than once, Ellis told me that he was convinced that the organizational 
structure of PIE programs should be studied in order to better understand the advantages 
or disadvantages of each.  I recommend that case study research be conducted to 
determine whether various state prison industry organizational structures (e.g., 
                                                 
37 The Washington  program was terminated in 2004; because the data presented were cumulative, the state 
maintained its high ranking even in 2005. 
38 By 2006, South Carolina ranked 4th in room and board collections. 
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intra-DOC vs. extra-DOC) affect the growth and development of the PIE program, 
and if so, how. 
The progress and performance of individual state PIE initiatives deserve special 
review.  Given that few governmental programs—particularly correctional programs—
are income-producing and profitable, the PIE program appears to have more potential 
than has been realized for providing relief to the state and taxpayers, while 
simultaneously benefiting inmates, their victims and their families.  PIE practitioners 
should be encouraged to emphasize the importance of using research findings 
constructively—for improving rather than criticizing PIE programming. 
While conducting this research, I found that alcohol and drug histories of inmates 
were not often included in criteria related to selection of PIE inmate participants.  I 
recommend the inclusion of drug and alcohol abuse histories of PIE participants in 
PIE selection criteria, and that effects (on post-release recidivism and employment) 
be subsequently studied.  The issue of whether a history of substance abuse has been 
successfully treated is hypothesized by the writer to be a predictor of post-prison 
employment success as well as reduced recidivism. 
The resistance to PIE that we have learned about suggests my 
recommendation that research be conducted to determine the full impact of the 
potential expansion of prison labor, especially the impact on the economy, of paying 
inmates minimum to prevailing wages.  My study revealed that economists (e.g., 
Petersik) have concluded that the effect on the nation’s economy would be minimal if 
most inmates were paid minimum to prevailing wages, and that in fact, an extraordinary 
pool of benefits might be realized by taxpayers and the state.  The full potential number 
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of PIE “beneficiaries” and benefits will remain unknown until additional research is 
conducted. 
The termination of the PIE program in Washington State deserves to be 
studied, and I urge that a case study be conducted to determine what kind of 
assistance (if any) was provided the state’s prison industries director.  Was it 
adequate?  What assistance is available for PIE administrators who need it?  At least one 
case study is recommended. 
 
UNICOR 
 During the course of this study, I found that UNICOR is the object of 
criticism and Congressional threats.  How can this agency be helped?  While it would 
seem desirable for UNICOR to be eligible for PIE certification, the agency’s many 
adversaries appear unlikely to be receptive to the possibility.  I recommend that an 
objective, thorough and bipartisan study of federal prison industries be conducted as 
soon as possible.   
 
Summary 
 While the PIE initiative has made great strides in the 29 years since its inception 
(in 1979), its full potential is far from realized.  It is the responsibility of national and 
state policymakers, corrections officials, PIE administrators and other stakeholders alike 
to support and foster the successes of the program, and to evaluate and resolve its 
shortcomings.  Proponents must be energetic in nourishing and promoting the program, to 




Economics of Inmate Labor 
 
 In 1999, a National Symposium on “The Economics of Inmate Labor Force 
Participation”39 was held at The George Washington University (GWU).  The symposium 
was led by five distinguished economists: 
• Ray Marshall, Professor Emeritus and Audre and Bernard Rapoport Centennial 
Chair in Economics and Public Affairs at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public 
Affairs of the University of Texas at Austin and former U.S. Secretary of Labor 
• Richard Freeman, Ascherman Chair of Economics at Harvard University, Faculty 
Co-chair at the Harvard University Trade Union Program, Program Director of 
the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Program in Labor Studies, Co-
director of the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of 
Economics and Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics. 
• Alan B. Krueger, Bendheim Professor of Economics and Public Affairs in the 
Economics Department and Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, 
former chief economist at the U.S. Department of Labor. 
• Jeffrey Kling, Assistant Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at the 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton 
University, and former assistant to the Chief Economist at the World Bank and 
special assistant to the Secretary of Labor. 
                                                 
39 This is a synthesis of highlights taken from the official transcript of the Symposium. 
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• Steven Levitt, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, research fellow of 
the American Bar Association and John Olin Research Fellow in Law and 
Economics at the Harvard School of Law. 
 
 After the presentations made by the above-listed economists, they were 
questioned by a group of panelists, or stakeholders, including: 
• Gus Faucher, U.S. Department of Treasury (representing taxpayers) 
• Linda Haithcox, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) (representing the NAACP and minorities) 
• Harry Holzer, U.S. Department of Labor (representing labor) 
• Wendell Primus, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (representing children 
and families) 
• Steve Schwalb, Federal Prison Industries (representing FPI) 
• Brenda Smith, American University (representing women) 
• Charles Sullivan, Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants (CURE) 
(representing inmates and inmate families) 
• Gregory Woodhead, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) (representing union members) 
  
 The panelists were chosen to represent and advocate for their constituencies; in 
this respect, they were considered to be stakeholders. 
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 The symposium, therefore, was a kind of summit of the experts in the area of 
prison labor and economics, a Who’s Who well-positioned to analyze what was going on 
as the new millennium waited just around the corner. 
 The symposium was the result of the efforts of Thomas Petersik, Ph.D., himself 
an expert in the economics of inmate labor.  Speakers were asked to offer opinions on 
1. whether inmates participating in the labor force would be good or bad for the U.S. 
economy; 
2. what would happen to civilian labor if inmates were to participate; 
3. recommendations for U.S. inmate labor force policies. 
 
The Executive Summary for the symposium found that there was a general consensus 
among the speakers in several areas: 
• Inmate labor force participation would be good for the U.S. economy by 
increasing the nation’s output of goods and services.  The resulting 
increase in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would be generally good 
for consumers, business, government and taxpayers, and especially good 
for victims, prisoners, and prisoners’ children and families.  But the 
economic good would be small because the percentage of inmate work in 
the overall workforce would be small and inmate production is likely to be 
somewhat less than average (compared to labor taken as a whole); thus, 
the GDP increase would also be small (substantially less than 1 percent of 
the GDP). 
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• The likely greatest social and economic good from inmate labor force 
participation would likely be reduced future crime and recidivism 
resulting from the improved legal income opportunities for ex-offenders. 
 
Certainty as to the magnitude of the good was viewed as unclear, however, and 
lower incomes that might result from lowering incomes for “low-wage civilians” might 
result in additional crime.  Thus, the risk of “net harmful effects” could not be 
discounted. 
• Inmate labor force participation would have little or no discernible effect 
on U.S. civilian labor overall, but could slightly reduce the wage rate and 
employment levels for low-wage civilian workers.  The possibility existed 
in the view of some that any losses to low-wage civilians could be offset 
somewhat, since inmates often come from lower social economic 
backgrounds. 
 
 The economists, while not wholly in agreement about a myriad of details, found 
some room for agreement on policy recommendations, which will be addressed later. 
 The symposium did not attempt to address criminal justice issues per se, but 
focused on the issue of whether inmate labor in the private sector or open market might 
be desirable or undesirable for the economy as a whole.  The “background” segment of 
the summit proceedings report reviewed inmate labor in the past, particularly with regard 
to inmate prohibition from open-market jobs.  Participants were reminded that in spite of 
the passage of the Percy Amendment which enabled the Prison Industries Enhancement 
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Certification Project (PIECP), less than 3,000 inmates were employed in open-market 
jobs in 1998 (not counting approximately 40,000 work release inmates on the verge of 
release from prison). 
 The design of the symposium focused on economic aspects of inmate labor: 
 In sum, the design differs from typical debate in that it treats inmate labor 
as a standard economic issue in the broad context of general economic efficiency 
and not as a criminal justice or correctional issue.  Therefore, economic 
consequences for Gross Domestic Product, employment, prices, and income are 
of greater importance to this presentation than traditional features such as prison 
order, rehabilitation, and compensation.  By extension, the design emphasizes 
broader classes of economic winners and losers not traditionally identified or 
considered in inmate labor debate (Chapter 1 Background, p. 4). 
  
 Although not originally intended, the symposium led—perhaps inevitably—to 
discussions of recidivism or crime increases as a result of changes in economic costs 
and/or benefits. 
 Each speaker was asked to apply his economic specialty in addressing four 
questions: 
1. Are bans on prison inmate labor force participation “good” or “bad” for the U.S. 
economy?  (“Good” or “bad” was ultimately construed to be related to output of 
material goods and services as measured by the GDP.) 
2. Will expanded inmate participation in the economy create, destroy, or have no 
effect on civilian employment in the U.S.?  (Explain.) 
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3. What steps are essential to improving the economic contribution of the inmate 
labor force? 
4. If you can identify criminal justice or correctional effects distinguishable from 
economic aspects, explain them, and their effects on net social benefits or costs 
(Chapter 1 Background, pp. 5-6). 
 
 Marshall (former U.S. Secretary of Labor in the Carter Administration) began by 
saying that “overall effects” of inmate labor force participation (ILFP) would likely be 
small and less important than the effects on “particularly affected groups,” such as 
inmates, their families and victims; workers, unions and companies in industries heavily 
impacted by the ILFP; the criminal justice system; and the general public.  Marshall 
noted that inmate labor would have a very limited impact on the GDP because prison 
industry output ($1.6 billion in 1997) was only a fraction of the total GDP of more than 
$8 trillion.  He also pointed out that the total prison labor force of 611,000 was quite 
small compared to the civilian labor force of 136 million.   [Of the total labor force of 
611,000, most (nearly 500,000) were employed as support workers at their institutions, 
while 75,000 were employed in the production of goods and services primarily for 
governmental agencies—and only 2,429 were employed by the private sector in the 
production of goods and services for the open market (Miller et al., 1998).] 
 As a labor economist concerned primarily with public policy, Marshall said, his 
interest was in outlining measures to increase public welfare.  He also said that he did not 
think that purely economic analyses could or should be divorced from considerations like 
crime and recidivism, since both were serious economic, criminal justice and human 
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development issues.  He pointed out that the criminal justice system of the time was 
viewed as inefficient, and did little to rehabilitate offenders or reduce crime.  He called 
attention to the fact that the American criminal justice system was very different from 
those of other countries.  He called for transformation of the American criminal justice 
system: 
We therefore should attempt to develop policies that will help transform the 
criminal justice system and make it more effectively deter crime, rehabilitate and 
punish criminals, and reintegrate ex-offenders into society.  Such policies would 
greatly reduce the enormous and growing human and economic costs of crime 
and incarceration. 
  
 Marshall noted the trend of recent years on state and federal prison inmates.  
Between the years of 1990 and 1997, he said, the federal prison population increased 
from 66,000 to 113,000, while the number of state inmates increased from 708,000 to 
1,132,000 during the same period.  In 1988, one third of federal inmates were employed, 
but eight years later (1996), only 18 percent were employed.   
 Marshall reported that the industrial pay scale for federal inmates ranged from 
$0.23 to $1.15 per hour.   (A 1993 report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources found that prison workers in non-industrial activities in 1991 earned 
between $0.12 and $0.40 per hour,  and that most (55 percent) earned $0.12 while 5 
percent earned $0.40.) 
 Having cited the meager wages given to inmates, Marshall noted that ILFP critics 
were concerned about both the potential for inmate exploitation, and the likelihood that 
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low-paid inmate workers would “undercut free labor wages.”  He called attention to the 
fact that the prohibitions on inmate employment coincided with the growth of unions in 
the 19th century and during the 1930s.  Prior to the imposition of restrictions on inmate 
employment, he said, it was common for prisoners to be used to break strikes, a fact not 
overlooked by union leaders today. 
 Marshall cited Garvey (1998) as a prison labor expert who believed that PIE’s 
failure to spread throughout the nation’s state prisons was the result of its prevailing wage 
requirement and the related inability of the private sector to compensate for the cost of 
doing business in a prison setting.  (Garvey’s solution was for the state to offer subsidies 
to offset such costs—which indeed is often the case in existing PIE programs.) 
 
Oppostion to PIE and FPI 
 Both PIE and FPI proponents are convinced that their programs have restrictions 
or regulations to minimize the likelihood of unfair competition with private sector 
business.  But FPI opponents maintain that UNICOR regularly infringes on federal wage 
and business protection regulations.  And business advocates maintain that FPI’s 
mandatory sourcing requirements give UNICOR an inequitable business edge, resulting 
in unfair competition (Marshall, 1999). 
 Although the AFL-CIO has frequently criticized inmate working conditions, and 
objected to the threat posed by ILFP to free workers, the South Central AFL-CIO has 
developed an apprenticeship partnership with the Iowa Department of Correction PIE 
program (Marshall, 1999).  The national AFL-CIO endorsed the program, while 
maintaining that most correctional training does not do an adequate job of preparing 
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inmates for skilled labor—largely the result of placing the emphasis on work rather than 
training.  In Iowa, however, the union assumes responsibility for the placement of 
successful inmate graduates.  Indeed, the president of the South Central AFL-CIO was 
quoted as saying, “It’s our duty and our job to represent [inmate prison apprentices] in the 
job market” (Rostad, 1996; Marshall 1999). 
 Iowa is exceptional in its ties with the AFL-CIO, although most PIE programs 
have managed development of a rapport with state chapters.  Without the concurrence of 
local unions, the PIE programs could not have been implemented. 
 More representative of the AFL-CIO’s attitude is a 1993 quote attributed to John 
Zalusky of the AFL-CIO’s economic research department in front of the U.S. Senate 
Labor and Human Resources Committee (Marshall, 1999).  It is wrong, he said, “for 
state-owned prisons to create or support businesses paying convicts substandard wages to 
take jobs from free labor who have committed no crime. . .”  However, “[t]he AFL-CIO 
supports the self-use concept of prison labor with effective business and labor input in the 
decision process to ensure minimal adverse impact on free labor.” 
 Marshall maintained that unions are more concerned about wages and conditions 
of inmate labor than about requirements that inmates must work—a concept that union 
leaders favor.  Nevertheless, most unions object to inmate-manufactured products being 
sold on the open market, as well as inmate labor that compete with civilian labor. 
 Similarly, according to Marshall, Chambers of Commerce generally oppose sales 
of prison-made goods on the open market, although a minority of businesses may support 
inmate labor because they profit from it in some way (e.g., through the sales of supplies 
or material used by prison workers). 
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 Marshall referred to UNICOR as being especially disliked and criticized for its 
perceived threat to fair competition which is believed to harm private businesses.  
Virulent critics accuse UNICOR of being a monopoly.  Among the most damaging 
accusations leveled at UNICOR are those of the Director of Government Relations for 
the Apparel Manufacturers Association, Michael Gale (quoted by Marshall): 
UNICOR steals jobs from . . . hardworking, law-abiding, tax-paying citizens. . . 
We estimate that over the years, 7,000 private sector apparel workers have lost 
their jobs because of UNICOR’s continued and unchecked expansion of apparel 
manufacturing . . . The [Defense Personnel Supply Command (DPSC)] estimates 
that it pays, on average, 15 percent more than the lowest private sector bid on 
almost 100 percent of what it buys from UNICOR. . . [I]n fiscal year 1995, 
UNICOR was delinquent in 46 percent of its contracts with DPSC.  In . . . 1996 
UNICOR was delinquent in 36 percent of its contracts.  For both years the private 
sector was delinquent in only 9 percent of its contracts. 
(Hearing, House Subcommittee on Crime, 1996) 
 
 Gale also maintained that a 1991 Deloitte and Touche study revealed that 
UNICOR was given poor quality ratings from customers, a complaint often leveled at 
state prison industries (but refuted by others, as we shall see).  [f.n.  Note: Former Bureau 
of Prisons Assistant Director and FPI Chief Operating Officer Steve Schwalb wrote a 
forceful repudiation of these kinds of criticisms in a 1996 letter to the author of a trade 
magazine article that was critical of FPI.] 
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 Advocates for inmates complain that the “get tough” policies of the 1980s led to 
increased pressure on prison administrators to offset rising costs of managing the increase 
in prison populations.  These pressures, they claim, resulted in a search for ways to 
reduce costs.  Among the solutions, it is alleged that wages received by inmates could be 
used to pay for room and board, victim restitution, court costs, and even medical care.  
Inmate advocates charge that while inmates are forced to work, their remuneration is 
limited by their net compensation (Marshall, 1999). 
 
Rationale for Inmate Paid Employment 
 Increasing opportunities for paid employment among inmates would benefit 
inmates and their families, as well as victims, prisons and the general public (Marshall, 
1999; Petersik, 2000).  However, the traditional model of prison work harms both 
inmates and their families—all locked into—as Marshall (1999) said—“self-perpetuating 
cycles of poverty and crime.”  Much has been written on this subject (Bloom and 
Steinhart, 1993; Butterfield, 1999). 
  The New York Times reported in 1999 that seven million children had a parent in 
prison or jail, or in parole or probation supervision.  Children whose parents are 
incarcerated are at substantially greater risk for delinquency (Bloom and Steinhart, 1993; 
Butterfield, 1999).  The New York Times report maintained that the link between 
delinquency and the incarceration of a parent or close relative was so strong that half of 
all juveniles in custody had a parent or close relative who had been incarcerated 
(Butterfield, 1999; Marshall, 1999). 
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 Marshall maintained that expanding paid employment among inmates would 
enable them to make restitution.  Increasing private sector work, he said, might improve 
the culture of corrections by minimizing tensions caused by idleness, instilling a work 
ethic, and helping to offset the costs of imprisonment.  He called attention to Vice 
President Gore’s National Performance Review, which recommended elimination of 
FPI’s mandatory sourcing.  (But FPI officials maintain that the elimination of mandatory 
sourcing would devastate federal prison industries, which could not otherwise attract 
private sector partners. Mandatory sourcing, they argue, also helps to offset the 
disadvantages associated with prison security and the inferior quality of prison labor.) 
 Marshall noted that FPI might be compensated for those disadvantages by 
deductions from inmate wages, as well as through public subsidies for education and 
training of inmates.  He maintained that it was “in the national interest to remove the 
financial barriers to education and training for all workers in and out of prison.”  Such 
“human capital subsidies” could ultimately prove to be investments in inmate 
rehabilitation as well as subsidies to prison industry.  (No mention was made of FPI’s 
Congressional exclusion from the PIE project.) 
 
Analyses of Prison Labor and Economics of Trade or Immigration 
 Marshall suggested that “the efficacy of procedures to balance compensation 
between inmates and free workers might be found in the U.S. experience with adverse 
effect wage rates (AEWR) for temporary foreign workers and prevailing wages for 
government contractors.”  The purpose of the AEWR was to restrict foreign worker 
employment from driving down domestic working conditions.  The purpose of prevailing 
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wage laws, he said, was to restrict the government from exercising its economic power to 
drive down labor standards. 
 Another conference panelist, Richard Freeman, examined the effect of prison 
labor on the nation’s economy from a slightly different perspective: the viewpoint of 
economics of trade or immigration.  Freeman (1999) noted that “In trade/immigration 
analysis an increase in imports due to freer trade or increased competence of foreign 
labor or of immigrants from overseas raises national out put and [his emphasis] lowers 
the earnings of competing domestic factors.  From the perspective of the free labor 
market, an increase in the work of prisoners is equivalent to an increase in 
imports/immigration from some foreign country.”  However, the general consensus of 
panelists and attendees ultimately seemed to suggest that the GDP would be affected only 
minimally by inmate production in the foreseeable future.  Economists Krueger and 
Kling pointed to 1998, when the total GDP was $8.5 trillion, saying that “the potential 
addition of inmate labor to GDP is only 0.2 percent of total U.S. GDP.”  (Miller, Shelton 
and Petersik made a similar observation in a 1998 preliminary report to the American Bar 
Association’s Subcommittee on Correctional Industries.) 
 While Krueger and Klinger expressed the view that “the economic contribution of 
inmate labor is likely to be a very small addition to GDP . . .,” they believed that the most 
important economic effect of inmate labor would flow from the potential reduction of 
recidivism.  The two economists—like several other panelists—cited the work of Saylor 
and Gaes (and that of others) as evidence that the economic advantages of reduced 
recidivism could be considerable: 
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For example, if just 5 percent of released prisoners were induced to commit no 
crimes after being released, compared to a situation in which they would commit 
an average level of crime (say, costing $35,000 in the first year after release and 
gradually declining to zero after 15 years), the net present value that could be 
saved over the 15 year period would be about $11,000 per released inmate.  
Moreover, if 5 percent of released prisoners avoided a two-year prison term after 
participating in inmate labor, the present value of future incarceration costs 
would be reduced by about $2,800 per released inmate. 
 
Krueger and Klinger based their estimates on the work of Saylor and Gaes (1997), 
Anderson (1995), and Levitt (1996).  However, they did add the caveat that the 
relationship (between inmate employment and reduced recidivism) might not necessarily 
be causal.  Perhaps, they suggested, “those who choose to participate in inmate labor 
would have had a lower propensity to engage in criminal activity even if they had not 
worked.”  They urged further study of the issue. 
 Levitt, too, was unsure of the implications of research findings that reductions in 
offender recidivism were associated with inmate employment programs.   He questioned 
whether inmates who worked were, in fact, matched appropriately with inmate non-
workers.  “In particular,” he said, “one worries that the workers were more motivated 
than the non-workers and that motivation is itself an important determinant of recidivism 
likelihood.”  Like others before him, he urged randomized assignment of inmates into 
work programs.  He cited the work of Maguire and her colleagues (1988) who examined 
a population of New York state prison inmates, controlling for factors like prior felony 
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arrest records, time served, military service and marital status—concluding that prison 
employment was no longer associated with reduced recidivism. 
 In his presentation, Levitt noted that the social costs of the crime perpetrated by 
released offenders was much larger than the typical inmate’s contribution to the GDP.  
He referred to the body of studies in the late 80s and 90s (DiIulio and Piehl, 1991; 
Spelman, 1994; Piehl and DiIulio, 1995; Levitt, 1996) that attempted to measure the costs 
of crime committed by offenders when not imprisoned, along with the costs to victims 
(Cohen, 1988; Miller, Cohen, and Rossman, 1993).  He estimated that the “marginal” 
criminal commits 1-2 violent crimes and approximately 10 property crimes per year.  He 
estimated the cost of their crimes to victims in terms of lost property, injury, 
psychological costs, lost years of life, and missed work) at “roughly $35,000 per criminal 
year.  Using the “average” offender instead of the “marginal” offender, he estimated 
more substantial costs to crime victims—roughly $80,000 per criminal year.  In short, 
Levitt maintained that “a policy that reduces recidivism can have a social benefit that far 
outweighs a prisoner’s narrow contribution to GDP.” 
 Levitt said that while it was unrealistic to think that all inmates could ever be 
employed full time, if they were, yearly prison industry output would be $35 billion 
annually—what he called “an extreme upper bound that is unlikely ever to be realized.”  
(He based his estimate on the 1998 work of Miller, Shelton and Petersik who calculated 
the current output per prisoner-hour of $14.56.)  Using this premise, Levitt said that even 
in the “extreme case where we went from a situation where no prisoners worked to one in 
which all prisoners worked, GDP would increase by about 0.4 percent.”  Compared to the 
18.3 percent growth of the economy between the years 1991 and 1997, he pointed out 
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that the potential economic impact of universal inmate employment would be relatively 
small.  This did not mean, he said, that the potential output that might be caused by 
inmate workers would be inconsequential.  If the output were allocated in equal portions 
to all Americans, it would amount to $125 per person yearly. 
 Levitt expressed views often parallel to those of Krueger and Klinger: “By any 
macroeconomic measure, prison labor is currently and will almost certainly remain a 
small (though not necessarily trivial) fraction of the economy even if restrictions on 
prison industries are abolished.”  But even if restrictions on inmate labor were lifted and 
every inmate in the country worked fulltime, he said, prison products and services would 
account for only 0.4 percent of the GDP. 
 But Levitt maintained that “output per prisoner hour worked” was approximately 
a third of that for the average American worker.  This, he said, was part of the reason for 
the fact that prison industries were unprofitable.  The PIE programs had not thrived, he 
said, for this reason, along with the lack of what he (and others) referred to repeatedly as 
a “level playing field.” Levitt stressed the need for a level playing field in prison 
industries in general.  This, he said, would be required if prison industries were to be 
economically efficient.  He pointed out that inmates were not subject to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) which requires minimum hourly wages, among other things.  
Because free market rules do not currently apply to prison labor, “allocation of such labor 
is likely to be governed primarily by political rather than economic considerations.  This 
observation is consistent with what the writer has observed—not only with regard to 
prison industries, but across the board.  It is no secret that crime and criminals are often 
used as political footballs in the political arena, where elections are sometimes won or 
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lost based on the dexterity of the candidates on the campaign trail, e.g., the afore-
mentioned 1988 presidential Bush-Dukakis presidential campaign which some say was 
determined by the untimely release of a hapless Massachusetts state prison inmate named 
Willie Horton. 
 (Regarding Levitt’s position, Barbara Auerbach wrote me that historically, BJA’s 
attorneys have adopted the position that, in fact, the PIE program was in compliance with 
the FLSA 
. . . based on the rationale that the PIE statute does require a level playing field.  
Thus the PIE guideline requires such things as time-and-a-half for overtime, etc.  
BJA based all of its Guideline requirements on this notion of the need for a level 
playing field, particularly in the wage and displacement area.  Of course, Levitt 
was not talking about PIE requirements, but I think it’s interesting because of 
course this level playing field mentality is the source of all the struggles between 
the PIE certificate holders and BJA.  As a Federal agency, presumably with a 
national point of view, BJA sees itself as needing to hold its PIE sites to these 
standards.  The sites, of course, tend to put less stock in this viewpoint.  Since 
inmates have no standing to sue under the PIE legislation, only competitor 
manufacturers can do so.  When they do, it seems it is always because they 
perceive a lack of level playing field.  Washington state, for example. 
 (Author’s note: a 2002 lawsuit was filed that resulted in termination of 
Washington’s PIE initiative). 
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 While acknowledging that PIE programs come closer than other prison industries 
to leveling the playing field, Levitt criticized the programs, maintaining that since prison 
labor is less productive than civilian labor, the field is tilted against prison industries.  
One remedy for this, he suggested, would be to pay prevailing wage per unit of output. 
 Levitt suggested the dismantling of regulations affecting prison industries.  This 
he said, would put all players on a level playing field, where the market would determine 
the outcome.  He proposed four elements essential to his level playing field scenario, 
maintaining that all elements were essential, and that if even one were omitted, the 
program would be unlikely to be “completely successful.” 
1. (P)rivatize prison industry.  As long as the government is in charge of prison 
industries, it will be difficult if not impossible to avoid decisions being made with 
political rather than economic justifications. . . . 
2. (E)very prison system that wants to have inmates employed in prison industries 
should put the rights to use those workers out to a competitive bid of prospective 
employers.  The prison would stipulate certain conditions . . . and the highest 
bidder would obtain the rights to access the prison labor. . . . Voluntary 
participation on the part of prisoners is especially important given the potential 
exploitation of prison labor that has sometimes occurred in the past. 
3. (E)xtend current civilian labor laws to cover prisoners. . . . Fair Labor Standards 
Act should apply, as should employer requirements concerning workers comp, 
contributions to Social Security, etc.  Levitt also called for unionization of 
inmates, although he did not consider it critical to his proposal.  It was also 
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reasonable, he said, for the government to “garnish” inmate wages to pay for 
maintenance, child support and victim compensation, etc. 
4. (E)liminate all preferences and restrictions with respect to prison-made goods.  
No one should be required to buy prison-made goods and no one should be 
prohibited from doing so if they want to. 
(Levitt’s first two recommendations would appear to the writer to be “slippery slopes” 
which would warrant cautious implementation and monitoring.) 
 
Levitt predicted that the most likely outcome of his proposal was “that very little prison 
labor (would) actually be utilized if competitive bids (were) required to be positive.”  In 
short, he did not expect prison industries to be profitable if they were forced to pay 
minimum wage. 
 The “clear losers” that Levitt foresaw with his plan would be UNICOR and state-
run prison industries.  “Clear winners,” he predicted, would be the businesses that 
formerly competed with prison industries, along with the government, prisoners and their 
dependents, taxpayers, and consumers.   While he predicted short term (5 years or less) 
effects on civilian workers, he anticipated that over time, labor markets would level off 
with only “little impact on civilian employment, but potentially some small permanent 
decline in wages of low-skilled civilians.” 
 
Benefits of Paying Inmates Minimum to Prevailing Wage 
 Marshall maintained that requiring prison industries to pay minimum and 
prevailing wages would force the industries to become more efficient rather than depress 
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labor standards.  And although many still insist that prison industries can never 
successfully compete in the free market by paying minimum or prevailing wages—even 
if inmate deductions were taken—the success of the PIE program in some states belies 
their argument (e.g., Iowa and South Carolina). 
 Marshall also suggested that prison industries not only observe the same labor 
standards as civilian labor, but that they be accorded the right to unionize.  In addition, he 
encouraged investigation of the possibility of applying anti-discrimination laws and 
policies to prison inmates.  He discussed discrimination concepts and how they might 
apply to prisoners.  He pointed out labor standards and policies related to merit and 
productivity—not gender, race, age, or comparable factors.  He cited the difficulties that 
offenders have finding post-release employment, and suggested development of a theory 
of discrimination for ex-offenders. 
 
Principles of Economic Discrimination 
 Marshall expressed little doubt that offenders are subjected to discrimination, 
including economic discrimination (ED), which impedes both rehabilitation and 
reintegration.  Basic principles of economic discrimination (ED), he suggested, are 
applicable: 
• ED is caused by a combination of status and economic advantage for the 
discriminators; status, because people discriminated against have identifiable 
characteristics which cause victims to be considered inferior by discriminators. 
• ED varies in intensity between different groups of victims. 
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• ED is difficult to identify and measure because it is part of a complex 
constellation of factors that cause victims to be disadvantaged. 
• It is important to distinguish institutionalized forms of discrimination from 
specific overt acts that can be proved in courts or administrative processes.  
Different policies are required to counteract institutional and overt ED. 
• Discrimination is an action while prejudice is an attitude, which may or may not 
lead to discrimination depending upon the power relationships between actors.  
Through cognitive dissonance in economic relationships, attitudes are more likely 
to flow from actions than actions are from attitudes. 
 
Unions for Inmates? 
Marshall elaborated on the benefits that could accrue if inmates were unionized.  
Unions could become agents for paid inmate workers, and thus facilitate the reduction of 
often trivial, time-consuming and expensive litigation.   By means of apprenticeship 
training and skills development, inmates would be better prepared for prison employment 
as well as post-release employment.  (He cited Iowa’s apprenticeship program for 
inmates as a “prototype” to be emulated.) 
Krueger and Klinger, too, suggested that inmates be accorded the right to form 
unions, and to be covered by all relevant labor legislation that applies to private sector 
business, fair labor standards, and workplace safety regulations.  Like Marshall, they 
believed that unions could advocate for inmate workers.  Additionally, they speculated 
that unions might be more effective in persuading inmates to participate in education or 
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training to increase their wages, “since inmates may (accurately) perceive that this advice 
is coming from a party that has their self-interest in mind.” 
The two economists suggested also that unions might provide “continuity” in 
managing relations with inmate employers, even with high rates of turnover—a common 
problem with inmate employees. 
Levitt—while he did not think unionization of inmates was “critical”—did believe 
that it would benefit organized labor. 
It should be noted that a Supreme Court case (Jones v. North Carolina) prohibiting 
inmates from organizing has often been cited as a reason unions cannot be established in 
prisons.  Prison administrators, as might be expected, vehemently oppose the concept.  
The apprenticeship program developed in Iowa, however, appears to have struck a 
workable balance. 
 
Other Elements of Successful Offender Reintegration  
 Other factors are essential to post-release reintegration, Marshall said.  “While 
employment is necessary for the successful reintegration of ex-offenders, it is not 
sufficient; other factors include counseling, education and training, drug treatment, and 
post-release support and placement services.” 
 Krueger and Klinger also noted that there are other important factors to consider 
when working to achieve reductions in offender recidivism and to improve reintegration, 
and that research into other strategies should be ongoing.  Some strategies, they pointed 
out, may complement inmate labor.  Ultimately, they emphasized the importance of 




 Following the economists’ presentations, questions and comments were offered 
by the (previously identified) stakeholders.  Steve Schwalb, chief operations officer for 
Federal Prison Industries (FPI), stated that he wished all present to know that the federal 
view of the presentations was one “of interest.”  Contrary to what some might think, he 
said, many federal authorities were intrigued by many of the possibilities, excluding 
unionization.  He said however that the “overriding” concern was that inmates not be 
idle, and that work be available for as many as possible.  He asked why some felt it 
essential that inmates be paid prevailing wage, especially if workers outside the country 
were paid low wages for imports brought into the country?  He liked the idea espoused by 
some that prison industries aim to acquire manufacturing or production of goods and 
services that had been moved out of the country.  This seemed to be the least-threatening 
concept suggested, and one that might appeal to the states as well.  However, a cautionary 
note was offered by one economist, Krueger, that since reintegration and post-release 
employment are major considerations, it would be counter-productive to train inmates in 
the manufacture of goods that could be produced only in prison. 
 Discussion ensued about whether inmate work should be voluntary or 
involuntary, and those present were reminded that involuntary labor-produced goods 
were contrary to international labor laws.  Since one goal is to encourage the work ethic 
among inmates, other discussion followed that focused on the need to provide incentives 
for work.  Levitt pointed out that while welfare mothers were not forced to work, their 
welfare was withdrawn if they didn’t.  Other discussion centered on the distinctions 
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between prison maintenance work (which pays very little) versus prison industries work 
with the private sector, which pays minimum to prevailing wage.  The question was 
raised as to what might motivate an inmate to work if most of his earnings were withheld 
for room and board, restitution, child support and taxes.  (This writer’s interviews with 
inmates found a sense of pride among inmate workers engaged in prison-based private 
sector employment.  In particular, several inmates expressed satisfaction at being able to 
provide Christmas, graduation or birthday gifts for their children.) 
 The point was also made that while the state and taxpayers might benefit from the 
payment of room and board, taxes, etc., additional benefits to accrue would be in the 
form of reduced recidivism and post-release employment (Freeman).  This point was 
made in response to a question raised by an advocate for children and families, Wendell 
Primus of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.  Primus argued that inmate work—
at least from a political viewpoint—should be compulsory. 
 Marshall agreed with the need to provide rewards to inmates who work.  
Economists, he said, have found that “you get what you reward.”  He noted that both the 
educational and prison systems are misguided in some ways, e.g., the nation’s 
educational system seems to reward average daily attendance more than learning, while 
the criminal justice system rewards—not rehabilitation and reintegration—but 
continuation of the existing system of re-incarceration. 
 
Position of the AFL-CIO on Unionization 
 Greg Woodhead, representing the Department of Public Policy at the AFL-CIO, 
was among the last to speak.  He began by saying that they try to develop public policy to 
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benefit American working families.  “We are the voice of working families and we are 
especially the voice of organized labor,” he said.  In addition, he stated that they try to 
balance the interests of federated union members in order to formulate policy that 
benefits their membership as well as inmates.  He called the issue of inmate labor force 
participation a “difficult” and “complex” problem, and called for more study of the 
known problems, and more longitudinal studies of the effects of employment and re-
employment, “not just on the effects of reducing recidivism.”  He referred specifically to 
an Ohio study that found that rates of recidivism dropped among black offenders but not 
white offenders.  (Note: A study of Ohio Prison Industries (OPI) found that blacks 
benefited more than whites from participation in prison industries [Funke, 1996].) 
 Woodhead stated that inmates should perhaps be encouraged to become 
entrepreneurs, because “that is where job creation is.”  He sounded a note of concern that 
some state prison industries needed to be scrutinized because they “may, in fact, be 
selling goods across state lines in direct violation of federal law and not be participating 
in an established PIE program. 
 Striking a more optimistic tone, he called for the need to look more carefully at 
the joint apprenticeship programs.  He praised the apprenticeship program in Iowa, noting 
that the debate that transpired prior to establishment of the programs took place in union 
halls.  He pointed out that the Iowa experience proved that “it can be done,” and called 
for expansion of similar programs. . . . “(T)hose union members came to accept these 
graduates of apprentice programs, which are very highly valued amongst union 
members.” 
 Striking a more negative note, he said: 
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 The AFL-CIO is, however, very concerned about the potential expansion 
of prison labor.  After all, we did lose 400,000 manufacturing jobs in the United 
States in the last year [1998] alone.  In that context, that economic context, being 
a manufacturing worker and being asked to compete with expanding prison 
industries is not a good prospect.  At the same time, we always have to be 
concerned with guard safety, because we know that prison work is good and 
prison work provides for guard safety. . . . 
 At the macro-level, yes, the size of prison industries is not overwhelming 
relative to the size of the GDP.  But at the micro-level, the dislocation can be 
devastating, especially if you can make a direct link, like a case in Wisconsin with 
fabric gloves  where a private factory closed and a company ramped up 
production inside the prison walls.  So free labor was directly impacted.  
[inaccurate per NCIA Executive Director Gwyn Smith-Ingley] . . . .  I am also 
concerned about just the notion of bidding out prisoners to private companies.  
That just has a connotation to it that is just disturbing if you follow through with 
the implications of that. 
 Prevailing wages can be paid to prisoners.  The PIE program shows that.  
Maybe we have to have some imputed wage to level the playing field somewhere 
between prevailing wage and minimum wage.  But we can’t just say that the 
minimum wage is enough . . . 
 
Subsequently, Petersik sought to clarify the issue of inmate participation in 
unions, whether the consensus was that inmates participate via “company unions” or 
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“unions of inmates”—or was the earlier discussion actually about inmate membership in 
unions that exist outside the prison?  Levitt’s response was that he was thinking about 
unions outside of prison, but that he was “open-minded.”  Marshall agreed that he, too, 
was thinking of external unions.  The “essential ingredient,” he said, if it were to be 
successful overall, was “that whatever you call the organization that represents the 
inmates, that it has to have some independent source of power, independent from the 
system . . . a voluntary system . . . Another part of the system that I would think would be 
beneficial to everybody involved is an alternative dispute settlement process that would 
avoid litigation, or at least minimize litigation.” 
 
Final Feedback from Symposium Attendees 
 Panelists and stakeholders formed smaller groups on the final afternoon of the 
symposium.  Groups were asked to identify positive and negative aspects of the 
presentations and discussion, as well as issues of concern.    Recommendations were also 
requested. 
 The “positives” were summarized as follows: 
• The fact that the economists saw inmate employment as desirable was viewed as 
encouraging. 
• The assessment of inmate employment as having a minor effect on the larger 
economy was also viewed favorably, and seemed to minimize any threat to 
society. 
• Attendees were encouraged by reports that inmate employment was associated 
with reductions in recidivism. 
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• The potential for inmates to contribute to child and family support was viewed 
favorably. 
• Attendees were encouraged by the emphasis on education and training. 
 
Perceived “negatives” were also summarized: 
• Participants were apprehensive that reports of reduced recidivism were perhaps 
“assumed rather than demonstrated.” 
• “Ignorance of prisons and of the specific components of work yielding success” 
contributed to a general lack of optimism about the benefits of inmate 
employment. 
• Attendees expressed concern about the lack of “specific implementation steps” 
leading to success. 
• Reintegration issues were also viewed as cause for concern, along with education 
and training. 
• Some were concerned that minority issues, including race and gender, needed 
more attention. 
• Some participants expressed concerns about whether it was realistic to think that 
inmates could be paid market wages. 
• Questions were raised about the need to know about experiences in other 
countries. 
 
Recommendations were made, focusing on the need for more research.  In 
particular, the consensus was that more research was needed on the issues of employment 
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and its impact on recidivism, as well as explanation of specific components associated 
with reduced recidivism. A recommendation called for more study of the effects of 
inmate employment and unemployment on families and children.  Another 
recommendation called for more study of the “social processes of adjustment” including 
the effects of education.  A key recommendation, too, was that “demonstration programs” 
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